

National Security Crisis Decision-Making: The Role of the Regional Combatant Commander

A Monograph

by

MAJ Sean C Williams

US Army



School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AY 06-07

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>		
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 03-05-2007		2. REPORT TYPE AMSP Monograph		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) July 2006 - May 2007	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE National Security Crisis Decision-Making: The Role of the Regional Combatant Commander			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJOR Sean C. Williams (U.S. Army)			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Advanced Military Studies Program 250 Gibbon Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College 1 Reynolds Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) CGSC		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT The successful management of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 set an unfortunate precedent for crisis management and national security crisis decision-making that persists into the contemporary security environment. The Cold War norm, roughly translated, meant that crisis management equaled crisis mitigation. The problem today is that the security environment has changed. Crisis management in the new environment should consider the use of crisis conditions to further the nation's security interests. The US has implemented formal changes to the structure of national security decision-making. Through the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA), the Congress sought to reorganize the defense establishment to provide for better military advice to civilian leaders and also to enable better operational execution during complex and fast-moving national security contingencies. The GNA expanded the authority of the regional combatant commanders (CCDR) and charged the CCDRs with the maintenance of security in their region. Finally, the informal roles and relationships between the civilian and uniformed leadership that change with new presidential administrations often influence the decision-making					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Crisis, Crisis Management, Goldwater Nichols Act, Combatant Commander, National Security Policy, Strategic Guidance, Crisis Action Planning, GEN Schwarzkopf, GEN Clark, GEN Franks					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 62	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, US Army
a. REPORT UNCLASS	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASS	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASS			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 913-758-3302

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

MAJ Sean C. Williams

Title of Monograph: National Security Crisis Decision-Making: The Role of the Regional Combatant Commander

Approved by:

William J. Gregor, Ph.D. Monograph Director

Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR Director,
School of Advanced
Military Studies

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. Director,
Graduate Degree
Programs

Abstract

National Security Crisis Decision-Making: The Role of the Regional Combatant Commander by MAJ Sean C. Williams, US Army, 56 pages.

The successful management of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 set an unfortunate precedent for crisis management and national security crisis decision-making that persists into the contemporary security environment. The Cold War norm, roughly translated, meant that crisis management equaled crisis mitigation. The problem today is that the security environment has changed. Crisis management in the new environment should consider the use of crisis conditions to further the nation's security interests. The US has implemented formal changes to the structure of national security decision-making. Through the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA), the Congress sought to reorganize the defense establishment to provide for better military advice to civilian leaders and also to enable better operational execution during complex and fast-moving national security contingencies. The GNA expanded the authority of the regional combatant commanders (CCDR) and charged the CCDRs with the maintenance of security in their region. Finally, the informal roles and relationships between the civilian and uniformed leadership that change with new presidential administrations often influence the decision-making process and policy formulation. Despite these changes, few scholars or policy makers have considered the role of the CCDR during complex contingencies.

To discern a new norm for crisis decision-making and civil-military interaction, the study considered all of these changes. An initial examination of the existing crisis and crisis management definitions made it possible to project the new requirements for the contemporary security environment. Subsequent analysis of the CCDR's formal role in the decision-making process and a critical review of three recent military interventions (Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, ALLIED FORCE, and ENDURING FREEDOM) enabled a comparison of actual crisis behavior with the predefined crisis management norms and the evolving role of the CCDR. The comparison revealed that capabilities were not used and policy matters were overlooked because the CCDR either did not engage effectively or his advice was not considered. Nevertheless, the regional commander remained responsible for long-term security achievement of US objectives in his geographical region. The final analysis revealed that the politicians acted as if there were no changes to the environment or the roles of the uniformed military and the CCDRs did not fully understand their new role as a participant in the policy formulation process. The combined failures of the national security leadership allowed conflict conditions to persist long after the crisis response.

The national security decision-making process ought to pay closer attention to the military advice of the regional CCDRs. Interagency planning and management efforts must include military advice in the decision-making process and/or policy formulation. CCDRs must be more aware of political considerations and willing to take part in the political discussion. Finally, the study suggested that formal changes in the decision-making process will not change the informal roles or relationships of the major players. The President makes decisions regarding national security according to his own personal preferences and management style. The working relationships among the President, SecDef, CJCS, and CCDR determine how much impact or influence a CCDR will have during crisis management.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Defining Crisis and Crisis Management.....	9
Formal Role of the CCDR during National Security Crises	17
Case Studies: 3 National Security Crises	25
GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf (1990): Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM	25
GEN Wesley Clark (1999): Operation ALLIED FORCE	32
GEN Tommy Franks(2001): Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.....	43
Conclusion.....	51
Appendix A (Acronyms)	54
Bibliography	55

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Chain of Command and Control..	18
Figure 2. Crisis Action Procedures.....	21
Figure 3. Duality of the US European Chain of Command.....	33

Introduction

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is perhaps the most prominent example of Cold War crisis management. President Kennedy used a select group of senior civilian authorities to successfully manage the US-USSR confrontation without the consultation or advice from “a military leadership assumed to be biased toward narrowly military approaches to international questions.”¹ The President’s handling of the situation suggested a norm for crisis management based upon the fear of escalation, strict control over military forces, and a preeminent concern for political over military matters.² Writing in the midst of the Cold War, Phil Williams discussed two extreme schools of thought about crisis management. The first held that success is defined wholly by the avoidance of war, while the second saw crisis management only as a means to advance national objectives at the expense of the adversary.³ The Cuban Missile Crisis is a clear example of the former school of thought. The two opposing perspectives are the elements of the crisis management policy dilemma that plagued national security leaders throughout the Cold War. These Cold War perspectives on crisis management are problematic in the contemporary environment.

The problem is crises in the contemporary environment no longer manifest the prospects of thermonuclear war and national destruction. The break up of the Soviet Union ended the era of superpower competition. Since then, academic and national security studies have offered analysis that points to the changing nature of the contemporary security environment. Although the studies still identify the traditional military threats posed by other nation-states, the analysis describes a growing threat defined by transnational security issues and non-state actors. In turn, this “new threat brings about the prospect of a crisis to which the response, if it is to be effective,

¹ Carnes Lord, "Crisis Management Primer: A Primer," IASPS Research Papers in Strategy No. 7 (August 1998), 4.

² Coral Bell, *The Conventions of Crisis : A Study in Diplomatic Management*, (London, New York: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1971), 3.

must be organized on a wider front, drawing on many, if not all, available institutions and forces.”⁴

The break up of the Soviet Union changed the security environment and suggests there should have been other changes to the crisis management paradigm. Within the United States, organizational changes in response to Cold War needs and subsequent post-Cold War military interventions have changed the structure of US national security decision-making. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) solidified the venue for the uniformed military leadership to communicate military advice into the national security apparatus.⁵ Primarily in response to two military disasters, the legislation also reformed military command structures, military organization, and its training and employment mechanisms. The 1980 failed rescue attempt of American hostages in Iran initially aroused congressional concern about serious problems within the Armed Forces regarding these issues. The second event, the 1983 bombings of the US Embassy and marine barracks in Beirut, confirmed to the Congress that remedial action from outside the DoD was needed to fix the deficiencies in military command, organization, training, and employment. Through the GNA, the Congress sought to reorganize the defense establishment to provide for better military advice to civilian leaders and also to enable better operational execution during complex and fast-moving national security challenges.⁶

³ Phil Williams, *Crisis Management : Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age*, (New York: Wiley, 1976), 27-31.

⁴ Andrzej Karkoszka, "Crisis Management: The Transformation of National and International Systems of Response," *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* IV, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 35.

⁵ The GNA provision described has also been reinforced by National Security Directive-1 (30 Jan 1989), Presidential Decision Directive-2 (20 Jan 1993), and National Security Presidential Directive-1 (13 Feb 01), all of which direct pertain to the organization of the National Security Council and direct the CJCS to attend all NSC meetings.

⁶ Richard M. Meinhart, *Chairmen Joint Chiefs of Staff's Leadership using the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s : Recommendations for Strategic Leaders*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003), 2-9.

The GNA provisions changed the role of the combatant commander (CCDR) and brought him into the political process of policy formulation.⁷ Charged with the maintenance of US security interests in his region, the CCDR must coordinate effective military and political action in the interest of long-term security. Many argue that the CCDRs today have a far greater, “often indispensable role” in foreign affairs, even to the extent that “they have effectively displaced American ambassadors and the State Department as the primary instruments of American foreign policy.”⁸ However the personalities of the military participants and the civilian leadership informally shape decisions. Understanding the informal nature of policy formulation is just as important as understanding the formal process.

The personal interaction among civilian leadership and the uniformed leaders of the Armed Forces—the President, SecDef, CJCS, and CCDR—largely determines the impact of the CCDR on the national security crisis decision-making process. The President may choose to involve the CCDR directly in the decision-making process or he may invoke the powers of the GNA to channel all communications through the CJCS. Also, the President and the NSC may be willing to accept unilateral advice from the CJCS without direct consultation with the CCDR. Similarly, the relationships of both the SecDef and the Chairman with the CCDR may impact the CCDR’s influence on the national crisis decision-making process—they both have the ability to

⁷ The GNA directed the following changes in the role of the unified CCDRs (list not all-inclusive): all forces from the individual military departments, unless directed otherwise by the SecDef, are to be assigned to unified or specified commands; all forces in the geographic AOR of a unified command are under the command of the CCDR; CCDRs must communicate requirements of their commands to the CJCS, who must in turn evaluate, integrate, assess and make recommendations to the SecDef with respect to the requirements of the combatant commands; CCDR is directly responsible to the President and the SecDef for the preparedness of the command to perform missions assigned to that command; organizing subordinate commands, assigning and employing forces within the command; CCDR must inform the SecDef if, at any time, the CCDR feels his authority, direction, or control with respect to any of the commands or forces assigned to the combatant command is insufficient to command effectively. See Congress, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, 22-27

⁸ Richard H. Kohn, "The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today," *Naval War College Review* 55, no. 3 (2002): 17, 22. ; See also the remarks of Dana Priest and Robert B. Oakley in the State Department Open Forum, 23 March 2001, and U.S. Secretary of State, “Civil Military Affairs and U.S. Diplomacy: The Changing Roles of the Regional Commanders-in-Chief,” cable message to all diplomatic and consular posts, 1 July 2001.

bolster or diminish the CCDR's recommendations. A second consideration is the amount of authority the President has delegated to the SecDef. A strong, influential SecDef may unduly influence the President's decisions beyond the mere consideration of advice from the uniformed military. A final consideration involves Presidential leadership. The uniformed military expects strong civilian leadership to provide them with critical guidance and decisions on strategic goals and policies while at the same time consulting them on purely military matters. Presidential disregard for this leadership role may impact the military's implementation of missions, directives, or other policies.⁹ The informal aspects of crisis decision-making often overshadow the formal structural changes to the process during contemporary contingencies.

An examination of recent historical crisis events reveals the CCDR's actual role in crisis decision-making. Several cases of military intervention that occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall appear to represent fairly the pattern of military response suggested by the new security conditions. Three cases in the period 1990-2002 stand out: Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, Operation ALLIED FORCE, and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. These particular cases are appropriate for several reasons. First, they are all relatively well documented in unclassified sources despite their recent execution. Second, they represent military interventions from three different presidential administrations during the period. Both major political parties are also represented. Next, none of these crisis situations evolved so rapidly to preclude the systemic national crisis decision-making process. The responses to each crisis were developed with the full availability of consultation with all appropriate civilian and uniformed leadership. Fourth, all three cases involved combat operations in the attempted resolution of the crisis, and at least some conflict conditions persisted long after

⁹ Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency : Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush*, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 15-16; Douglas C. Lovelace, *Unification of the United States Armed Forces : Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act*, (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996), 27.

the initial crisis response.¹⁰ The persistence of conflict conditions is especially important when one considers the CCDR's role in the implementation of US objectives in his region long after the crisis response. Additionally, none of these cases involved the prospect of escalation to thermonuclear war and the latter two cases involved non-traditional threats.¹¹ A final thought involves contemporary civil-military relationships. The impact of the first Gulf War and other crises has many leaders and academics considering how best to conduct policy-making in the midst of contemporary challenges and threats to national security. Moreover, the existing literature on crisis response is inadequate to develop a contemporary understanding of crisis management—it promotes a typical Cold War response; namely, immediate crisis mitigation. The experiences of the three CCDRs involved in these cases demonstrate that the CCDR does not have as much impact on policy formulation as he does on implementation. The cases reveal how the civil-military leaders were engaged in the crisis decision-making process and suggest where the CCDR might have acted differently, but the cases do not set a new norm.

Referencing the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Carnes Lord asserted in 1998 that the Cold War paradigm for crisis management had persisted into the contemporary age and that paradigm had left us with the underlying assumption that the “overriding strategic purpose [of crisis management] is to minimize risk rather than maximize gain.”¹² If Professor Lord is correct, national security decision-makers will miss unique opportunities to shape the security

¹⁰ Aspects of the military responses to each of the three cases persist as of the date of this study. Follow-on operations in Iraq included Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (1991), Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (1992), Operation NORTHERN WATCH (1997), Operation DESERT FOX (1998), and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (2003), still continuing today. Following Operation ALLIED FORCE, the bombing of Serbian forces in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, NATO established KFOR (Kosovo Force) to implement UNSCR 1244 that still operates in the region today. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan continues under the auspices of NATO command—International Security Assistance Force and is an important part of the current Global War on Terrorism.

