Department of Education
Graduate Research Management Office
Research Papers
Academic Year 2007


Transforming Change in the Military a Systems Approach

by James G. Alden MAJ, USA; Amber L. Hopeman LT, USN; Jodi A. Neff MAJ, USAF
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Why are military organizations resistant to change? In an attempt to answer this question, this thesis proposes the use of systems thinking to evaluate the military and its ability to effect change. Rather than investigate individual components of the environment, systems thinking dictates the study of the relationships between system components. We offer two frameworks to examine these relationships. The prescriptive framework, developed via literature, illustrates how each of the military subsystems of strategy, doctrine, and organization should interact. The theoretical framework shows how these subsystems interact in reality. A study of the theoretical framework illustrates differences from the prescriptive framework and where resistance to change within the military system actually occurs. We find there are many barriers to change to include doctrinal rigidity and a legacy force structure that is preserved by a dominant culture, the misuse of history, and the inability to learn from past failures.

Systems thinking, as seen through these frameworks, can apply to every military organization and be very useful in not only realizing the need for change but understanding how these changes affect the entire system. More importantly, through systems thinking, the inhibitors to change can finally be realized and understood.

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Reform of Command and Control Structure in NATO Special Operations Forces

by Robert S. Berg MAJ, USA
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

The current NATO SOF capability is an ad hoc force which does not provide a synchronized, integrated Special Operations response capability to the alliance. There is no standing NATO SOF combat force or Command and Control architecture to frame the transformation effort. NATO has declared its intentions to transform from a static collective alliance for the defense of the common members, to an expeditionary force capable of responding to the needs of a growing global security concern. The central research question is: Does NATO require a standing Special Operations Force Command and Control structure and combat capability to meet the emerging global security requirements of the Alliance? This researched revealed that a more robust and interoperable SOF capability is both advocated and supported amongst member states. The comparison of recommended structure reforms produced consensus only in the function of improved SOF and not in the form of that innovation. Interviews with subject matter experts within the NATO SOF community reveal support for a standing command and control structure but not to a standing NATO SOF combat force. This research supports the current NATO SOF transformation initiative with the addition of growth to an inner core and wider network standing force.

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Special Forces: Creating Synergy in the Contemporary Operating Environment

by Glenn R. Bollinger III MAJ, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

An irregular enemy opposing US and partner forces in an expeditionary, nonlinear battle space defines the contemporary operating environment and post-modern warfare. This environment calls for improving our methods of operating, identifying, and building upon our strengths, and applying multiple efforts to achieve our national end state.
Does the current doctrine help Special Forces commanders facilitate the successful integration of forces, capabilities, and effects in the contemporary operating environment? General purpose forces, Special Forces, and partner nation forces must achieve some degree of interoperability in order to create synergy.
The purpose of this paper is to review the current doctrine with regard to command relationships, battlespace, and liaisons and to see if there are methods that Special Forces, partner nation forces, and general purpose forces can use to attain this all-important synergy.
This monograph will show that commanders from both general purpose forces and Special Forces are striving to attain synergy. These commanders are applying joint doctrine in a descriptive manner, focusing mission accomplishment. Special Forces commanders understand the importance of the liaison functions and are multitasking subordinate units to fulfill this need while conducting other special operations.

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A Non-Conventional Interdiction Strategy for the Global War on Terror

by Jason M. Brizek MAJ, USA; Erwin C. Morris III MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

The purpose of this thesis is to explore an alternative strategic focus for the Department of Defense to implement in the conduct of the Global War on Terrorism. Our thesis is as follows: A non-conventional approach to strategic policy, led by an enhanced Foreign Internal Defense concept, and judicious execution of U.S. Sponsored Unconventional Warfare, applied as a primary tool of U.S. national policy through the Department of Defense, will serve as an effective solution to the global “terrorist” threat.

This paper will justify such by analyzing the historical conduct of the United States through the framework of its own doctrine and the “Mystic Diamond” a State/Counter-state dynamic model as presented by Dr. Gordon McCormick. Elements of the Department of Defense and the Department of State know the operational strategy to take, but are hampered by the misapplication of counter-guerilla tactics as strategy, and are reluctant to use sponsored UW to preempt or curtail the exportation of terrorism. In essence, the Department of Defense has been and continues to be limited by its conventional tactical successes, when what is required is strategic application of FID, UW, and limited Direct Engagement to defeat an enemy employing a non-conventional method of engagement.

