THE ROLE OF ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
IN NATION BUILDING

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General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN NATION BUILDING,
by MAJ Jeffrey J. Monte, 85 pages.

Although the United States (US) has been involved in nation-building efforts for the past 100 years it does not have a doctrinal definition to articulate what nation building is. Another challenge for the US is the lack of a designated agency within the US Government (USG) to lead the effort. First, an interagency, agreed upon, doctrinal definition of nation building must be established. Following this, each department and agency within the USG must be examined to identify the role each plays within a nation-building operation. This examination will allow the identification of the relationships between departments of the USG and the resources available to conduct nation building.

This thesis examines the role of Army Special Operation Forces (ARSOF) in nation building. In order to do so, a definition of nation building is established, key tasks of nation building are derived, and military tasks that support a nation building operation are developed. These military tasks are analyzed against the doctrinal missions and capabilities of ARSOF in order to identify how ARSOF can contribute to nation building. This thesis concludes with recommendations on the employment of ARSOF in nation-building operations.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATION</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation-Building Definition</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation-Building Key Tasks</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation-Building Military Tasks</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of ARSOF within Nation-Building Military Tasks</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDIES</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Uphold Democracy: Haiti</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Special Operations Forces in Haiti</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom: Afghanistan</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of ARSOF in Haiti and Afghanistan</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOSSARY</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCE LIST</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACRONYMS

AFSOF  Air Force Special Operations Forces
ANA   Afghan National Army
ARSOF  Army Special Operations Forces
AUSA  Association of the United States Army
CA    Civil Affairs
CAO   Civil Affairs Operations
CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive
CJCS  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
CJSOTF Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
CMO   Civil-Military Operations
CMOC  Civil-Military Operations Center
COCOM Combatant Command
CP    Counterproliferation (used in conjunction with WMD)
CSIS  Center for Strategic and International Studies
CT    Counterterrorism
DA    Direct Action
DOD   Department of Defense
DOS   Department of State
FID   Foreign Internal Defense
FMS   Foreign Military Sales
HCA   Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
IMET  International Military Education and Training
IO    Information Operations
JCMOTF Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
JPOTF Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force
MAAG  Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAT   Ministerial Advisory Team
MCA   Military Civic Action
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War
NAVSOF Naval Special Warfare Forces
NGO   Non-Governmental Organization
NSS   National Security Strategy
NSW   Naval Special Warfare
OEF   Operation Enduring Freedom
OP    Operational (Task)
PRT   Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSYOP Psychological Operations
PVO   Private Volunteer Organization
QDR   Quadrennial Defense Review
SA    Security Assistance
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAO</td>
<td>Security Assistance Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAL</td>
<td>Sea-Air-Land team</td>
</tr>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Special Operations</td>
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<td>SOA</td>
<td>Special Operations Aviation</td>
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<td>SOAR</td>
<td>Special Operations Aviation Regiment</td>
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<td>SOC</td>
<td>Special Operations Command (within a combatant command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCCCE</td>
<td>Special Operations Command and Control Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCJFCOM</td>
<td>Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Special Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Strategic Theater (Task)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UJTL</td>
<td>Universal Joint Task List</td>
</tr>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>Unconventional Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Nation-Building Task Evaluation Method.......................................................24
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Nation-Building Key Tasks</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Military Tasks to Support Nation Building</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Nation-Building Military Tasks and ARSOF</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Nation building is not a new mission for the United States or the United States military. The United States has been involved in nation building since the takeover in the Philippines in 1898 (Maslowsky 1993, 4), to include missions in Cuba, Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and now Iraq. In fact, the number of nation-building operations has increased since the demise of the Soviet Union with the United States averaging a nation-building operation every two years.

The United States has experienced varying levels of success with nation building. In Germany and Japan following World War II, nation building was very successful, while in Haiti nation building was unsuccessful (RAND 2003, xix-xxi). Although it is too early to tell the results of nation building in Afghanistan there have been positive results, and the conditions within Afghanistan are improving (Celeski 2003).