¹¹ Though operations in Kosovo mainly focused on operations versus President Milosevic of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and the Serbian military forces, other considerations and potential hostile actors involved the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), essentially an armed insurgent group in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Operations in Afghanistan also initially targeted a governmental body that was ruling Afghanistan, the Taliban, but was more concerned with the non-traditional threat posed by international terrorism.

environment in times of crisis. In the contemporary security environment, crisis management ought to achieve more than simply a quick ending. Rather, crisis management should involve using the situation to further the nation's security interests or other objectives. This suggests a new norm for crisis management.

To discern a new norm for crisis decision-making and civil-military interaction it is necessary to first examine what has been the definition of crisis and crisis management and how those definitions must change to incorporate the requirements of the new security environment. Today, the concepts must recognize that national leaders may use crises as diplomatic occasions to further national interests while still preventing inadvertent, unwanted armed conflict. More importantly, a new crisis management paradigm must recognize the value of multiple perspectives (to include military advice from the appropriate CCDR) in formulating options for crisis response. The next step is to analyze the formal role of the CCDR in the policy-making process. Armed with that understanding, it is possible to examine post-Cold War civil-military interaction and to compare the actual role of the CCDR in military interventions with his formal responsibilities, planning requirements, and theater security strategy. The comparison reveals that capabilities were not used and policy matters were overlooked because the CCDR either did not engage effectively or his advice was not considered.

The formal responsibilities of the CCDR are defined in Title 10 United States Code and are amplified in joint military doctrine and DoD directives. Current military doctrine describes a top-driven national security policy process. DoD and Joint Publications and Directives portray the CCDR as the recipient of clearly defined national strategic guidance. According to the manuals, the CCDR must work with the civilian leadership to develop strategic guidance and to define a strategic end state. Despite the intent of joint military doctrine, its limits are inherent—it does not apply beyond the realm of the uniformed military. Since civilian political leaders are not

¹² Lord, 7.

bound by regulations to seek military advice, only legislation can bind civilian leaders to give weight to military advice.

Command relationships defined by the GNA are ambiguous. Although the GNA delineates a clear chain of command, it cannot clearly define the personal working relationships from the President to the CCDR. Much like the organization of the NSC, the relationships are subject to the preferences of the incumbent political appointees. The experiences of the CCDRs in the three selected cases illustrate variations in the working relationships between the civilian leadership and the uniformed military and the impact of these differences on strategy and policy formulation in response to complex contingencies. The relationships between the President, SecDef, CJCS and CCDR determined the impact and influence of the CCDR during these particular complex contingency situations. Though doctrine suggests a joint situational understanding and dialogue among civilian and uniformed leadership, real-world circumstances are subject to the management styles and working relationships among the four top members of the military hierarchy.

The individual experiences of GEN Schwarzkopf, GEN Clark, and GEN Franks demonstrate that the impact and influence of the CCDR depends upon the national security decision-making environment established by the President. During the First Gulf War, GEN Schwarzkopf performed his duties as a narrowly focused war fighting CCDR, leaving the interaction with domestic civilian leadership primarily to the CJCS, GEN Colin Powell. GEN Schwarzkopf's personal influence on national policy during crisis management was small. While GEN Powell was a dominant political-military mediator, he too was overshadowed by a President willing to make unilateral decisions. On the other hand, in 1999 GEN Clark understood and participated in the political arena, often opposing the views and opinions of Chairman Shelton and William Cohen, the Secretary of Defense. Despite GEN Clark's attempts to influence the crisis decision-making directly in the politically weakened administration, his efforts failed to produce his desired result—a decisive ground option for intervention in the Kosovo crisis.

Finally, the strong personality of SecDef Rumsfeld and the management style of President Bush diminished the importance of both the CJCS and CCDR in the wake of the 9/11 crisis. President George W. Bush was content to allow the SecDef to dominate the formulation of national security policy and military options for operations in Afghanistan.

Despite the differences between these cases, the results of the decision-making process were essentially the same: the CCDR had little impact on the policy decisions that shaped the initial crisis response. Nevertheless, the regional commander remained responsible for long-term achievement of US security objectives in his geographical region. The final analysis reveals that the politicians acted as if there were no changes to the environment or the roles of the uniformed military. Further, the CCDRs did not always fully understand what their new role could be as a participant in the policy formulation process. The combined failures of the national security leadership resulted in various degrees of crisis mis-management that allowed conflict conditions to persist long after the crisis response. The new norm of contemporary crisis management must synchronize civilian and uniformed military efforts through effective interagency planning and management efforts that consider long-term security implications. At a minimum, this must always include the consideration of military advice in the decision-making process, and when appropriate, it must also include that advice in the formulation of national security policy and policy implementation. Accomplishing this may involve such drastic measures as a standardization of the National Security Council system that makes it impervious to the personal proclivities of changing presidential administrations.¹³ The uniformed military must also recognize the need for reform in this area. The CCDRs must be more aware of political

¹³ Attempts at an integrated interagency process have already surfaced. In response to the rise of military interventions and stability operations in the 1990s, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 56 to improve interagency coordination during 'complex contingency operations.' President George W. Bush revised PDD-56 with his own National Security Presidential Directive-44. Though narrower in scope, this order essentially seeks improvement in the interagency process as well. See Presidential Decision Directive 56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, The White House: Washington, D.C., May 1997 and National Security Presidential Directive 44, *Management of Interagency*

considerations and be willing to take part in the political discussion. Finally, an early focus on determining the goals and objectives in the face of a given national security crisis may succeed in changing the impetus of crisis management from crisis mitigation to the achievement of national strategic goals and long-term security.

Although this study did not attempt a comprehensive review of crisis management literature or national security crises in the post-Cold War era, it nevertheless reveals some of the shortfalls of the crisis literature. The study also suggests that formal changes in the decision-making process will not change the informal roles or relationships of the major players. The President makes decisions regarding national security according to his own personal preferences and management style. The working relationships among the President, SecDef, CJCS, and CCDR determine how much impact or influence a CCDR will have during crisis management and it may be only through repeated experiences that future civilian leaders will learn how to exploit the advice of regional CCDRs.

Defining Crisis and Crisis Management

A cursory review of literature reveals numerous definitions of both crisis and crisis management. These definitions differ in scope, perspective, and relevance. If crises are “preoccupying events for the leadership of contemporary democracies,” then defining parameters and methods for coping with crises becomes a necessary task for those involved with national security.¹⁴ Part of the challenge for today’s leaders is a lack of relevant methods for dealing with crises in the contemporary environment.

The Greek derivation of the word ‘crisis’ means simply a “decision point, or the turning point of an illness...”¹⁵ Cold War authors defined crisis differently. They sought a definition relevant in the realm of international security. In his book *Command In Crisis*, Joseph Bouchard

Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, The White House: Washington, D.C., September 7, 2005.

¹⁴ Lord, "Crisis Management Primer," 3.

cited three definitions. First, Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing describe crisis as “a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war.”¹⁶ Oran Young specifies an ‘acute’ international crisis as “a process of interaction occurring at higher levels of perceived intensity than the ordinary flow of events and characterized by: a sharp break from the ordinary flow of politics; a rise in the perceived prospects that violence will break out; and significant implications for the stability of some system or subsystem in international politics.”¹⁷ Finally, Bouchard states that a crisis is “fundamentally a bargaining relationship” between the participants.¹⁸ The essential features here include the ‘danger’ of armed conflict and the competing interests of self-interested international players.

Various post-Cold War definitions of crisis offer slightly different perspectives. The 2005 Suomenlinna Seminar on crisis management offers two definitions. The first describes crisis rather narrowly, a “situation of very high tension between two states where use of military force is contemplated.”¹⁹ The second definition of crisis highlights the “fact that important values are at stake, that there is limited time and that there is considerable uncertainty.” It is interesting to note that Coral Bell recognized a similar narrowness in the use of the term crisis in 1971: “Crisis is a smaller, more manageable, more clearly defined, more *isolable* phenomenon than conflict...”²⁰ Finally, Brecher and Wilkenfeld define crisis as a perception by the highest level decision makers of “a threat to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military

¹⁵ Bell, 6.

¹⁶ Joseph F. Bouchard, *Command in Crisis : Four Case Studies*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 1.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁹ Tommi Koivula, Tuomas Tammilehto, *Crisis Management : A New Form of Nation-Building?* (Helsinki: National Defence College, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, 2005), 11. ; The Suomenlinna Seminar is an annual event arranged by the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Finnish National Defence College to bring together a multi-national group of specialists in security studies to discuss current pressing issues.

hostilities.”²¹ Carnes Lord notes that a crisis does not exclude events in actual war. That a crisis can occur in the midst of ongoing military hostilities highlights the “ineluctably *strategic* character of genuine crisis situations.”²² In other words, there is an inherent military aspect to the use of force as an element of diplomatic statecraft.

Given the focus of this particular research, it is appropriate to look to US military doctrine for another crisis definition. According to Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, a crisis is an “incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated in order to achieve national objectives.”²³ The DoD definition agrees with Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Lord in that it recognizes both the strategic nature of crises and the non-exclusivity of crisis and ongoing warfare, but omits Young’s observation that crises have implications for international political stability.

With regards to national security decision-making, the concepts of crisis and crisis management are interrelated and should be informed by the security environment. Therefore, it is useful to review crisis management concepts and analyze the contemporary security environment in comparison to the Cold War conditions before refining the definition of ‘crisis.’ In defining crisis management, Bouchard provides three examples. Snyder and Diesing say that crisis management is the “exercise of detailed control...in order to avoid war,” including efforts by national leaders “to advance or protect their state’s interests, to win or at least to maximize gains or minimize losses, and if possible to settle the issue in conflict so that it does not produce further

²⁰ Bell, 4.

²¹ Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 2-3.

²² Lord, “Crisis Management Primer,” 5.

crises.”²⁴ Similarly, Phil Williams calls for controlling a crisis in order to prevent it from getting out of hand and leading to war, while also seeking a satisfactory resolution “in which the vital interests of the state are secured and protected.”²⁵ Lastly, Bouchard posits that the “essence of crisis management” is the optimal balance between protecting one’s vital interests and the efforts to avoid war.²⁶ According to Cold War crisis management literature, the prevention of war or armed conflict was always the primary concern and the advancement of national interests was a secondary effort.

Near the end of the Cold War, crisis management theory began to evolve away from the cookie-cutter, ‘avoid war’ perspectives. James Richardson recognized a basic conceptual problem with the definition of crisis management. The definition did not recognize the diverse goals of nations other than the two nuclear superpowers. “Not all decision makers are committed to the goal of avoiding war.”²⁷ As supporting evidence, Richardson cites the extreme example of Hitler, but also appropriately references then-emerging third world characteristics:

...crises can be and are planned, engineered and steered by some states to achieve their national interests...crisis management does not necessarily mean the avoidance of the use of force...It follows that managing a crisis does not always mean deescalating it...The concept of ‘management’ refers to a way of handling or success in accomplishing one’s objectives.²⁸

In other words, crises may present unique opportunities to further the pursuit of one’s interests or objectives. Immediate crisis mitigation that seeks to end or avoid hostilities may conflict with a state’s intentions. In this sense, crisis management may mean the carefully executed escalation of force the point of armed conflict.

²³ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 132.

²⁴ Bouchard, 13.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 13.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ James L. Richardson, “Crisis Management: A Critical Appraisal,” in Gilbert R. Winham, *New Issues in International Crisis Management*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 16.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 16-17.

Richardson and I. William Zartman also recognized the short-sighted nature of Cold War crisis management was an additional limitation. The preoccupation with nuclear annihilation necessitated an overemphasis on limited objectives that one could achieve quickly without recourse to war.²⁹ New perspectives began to view crises and their management in a contextual sense.

The most misleading feature of current work on crisis and negotiations is the presentation of the phenomena as single, short-lived events rather than as moments in a longer evolving context. Crises can only be understood and handled well as part of a general process...the product of a course of events and not an isolated event of their own, and that crisis management involves a particular manipulation...in the course of their evolution.³⁰

More contemporary perspectives of crisis management recognize the changes in the security environment. NATO defines crisis management as “the coordinated actions taken to defuse crises, prevent their escalation into an armed conflict and contain hostilities if they should result.”³¹ Suggesting this was a limited viewpoint, the international Suomenlinna Seminar broadened the concept to encompass “all phases of crisis and conflict: prevention, acting in armed conflict and post-conflict stabilization... Crisis management *operations* might entail all levels of violence—from peaceful cooperation to high-intensity battle.” Surprisingly, but probably a result of the multi-national character of the Suomenlinna Seminar, this definition does not address the issue of national vital interests. Absent active measures or efforts to achieve or protect important national interests, crisis response at the national policy level is usually nothing more than mitigation or de-escalation.

Finally, current US military doctrine seemingly eschews the concept of crisis management in favor of a dynamic planning system—crisis action planning. Though JP 1-02 effectively defines crisis management—“measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of

²⁹ Ibid., 27.

³⁰ I. William Zartman, “Alternative Attempts at Crisis Management: Concepts and Processes,” in Gilbert R. Winham, *New Issues in International Crisis Management*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 199.

³¹ Koivula, 12-13.

resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or an act of terrorism”—the publication relegates crisis management as a matter of concern for law enforcement.³² Instead, crisis action planning involves the actual formulation of plans and orders for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces or resources in response to an “imminent crisis,” particularly one that may result in “actual military operations.”³³ The difference in terminology may be problematic for the national security system. Military advice or resources ought to be considered in all cases of national security, instead of disregarding military options outright in the early stages of crisis management. Characterizing crisis management as a law enforcement concern risks separating the military from responsibilities (and necessary capabilities) for national security interests that are not attainable through law enforcement measures alone. ‘Crisis action planning’ also implies that there will be an active response to the crisis, whereas actual crisis management may simply involve a passive monitoring of the situation without interference or intervention. A consistent push for an active response may diminish the relevance of military advice during national security crisis management.