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Civil Reconnaissance; Separating the Insurgent from the Population

by Kevin P. Burke MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Civil Information Management is one of the main tools in conducting effective counter insurgency operations, yet there is no definitive doctrine that explains how to collect, analyze, or warehouse Civil Information. This thesis provides a methodology for collecting civil information in a counter insurgency environment. The proposed methodology provides a foundation for the creation of standard operating procedures and tactics to enhance the US Military’s capability to conduct Civil Reconnaissance and Counter Insurgency Warfare.

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Do Psychological Operations Benefit from the Use of Host Nation Media?

by Daniel A. Castro MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Organizing and conducting effective psychological operations (PSYOP) in support of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives is a complex endeavor fraught with many challenges. The challenges include: a general negative attitude towards PSYOP / deception operations, the emphasis on kinetic platforms as the solution set for all crises to include unconventional warfare (UW), the sheer lack of numbers in both PSYOP personnel and equipment, and a recent upsurge of negativity from the world media of U.S. PSYOP due to the utilization of host nation media. This thesis will examine the benefits of host nation media from World War II to the present that include the utilization of media personnel and infrastructure in mediums of radio, newspapers, leaflets, posters, magazines, comic books, radio stations, satellite and terrestrial television. The merits of host nation media will be examined by analyzing their effect upon Psychological Operations (PSYOP) from the perspective of opposing countries in previous wars as well as U.S. PSYOP programs in both past and present conflicts in addition to the impact of counter-PSYOP from an adversarial point of view. The final goal of the thesis is to illustrate the need for the use of host nation media assets relevant to U.S. military and civil operations.

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Psychological Operations: Fighting the War of Ideas

by Ceroli Michael A. COL, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Psychological Operations, when properly organized and executed are the Department of Defense's premier capability to counter our enemy's ideological support for terrorism. This ideological support is defined in the National Military Strategy for the War on Terror as our enemy's strategic center of gravity. This paper recommends an established force structure and coordinating mechanism to attack our enemy's strategic center of gravity while defending ours.

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Irregular Techniques for Controlling Under-Governed Space

by Matthew D. Coburn MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

The United States government has identified undergoverned areas in weakened or failed states as one of the threats faced by the U.S. and its allies because these spaces can provide safe havens for terrorists. Under certain circumstances, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) may choose to counter these threats by utilizing specific elements of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to work indirectly through irregular forces who can achieve control over and legitimacy with the populations within these under-governed areas. This study uses the cases of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Taliban in Afghanistan to determine how irregular forces, with external support, can establish political control of under-governed space. To a more limited extent, this study also determines methods that Special Operations Forces (SOF) can utilize to influence irregular surrogates, should SOF choose to operate by, with, and through them to attempt to establish control of under-governed space within weakened or failed states in support of United States foreign policy. This study provides lessons learned and potential implications for emerging DoD irregular warfare (IW) literature and future DoD and USSOCOM IW doctrine design and operational planning.

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An Adaptive Security Construct: Insurgency in Sudan

by Patrick T. Colloton MAJ, USA; Benjamin R. Maitre MAJ, USAF; Tommy E. Stoner MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Internal wars are by default the business of others, until someone says they are not. Artificially contained within the confines of the current international system, insurgent conflicts are considered domestic affairs only until they threaten external interests. In judging intrastate conflict by and large from a crisis-response perspective, conventional assessment methodologies, oriented largely toward interstate wars, tend to fall short in objectively analyzing the historical and dynamic aspects of internal wars. This thesis develops an Adaptive Security Construct (ASC) that aims to correct such shortcomings through the multi-disciplinary integration of three conceptual lenses: a qualitative situation estimate, a game-theoretic dynamic conflict model, and geospatially oriented nexus topography. Using Sudan’s internal wars as a case study, where the existence of signed peace-agreements in both the south and Darfur exist in apparent contradiction of these conflicts’ causes, the ASC iteratively correlates the analysis of each of the three lenses to provide an observer a more objective external view of conflicts that are inherently “internal.” This thesis presents the ASC as an iterative process and perspective that enables the formulation of general imperatives and specific approaches in response to contemporary arenas of conflict, both in Sudan and within the international community at large.