Although the United States has been involved in nation-building efforts around the world for the past 100 years, the United States does not have a doctrinal definition to clearly articulate what nation building is and what the role of the US Armed Forces is within a nation-building operation. One military officer, Colonel Jayne Carson, defines nation building as follows: “Nation-building is the intervention in the affairs of a nation state for the purpose of changing the state’s method of government. Nation building also includes efforts to promote institutions which will provide for economic well being and social equity” (Carson 2003, 2). While another military officer, Commander Robert Maslowsky, uses the following as a definition: “Nation-[building] is a methodical,
coordinated interagency approach to enhancing security through mutually agreed-upon requirements for infrastructure and institutional development. It addresses the root causes of instability by focusing collective energies and capabilities toward the development of key host nation institutions, both public and private” (Maslowsky 1993, 13). These two examples, although similar, show the different definitions used by military professionals attempting to articulate the definition of nation building. These differences result in military officers approaching nation building with different expectations of what the objectives are and of what the end state of the operation is to be.

The definition of nation building used in this thesis will be: Nation building is the application of diplomatic, informational, economic, and military resources in support of another nation in order to: establish sustainable key infrastructure and institutions; enable a nation to provide internal and external security to its population and nation; correct the conditions that have caused instability; and promote internal development. The end state is a nation that can function independently of foreign assistance or administration.

This definition was derived from current and historical related doctrine, research conducted on nation building, and research conducted on successful and unsuccessful nation-building operations. This definition reflects that nation building encompasses all the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, economic, and military), identifies the essential tasks within nation building, and describes the end state of nation building as the recipient nation able to function independently, without assistance from other nations.

For the United States, a significant challenge to nation building is the lack of a designated agency or department within the United States Government (USG) to lead the
effort. Neither the Department of Defense nor the Department of State believes nation building to be among their core missions. Hence, the two most influential and capable entities of the United States abroad are reluctant to step forward, provide a common direction or unity of effort for the operation, and shoulder the responsibility of mission success or failure (RAND 2003, xxviii). The result is a disjointed and less-effective effort in accomplishing the overall objectives due to a lack of unity of effort among participating departments, a lack of institutional knowledge concerning nation building, and a lack of investment in the education, training, and equipping of an element to prepare for this type of operation.

In the Department of Defense, military commanders are reluctant to conduct nation-building operations. These operations, increasingly more frequent in the past decade, deprive commanders of the needed time to train on combat skills they insist are required in order to conduct successful combat operations.

In the Department of State (DOS), officials are also reluctant to shoulder the responsibility for nation-building operations. This is a result of both the limited resources (financial and personnel) of the DOS and the current structure of the DOS. This existing structure currently hinders the ability of the DOS to effectively command and control the number of organizations, resources, and personnel to successfully nation build, when required to do so.

In order to effectively nation build in the future, the two most capable entities of the United States abroad must identify their roles within nation building and their relationships to each other. Additionally, the expertise and experience of all departments and agencies within the USG must be examined to identify the role each plays within a
nation-building operation. This analysis will allow a more effective integration of the capabilities found among the various agencies and enable the USG, as a whole, to define the relationships among the diverse departments and agencies when conducting a nation-building operation.

The first step that must be taken is to establish an interagency, agreed upon, doctrinal definition of nation building. Following this, each department of the USG must identify their internal resources capable of contributing to a nation-building operation. An agreed upon definition, and each department’s subsequent analysis, will serve all segments of the USG by assisting in the identification of the relationships between organizations, as well as the resources best suited to conduct the operation. History tells us that the resources called upon have come from all segments of the USG. However, in each particular situation these resources must be tailored to the requirements within the specific recipient nation. Frequently, the primary resources have come from the United States Armed Forces due to their ability to deploy rapidly and operate in an austere environment for extended periods of time.

The process of determining the resources required involves several agencies or departments within the USG. In most cases, the Ambassador, as the United States’ representative to a host nation, consults with the host nation to identify the host nation’s needs and requests, then conducts an analysis based upon his experience and expertise within the country. Following this, the Ambassador develops a country plan in consultation with his country team. The Ambassador determines which instruments of national power are at his disposal to accommodate the requests of the host nation, while fulfilling those requests within the objectives of the United States within that nation.
When military resources are needed, the Ambassador and his Senior Defense Representative request the resources from the Regional Combatant Commander with whom they are aligned. The military resources or units required, under the direction of the Regional Combatant Commander, engage, as needed, with the host nation, to fulfill the needs or requests of the host nation.

The objectives of the United States within a particular nation vary greatly from country to country. However, as the events of September, 11, 2001 have demonstrated, the United States must remain engaged throughout the world to identify current and potential threats, and commit resources to prevent those threats from developing the capability to attack the United States, its allies, or its interests abroad.