Reviewing the definitions of ‘crisis’ and ‘crisis management’ reveals an evolution in perspectives about the two concepts. It is clear that the prospect of nuclear annihilation had a profound impact on the early theory and processes of crisis management.³⁴ But the threat of mutual destruction no longer exists. Alexander George summarizes the impact of the changing security environment: “In any case, past experience in crisis management and lessons derived from it will have to be adapted to the many important changes in the strategic-military context of US-Soviet relations and in the rest of the international system that have occurred since the Cuban

³² Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02*, 133.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Coral Bell notes that the academic study of crisis management dates only from the period when it “became a preoccupation of policy-makers,” mostly after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. However, he also notes that the longstanding concept of diplomacy served as the traditional means of controlling crises, though in a much broader context. See Bell, 4-6; Also see Winham, pp. 7-10 for a discussion about the nuclear balance of power and its impact on crisis management from 1950-1980 and beyond.

Missile Crisis...”³⁵ The changes are apparent in successive statements of the National Security Strategy.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) offers the President’s views on the nature of the evolving strategic security environment. Though largely a political document, the NSS provides a summary of security issues that a presidential administration *wants* to address while in office. The NSS serves as a guide for policy decisions and strategic objectives. As a basis for security policy, each NSS usually offers a succinct description of the major threats to national security³⁶ In response to the rise of the Soviet Union, NSC-68, US Objectives and Programs for National Security, in April 1950, clearly identified the Soviet Union as the source of “endemic” conflict threatening the “destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself.”³⁷ NSC-68 provided an enduring theme for policy-direction and National Security Strategies for subsequent administrations through the end of the Cold War: “The key military threats to US security during the 1980s will continue to be posed by the Soviet Union and its allies and clients.”³⁸

The focus of national security began to change immediately following the end of the Cold War. In the 1991 NSS, President George H.W. Bush defined the changing environment and its implications for US national security. “We have entered a new era... We face new challenges not only to our security, but to our ways of thinking about security.”³⁹ For the first time since the issuance of NSC-68, the principle security threat and guiding image of crisis management was not entirely about the Soviet Union. “As we seek to build a new world order in the aftermath of the Cold War, we will likely discover that the enemy we face is less an expansionist communism

³⁵ Alexander L. George and Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, *Avoiding War : Problems of Crisis Management*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 4.

³⁶ Per US Code Title 50, Chapter 15, Section 404a, the NSS must include a comprehensive description of the “worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.”

³⁷ National Security Council 68, *United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*, The White House: Washington, D.C., April 14, 1950.

³⁸ National Security Decision Directive 32, *US National Security Strategy*, The White House: Washington, D.C., May 20, 1982.

than it is instability itself.” Despite the recognition of a variety of emerging security threats, there still remained a preoccupation with the prevention of nuclear war. “Even in a new era, deterring nuclear attack remains the number one defense priority of the United States.”⁴⁰ This perspective changed with the next administration.

In the 1995 NSS, President Clinton clearly stated the fact that the threat of nuclear war was no longer the primary threat to US security. “The primary security imperative of the past half century—containing communist expansion while preventing nuclear war—is gone... Both the threat of a war among great powers and the specter of nuclear annihilation have receded dramatically.”⁴¹ President Clinton’s NSS and other documents since have pointed to the rising threat of transnational issues—terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international crime, illicit drug trade, economic disruption, disease, environmental issues, and population growth. This complex set of security challenges was neither all military nor immediate. As nearly every NSS states in some way, a proper response to these challenges requires an adaptation of security policies to the new threats and new methods for dealing with national security crises.⁴²

National Security Strategies provide evidence that US national policy-makers have recognized the changing nature of the security environment. Because a proposal for either a new definition of crisis or new principles of crisis management is beyond the scope of this research, it is necessary to choose from among existing definitions that which best fits the contemporary environment. JP 1-02 provides the most cogent definition when the role of the CCDR in the

³⁹ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, The White House: Washington D.C., George H.W. Bush, August 1991.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ U.S. President, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, The White House: Washington D.C., William J. Clinton, February 1995.

⁴² See U.S. President, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, The White House: Washington D.C., William J. Clinton, December 2000; U.S. President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, The White House: Washington D.C., George W. Bush, September 2002; U.S. President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, The White House: Washington D.C., George W. Bush, March 2006.

decision-making process is considered. The definition supports traditional notions regarding the use of force and limited time but also the contemporary notion that crisis is not exclusive of other conflict. Similarly, crisis management can be described as the coordinated efforts and decisions by national leaders to prevent inadvertent war while manipulating a national security situation to advance or protect their state's interests. This definition recognizes the traditional policy dilemma of crisis management—the tension between protecting one's national interests while preventing undesired escalation—but also recognizes the strategic nature of crisis management as a link between national objectives and the means to achieve or advance them. Under these definitions, crisis management is a necessary tool of diplomatic statecraft.”⁴³ Understanding the concepts and the contemporary nature of the security environment will help to discern a new norm of crisis decision-making and civil-military interaction. Now it is necessary to examine the CCDR's formal role as defined by legislation and military doctrine.

Formal Role of the CCDR during National Security Crises

The GNA significantly expanded the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the authority of the regional combatant commanders (CCDR). The Act made the CJCS the principal advisor to the President and diminished the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a collective body. Under the GNA, the Chairman possesses no executive authority. Instead, the chain of command runs directly from the President to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), to the CCDRs.⁴⁴

⁴³ Winham, 4.

⁴⁴ Congress, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 Conference Report* (To Accompany H. R. 3622) (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986), 23.




Figure 1. Chain of Command and Control. Adapted from Figure I-2 in *Joint Publication 0-2 (Unified Action Armed Forces)*, 10 July 2001, p. I-7.

As a result of the GNA provisions, “the theater commander does not operate isolated from political institutions, nor is he subordinate [to them]. Rather he is engaged in a collegial dialogue that seeks effective unified military and political action.”⁴⁵ Charged to maintain US security in his respective geographic theater, the CCDR may—and rightfully should—be an expert on the military conditions in his region and how those conditions affect US interests and objectives. He also has the resources to act in many crisis situations.

Despite the formal changes in the CCDR’s role, the CCDRs are not directly involved in Washington politics and decision-making. By law, the CJCS is the spokesman for the CCDRs and conveys their position to the President and the SecDef. The CJCS takes very seriously his duty to represent the views of the CCDR. However, when the CJCS’s advice differs from that of the CCDR, the President must judge whose military advice ought to receive the greatest weight. The authors of the GNA also intended to strengthen civilian authority over the armed forces and

⁴⁵ William Gregor, “Toward a Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs: Understanding the United States Military in the Post Cold War World,” Working Paper No. 6, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, August 1996, 31.

to provide for independent military advice to the civilian leaders. The statute directed the SecDef, assisted by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to provide guidance to the JCS on contingency planning.⁴⁶ The provisions of the GNA pertaining to the military are detailed in the joint military publications.

The Department of Defense's series of joint publications and directives set the procedures the CCDR will follow during national security crisis decision-making. Published as CJCS guidance for the armed forces, the joint doctrinal series outlines the policies, principles, and procedures for the uniformed military to fulfill its responsibility as an independent advisor to the civilian national security leaders.⁴⁷ The regional CCDRs lead unified commands and are direct subordinates of the President and the SecDef. By definition, the unified commands are composed of forces from two or more military departments.⁴⁸ The joint publications propagate a single set of guidelines for joint force commanders and staffs not found in the doctrine of the individual military departments.

The uniformed portion of DoD defines its crisis management responsibilities during national security crises in terms of crisis action planning (CAP). During dynamic conditions, "CAP procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis [and] the timely preparation of military courses of action (COAs) for consideration by the President or SecDef."⁴⁹ The specification of real-world conditions is an important distinction for military planners. Because of the size and complexity of many operations, the DoD conducts contingency planning in non-crisis situations to develop plans for a broad range of possible military activities or contingencies based upon a series of planning assumptions—essentially the planners best-guess of what conditions will exist at a given time in the future. "Contingency planning

⁴⁶ Congress, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, 7.

⁴⁷ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, 10 July 2001, i.

⁴⁸ *JP 1-02*, 557.

⁴⁹ *JP 5-0*, I-20.

facilitates the transition to CAP” by building comprehensive standing plans that offer an array of possible options to the CCDR during actual crisis situations in his region.⁵⁰

If contingency planning facilitates the transition to CAP, then contingency planning may provide the foundation for planning during a crisis.⁵¹ The opportunity for dialogue and exchange among the NCA, the CJCS and the CCDR is much greater during contingency planning because it occurs under non-crisis conditions. Moreover, contingency planning should reflect the consideration of long-term security effects of given actions in a region. According to the doctrine, contingency planning is a collaborative process that involves the President, SecDef, CJCS, CCDR and other members of the military planning community. The involvement of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy demonstrates the potential for the products of contingency planning to serve as a guide for future actions. This may prove the best opportunity for a CCDR to impact and influence the formulation of national security policy in the face of theoretical problems. National security leaders, using the full efforts of the NSC system, can examine the strengths and weaknesses of proposed courses of action in detail. If this planning accurately portrays the security environment and forecasts conditions that may lead to military operations, leaders may only need to review previously designed plans and policy decisions or make limited revisions before executing a particular course of action. National security crisis situations may approximate those planned during contingency planning, but it is likely that they will not be identical or even unanticipated. As a result, CAP is designed to address the actual conditions at the time planning occurs.

CAP is a six-phase planning model. The first three phases (Situation Development, Crisis Assessment, and Course of Action Development) are of most importance to this research

⁵⁰ Ibid., I-17.

⁵¹ The most recent publication of *JP 5-0*, the primary joint operations planning document, briefly discusses adaptive planning, an ongoing initiative to succeed the current planning processes. Adaptive planning is defined as “the joint capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as

because they describe the procedures and decisions leading to execution. National security leaders exchange information and ideas during these phases, leading to a course of action decision for execution. Within a given crisis, the CCDR or other designated lead agency executes a chosen course of action without further decisions by the President, SecDef, or CJCS. As a result, phases four to six (Course of Action Selection, Execution Planning, and Execution) are beyond the scope of this research.⁵²

PHASE I SITUATION DEVELOPMENT	PHASE II CRISIS ASSESSMENT	PHASE III COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT	PHASE IV COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION	PHASE V EXECUTION PLANNING	PHASE VI EXECUTION
EVENT					
EVENT OCCURS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS	CINC's REPORT/ ASSESSMENT RECEIVED	CJCS PUBLISHES WARNING ORDER	CINC PRESENTS REFINED AND PRIORITIZED COAs TO NCA	CINC RECEIVES ALERT ORDER OR PLANNING ORDER	NCA DECISION TO EXECUTE OPORD
ACTION					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CINC: MONITOR WORLD SITUATION CINC: IDENTIFY PROBLEM CINC: SUBMIT CINC's ASSESSMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CINC: INCREASE MONITORING CINC: INCREASE REPORTING JCS: ADVISE ON POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION JCS: NCA-JCS EVALUATION 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CINC: DEVELOP COAs CINC: EVALUATE COAs CINC: CREATE/MODIFY JOPES DATA BASE CINC: ASSIGN TASKS TO SUBORDINATES BY EVALUATION REQUEST MESSAGE USTRANSCOM: PREPARE DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATES JCS: REVIEW COMMANDER'S ESTIMATES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CJCS: GIVE MILITARY ADVICE TO NCA CJCS: MAY PUBLISH PLANNING ORDER TO BEGIN EXECUTION PLANNING BEFORE FORMAL SELECTION OF COA BY NCA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CINC: ADJUST JOPES DATABASE CINC: IDENTIFY MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS CINC: IDENTIFY AND ASSIGN TASKS TO UNITS CINC: PUBLISH OPORD OR CONVERT COA INTO OPORD & SUPPORTING OPORDs CINC: RESOLVE SHORTFALLS AND LIMITATIONS CINC: INTENSIFY SORTS REPORTING JCS: MONITOR OPORD DEVELOPMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CJCS: PUBLISH EXECUTE ORDER BY AUTHORITY & DIRECTION OF SecDef CINC: EXECUTE OPLAN OR OPORD CINC: MAINTAIN JOPES DATABASE JPEC: REPORT EXECUTION STATUS
OUTCOME					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CINC ASSESSMENT THAT MAY HAVE NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS REPORT EVENTS TO NCA/CJCS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NCA/CJCS DECIDE TO DEVELOP MILITARY COAs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CINC PUBLISHES COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE WITH RECOMMENDED COA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NCA SELECTS COA CJCS PUBLISHES SELECTED COA IN ALERT OR PLANNING ORDER 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CINC PUBLISHES OPLAN (FOR PLANNING ORDER) OR OPORD (FOR ALERT ORDER) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CRISIS RESOLVED

Figure 2. Crisis Action Procedures. Taken from CJCSM 3122.01A: Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume 1 (Planning Policies and Procedures), 14 July 2000 with Change 1, 25 May 2001, E-7.

Phase I, Situation Development, begins with the occurrence of some event that has potential implications for national security. Regardless of other venues that may report the event, the regional CCDR has the responsibility to report the situation through the military chain of

circumstances require” to meet emerging challenges of the twenty-first century. See JP 5-0, cover letter by General Peter Pace, CJCS.