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Optimizing Army Special Forces Leaders in a Global Counter-Insurgent Network

by Joshua H. Walker MAJ, USA; Eric J. Deal MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Since the watershed events of September 11, 2001, the United States military has been engaged in fighting what has been recognized as a highly organized and networked global insurgency. These global insurgents have sought to take advantage of all the technological advances available in the current information age, combined with the innovative and adaptive advantages of networked organizations. This study asks two questions: 1.) How can global insurgent networks be countered; and 2.) Where might the most appropriate personnel to man a global U.S. counter-insurgent network be found? This thesis asserts that organizational considerations matter and that for the U.S. military to have the best chance to defeat these global insurgent networks it must further develop small, adaptive human networks of its own. Secondly, the authors will demonstrate that there exists within the Army Special Forces field grade officer population the capability and capacity to man and lead a small, yet globally dispersed counter-insurgent network.

These arguments will be evidenced by an examination of the networked aspects of the global insurgency, hierarchical aspects of the U.S. military and finally the specific manpower data within the Army Special Forces officer population. What is still needed in the evolving global war on terror, and this study hopes to contribute, is a small turn of mind towards applying networked counter-terror organizations against a very serious irregular, networked threat. To this end, the authors will propose the establishment of a Special Forces Global Counter-Insurgent Network (SFGCIN).

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Eisenhower and Manstein: Operational Leadership Lessons of the Past for Today’s Commanders

by Herbert William E. LTC, USA
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island

The United States Military, the ultimate instrument of national resolve, is centered on servicemen and women. Without effective leadership these men and women are ill-equipped to succeed in combat and are unjustly put in harms way. The commander at the operational level is the link between national policy and action. His actions, character and decisions are of historical importance. While this paper will not cover the full spectrum of operational leadership; the most important traits of operational leadership will be explored. Additionally, this paper will highlight recent failures in operational leadership and compare and contrast them with lessons learned from two diametrically opposed operational leaders of World War II, General Dwight Eisenhower and Field Marshall Erich von Manstein. Analysis will concentrate on the specific operations of the Normandy invasion and Kharkov. The analysis will not deconstruct the operations but rather center on the operational leadership traits each commander displayed and their importance to the operation. Finally the paper will show how the lessons of sixty-five years ago are applicable today and for the future.

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Rethinking Militias Recognizing the Potential of Militia Groups in Nation-Building

by Terry L. Hodgson MAJ, USA; Glenn R. Thomas MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Recent media, political, and military consideration regarding the use of militias has been almost totally negative. This conceptual bias against militias is somewhat misguided, and can lead to disastrously counterproductive situations. Conceivably, militias can play a role in building a functioning state, and can support immediate and long-term U.S. and host nation government efforts in these situations. Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) has become a mainstay of current U.S. strategy, but little effort is dedicated to developing options that deal specifically with the inclusion of irregular forces outside the control of a central government. This thesis seeks to counter the conceptual bias against militia groups, and provides a framework for analyzing militias’ potential to assist with the establishment of governance in weak and failing states. Second, it analyzes a series of examples and arrays them along a spectrum that can be used to better define militias’ characteristics and intents. The third aim of this thesis is to offer a set of strategy options the U.S. might apply in its efforts to deal with militias in its nation-building efforts.

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Fighting the Global War on Terror Tolerably: Augmenting the Global Counter Insurgency Strategy with Surrogates

by Stephen F. Howe MAJ, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

There is a long historical precedent of great powers utilizing surrogate forces as an economy of force measure in the pursuit of their objectives. The lessons learned during the ideological brush fire conflicts of the Cold War are relevant to the current ideological struggles ofthe GWOT. The two case studies chosen for this paper are the French in Algeria 1954-1962 and the British in Oman/Dhofar 1965-1975. The scope of this study reviews three themes that run through the French and British utilization of surrogates and the potential applications for the US in the GWOT. The three themes are the recruitment of surrogates, their employment and the moral implications of adopting a surrogate based strategy. The current GWOT strategy of the United States has alienated allies, stretched her military resources thin and exacerbated chronic third world discontent with America. The primary aim of this paper is to review the potential use of surrogates as a lower profile and more cost effective approach to achieving American GWOT objectives. The way ahead is to train, equip and utilize indigenous forces to act for or in concert with US forces. The unrivaled combat power and efficiency of the US military dictates there is no surrogate force capable of operating replacing that level of operations, however in the COE the most important advantages a surrogate force offers are their non-kinetic operational multipliers. T.E. Lawrence’s admonition that it is, “Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly” has grown even more applicable in the COE.