In the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), President Bush outlined the following: “Wherever possible, the United States will rely on regional organizations and state powers to meet their obligations to fight terrorism. Where governments find the fight against terrorism beyond their capacities, we will match their willpower and their resources with whatever help we and our allies can provide” (Bush 2002, 7). In other words, in countries that are incapable of dealing with a particular threat within their borders, the United States will assist them in developing the ability to combat terrorist organizations. In the NSS, President Bush publicly adopted a more preemptive policy in assisting the United States’ allies and friends around the world in the goal of preventing terrorists from operating within their countries. When the United States works with these countries in their efforts to combat terrorists, it will be assisting them in building their nation’s capability to internally deal with organizations that could be potentially harmful to the United States. Although this element of the NSS is applicable to nation assistance
where the two nations (US and host nation) agree upon the assistance to be given, this can also be applied to nation building where the host nation is incapable of functioning as it is currently operating and requires a more comprehensive level of assistance.

The United States military has been and continues to be engaged throughout the world assisting countries during peace and war. Through numerous training exercises, joint operations, and assistance directly to foreign countries, the military has been active in the development of other countries’ military forces. Additional advantages of these military-to-military contacts are: personnel within the host nation are exposed to US ideals and values, military units observe the military-civilian relationship within democracies, and the host nation receives assistance in infrastructure development that relates to the military training and exercises.

The military’s role in engagement activities and the development of these countries is varied from region to region. Similarly, the role of Special Operations Forces (SOF) varies within these regions as well. However, for some Regional Combatant Commanders, SOF has become the force of choice for these activities (House 1997, 3). SOF’s ability to operate independently and their small footprint is an effective and low-cost way of assisting the nation and at the same time demonstrating the US resolve to work with and assist the nation.

SOF are those that are designated by law to perform nine principal missions. In a message released 202013Z May 2003, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) changed these principal missions to core tasks. The SOF core tasks are: Unconventional Warfare (UW); Foreign Internal Defense (FID); Direct Action (DA); Special Reconnaissance (SR); Counterterrorism (CT); Counterproliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction (CP); Psychological Operations (PSYOP); Information Operations (IO); and Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) (USSOCOM Msg 2003, 3). In this message, USSOCOM changed two of the principal missions articulated in joint doctrine. The first change was renaming Combating Terrorism to Counterterrorism to better describe SOF’s offensive capability within the Department of Defense’s combating terrorism effort (USSOCOM Msg 2003, 4). The second change was renaming Civil Affairs to Civil Affairs Operations to distinguish between the forces and the actions they are conducting (USSOCOM Msg 2003, 4).

SOF are operationally inexpensive to employ due to their small size. At the same time, their experience and expertise display to US friends and allies a high level of professionalism and the ability to expertly perform their missions. However, the time and resources required to train SOF, the resources required to maintain SOF units, and the shrinking number of personnel within the Armed Forces capable of meeting SOF’s standards has resulted in a small number of SOF soldiers and units. The smaller number of SOF soldiers and units demands their selected use to prevent their overuse and the erosion of their skills. This erosion would cause them to be unable to perform their core tasks with the exception of when they are conducting activities directly related to one of these tasks, such as Foreign Internal Defense. These are factors a regional combatant commander must consider when deciding upon the type of forces to employ in nation-building operations.

Additionally, the SOF soldier is normally more mature and experienced than the normal conventional soldier. Many are regionally oriented and possess both language skills and a cultural awareness of the country or area of operations. They possess an
ability to interact with foreign nationals, apply judgment or discretion, and initiate actions to accomplish their mission (USSOCOM 2003, 1). These characteristics enhance SOF’s ability to operate both independently and within an existing US government structure in a host nation.

Each component of SOF brings unique strengths, weaknesses, capabilities, and limitations. With a thorough knowledge of these factors, a commander is better suited to understand when to employ his SOF forces, when to use conventional forces, and in what circumstances he needs to request additional SOF assets to accomplish his assigned mission.

The United States Special Operations Command consists of forces from the US Army, the US Navy, and the US Air Force. This thesis will focus on the forces within the US Army designated as SOF. These forces include the Special Forces, Rangers, Army Special Operations Aviation, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs.

The primary question this thesis seeks to answer is: What is the role of the United States Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) in nation building? To answer this question it will be necessary to define nation building, determine what activities or actions must be accomplished to successfully nation build, determine what military tasks support a nation building operation, identify the ways in which the United States has conducted nation building in the past, and examine what the United States’ policy is toward nation building.