⁵² CJCSM 3122.01A: Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), 14 July 2000 with Change 1, 25 May 2001, E-1 to E19.

command to the NCA. The most important aspect of this first phase is not necessarily the factual reporting, but the commander's initial assessment of the situation. The CCDR often has resources, contacts, and regional experience to understand the situation in the context of existing regional plans, policies, and objectives. Moreover, the CCDR may have to adjust existing orders or rules of engagement that would allow military forces to act in the absence of further orders. The commander's initial assessment of the situation and subsequent actions may have policy implications or determine the direction of a response even before national leaders have any opportunity for input.

The second phase of CAP, Crisis Assessment, refers to the assessment that national strategic leaders make of the reported situation. The primary input to this phase is the CCDR's initial assessment to the CJCS. The Chairman considers this and makes his own assessment from a national strategic perspective with a knowledge of available forces, resources, and worldwide commitments. He then formulates advice for the NCA with possible military options that the DoD can execute and passes the information to the NCA for evaluation. This phase is characterized by increased monitoring and reporting, regional evaluation, and initial assessments of force capabilities in the region. At the national level, the President, SecDef, CJCS and other NSC members (as appropriate or available) formulate politico-military assessments to determine initial "suitable and feasible national strategic objectives that reflect US national interests."⁵³ The CCDR's initial assessment may be the foundation for this initial strategic guidance. The NCA may direct the development of military COAs to advance the national interests or achieve one or more objectives as a result of phase two.

If the NCA directs the development of military COAs, the DoD begins phase three of the CAP. The CJCS issues a warning order to the CCDR. This order provides the CCDR with initial guidance from the NCA and CJCS and directs him to evaluate the situation and submit a

⁵³ JP 5-0, I-15.

commander's estimate with a recommended COA. At the same time, other supporting agencies begin planning intelligence support, logistics and transportation requirements, and other important activities as appropriate. The commander's estimate is the second formalized opportunity for the CCDR to influence the policy process in response to the crisis. The estimate contains the results of the CCDR's thorough evaluation and planning efforts, as well as recommended theater objectives and a military end state with termination criteria. It is at this point that the role of the CCDR becomes somewhat ambiguous.

The supported CCDR must work closely with the civilian leadership to ensure a clearly defined national strategic end state is established when possible. Often this end state is uncertain, difficult to determine with clarity, or an estimate based on assumptions and unpredictable conditions in the operational environment. In some situations, operations must begin before a clear understanding of the end state is determined...The President or SecDef, with the advice of the CJCS and the supported CCDR, should clearly describe the national strategic end state before committing the Armed Forces of the United States to an operation...A clearly defined military end state complements and supports attaining the specified termination criteria and objectives associated with other instruments of national power. The military end state helps affected CCDRs modify their theater strategic estimates and begin mission analysis even without a pre-existing OPLAN. The CCDR must work closely with the civilian leadership to ensure a clearly defined military end state is established. The CCDR also should anticipate that military capability likely would be required in some capacity in support of other instruments of national power, potentially before, during, and after any required large-scale combat. A clearly defined end state is just as necessary for situations across the range of military operations that might not require large-scale combat.⁵⁴

On one hand, the doctrine directs the supported CCDR to work with and advise the President to ensure a clearly defined national strategic end state "when possible," but on the other it suggests that the end state is a critical part of the process necessary for the commitment of the Armed Forces and integration with other elements of national power. Regardless of the interaction among the NCA, CJCS, and CCDR in developing national strategic objectives, national strategic end state, military strategic objectives or military end state, planners should integrate each of these elements into the planning process. These elements guide the development of appropriate

⁵⁴ Ibid., III-5 to III-8.

COAs for the crisis situation, and become a part of the commander's estimate. In the estimate, the CCDR communicates back to the CJCS and the NCA his preferred mission in response to the situation. The estimate provides information that addresses the required resources, timing, and how the CCDR will use military forces and other assets. More importantly, the estimate and recommended COA reflect the CCDR's consideration of long-term security concerns in his region. After all, he is the one individual charged with the responsibility to maintain the security interests of the US in his geographic area of responsibility.⁵⁵ The estimate is submitted not only to the CJCS and SecDef for review, but also to the remainder of the supporting commands and agencies for assessment. "The CJCS, in consultation with other members of the JCS and CCDRs, reviews and evaluates the supported commander's estimate and provides recommendations and advice to the President and SecDef for COA selection. The supported commander's COAs may be refined or revised, or new COAs may have to be developed to accommodate a changing situation."⁵⁶

Though joint military doctrine clearly highlights the role of the CCDR during crisis action planning, it is ambiguous about his impact at the national strategic level. The process affords the CCDR two formal opportunities to offer input to the national security apparatus, but the CJCS, in his role as the focal point for all military advice to the President and SecDef, has the real ability to endorse, change, or reject any or all of the CCDRs input. Finally, the doctrine portrays a top-driven process for the formulation of national strategic guidance. Though it advocates the advice of the CJCS and CCDR, the procedures clearly focus on the derivation of military objectives from national strategic objectives and end state that are formulated and passed down from the NCA to the CJCS and CCDR.

⁵⁵ The Unified Command Plan is a classified annual document that outlines the detailed missions and responsibilities assigned to the commanders of the unified combatant commands.

⁵⁶ *JP 5-0*, I-21.

The advice offered to the NCA by the CCDR and CJCS still represents only the military options available in response to the crisis situation. Though the CCDR must consider and coordinate the application of other elements of national power as part of his regional security strategy, he does not possess the expertise or functional knowledge of the various governmental departments, agencies, or other organizations that also have an interest or perspective on the situation. Nevertheless, debate exists over the influence of the military institution on policy formulation. Some argue that civil-military relations exist in which military officers want and expect appropriate civilian authorities to provide guidance and orders.⁵⁷ Kohn counters this view saying that the “American military has slipped from conceiving of its primary role of advice to civilians...to trying to impose its viewpoints on policies or decisions.”⁵⁸ Whatever the case, the situation and influence of the CCDR on the processes largely has to do with the personal proclivities of the principals involved in the security policy decision-making apparatus—that is, the President, the SecDef, and the CJCS. While theoretical studies provide a common foundation for the study, real-world situations best illustrate the interaction of these individuals in times of crisis.

Case Studies: 3 National Security Crises

GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf (1990): Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

For many senior military officers, command of the US Central Command in the early 1990s was not the most desirable four-star command position. Not only did the regional four-star command control the smallest force of any of the theater commands, it involved numerous political-military responsibilities that many officers found “distasteful.”⁵⁹ General H. Norman

⁵⁷ Herspring, 13.

⁵⁸ Kohn, 33.

⁵⁹ H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, *It Doesn't Take a Hero : General H. Norman Schwarzkopf : The Autobiography*, Bantam paperback ed. (New York: Bantam Books, 1993), 313-314.

Schwarzkopf saw things differently. While he loved commanding troops, he perceived the challenge and tumultuousness of the Middle East region as exciting and unpredictable. In the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-91, “Stormin’ Norman” found his place to make history.⁶⁰

USCENTCOM was a relatively new command. In 1983, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force transitioned from a subordinate task force in Readiness Command with a worldwide focus to the separate unified command with responsibility for Southwest Asia.⁶¹ From its inception, USCENTCOM’s main operational focus involved preventing a Soviet invasion from seizing the strategically important oil fields of Iran. By the time GEN Schwarzkopf took command in November of 1988, USCENTCOM had used Soviet-based plans to justify the stockpiling of millions of dollars of specialized supplies and equipment for what most generals knew “made no sense and would eventually be junked.”⁶² In July of 1989, Schwarzkopf reoriented his staff to focus on the principal threat to US interests in the USCENTCOM theater; he directed the staff to plan for operations against Iraq.⁶³ He met with bureaucratic resistance from the CJCS, Admiral William Crowe, but soon found support from the SecDef, Dick Cheney, and the leading Army force provider for USCENTCOM, GEN Colin Powell, who was still

⁶⁰ GEN Schwarzkopf had input into his selection as the Commander of USCENTCOM. Army Chief of Staff, GEN Carl Vuono presented Schwarzkopf with three potential assignment options. When prompted for his preference, Schwarzkopf responded emphatically, “Of the three assignments, Central Command is where you can make history.” See Schwarzkopf, 315.

⁶¹ The 10 October 1982 revision of the 1975 Unified Command Plan established the USCENTCOM effective 1 January 1983. USCENTCOM had responsibility for Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE, Yemen Arab Republic, People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Jordan, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. US Pacific Command retained responsibility for security assistance in Pakistan and Afghanistan until 1 October 1983. See Ronald H. Cole, *The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1999*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003), 66.

⁶² Schwarzkopf, 331.

⁶³ GEN Schwarzkopf testified that “the greatest threat US interests in the [USCENTCOM] area is the spillover of a regional conflict which could endanger American lives, threaten US interests in the area or interrupt the flow of oil, thereby requiring the commitment of US combat forces...The cease-fire with Iran has allowed Iraq to resume its bid for leadership and influence within the Arab World. Iraq ended the war with one of the largest and best-equipped military forces in the world.” See Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations, FY91*, 101st Cong., 6 March 1990, 139-146.

commanding the US Army Forces Command.⁶⁴ Even in the midst of heightened tensions with Iraq, other governmental agencies expressed unease that USCENTCOM was internally testing their new war plan against Iraq. Despite this, contingency planning for Iraq progressed, but it was far from complete when Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait.⁶⁵

Though USCENTCOM recognized the potential threat Iraq posed to the region, they did not believe the Iraqis would actually invade Kuwait or any of its other neighbors in the early 1990s. The military assessment of Iraq essentially mirrored that of the White House. Iraq had large, capable armed forces but, after fighting a long war with Iran, they were war-weary and would resort to diplomacy and subversion to leverage their power. GEN Schwarzkopf even supported a proposal for military training exchanges with Iraq in 1989.⁶⁶ By 4 August 1990, three full days after the Iraqis first invaded Kuwait, Schwarzkopf did not believe the crisis would lead to war: "...it seemed to me that the diplomatic community and the Arab nations would figure out a way to resolve the crisis peacefully."⁶⁷ Despite these misgivings, the USCENTCOM planners had been on alert since mid-July 1990 watching the Iraqi military mass forces along the

⁶⁴ Admiral Crowe, on the eve of his retirement in 1989, prepared advice for the national military strategy that made no provision for the Middle East. Under pressure to cut the DoD budget following the Cold War, he believed the DoD should reserve its resources for the continental US, NATO, and the Pacific theater. See Schwarzkopf pp. 331-335; Powell was not necessarily enthused. Even as ADM Crowe's successor (effective 1 Oct 89), he took relatively little interest in USCENTCOM, also due to budget cutbacks and a lack of military commitments in the region. Nevertheless, he "encouraged Schwarzkopf to overhaul the war plan with a focus on regional, non-Soviet threats to the oil supply. See Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War : The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 4802), 44.

⁶⁵ The exercise war game was titled Internal Look. The Department of State had particular concerns over practicing a war against Iraq. At the conclusion of the war game, USCENTCOM requested comments and revisions for the war plan by 14 September 1990. See Gordon and Trainor, 45. ; The planning at this time was directed in the Contingency Planning Guidance issued by the CJCS, GEN Colin Powell. USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-88 was a limited war plan option for the defense of oil reserves in the Arabian Peninsula. Planning of this type, now called contingency planning, was known at the time as deliberate planning. Contingency planning is used here to maintain continuity of terminology in this paper. The USCENTCOM deliberate planning at the time served the same purpose as contingency planning described earlier in this paper. GEN Schwarzkopf's revisions to the plan became the basis for USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90. See Dr. Eliot A. Cohen and Thomas A. Keaney, "Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume I: Planning & C2," an independent study commissioned by the US Air Force in 1993, p. 53.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 9-12.

⁶⁷ Schwarzkopf, 350.

border with Kuwait. USCENTCOM had even drafted a list of military options for the President to consider to deter Saddam Hussein. The options included speeding the deployment of an aircraft carrier to the North Arabian Sea, moving US Marine Maritime Prepositioning Ships (containing tanks, amphibious landing craft, and other equipment and supplies) or F-15 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, or B-52 bombers and munitions to the region. But neither the CJCS, GEN Colin Powell, or other civilian officials within the DoD “pressed the White House to support their recommendations.”⁶⁸ The only authorized military response to the growing Iraqi threats occurred on 24 July. In Operation IVORY JUSTICE, two US Air Force KC-135 refueling planes deployed to the UAE at their request. To the Bush administration, the planes were a modest way to demonstrate resolve against Iraq.⁶⁹

After the Iraqis invaded Kuwait on the first of August, the President convened a meeting of the NSC. GEN Powell brought GEN Schwarzkopf to the meeting to present available military options to the President. Schwarzkopf presented the options essentially outlined in Phase I (Deterrence) of OPLAN 1002-90 to demonstrate increased US resolve: Air Force fighter squadrons and Navy aircraft carriers.⁷⁰ Though USCENTCOM’s OPLAN involved a much larger force package for Phase I including special operations forces and marines, GEN Powell directed the USCENTCOM commander to limit his presentation. “Powell made it clear he didn’t want me to get into our contingency plan for sending troops...he surmised, ‘I think we’d go to war over Saudi Arabia, but I doubt we’d go to war over Kuwait.’”⁷¹ By this point, it seems as if the CCDR and GEN Powell were already contemplating different recommendations. While Schwarzkopf was leaning forward with deterrence and the defense of Saudi Arabia, the CJCS

⁶⁸ Gordon and Trainor, 17-18.

⁶⁹ Eliot A. Cohen and Thomas A. Keaney, “Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume IV, Part II: Chronology of the Gulf War,” 15; also see *Ibid.*, 18.

⁷⁰ Cohen and Keaney, “Volume I: Planning and C2,” 53-55.