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Understanding Warlordism

by Benjamin E. Hwang MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

The purpose of this thesis is to understand warlordism, and in particular, the warlord environment in Afghanistan. Weak central authority in the state of Afghanistan has been a political tradition due largely to a patronage system of governance. This weak political structure allows warlord military organizations to draw resources from the environment. Warlord organizations use armed force to access these resources. Warlords also wield political power and use their military organizations as a base to expand their power and fame. There are numerous population bases of support, and not all are good for the growth of stable organizations. However, warlords are able to develop their political organizations reliably because of the stability provided by their military organizations. Because of these factors, the warlord Ahmed Rashid Dostum, a man with minimal political education, has slowly but surely built a political organization based on ethnicity.

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Mortus Discriminatus Procedures in Targeted Killing

by Glenn W. Johnson MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Currently, no widely established standard or published set of guidelines and planning considerations exist for operational planners to conduct targeted killing operations. Due to the political complexity intertwined with targeted killing these types of operations rarely occur without repercussion. Operational planners need to understand that targeted killing operations cannot exist solely at the operational level because their consequences have strategic and political ramifications. By utilizing a case study analysis, this thesis will identify the operational planning considerations that need to be addressed to successfully conduct a targeted killing mission. This thesis will also outline any guidance the operational team should receive when tasked with a targeted killing mission. This will enable the operational unit to minimize any unintended consequences that result from targeted killing missions. Minimizing the unintended consequences will assist in removing the aura of illegitimacy surrounding targeted killing operations because transparency is provided on the procedures and planning considerations that are involved in the execution of these types of operations.

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Private Military Companies Analyzing the Use of Armed Contractors

by Michael D. Kornburger MAJ, USA; Jeremy R. Dobos MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

“Private Military Companies: Analyzing the Use of Armed Contractors” explores the critical issues that influence the decision to utilize private military companies (PMC) and armed contractors in support of U.S. military operations. The critical issues identified in the thesis address a combination of government, military, and public concerns with the private military industry. Understanding of these critical issues will assist policy makers in determining the validity of the PMC concept and extent to which the U.S. government could utilize armed contractors and consider privatization of combat forces as a viable option to satisfy certain military requirements of this nation. The thesis also expands on the link between the expansion in the private military industry and the shortage of U.S. government resources to satisfy the requirements of its foreign policy decisions. This work focused on the legitimate use of PMCs and armed contractors to support U.S. government and military operations.

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Shaping Jihadism How Syria Molded the Muslim Brotherhood

by Seth D. Krummrich MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

In February 1982, Syrian President Assad’s military and security forces surrounded, assaulted, and leveled the fourth largest city in Syria, Hama, killing between 5,000-25,000 Syrians in less than three weeks. It was the culmination of an escalating five year revolutionary war between the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and President Hafez Assad’s authoritarian rule. Through the use of overwhelming force and a government sponsored moderate Islamification process, the Muslim Brotherhood was transformed from a violent revolutionary opposition movement to a peace oriented social organization calling for a representative democratic government.

Using Social Movement Theory (SMT) and Dr. McCormick’s Mystic Diamond, this thesis demonstrates how extreme state violence affects opposition social movements. It analyzes why the Muslim Brotherhood’ s revolution failed, why the Assad regime succeeded, and how its overwhelming defeat transformed the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood from a violent revolutionary organization to a peaceful social movement. The Syrian counter-insurgency model provides a viable strategy that can be applied to existing and future insurgencies throughout the Middle East.