This thesis will also examine SOF’s core tasks, the roles and missions of the different units within ARSOF, ARSOF’s capabilities within a nation building effort, and ARSOF’s strengths, weaknesses, and unique characteristics.
Additionally, this thesis will examine the conduct of nation building in Haiti and Afghanistan to determine how Army Special Operations Forces were used in Haiti and are currently being utilized in nation building operations in Afghanistan.

Finally, this thesis will provide conclusions and recommendations on nation building and how US Army Special Operations Forces can be utilized within a nation-building operation.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

There are currently a number of works that devote a great amount of effort in discussing nation building. This is a topic of considerable concern to both the US and the world since the US removed the Taliban from Afghanistan and continues to increase since the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and the subsequent turmoil that exists within Iraq. The trend among the discussion, with few exceptions, identifies nation building as the complete construction or re-construction of a state. This differentiates nation building from nation assistance where nation assistance is the mutually agreed upon assistance provided to a country that can still function, but requires a limited level of assistance to correct a deficiency in its ability to internally function.

To contribute to the literature regarding nation building this thesis will define the role of Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) in nation building. To do so, the thesis has established a definition of nation building and will explore the capabilities of ARSOF that contribute to this mission by identifying the tasks that must be done during nation building and the military tasks associated with nation building.

The publications that will be used in this thesis will be diverse. To achieve a thorough understanding of nation building and arrive at an accurate, encompassing definition of this mission it must be analyzed from a number of differing viewpoints. These viewpoints will include those expressed by the United States Government through the National Security Strategy and congressional hearings and testimony, joint and individual service publications, and individual research papers conducted by members of
the United States Armed Forces during study at service schools. Also, this thesis will examine civilian and international sources, who approach the mission from an international perspective with different experiences. Additionally, numerous publications have been written describing historical examples of the US military’s role in nation building, specifically the use of ARSOF during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

The September 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) addresses the need to defend the US from adversaries and potential adversaries with the assistance of other nations, or, unilaterally if other nations cannot assist adequately. It states that two common enemies to the US and its allies are terrorism and violence and when US allies do not have the ability to deal with these enemies we will assist them. We will do this specifically with law enforcement, political assistance, military forces, financial resources and, generally, with whatever assistance is needed (Bush 2002, 6-7). Additionally, the strategy outlines that when violence occurs and a nation begins to fail, the US will assist in restoring stability to the nation and assist the population in dealing with the crisis (Bush 2002, 9). A key component of the 2002 NSS, in relation to nation building, is the willingness of the US to assist regional organizations and individual nations by providing the needed resources to ensure stability within regions and countries.

The September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report establishes the relationship between the security and stability of other nations and the security of the US. The QDR further establishes the role of the military in preserving the stability within other nations and the responsibility of the military to work with the militaries of other nations in order to be prepared for future conflicts. The QDR uses the term security
cooperation in which the Department of Defense uses its resources to “create favorable balances of military power in critical areas of the world to deter aggression or coercion” (QDR 2001, 7). This is accomplished by conducting training exercises, participating in joint exercises, and operating together during peace as the forces would operate together during times of conflict. These training and joint exercises increase interoperability between the forces, assure friends and allies that the United States is committed to them, and establishes the mechanisms for follow-on forces should a crisis develop. Although the QDR does not directly state the role of the armed forces in nation building, the military is designated to conduct operations and training with friends and allies. This interaction strengthens their internal ability to maintain stability and establishes the interoperability required to introduce additional forces.

In Nation-Building and the Operational Commander, Commander (CDR) Robert Maslowsky, US Navy, examines nation building and how combatant commanders conduct nation building. CDR Maslowsky uses the following during his research as the definition of nation building:

Nation-[building] is a methodical, coordinated interagency approach to enhancing security through mutually agreed-upon requirements for infrastructure and institutional development. It addresses the root causes of instability by focusing on collective energies and capabilities toward the development of key host nation institutions, both public and private. (1993, 1)

CDR Maslowky views nation building as a low cost way of stabilizing a nation or region by using a limited number of forces to address the cause of the instability and, in the process, assist the host nation in developing its internal infrastructure. He also links regional security with the security of the United States. CDR Maslowsky states that the
United States military is the only organization that has the required skills to nation build and that if it is requested by the host nation, it works (Maslowsky 1993, 7).