⁷¹ Schwarzkopf, 344.

avored diplomacy. The President had an altogether different perspective: “Bush was tilting toward rollback, not containment.”⁷²

Critics call Powell’s aversion to committing forces in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait part of the so-called “Powell Doctrine.” The Powell Doctrine was the result of the Chairman’s experiences with the Panama crisis of 1989 and the US military experience from Vietnam. The lessons were clear to Powell: “Have a clear political objective and stick to it. Use all the force necessary, and do not apologize for going in big if that is what it takes. Decisive force ends wars quickly and in the long run saves lives.”⁷³ The day prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, GEN Powell ordered Schwarzkopf to the Pentagon. Both Powell and Secretary Cheney wanted GEN Schwarzkopf’s assessment of the situation and a briefing of the contingency plans that USCENTCOM was already working. Schwarzkopf predicted an Iraqi limited attack into Kuwait to seize the Rumaila oilfields. Powell urged a cautious military response, if any at all, arguing for the use of diplomacy before committing forces. “We can’t make a case for losing lives for Kuwait, but Saudi Arabia is different. I am opposed to dramatic action without the President having popular support.”⁷⁴ As a result, Powell offered only options for the defense of Saudi Arabia, but in subsequent NSC meetings with the President (2nd and 3rd of August), Powell sought the definition of the immediate strategic objectives: defend Saudi Arabia or liberate Kuwait? The answer to that question would determine the number of troops needed for the military mission, and would shape the available options for courses of action. Powell did not receive an answer at either meeting.⁷⁵

For his part, Secretary Cheney clearly recognized the need to differentiate between protecting Saudi Arabia and expelling Iraq from Kuwait. On 2 August, he urged the President

⁷² Gordon and Trainor, 37.

⁷³ Joseph E. Persico and Colin L. Powell, *My American Journey*, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1995), 434.

⁷⁴ Gordon and Trainor, 34.

⁷⁵ Persico and Powell, 462-465.

and the NSC to focus on defending the Saudis, but inside the Pentagon, he pushed for other options including toppling Saddam Hussein.⁷⁶ Though Powell and Cheney normally worked as a team, Powell's aversion to offering military options in lieu of diplomatic measures drew a sharp rebuke from the Secretary. Cheney believed the President wanted military options. The President confirmed Cheney's conviction on 3 August when he offered to the Saudis the US plans for helping the Saudis defend their country. No matter how unclear the objectives, the President wanted military options, despite Powell's misgivings. After Powell raised the question about objectives in the 3 August NSC meeting, Cheney clearly delineated Powell's boundaries: "Colin, you're Chairman of the Joint Chiefs...So stick to military matters."⁷⁷ Cheney even began to seek alternative military options by circumventing the CJCS and soliciting advice directly from the individual services.⁷⁸ The line between the military and the civilian leadership had been drawn. "The civilians were looking for a way to roll back the Iraqi gains while the military was urging caution."⁷⁹

From very early in the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990, President Bush knew how he wanted the US to respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Bush recalled after the war, "I had decided in my own mind in the first hours that the Iraqi aggression could not be tolerated."⁸⁰ On the other hand, he sent mixed signals to the public and the national security apparatus about his true intentions. When reporters questioned the President on the first day of the invasion if he intended to send troops to the region, he responded, "I am not contemplating any such action," and again on the following day, "We're not discussing intervention."⁸¹ To his advisors and the NSC, however, he supported the proposition that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was unacceptable and

⁷⁶ Alex Roberto Hybel, *Power Over Rationality : The Bush Administration and the Gulf Crisis*, (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 9777), 60. ; Gordon and Trainor, 33.

⁷⁷ Persico and Powell, 465-466.

⁷⁸ Herspring, 314-315.

⁷⁹ Gordon and Trainor, 31.

⁸⁰ Gordon and Trainor, 49. Also Persico and Powell, 463

something had to be done despite the difficulties involved.⁸² Such actions fit the management style of the President. Bush was pragmatic in his approach to decision-making; not only did he seek consensus, but he also was tolerant of dissent and different perspectives in the early stages of the decision-making process. While holding off the press and the American public, he bought himself time to make informed decisions. Bush also had a “marked sense of personal efficacy in the realm of foreign policy” and remained substantially active in the policymaking process. Despite his desire for informed input, the President’s actions in the first days of the crisis suggest that his set of principles, experience, and feelings of efficacy guided his decisions.⁸³ On Sunday, 5 August, with no earlier indications to his advisors, Bush made the public announcement, “I view very seriously our determination to reverse this aggression...This will not stand. This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.”⁸⁴ The President basically committed the US to a course of action. Referring to the President’s policy pronouncement, Powell later commented: “The thought process, however, was pure George Bush. He had listened quietly to his advisors. He had consulted by phone with world leaders. And then, taking his own counsel, he had come to this momentous decision and revealed it at the first opportunity.”⁸⁵

In the early days of the Persian Gulf Crisis, GEN Schwarzkopf had little impact or influence on the national security policymaking process, nor did any of the President’s advisors. From a military perspective, the decision-making process nearly followed the steps of crisis action planning. Prior to the escalating circumstances with Iraq, USCENTCOM’s contingency plans identified the Iraqi threat and integrated OPLAN 1002-90 with the national security objectives for the region. As the situation with Iraq deteriorated, GEN Schwarzkopf and the

⁸¹ Persico and Powell, 463. ; James P. Pfiffner, “Presidential Policy-Making and the Gulf War,” in Marcia Lynn Whicker, James P. Pfiffner, and Raymond A. Moore, *The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), 3.

⁸² Hybel, 61.

⁸³ Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, *Presidential Personality and Performance*, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), 235-237.

⁸⁴ Pfiffer, 4.

USCENTCOM planners made initial assessments of the situation and even offered a list of immediate options available to the President to demonstrate US resolve to defend its national interests. Powell and Schwarzkopf had even begun the commander's estimate process and presented possible courses of action to the President and the NSC. Essentially, Powell and Schwarzkopf had given the military assessment and a review of possible COAs, but no recommendation. Moreover, civilian decision-makers viewed Powell and Schwarzkopf's assessment and COAs as too cautious for the political situation. The president had already made a decision and, in the form of a public statement, provided the immediate military objective to them before they could offer a recommendation.⁸⁶ This is certainly not the case in all crisis situations. GEN Schwarzkopf's political reticence and George H.W. Bush's confidence to make difficult foreign policy decisions stand in stark contrast to the crisis situation in Kosovo in 1999. In 1999, the regional commander showed none of GEN Schwarzkopf's reticence, but President Clinton was not inclined to receive his commander's advice.

GEN Wesley Clark (1999): Operation ALLIED FORCE

By 1999, the United States European Command had been in existence for nearly 50 years and was historically the most important theater.⁸⁷ The USEUCOM commander has always served as a diplomat because of his dual role as the supreme allied commander of NATO's military forces (SACEUR). "Simultaneously, the same person is responsible to the US Secretary

⁸⁵ Persico and Powell, 467.

⁸⁶ Despite the President's public announcement, GEN Schwarzkopf continued his plan to defend Saudi Arabia. The disregard for the CCDRs input was even more apparent on 23 August in a telephone conversation between GENs Powell and Schwarzkopf: "I'm following orders to put a defensive force in place, and all of a sudden you guys in Washington are asking me to prepare an offensive using a defensive force." See Herspring, 318.

⁸⁷ USEUCOM became a full-fledged unified command on 1 Aug 1952. It is one of only three geographically-oriented unified commands established under the first Unified Command Plan of 1946 that still exists today. The other two are US Pacific Command and US Southern Command (originally designated Caribbean Command). The position of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe was created in 1951. See Cole 11-15, 117-118.

of Defense and the heads of state of all NATO countries.”⁸⁸ While the GNA designated the US chain of command from the CCDR to the SecDef and President, in his NATO role, the SACEUR can speak directly to the US Secretary of State or the President of the US through the North Atlantic Council (NAC).




Figure 3. Duality of the US European Chain of Command. Taken from Derek S. Reveron, *America's Viceroy: The Military and US Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, 107.

As the NATO commander, the SACEUR must build and maintain consensus among the Alliance in order to accomplish NATO objectives and shape its defense policies. US and European leaders originally charged the European Command with preventing and defeating a Soviet invasion of Europe, but as the Cold War ended the command was reconfigured. As the four-star American and NATO commander, the USEUCOM commander has three main missions: “to support and advance US interests and policies throughout the area of responsibility, to provide combat-ready land, maritime, and air forces to Allied Command Europe, and to conduct missions unilaterally or in concert with coalition partners.”⁸⁹ The main US interest in the European theater is stability. Serbian President Slobodon Milosevic threatened Balkan and European stability throughout the 1990’s in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). While Milosevic’s actions prompted NATO military strikes in 1995, a humanitarian crisis in the

⁸⁸ Derek S. Reveron, *America's Viceroy: The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 106.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 95-97.

form of genocide against the Kosovar Albanians and subsequent massive refugee flows prompted a US and NATO military intervention in March 1999 in the Serbian province of Kosovo.⁹⁰

“Wesley Clark was a free-thinking general...[who] was not afraid to come to his own conclusions.”⁹¹ West Point valedictorian, Rhodes Scholar, White House Fellow, and Army officer on the fast-track, GEN Clark stated in his autobiographical work, *Waging Modern War*: “The way I saw it, I knew soldiering, joint operations, and national strategy, and also a little about diplomacy, NATO, Europe, and the US government, and politics.”⁹² In fact, GEN Clark had much exposure to Washington’s senior military and civilian leaders, the NSC and crisis management, as well as strategy and policymaking. As a lieutenant colonel on the Army Staff in the Pentagon, Clark helped Brigadier General Colin Powell draft a transition plan for the new Army Chief of Staff that emphasized the use of overwhelming force and the elimination of gradualism in military operations.⁹³ In April 1994, he assumed duties as the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J5, on the Joint Staff and soon after faced the political-military considerations surrounding crises in Kigali and Rwanda, Africa. As J5 he was involved in policy discussions and negotiations on the continuing problems in Bosnia and North Korea, and writing the National Military Strategy. Successes and failures in these endeavors taught Clark to take care “in getting the right military advice into the policy process early in the development of solutions.”⁹⁴ Clark’s actions also earned him a questionable reputation among senior military and civilian leaders in the DoD. The Pentagon were concerned that Clark was “selling out” to the White House, Congress and other executive agencies. After dealing closely with Ambassador Holbrooke during the Bosnia negotiations and having become a recognized face around Congress

⁹⁰ Ibid., 98.

⁹¹ "Analysis: General Wesley Clark's Kosovo Experience," *All Things Considered* (May 25 2001): 1.

⁹² Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War : Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 20.

⁹³ Ibid., 7.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 31-38.

and the White House, SecDef William Cohen and GEN Shelton, CJCS, warned Clark that his actions were perceived as promoting inappropriate relationships outside the DoD. Nevertheless, against the recommendations of senior Army leaders, Secretary Cohen and President Clinton appointed GEN Clark to command USEUCOM and the NATO military forces in 1997.⁹⁵

Problems in the Balkans had caught the attention of President Bush in early 1992.⁹⁶ United Nations operations, NATO strikes in Bosnia, and other diplomatic responses postponed significant trouble in that Serbian province until the crisis in 1999 prompted the US and NATO into definitive military action.⁹⁷ Crisis planning that culminated in Operation ALLIED FORCE over Kosovo began in March 1998 when, during a counterinsurgency campaign against the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), FRY security forces began attacking the civilian population in Kosovo.⁹⁸ Almost immediately, the Pentagon leadership demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm for any further involvement in the Balkans: “Look, Wes, we’ve got a lot on our plates back

⁹⁵ William Cohen became the Secretary of Defense in January 1997. Herspring states that Ambassador Holbrooke, NSC advisor Sandy Berger, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and possibly Secretary of State Madeleine Albright lobbied the CJCS, GEN Shalikashvili, and Cohen on Clark’s behalf. Much of the senior Army leadership believed Clark was ‘too political.’ GEN Hugh Shelton became succeeded Shalikashvili as CJCS on 1 Oct 97. See Herspring, 360-362.

⁹⁶ On the eve of his leaving office, President George H.W. Bush issued the so-called Christmas warning to President Milosevic in December 1992: “in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.” See Clark, 108.

⁹⁷ NATO and US forces conducted Operation DELIBERATE FORCE from 30 August to 20 September 1995 to undermine the military capability of the Bosnian-Serb Army that threatened and attacked UN-designated safe zones in Bosnia. See NATO’s Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) Operation DELIBERATE FORCE Fact Sheet available at <http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/DeliberateForceFactSheet.htm>. The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission began in March 1992 to create conditions of peace and security for a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR was terminated in December of 1995 when the UN Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (UNBiH) assumed the peacekeeping mission alongside NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR). See <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmibh/background.html>. For information on NATO’s IFOR mission (20 Dec 1995–20 Dec 1996) see <http://www.nato.int/ifor/>. For information on NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission (Dec 1996 – Dec 2005) see <http://www.nato.int/sfor/index.htm>.