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How Can the U.S. Military Avoid Another 9/15 An Analysis of the Inability of U.S. Military Leaders to Provide an Adequate Strategy for Responding to the 9/11 Attacks

by James R. Mauldin MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

The purpose of this thesis is to identify the actions the U.S. military should take to ensure the next time it is called upon to provide a campaign strategy to the President, the U.S. military does not repeat the shortfalls of 9/15/2001, which called for a Direct Approach against an irregular adversary, Al Qaeda. The thesis presents a Game Theory analysis of Toft’s “Strategic Interaction Theory” to develop an optimal strategy for conducting future asymmetric conflicts. It finds the optimal strategy is to be equally capable of either a Direct or Indirect Approach and to employ whichever approach the adversary is employing. The thesis then reviews U.S. military operations between 1947 and 2001 and finds that 208 of the 210 known engagements optimally required a U.S. Indirect Approach. Despite the overwhelming preponderance of indirect action during this period, an assessment of the U.S. military educational system that produced the military uniformed leaders at the time of the 9/11 attacks shows it focused on the Direct Approach, rendering these leaders ill-prepared to advise the President on 9/15. The thesis concludes with recommendations for future U.S. military preparations for asymmetric warfare, calling for an equally balanced education of U.S. officers in Direct and Indirect Approach strategies.

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Email Marketing for U.S. Army and Special Operations Forces (SOF) Recruiting

by George F. McGrath III MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

United States Army and Special Operations Forces (SOF) Recruiters in the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) currently use four prospecting strategies to recruit Future Soldiers. These include telephone, referral, face-to-face, and internet or email prospecting. The four prospecting strategies have proven to be effective, but email prospecting continues to remain the most under utilized. Ironically, email prospecting is the most efficient strategy, yet most recruiters either refuse to try it or they use it incorrectly. This study will demonstrate that U.S. Army and SOF Recruiters can use email as a legitimate marketing tactic and powerful tool. The introduction will include the purpose of this study, background information that led me to this topic, and my hypothesis. The second chapter discusses the four recruiting strategies that are being used by U.S. Army and SOF recruiters with a concentration on email prospecting. In the third chapter, I conduct two case studies on organizations that successfully used E-mail marketing to increase recruitment and production. I also conduct a case study on the Raleigh Recruiting Company and demonstrate how E-mail marketing was used to increase recruitment during Fiscal Year (FY) 2006. The fourth chapter, containing a model to demonstrate the efficiency of Email marketing/prospecting when compared to phone prospecting and I justify an estimated Return on Investment (ROE) if the Army were to outsource an Email Service Provider (ESP) to assist recruiters with their email prospecting efforts. The final portion of this chapter determines whether or not USAREC is properly aligned to execute an effective email marketing campaign. Chapter five concludes the study and chapter six contains references, an appendix, and a distribution list.

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NATO, SOF And The Future Of The Alliance

by Joseph M. Mouer MAJ, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

NATO continues to transform itself from a Cold-War institution. Originally designed to defend Western Europe from a conventional attack from the Soviet Union, the alliance is now extending its operational reach well beyond the borders of Europe. The realization that security for the alliance is integrated in the global security environment was first realized during the wars in the former Yugoslavia. During this conflict, NATO’s Cold War structure proved inadequate to address security issues that emanated from outside the alliance but impacted on its security. Although NATO began experimenting with organizational restructuring immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Balkan crisis acted as a catalyst and pressured NATO into adopting the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept which provides NATO with greater operational flexibility. However, NATO is still primarily structured to conduct military operations against conventional nation-state entities as exemplified by the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), a corps-level reaction force. In order to successfully respond to the threats of the 21st Century, NATO will require adopting changes in its organizational structure. This monograph recommends that NATO complete earlier transformational efforts by incorporating Special Operations Forces (SOF) into its permanent organizational structure to meet current and future challenges. The monograph argues NATO’s current relevancy is undermined by the lack of an organic SOF command and control headquarters at the strategic and operational levels. There is robust internal capacity at the tactical level within NATO; missing are the operational and strategic headquarters necessary to leverage that Special Operations capability to conduct unilateral or combined operations across all levels of war. Without the effort to create such an organization within NATO, the alliance will be unable to respond effectively to asymmetric threats originating from outside North America and Europe.