⁹⁸ Blumenthal and others assert that the KLA emerged as a result of the Serbian oppression of the Kosovar Albanians. See Sidney Blumenthal, *The Clinton Wars*, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), 631, and Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, *US and NATO Policy Toward the Crisis in Kosovo*, 106th Cong., 20 April 1999, 4-38.

here... We can't deal with any more problems."⁹⁹ However, as SACEUR, Clark had responsibilities to the NATO chain of command. In May, the NATO foreign ministers directed Clark to consider preventive deployments (partner exercises, ship visits, and support to non-governmental organizations) to the region as a deterrent to Milosevic.¹⁰⁰ In June, Cohen and Shelton supported Clark's proposal for continued diplomatic negotiations with Milosevic, backed by the threat of military force. The Pentagon supported the use of an air threat, but with reservations concerning the need for a contingency plan in case the air threat did not deter the Serbians; they did not want to conduct ground operations in Kosovo.¹⁰¹ Between Clark, Cohen, Shelton, and the NATO leaders, they had developed a strategy of diplomatic measures backed by an escalation of airpower. Various concepts for ground operations were under development only at the NATO headquarters. In July, Clark was ready to present Cohen and Shelton the "Limited Air Option." This plan became a major issue in the Pentagon because Clark briefed the plan to the State Department and to the deputy National Security Advisor before either the SecDef or CJCS viewed and approved it.¹⁰²

While diplomacy proceeded between the UN, NATO, the US, and Milosevic, the Serb military and police forces continued to destroy villages in Kosovo. Though reluctant to commit to US ground operations (or even planning for them), Secretary Cohen pushed the NSC to assist in the drafting of UNSCR 1199 and he called for NATO commitments to the air campaign. UNSCR 1199 became the line in the sand for Milosevic. It called for and authorized member nations to use all available means to enforce: a ceasefire. The resolution also called for the complete withdrawal of FRY security forces from the Kosovo province, access for humanitarian

⁹⁹ Statement by Air Force General Joe Ralson, the Vice CJCS, to Clark upon receiving written notice from USEUCOM about the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. Clark wanted the SecDef to reiterate the Bush Christmas warning of 1992. See Clark, 107-110.

¹⁰⁰ William S. Cohen, *Kosovo : Operation Allied Force : After-Action Report*, (Washington: Department of Defense, 2000), A-1.

assistance, and the safe return of refugees to their homes.¹⁰³ Clark continued to plan NATO ground options under the direction of the European Foreign Ministers and had “about a dozen plans completed or underway at this point, all in response to political guidance from NATO headquarters.”¹⁰⁴ Cohen rebuffed the planning. In early October, the US dispatched Ambassador Holbrooke to Belgrade to press Milosevic into compliance with UNSCR 1199. Enroute to Belgrade, Holbrooke told GEN Clark, “Your Secretary of Defense warned me that under no circumstances was I to offer NATO ground troops as peacekeepers.”¹⁰⁵ With activation orders already in place for both the Limited Air Option and a phased air campaign, the air threat backing up UNSCR 1199 halted the crisis for a short time until the Serbs perpetrated a massacre of 45 Albanian civilians in Racak, Kosovo on 16 January 1999.¹⁰⁶

Despite NATO Secretary General Solana’s previous authorization to strike in response to violations of UNSCR 1199, neither the European nations nor the US were ready to attack. Peace talks convened at Rambouillet, France, in hopes that all parties could reach a political solution and end the repression in Kosovo. This time, however, the US finally realized that a ground force was necessary to prevent another outbreak of fighting. The Serbs could either accept a negotiated agreement with a NATO-led ground force or face air strikes. GEN Clark still had to work the military plan for the peace enforcement force and suggested that the US assume responsibility for the critical border sector between Kosovo and Serbia proper. The Pentagon declined the position, demanding an easier sector from which the US could withdraw early and leave the operation to the rest of NATO. The Pentagon still viewed the Kosovo situation as a distraction, and the

¹⁰¹ Cohen even urged Clark to conduct an air exercise close to the Serbian border. The demonstration took place on 15 June 98 and was dubbed Operation DETERMINED FALCON. Clark, 117-121.

¹⁰² Ibid., 125-127.

¹⁰³ UNSCR 1199.

¹⁰⁴ Clark, 135.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 137.

¹⁰⁶ The UN endorsed an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) on 24 October. Its primary mission was to ensure FRY compliance with

Service chiefs held a meeting of the Joint Staff in January without Clark. The meeting concluded with consensus that Kosovo was not in the national interest and further commitments there would hamper readiness.¹⁰⁷ Clark later reflected: “In retrospect, it seemed that a regional commander in chief would be asked to come in and present his war plans or at least his assessment of the theater.”¹⁰⁸ Clark also learned that Secretary Cohen and other European leaders had been speaking about the divisive issue of ground intervention and essentially ruled it out. Finally, despite Clark’s previous involvement in negotiations with Milosevic, the SecDef rejected Clark’s request to attend the peace negotiations at Rambouillet. Negotiations at Rambouillet broke down on 19 March with no agreement and the Serbs launched another offensive into Kosovo on 20 March. The time for threats had ended. On 23 March, NATO Secretary General Solana and the US chain of command ordered GEN Clark to initiate Operation ALLIED FORCE.¹⁰⁹ GEN Clark found himself in the middle of a four-way struggle over the use of ground forces in Kosovo: a ‘hawkish’ State Department that advocated the use of ground forces; a ‘dovish’ Pentagon that was cautious; a White House intent on delaying any use of US ground forces; and a NATO alliance that planned for and anticipated ground operations but could not agree to the commitment.¹¹⁰ Moreover, Clark saw himself as the ‘swing vote’ in any policy decisions: “If it all came to a head over what to do in Kosovo and the CINC lined up with the civilians, that would be a very

UNSCR 1160 and 1169. The head of the OSCE KVM, American diplomat Bill Walker, confirmed the killings in Racak.

¹⁰⁷ The Service chiefs faced prioritization problems. They had to maintain the ability to fight two Major Regional Contingencies—one in response to commitments on the Korean peninsula, and the other in the Persian Gulf region. Anything else was a detractor from military readiness to conduct these other operations. Ironically, it was LTG Clark, J-5, that drafted the National Military Strategy outlining these requirements from the Pentagon’s Bottom-Up Review (a study to determine the optimal force structure for the US Armed Forces after the Cold War). See Clark, 46-47, 165.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 161-166.

¹⁰⁹ Cohen, "Kosovo : Operation Allied Force : After-Action Report," A-5 to A-7.

¹¹⁰ David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace : Bush, Clinton, and the Generals*, (New York: Scribner, 2001), 376-378.

different equation than if everyone in the military opposed action or gave an unacceptably high figure for what it would take.”¹¹¹

Unlike Clark, GEN Shelton was a leader from the traditional military culture—an old-fashioned soldier that was liked by his peers, virtuous, and demonstrative of the conservatism of his service culture. He was not the first choice for CJCS, but he would prove a good fit for the Clinton administration. Because of his apparent aloofness to civil-military matters and political responsibilities, it was unlikely he would be assertive or overly critical of the administration’s decisions. Secretary Cohen even compared Shelton to Gary Cooper and John Wayne: “tall, straight to the point, not a lot of words.”¹¹² As Shelton saw things, it was his job to follow orders rather than develop policy recommendations. Over the course of the Kosovo crisis, Shelton personified all of these qualities. He tended to act as mediator between Clark, Cohen and the other Service chiefs, except on the occasion when he or Cohen believed Clark was circumventing their authority and responsibilities within the system. At one point early in the crisis when Clark was clearly advocating a more activist approach to the situation, Clark recalls asking GEN Shelton, “Am I pressing too hard?” GEN Shelton simply responded, “I just don’t know. I just don’t know.”¹¹³

GEN Clark’s problems with Secretary Cohen began long before the Kosovo crisis. Shortly after his arrival in USEUCOM and NATO, Clark briefed Cohen on his vision for a more aggressive approach to the situation in Bosnia. Cohen coldly stated that Clark was “just barely” within Cohen’s guidelines, revealing the already deep-seated rift between civilians and military

¹¹¹ Ibid., 436.

¹¹² Ibid., 414.

¹¹³ "Analysis: General Wesley Clark's Kosovo Experience," 1; GEN Shelton’s legacy in strategic planning in general was one of “staying the course.” He made no substantive changes to the strategic planning process, nor did he update the National Military Strategy. Unlike his predecessors who were highly involved in the political and strategic aspects of the position, GEN Shelton was process-oriented. Rather than affecting great change, he relied on existing processes and tried to develop a consensus among civilian and military leaders to move the military institution. See Meinhart, 41-42.

over the Balkans.¹¹⁴ “As the stakes were going up, the game was becoming uglier, and the senior people in the Pentagon, who did not entirely trust Clark, clearly wanted to cut off his access to the civilians.”¹¹⁵ Cohen was the Clinton administration’s third SecDef. Les Aspin left the office shortly after the Mogadishu raid, taking the brunt of the political fallout for the mission’s failure and leaving the Congress apprehensive about future peacekeeping operations. William Perry, though well-respected in the Pentagon and Congress, had presided over much of the American involvement in Bosnia. That mission had already extended well-beyond its original withdrawal deadline and the Congress was eerily reminded of the Somali-style mission-creep under President Clinton. William Cohen, the moderate Republican Senator, was a part of that Congress and had been a tough critic of the administration’s Bosnia policies. When he accepted the President’s nomination for Secretary of Defense, he brought with him the instincts of a politician as well as the doubts he shared with his former colleagues. Rather than causing controversy within the Pentagon bureaucracy, he was dependent on the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Ralston, “who knew the building and its interior politics better than most and would let Cohen know what decisions he had to make and when to make them.”¹¹⁶ On the “notorious geopolitical cemetery” of the Balkans, the Secretary spoke not only with the consensus of those within the Pentagon, but also largely with the support of an apprehensive Congress.¹¹⁷ Cohen’s policy stance and alignment with the Service Chiefs and Congress put him at almost direct odds with GEN Clark, who was not only speaking both for the security of his theater and the heads of the NATO alliance, but also operating under two distinct chains of command. To Cohen, Clark’s responsibility was to implement the policies of Brussels and Washington, not formulate them.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ Halberstam, 363.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 436.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 436-443.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 441.

¹¹⁸ Herspring, 372.

Alexander George suggests that President Clinton was inclined to foreign policy compromise and procrastination due to his distaste for personal conflict and confrontation.¹¹⁹ In this sense, it is reasonable to believe Andrew Bacevich:

“...in the Clinton White House their own professional counsel [from the military] was not in high demand...Bill Clinton relied for professional advice almost exclusively on the CJCS—in 1999, General Henry H. Shelton...he possesses little of the flair, political savvy, or media presence of a Colin Powell—indeed, the Clinton administration may well have appointed him for that very reason...The White House managed the [Kosovo] campaign according to its own lights.”¹²⁰

As is typical with political appointees, the Clinton White House selected senior personnel within the uniformed military to suit their political aims. While technically adhering to the letter of the law, this did not necessarily meet the intent of independent advice as provided in the GNA.

Early in his presidency, Clinton distanced himself from the military by his policy on gays in the military. He followed that divisive decision with limited interventions in Iraq and Somalia.¹²¹ Despite the memories of the Vietnam War and the military’s preference for the Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force, Clinton developed his own doctrine for employing military forces. The US “wields military power not to defeat adversaries but as part of an effort to ‘shape’ the international environment” while mindful of the public’s willingness to support such efforts.¹²² Air strikes and cruise missiles were the perfect instruments for this doctrine. They allowed the administration to intervene with force but with minimal exposure and commitment. President Clinton soon became far removed from foreign policymaking and was overwhelmed by the Monica Lewinsky scandal that threatened his presidency. The last thing the president wanted was more controversy—namely another questionable intervention in Kosovo.

¹¹⁹ George and George, 244-255.

¹²⁰ Andrew J. Bacevich, “Neglected Trinity: Kosovo and the Crisis in US Civil-Military Relations,” in Eliot A. Cohen and A. J. Bacevich, *War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 157.

¹²¹ Clinton ordered a cruise missile attack against Baghdad in June 1993 in response to the uncovering of a suspected assassination plot against former President George Bush. The intervention in Somalia is touted as a semi-covert war that evolved well-beyond the stated objectives for the mission. See Bacevich, 173.

As a result, the “White House provided no leadership, no policy, and no focus.”¹²³ The Secretary of State, known to have activist views similar to those of GEN Clark, soon stepped into the foreign policy vacuum and encouraged Clark to continue planning to use military force. Democratic gains in the November 1998 mid-term elections and the President’s acquittal at the Senate impeachment trials in February 1999 changed perspectives in the White House. The administration began to support intervention to stop Milosevic and preserve NATO’s credibility in the international arena. Finally, because the White House was determined to intervene, the Pentagon “went along but [did] everything possible to minimize the extent of US involvement.”¹²⁴ The White House publicly bowed to the reservations of Congress and the military leaders when on March 24, the first day of hostilities, the President announced, “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.”¹²⁵ This line clearly signaled the White House intended an intervention in Kosovo. It also left NATO’s objectives and intentions ambiguous.

In keeping with the limited time frame associated with crisis situations described earlier, it is important to note that the real crisis over Kosovo did not fully emerge until the fateful massacre of 45 Kosovar Albanians in Racak on 16 January 1999. By that time, diplomatic attempts at conflict resolution had been ongoing for over a year, with the real threat of force available as early as October 1998. The year preceding the massacre and the initiation of Operation ALLIED FORCE is important because it demonstrates the difficulties, attitudes and positions of the key players. The President was occupied with other matters. There was a struggle between an activist State Department and a cautious Pentagon and between the high stakes position of the NATO alliance and the tenuous position of a CDR caught in the middle. “Clark believed that he was not getting clear orders, and that left him no choice but to make up

¹²² Bacevich, 178.

¹²³ Herspring, 364-367.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 368.

¹²⁵ Halberstam, 423.

policy as he went along.”¹²⁶ By the eve of the final crisis, GEN Clark had given his assessment of the situation both to Washington and the NATO leaders. He had also provided numerous estimates of the situation and had recommended courses of action involving the use of airpower and the use of ground forces should the air operations fail. Although GEN Clark had fulfilled the CAP doctrinal requirements, neither the White House nor the Pentagon were much interested in his views or development of a coherent strategy for the crisis. “Had the Pentagon, when it had ample time, developed a coherent Kosovo strategy then many of its [later] problems could have been resolved before the first bomb was dropped.”¹²⁷ GEN Clark was extremely active in the political-military process of national security policymaking, but had little impact on Washington’s decisions in the early days of the crisis. To his credit, much of Clark’s influence and impact came later in NATO during the conduct of the intervention¹²⁸ In contrast to the uncertainty and ambivalence towards military intervention in the Kosovo crisis, it was certain following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 “that there would be a fight and that it would be waged [Secretary of Defense] Rumsfeld’s way.”¹²⁹

GEN Tommy Franks(2001): Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

General Tommy Franks, Commander of USCENTCOM, assumed command of the volatile Middle East region on 7 July 2000. In testimony before Congress, Franks described Afghanistan as a “failed state” and a “destabilizing influence in the region.” This threat, as well as those from Iraq, Iran, and transnational terrorism, “requires us...to maintain operational plans

¹²⁶ Herspring, 372.

¹²⁷ Frederick Barnes, "Washington Looks at Kosovo's Lessons," *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* 27, no. 7 (Jul 1999): 13.

¹²⁸ Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Lessons Learned From Military Operations and Relief Efforts In Kosovo*, 106th Cong., 14 October 1999, 312-381.

¹²⁹ Peter J. Boyer, "The New War Machine a Reporter at Large," *The New Yorker* 79, no. 17 (Jun 30 2003): 3.

and contingency plans to respond to a variety of crises when directed.”¹³⁰ But when al Qaeda terrorists linked with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan attacked the US on 11 September 2001, USCENTCOM did not have a plan.¹³¹ As many would later observe, this was to be a new kind of war. Unlike the Persian Gulf and Kosovo crises, the attacks on 9/11 did not warrant a commander’s assessment from GEN Franks per crisis action planning because the crisis situation occurred inside the US. The links between the attacks to the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan were soon apparent and all indications pointed to a robust military response in the USCENTCOM theater.¹³² This made the situation a national security crisis focused on a response in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. GEN Franks would soon be a wartime commander in the first campaign of the War on Terror. He directed USCENTCOM to begin planning immediately to target al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

GEN Franks’ thirty-six year career in the Army had produced a traditional, conventional-minded “good ol’ boy” from Texas.¹³³ An artilleryman by trade, Franks was a soldier attuned to the institutional culture of the Army and had never served in a joint assignment with the other services. His previous assignment as the commander of all Army forces in the USCENTCOM region had given him significant experience in the region. Still, according to associates, Franks did “not fit the image of the nimble commander at home with high-tech methods and covert

¹³⁰ Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, *Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002*, 106th Cong., 2nd Session, 28 March 2001, 3-26.

¹³¹ Franks stated in his memoirs that USCENTCOM had already developed plans to strike al Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan using Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) and manned bombers, but no plan for conventional ground operations. More importantly, there were no arrangements with Afghanistan’s neighboring countries for basing, staging, or overflight rights. See Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, 1st ed. (New York: Regan Books, 2004), 243, 250-251.

¹³² In the first NSC meeting following the attacks (at 1530, 11 September 01) CIA Director George Tenet reported “with near certainty” that Osama bin Laden was behind the attacks. The CIA had already confirmed that passenger manifests for the attack planes contained known al Qaeda operatives. The CIA also believed that al Qaeda was the only terrorist organization capable of conducting the attacks of that morning. By the next morning, Tenet presented the President and the NSC with additional intelligence pointing to al Qaeda and bin Laden in Afghanistan. At the early morning NSC meeting on 12 September, the President instructed the NSC to “start with bin Laden” and began pressing Secretary Rumsfeld for immediate military options. See Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 26-27, 39-40, 43.

special operators maneuvering against an elusive foe.” A longtime friend of Franks and former commander of the US Army Field Artillery School, Major General Leo Baxter said that “Franks has spoken passionately about the need to maintain heavy ground forces...[and] ‘he is a proponent of conventional forces.’”¹³⁴ As a unified commander, however, GEN Franks soon recognized the strengths and capabilities of joint warfighting and concluded that the individual services needed to rethink their business means in order to remain relevant. When Secretary Rumsfeld prompted Franks for military options on 11 September, Franks knew Rumsfeld wanted “a far different type of operation” than the conventional ground operations to which Franks was accustomed.¹³⁵

GEN Franks presented initial deployment estimates to the SecDef before the early morning NSC meeting on 12 September. Franks told the Secretary it would take months to deploy forces and conduct a major military operation in Afghanistan. “Try again,” Rumsfeld responded. The President wanted options quickly and felt the Pentagon was moving slowly.¹³⁶ By the morning of the 13th, it became apparent that the CIA and USCENTCOM had already begun discussing options together. Tenet briefed a broad operational concept to the President. In it, CIA paramilitary teams would team with US Special Operations Forces to provide targeting data for US air strikes into Afghanistan. After two days, the CIA had provided the President with the means to track down and destroy the terrorists quickly.¹³⁷ The military, however, was still providing pessimistic estimates, and Rumsfeld was furious: “The military options look like five or ten years ago...Lift out of the conventional mind-set.”¹³⁸ President Bush told Shelton to “go back to the generals for new targets...I want decisions quick.” Eventually, Franks discussed three

¹³³ Boyer, "The New War Machine a Reporter at Large," 55.

¹³⁴ Dana Priest, "In Command of a Nonconventional, Anti-Terrorism War," *The Washington Post*, Sep 30 2001, p. A.10.

¹³⁵ Franks, 207-208, 251.

¹³⁶ Woodward, 44.

military options with Secretary Rumsfeld and the CJCS, GEN Hugh Shelton. Option one was a simple cruise missile strike that could happen almost immediately. The second option included cruise missiles and manned bombers, while option three had cruise missiles, manned bombers, and “boots on the ground,” using Special Operations Forces and possibly other ground forces from the Marines or Army. The third option required at least ten to twelve days to deploy forces, but it was the best option for “substance and a real campaign.”¹³⁹ On 20 September, GEN Franks flew to Washington to present the concept of operations to the Chairman and the SecDef, but was surprised when the Service chiefs wanted Franks to present them with the plan. After a half-hour of criticism, the Service chiefs had made it obvious they did not like the plan; it was risky and too unconventional and each service wanted a larger role.¹⁴⁰ Franks’ position was clear: “We should not allow narrow-minded four stars to advance their share of the budget at the expense of the mission.”¹⁴¹ The next day, Franks, Shelton, and Rumsfeld briefed the plan to the President and told him they could begin operations in approximately two weeks, pending international agreements of support.¹⁴² Franks and USCENTCOM continued to refine the operational plans under Secretary Rumsfeld’s heavy influence until the beginning of operations on 7 October.

¹³⁷ According to Woodward, Tenet was “directly involving himself in the military discussions because it was his men who were ready to go in on the ground while the Pentagon was lagging.” His plan hinged on eventual military support. See Woodward., 50-53, 134.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 88.

¹³⁹ Noah Lukeman and Michael DeLong, *Inside CentCom : The Unvarnished Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq*, (Washington, DC; Lanham, MD: Regnery Pub.; Distributed to the trade by National Book Network, 2004), 23.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 27-28.

¹⁴¹ Franks, 278.

¹⁴² Ibid., 279. The limiting factor for all operations involving manned aircraft and ground forces was combat search and rescue (CSAR). Despite Rumsfeld’s rebukes, it was not worth the risk of a captured pilot. The ability to base a CSAR force in Uzbekistan became the key political-military condition that USCENTCOM, Powell, and Rice all realized had to met. USCENTCOM could not do significant bombing damage in northern Afghanistan until there were special operations forces on the ground. Also, bombing in the south “made no sense” because there was no significant opposition ground force in that area. See Woodward, 181.

By 11 September 2001, GEN Shelton was only three weeks away from completing his tour as the CJCS on 1 October. Despite his strong reputation within the military and previous experience, Rumsfeld viewed Shelton as a “Clinton man” and disliked his support for the Clinton policies of global military engagement and intervention. Soon after assuming office in January 2001, Rumsfeld “relegated Shelton and his staff to the status of ‘second-rate citizens.’”¹⁴³ The Secretary suggested to Shelton at one point that he channel his advice to the President through him, despite the provisions of the GNA.¹⁴⁴ GEN Shelton even hoped for a crisis to ease the civil-military tensions at the Pentagon—it would give the military a chance to show their abilities.¹⁴⁵ The selections of US Air Force General Richard Myers and US Marine Corps General Peter Pace as the succeeding Chairman and Vice Chairman, respectively, did not improve the relations between the civilian and uniformed leadership of the military. Instead, the selections “made it clear that the administration wanted obedience, not officers who might make waves.”¹⁴⁶ General Myers, the former head of the US Space Command, shared Rumsfeld’s high-tech ideas and worked well with the SecDef, but Myers merely became another member of Rumsfeld’s pool of advisors for war planning and designing security policy.¹⁴⁷ General Myers was not in a position to influence Franks or the civilians above him in the chain of command.

Of the senior leaders in the military chain of command, Secretary Rumsfeld clearly had the most influence over the formulation of national security policy.¹⁴⁸ Rumsfeld came to the

¹⁴³ Dana Priest, *The Mission : Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military*, 1st ed. (New York: WW Norton, 2003), 23.

¹⁴⁴ Herspring, 382.

¹⁴⁵ Priest, 34.

¹⁴⁶ One source told Rowan Scarborough, “The Goldwater Nichols Act gave the Chairman broad power to advise the President separately from the secretary. Myers, however, agreed not to go around Rumsfeld.” See Rowan Scarborough, *Rumsfeld's War : The Untold Story of America's Anti-Terrorist Commander*, (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2004), 121.

¹⁴⁷ Thom Schmitt and Eric Shanker, "Rumsfeld Seeks Consensus through Jousting," *New York Times*, Mar 19 2003, p. A.1.

¹⁴⁸ President Bush used a hierarchical decision-making process. With an experienced pool of advisors, Bush waited for input and options from the various members of his NSC. Further, with contradictory viewpoints and personalities under him, Bush could expect varying perspectives for solving problems. According to Herspring, this leadership style “allowed Rumsfeld to dominate the formulation of

position with a mandate supported by President Bush to transform the military into a modern fighting force.¹⁴⁹ He was clear about the hierarchical positioning in the Pentagon and was staunchly concerned with the state of civil-military relations following the Clinton administration. In a meeting at the Pentagon, he announced, “I want to reinstitute civilian control of the military!”¹⁵⁰ Rumsfeld believed that he understood not only national security problems, but also military strategy, doctrine and weapons systems better than the uniformed military members he led. Moreover, they would have to understand “Donald Rumsfeld’s hand would be involved in any area he believed relevant. He also had no compunctions about micromanaging the military down to the tactical level...”¹⁵¹ With a check over the uniformed leaders below him and a firm place as one of the President’s principle advisors, Rumsfeld held a monopoly over military planning for Afghanistan.

Prior to assuming the presidency, George W. Bush unambiguously endorsed a Rumsfeld premonition. Rumsfeld told the president-elect to “expect a forward-leaning action plan” to unleash the military in a time of national security crisis.¹⁵² Bush understood his own lack of military and national security expertise. In contrast to his mere months of dealing with such issues, his advisory team collectively had nearly 100 years of experience. More importantly, Bush’s advisors were autonomous in their respective areas, and Rumsfeld dominated the national security apparatus. In an interview with Bob Woodward, Bush once said of his national security team: “When they give advice, I trust their judgment.”¹⁵³ The uniformed military believed Bush would trust them, too. In the presidential race, he spoke of good changes for the military—tough

national security policy.” See Herspring, 379.; In a phone conversation shortly after the attacks on 9/11, Bush told Rumsfeld, “It’s a day of national tragedy, and we’ll clean up the mess and then the ball will be in your court and Dick Meyer’s court.” See Woodward, 19.

¹⁴⁹ Herspring notes from one of Rumsfeld’s biographer’s: “The two men agreed completely about what kind of transformation of the military was required. The armed forces would have to be lighter, faster, more flexible...and in general both doctrine and equipment should be brought more fully into line with the galloping technological advances of the age.” See Herspring, 380.

¹⁵⁰ Priest, 24.

¹⁵¹ Herspring, 380-381.

¹⁵² Woodward, 20.

on the enemy, judicious use of force, more money, and fewer deployments. His electoral promises to reduce the number of limited interventions seemed in line with the military's preference for the dictums of the Powell doctrine. In reality, the terrorist acts of 9/11 forced a reexamination and reformation of this policy. The military was shocked at their treatment by Secretary Rumsfeld. While the President stayed "above the fray" and supported Rumsfeld's efforts, he was also championing his respect and admiration for the servicemembers' sacrifices.¹⁵⁴ Despite the President's role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Secretary Rumsfeld shaped the President's input to national security strategy and the conduct of military operations through ubiquitous control of the uniformed leaders below him. If Rumsfeld wanted the Chiefs to advise the President, "he would say so—although in practice this would not happen very often."¹⁵⁵

GEN Franks and USCENTCOM faced challenging conditions in the wake of the attacks on 11 September 2001. His command did not have existing contingency plans for large-scale military operations into Afghanistan. He did not have the necessary basing or overflight rights essential to combat operations in the region. The service chiefs did not support the plans developed to meet the demands of the civilian leadership. Additionally, the SecDef was demanding rapid, flexible, unconventional military operations in a fraction of the time Franks originally proposed and he insisted on his new way of conducting operations. Moreover, the CJCS was not in a position to influence either the SecDef or the President on behalf of the CCDR because Rumsfeld insisted on civilian control over the military leadership and the management of their operations to fit his concept of transformation. As a result, neither the CCDR nor CJCS had any significant impact on the political-military decision-making process following the attacks on

¹⁵³ Ibid., 74.