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Satan vs. Satan: The Use of Black PSYOP to Regain the Tactical Initiative in the Counterinsurgency Fight

by David E. Mugg MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

In the counterinsurgency fight, the insurgent has the tactical initiative because he is able to pick the time, place, and intensity of his own engagements. The insurgent’s environment, however, is a very difficult one despite his initiative. The insurgent must balance the mutually exclusive requirements of hiding (operational security) and fighting (operational effectiveness) in order to gain/maintain legitimacy without being prematurely destroyed by the state. What if the state could influence this balance? What if there was a way for the state to directly target the insurgent’s resource allocation between these competing requirements? Typically, states attempt this through influencing the population to support the state and reject the insurgent. But what if the state could use the insurgent’s own propaganda machine against itself? Through mathematical modeling, I will show that Black PSYOP enables the state to make strategic moves on behalf of the insurgent that are so detrimental to his cause that he must act in order to counter “his own” moves. In this way, the state is able to turn “Satan” against himself. “How shall then his kingdom stand?” ---Matthew 12:26

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Using Foreign Internal Defense and Unconventional Warfare to Conduct Global Counterinsurgency

by Eric J Peltzer MAJ, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

This monograph examines the use of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Unconventional Warfare (UW) as the primary means of preventing global insurgency. The paper is broken into four sections. The History section gives a basic background of Special Operations Forces, with emphasis on historical examples relevant to this topic. The historical overview shows that insurgency is an old form of warfare and is traditionally difficult to fight. The history of special operations shows a divergence over the past fifty years that has caused a decreasing capability in executing and coordinating FID and UW operations.

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Joint Targeting: Achieving Effects in an Uncertain Environment

by Ripley Michael T. MAJ, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

Throughout history, the process of targeting the enemy and its elements of power has been an essential component of achieving victory in warfare. The process of identifying, prioritizing and affecting targets in accordance with national goals and military objectives becomes even more critical in the complex operational environment of the 21st Century. The United States military uses the Joint Targeting Process as the critical linkage in translating desired effects into the actions that accomplish objectives and achieve victory. This monograph evaluates the effectiveness of the Joint Targeting Process in the current operational environment using research surveys. The paper examines the evolution of joint targeting methodology, the principles of targeting, the current application of joint targeting, and the emerging trends in the operational environment that affect targeting. The monograph then analyzes survey data to provide observations on the current effectiveness of systematic targeting procedures. Finally, the concluding section of the monograph offers recommendations on how to improve the education, training, and doctrine integration involving the Joint Targeting Process.

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Crossing the Last Three Feet: Organizational Integration of State Department Public Diplomacy and Psychological Operations Overseas

by Dale M. Russell MAJ, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

The influence effort is one of the key parts of success in the Global War on Terrorism. The US government must do everything possible to be effective in winning the war of ideas. This monograph will explore the efficacy of assigning a US military psychological operations officer to work in the Public Diplomacy section of select embassies to facilitate the Global War on Terrorism. It will address the responsibilities and capabilities of the Department of State in executing influence for the US government overseas and show how the addition of this officer will offset the resource shortfalls of State Public Diplomacy. In addition to highlighting the benefits to State, it will also show the benefits to the Department of Defense. Lastly, it will present considerations for implementation of this proposal including recommendations for grade and seniority of the officer, specific unit of assignment, and pre-assignment training and education.

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How to Win and Know it an Effects-Based Approach to Irregular Warfare

by Michael P. Sullivan MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

The United States is entering its seventh year of the Global War on Terror and continues to struggle with irregular war. As the Department of Defense’s lead for Irregular Warfare (IW), U.S. Special Operations Command co-authored the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0 with the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command in order to “outline a holistic U.S. Government and partner nation approach to IW.” The concept establishes the need to integrate all instruments of national power in order to enable a joint force commander to successfully conduct a protracted IW campaign against state and non-state actors. The end state is a joint force with enhanced capability for IW and a balanced approach to warfighting. To succeed in IW the commander and staff need a campaign planning system that answers two primary questions: “How do you effectively focus on controlling or influencing populations?” and, “How do you measure your efforts in IW?” The answer maybe a “marriage” of an effects-based thinking with the concepts outlined in the new IW JOC. This thesis will analyze the potential of such a concept utilizing a case study of Special Operations Command Pacific’s own effects-based approach to the War on Terror.