¹⁵⁴ Herspring, 407; Priest, 23-25.

¹⁵⁵ Herspring, 379.

9/11. Aside from detailed planning and execution within his guidelines, the SecDef dominated the military aspects of the crisis management process.

In each of the three cases, the CCDR provided needed advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense but the senior civilian leadership generally disregarded the advice. The traditional military-focus of GEN Schwarzkopf and GEN Franks was overshadowed by their lack of political-military considerations during the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis and the 2001 crisis response in Afghanistan. GEN Schwarzkopf's limited perspective was bolstered by the political-mindedness of the CJCS, but even that was overshadowed by the President's tendency to make unilateral foreign policy decisions. Following the attacks of 9/11, Secretary Rumsfeld challenged, manipulated, and minimized the military perspectives of both GEN Franks and the CJCS, effectively shaping all advice to the President. Finally, in contrast to the other two cases of this research, GEN Wesley Clark understood and embraced his role in the political arena as a formulator and implementer of national security policy. Though his perspective differed from those of the SecDef and the CJCS, he succeeded in circumventing the Pentagon and pressing his case to the White House. However, his attempts were ultimately unsuccessful. The President's concern for domestic political issues led him to take a policy position that mirrored that of the Pentagon and the Congress, ultimately overpowering the influence of GEN Clark and minimizing his impact on the formulation of national policy during the Kosovo crisis. The persistence of conflict conditions following each of the three cases suggests that problems still exist in the process of national security policy formulation.

It is almost impossible to say with any certainty what would have really happened under different conditions or decisions, but speculation reveals distinct possibilities. Near the end of Operation DESERT STORM, GEN Schwarzkopf made the hasty decision to end major combat operations after only one hundred hours of ground combat in response to questions and pressure from the President and the SecDef. In so doing, he either failed to consider the long term implications of leaving the Iraqi military largely intact, or he failed to communicate those

implications to the President. A decision based on these considerations might have allowed continued combat operations against Saddam's regime and the Iraqi Republican Guard and prevented nearly 12 years of continued conflict with Iraq and a second Iraq war in 2003. In the Kosovo crisis, it is plausible that a ground operation would have curtailed the seventy-eight day air campaign. It may also have ended the killing of Kosovar civilians that fueled continued conflict and hatred between the Serbian government and the Kosovar Albanians. Finally, the early introduction of conventional combat troops into Afghanistan may have prevented the escape of many Taliban and al Qaeda leaders and fighters into the ungoverned regions of Western Pakistan. Many believe remnants of those groups from the early days of the war still exist today and have rebuilt a support base from which they continue to fuel conflict and violence inside of Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The security environment has changed since the end of the Cold War but remnants from the Cold War crisis management paradigm still exist in the contemporary security environment. National security leaders have recognized that crisis management is more than simply avoiding armed conflict; that is, crises situations may provide useful means to improve or to change certain conditions involving national interests within the security environment. Humanitarian crises, threats of terrorism, and international crime are part of the new continuum of threats adding to the realities and dangers of traditional armed conflict. Academic and national security studies recognized the new environment and its demands for broad based, multi-faceted crisis management procedures. These studies led to changes in the organizational structure for dealing with crises. The GNA mandated military reform and provided the means for military advice to inform the national security decision-making process in times of crisis. Changes in joint military doctrine reflected the intent of the GNA as well as the recognition for militarily informed decision-making. Unfortunately, stipulations in joint doctrine for the development of strategic

guidance are not only ambiguous, but they also represent a top-down driven process from the President to the CCDR. In practice, this has created a decision-making environment that is subject to the relationships established by the President and the Secretary of Defense with the uniformed military leaders. In other words, the advice of the CJCS and the CCDR to the President and the SecDef is only useful if the civilian leadership is willing to listen and take the information under advisement during crisis management.

The study revealed that Cold War literature on crisis management is not sufficient for contemporary complex contingencies and suggested better definitions for crisis and crisis management. Instead of focusing on the dangers of armed conflict, the current joint military publications provide a crisis definition that better addresses the encompassing nature of crises as non-exclusive of other forms of conflict that act against the national security interests. Similarly, the study defined crisis management to recognize both the traditional security dilemma and the strategic nature of crisis management as a link between national interests and the means to achieve or advance them.

New concepts and definitions are most useful if they have practical application. This study showed that the GNA improved the formal structure for providing military options during a crisis. The GNA also complements the new crisis management definition. The regional CCDR is the critical link between national security objectives and the means to achieve them. With the military resources to act and the responsibility to coordinate all elements of national power in his region, the CCDR can best implement national policy and provide long-term security after he has had the opportunity to help shape the policy. The GNA solidified the venue for independent military advice into the national security apparatus and brought the CCDR into the political process. By and large, the CCDRs in this study brought needed advice into the political process during national security policy formulation. That the advice was not exploited points to other problems in the process.

Despite paradigmatic changes in the threats to national security and organizational changes in the US national security decision-making process, elements of the Cold War crisis management paradigm persist into the contemporary national security environment. Though the President may seek consultation or advice from the uniformed leaders of the military, he is the ultimate authority in the formulation of national security decisions. Neither the GNA nor joint military doctrine have removed the President's ability to make decisions based upon the advice of a select group of civilian advisors that President Kennedy demonstrated during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The President's ability to shape the decision-making process through his own management style and the interpersonal working relationships with the uniformed military demonstrate the long-standing preeminence of political over military considerations. At a minimum, the process should be formalized to ensure not only the consideration of military advice in the decision-making process, but also the advice of other key governmental departments such as State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, Homeland Security, and others. When appropriate, it must also include that advice in the formulation of national security policy and policy implementation. Accomplishing this may involve such drastic measures as a standardization of the National Security Council system that makes it impervious to the personal proclivities of changing presidential administrations. The uniformed military must also recognize the need for reform. The CCDRs must be more aware of political considerations and be willing to take part in the political discussion. Finally, an early focus on determining the goals and objectives in the face of a given national security crisis may succeed in changing the impetus of crisis management from crisis mitigation to the achievement of national strategic goals and long-term security.

Appendix A (Acronyms)

ADM	Admiral
AOR	Area of Responsibility
CAP	Crisis Action Planning
CCDR	Combatant Commander
USCENTCOM	US Central Command
CINC	Commander-in-Chief (used to designate the commander of a unified command; now used only with reference to the President as the Commander-in-Chief)
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
COA	Course of Action
DoD	Department of Defense
USEUCOM	US European Command
GEN	General
JP	Joint Publication
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authority
NSC	National Security Council
OPLAN	Operation Plan
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
UAE	United Arab Emirates

Bibliography

- Aspects of Campaign Planning : Modern Campaign Planning*. Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2002.
- "Analysis: General Wesley Clark's Kosovo Experience." *All Things Considered* (May 25 2001): 1.
- Barnes, Frederick. "Washington Looks at Kosovo's Lessons." *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* 27, no. 7 (Jul 1999): 13.
- Bell, Coral. *The Conventions of Crisis : A Study in Diplomatic Management*. London, New York: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1971.
- Blumenthal, Sidney. *The Clinton Wars*. 1st ed. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003.
- Bouchard, Joseph F. *Command in Crisis : Four Case Studies*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.
- Boyer, Peter J. "The New War Machine: A Reporter at Large." *The New Yorker* 79, no. 17 (Jun 30 2003): 055.
- Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997.
- Caldwell, Dan. "The Cuban Missile Affair and the American Style of Crisis Management." *Parameters* XIX, no. 1 (Mar 1989): 49.
- Clark, Wesley K. *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*. 1st ed. New York: Public Affairs, 2001.
- Cohen, Eliot A. "Why We Should Stop Studying the Cuban Missile Crisis." *The National Interest* 2 (Winter 1985/6): 3-13.
- Cohen, Eliot A., and A. J. Bacevich. *War Over Kosovo : Politics and Strategy in a Global Age*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- Cohen, William S. *Kosovo: Operation Allied Force: After-Action Report*. Washington: Department of Defense, 2000.
- Cole, Ronald H. *The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1999*. Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003.
- Franks, Tommy. *American Soldier*. 1st ed. New York: Regan Books, 2004.
- George, Alexander L. "Crisis Management: The Interaction of Political and Military Considerations." *Survival*, Vol. XXVI, No. 5 (September/October 1984), 223.
- George, Alexander L., and Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov. *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.
- George, Alexander L., and Juliette L. George. *Presidential Personality and Performance*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998.
- Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor. *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*. 1st ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1982.

- Gregor, William. "Toward a Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs: Understanding the United States Military in the Post Cold War World." Working Paper No. 6, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies: Harvard University, August 1996.
- Halberstam, David. *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals*. New York: Scribner, 2001.
- Herspring, Dale R. *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005.
- Hybel, Alex Roberto. *Power Over Rationality: The Bush Administration and the Gulf Crisis*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1977.
- Karkoszka, Andrzej. "Crisis Management: The Transformation of National and International Systems of Response." *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* IV, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 33.
- Kohn, Richard H. "The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today." *Naval War College Review* 55, no. 3 (2002): 9.
- Koivula, Tommi, and Tuomas Tammilehto. *Crisis Management: A New Form of Nation-Building?* Helsinki: National Defence College, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, 2005.
- Lovelace, Douglas C. *Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act*. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996.
- Lukeman, Noah, and Michael DeLong. *Inside CentCom: The Unvarnished Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq*. Washington, DC; Lanham, MD: Regnery Pub.; Distributed to the trade by National Book Network, 2004.
- Meinhart, Richard M. *Chairmen Joint Chiefs of Staff's Leadership using the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003.
- National Security Council 68. *United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*. The White House. Washington, D.C. April 14, 1950. Available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm>.
- National Security Decision Directive 32. *US National Security Strategy*. The White House. Washington, D.C. May 20, 1982. Available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-032.htm>.
- National Security Presidential Directive 1. *Organization of the National Security Council System*. The White House. Washington, D.C. February 13, 2001. Available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/index.html>.
- National Security Presidential Directive 44. *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*. The White House. Washington, D.C. September 7, 2005. Available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/index.html>.
- Persico, Joseph E., and Colin L. Powell. *My American Journey*. 1st ed. New York: Random House, 1995.
- Presidential Decision Directive 56. *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*. The White House. Washington, D.C. May 1997. Available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/index.html>.

- President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. *A Quest for Excellence: Final Report to the President*. Washington D.C., June 1986.
- Priest, Dana. *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military*. 1st ed. New York: WW Norton, 2003.
- _____. "In Command of a Nonconventional, Anti-Terrorism War," *The Washington Post*, Sep 30 2001.
- Reveron, Derek S. *America's Viceroy: The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy*. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
- Scarborough, Rowan. *Rumsfeld's War: The Untold Story of America's Anti-Terrorist Commander*. Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2004.
- Schmitt, Eric and Thom Shanker. "Rumsfeld Seeks Consensus through Jousting," *New York Times*, Mar 19 2003.
- Schwarzkopf, H. Norman, and Peter Petre. *It Doesn't Take a Hero : General H. Norman Schwarzkopf: The Autobiography*. Bantam paperback ed. New York: Bantam Books, 1993.
- Turabian, Kate L. *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*. 6th ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- U.N. Security Council. 3930th Meeting. "Resolution 1199 (1998) [On the situation in Kosovo (FRY)]" (S/RES/1199). 23 September 1998.
- _____. 3937th Meeting. "Resolution 1203 (1998) [On the situation in Kosovo]" (S/RES/1203). 24 October 1998.
- United States. Congress. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 Conference Report (To Accompany H. R. 3622)*. Washington, DC: GPO, 1986. Y1.1/8:99-824. House Conference Report no. 99-824.
- U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Publication 0-2: *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. 10 July 01.
- _____. Joint Publication 1-02: *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. 12 April 01 (As amended through 14 April 06).
- _____. Joint Publication 5-0: *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*. 13 April 95.
- _____. Joint Publication 5-0: *Joint Operational Planning*. 26 December 06.
- U.S. Congress. House. Armed Services Committee. *Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002*. 106th Cong., 2nd Session, 28 March 2001.
- _____. Senate. Armed Services Committee, *US and NATO Policy Toward the Crisis in Kosovo*. 106th Cong., 20 April 1999.
- _____. Senate. Armed Services Committee. *Lessons Learned From Military Operations and Relief Efforts In Kosovo*. 106th Cong., 14 October 1999.
- _____. Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee*. 106th Cong., 2nd Session, 27 June 2000.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. *Department of Defense Appropriations, FY91*. 101st Cong., 6 March 1990.

- U.S. President. *National Security Strategy of the United States*. The White House. Washington D.C. George H.W. Bush, August 1991. Available at <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/918015-nss.htm>.
- _____. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. The White House. Washington D.C. William J. Clinton, February 1995.
- _____. *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*. The White House. Washington D.C. William J. Clinton, December 2000.
- _____. *The National Security Strategy of the United States*. The White House. Washington D.C. George W. Bush, September 2002.
- _____. *The National Security Strategy of the United States*. The White House. Washington D.C. George W. Bush, March 2006.
- Whicker, Marcia Lynn, James P. Pfiffner, and Raymond A. Moore. *The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993.
- Williams, Phil. *Crisis Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age*. New York: Wiley, 1976.
- Winham, Gilbert R. *New Issues in International Crisis Management*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.
- Woodward, Bob. *Bush at War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.