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The Cycle of Reciprocity: A Social Capital Intervention Strategy for SSTR [sic]

by Glenn A. Tolle LTC, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Is it possible to initiate and sustain a positive cycle of reciprocity between competing actors in a Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) environment? The author postulates that an intervention strategy based on fostering “bridging social capital” between two or more competing parties stands a greater probability of success than an intervention strategy based primarily on an infusion of physical or human capital. The author reviews key literature of social capital and examines two cases involving a harvest initiative in Gnjilane, Kosovo (July-September 1999) and the “Village of Hope” in Mosul, Iraq (January-December, 2004). Examination of these two instances of convincing recalcitrant ethnicities to cooperate for the greater good yields lessons in civil military relations and provides a template for intervention and for generating “bridging” social capital. Current practices in SSTR operations inadvertently establish a competitive dilemma by introducing significant amounts of fiscal and physical capital in a post-conflict environment. Ethnic groups compete with other groups for financial, human and information capital—to the detriment of the collective civil good. Recommendations for civilian and military interventionists include bringing competing ethnicities together in common, low-level microfinancial projects that foster bridging social capital between kinship-based social networks.

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Commercial Augmentation for Intelligence Operations: Lessons Learned From the Global War on Terrorism

by Voelz Glenn J. COL, USA
Defense Acquisition Review Journal

The enormous operational demands of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) have required an unprecedented expansion of private sector augmentation to mitigate critical shortfalls in analytical staffing and supplement operational-level resources for tasks such as collection management, document exploitation, interrogation support, intelligence production, and linguistic services. Unfortunately, few Department of Defense intelligence organizations were fully prepared for the expanded contract administration requirements necessary to manage the influx of private sector support. This article discusses some recent lessons learned from commercial augmentation programs within the Intelligence Community and offers several recommendations for improving the management of these resources.

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A Decisive Point in the War on Terrorism

by Warburg Robert A. COL, USA
Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia

Joint doctrine can better frame the critical factor of human dimension and the element of time in the joint operation planning process. Both are central in the War on Terrorism. To frame the discussion, the study examines the strategic aspect of culture and then considers the human terrain in military planning. The research reviews various narratives for the current strategic environment. The paper then examines the current transnational terrorist threat, its ideology, its goals, and its operational reach. The study then reviews current joint doctrine with a specific focus on how it frames the operational environment and how it employs time in the operational design process. It examines the AirLand Battle doctrine for its applicability to the War on Terrorism. Changes to the joint operational environment and operational design models are recommended. This paper considers a decisive point the United States must control or influence in the War on Terrorism.

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National Security Crisis Decision-Making: The Role of the Regional Combatant Commander

by Sean C Williams MAJ, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

The successful management of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 set an unfortunate precedent for crisis management and national security crisis decision-making that persists into the contemporary security environment. The Cold War norm, roughly translated, meant that crisis management equaled crisis mitigation. The problem today is that the security environment has changed. Crisis management in the new environment should consider the use of crisis conditions to further the nation’s security interests. The US has implemented formal changes to the structure of national security decision-making. Through the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA), the Congress sought to reorganize the defense establishment to provide for better military advice to civilian leaders and also to enable better operational execution during complex and fast-moving national security contingencies. The GNA expanded the authority of the regional combatant commanders (CCDR) and charged the CCDRs with the maintenance of security in their region. Finally, the informal roles and relationships between the civilian and uniformed leadership that change with new presidential administrations often influence the decision-making process and policy formulation. Despite these changes, few scholars or policy makers have considered the role of the CCDR during complex contingencies.

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Building a Virtual Cultural Intelligence Community

by Matthew A. Zahn MAJ, USA; Wayne R. Lacey MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

The U.S. intelligence community is without peer in providing high-quality, detailed technical intelligence. Due to the intelligence community’s efforts, the USG has a thorough understanding of its adversaries’ activities. What we propose is to develop a means by which that same intelligence community can use cultural factors to answer the question “Why?” Although cultural intelligence plays a key role in many of America’s political and military successes, the maintenance of a broad-based, detailed cultural intelligence capability has thus far proven elusive. With the advent of networked collaboration tools, the intelligence community now has the ability to deploy a virtual cultural intelligence community. Such a community, based on a wiki, would incur almost no monetary or bureaucratic overhead, and could be configured so that the loss of any single intelligence organization would have minimal negative effect on its mission.

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