CDR Maslowsky also addresses the relationship between the Combatant Commander and the Ambassador assigned to each nation within his area of responsibility. The Ambassador decides which projects will be conducted within the host nation even though the Combatant Commander controls the personnel and resources to conduct the project (Maslowski 1993, 21). The coordination between the Combatant Commander and the Ambassador is critical to ensure not only that the appropriate projects are conducted but also to ensure that the limited resources available are used efficiently to maximize the results. CDR Maslowsky offers the following as methods for the combatant commander to conduct nation building: security assistance; international military education and training; mobile training teams; international maritime law enforcement teams; civil affairs and civic action; and foreign internal defense.

In *Nation-Building, The American Way*, Colonel (COL) Jayne Carson, US Army, looks at how the United States has historically conducted nation building and some key components to successfully nation build. COL Carson uses the following as a definition of nation building: “Nation-building is the intervention in the affairs of a nation state for the purposes of changing the state’s method of government. Nation-building also includes efforts to promote institutions which will provide for economic well being and social equity” (Carson 2003, 2). According to COL Carson, the objectives the United States desires when conducting nation building are unique. They are, “establishing a representative government and setting conditions which will allow for economic growth and individual prosperity” (Carson 2003, 2). COL Carson states that security is a
requirement to conduct nation building and this is the role of the United States military. COL Carson discusses Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in which the purpose was to conduct nation building. This operation initially established security, returned Haiti’s elected president, and then established the infrastructure for economic and social development (Carson 2003, 18). The operation consisted of mainly US forces during the first six months and was then handed over to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). Although UNMIH was initially successful by making improvements in water, sanitation, electricity, and roads, the effects would diminish due to the failure of the population and government to assume responsibility and ownership for nation building (Carson 2003, 18-19). Carson offers several lessons learned from nation building in the past. These include the following: nation building takes a long time and a long military presence in that nation; nation building is more successful if the nation’s economy is viable; nation building is more successful if the nation has experience in self-government; and that nation building is costly both in resources and lives (Carson 2003, 22-23).

In *Judicious Engagement: The Road to Enduring Peace*, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Chelsea Chae, US Army, argues that the United States must continue to engage in the international community because this engagement affirms the United States’ legitimacy and promotes both stability and democracy. These components are key to the prosperity of the United States (Chae 2002, 1). LTC Chae says that crises will continue due to states’ inability to govern their societies and these failed or failing states will result in a greater number of small-scale contingencies (Chae 2002, 3). This is a result of nonstate entities taking advantage of the inability of the nation to provide basic services for its population. In reference to Afghanistan, LTC Chae offers that the US must restore
legitimacy to the Afghan government and its leadership. Stability cannot return without the government providing basic services to its people and only a long-term reconstruction program can prevent Afghanistan from returning to a safe-haven for terrorists (Chae 2002, 22). Additionally, LTC Chae gives several keys to success in Afghanistan. First, an external power must provide security for the uninterrupted movement of resources within the country while a national army is being established (Chae 2002, 23). Second, the international community, supported by the US, must ensure that the political system within Afghanistan is reconstructed and this process will take a long time (Chae 2002, 23). Additionally, LTC Chae notes some important aspects of nation building in general. He states that nation building is expensive, requires a lot of personnel to ensure its success, and takes a great deal of time to accomplish; that those who are nation building must be patient; and that the cost of nation building is not as great as the alternative (Chae 2002, 24).

In *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, RAND analyzes both the United States and international involvement in nation building since World War II. In this study, military, political, and economic activities are discussed in order to determine the factors of a successful nation-building effort, and with the lessons learned from previous US nation-building efforts, these factors are applied to nation building in Iraq. RAND recognizes the reluctance of the US to become entangled in nation building. However, RAND also acknowledges the increased commitment that the US has shown in nation building efforts when it chooses to do so. Through an analysis of nation building in Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, RAND concludes a number of factors that are relevant in nation building. First, “Nation-building is not
principally about economic reconstruction; rather it is about political transformation.” (RAND 2003, xix). Second, the following influence nation building: the nation’s system of governance, how developed the nation is economically, and the ethnic composition of the country (RAND 2003, xxv). Third, larger contributions (time, manpower, and money) of the United States and the international community toward nation building result in higher levels of development of the nation’s democratic institutions and its economy (RAND 2003, xix). Fourth, the quicker and the less blood that is shed, the more difficult it will be to stabilize the nation following a conflict. This is the result of how weary the population is toward conflict and of its willingness to continue to struggle with the stabilization force following hostilities (RAND 2003, xxii). Fifth, nation building is more successful when the there is a single entity responsible for developing a vision, or, the participants involved share the same vision for the nation building efforts of the contributing nations (RAND 2003, xxiii-xxiv). Sixth, nation building is time-consuming with no successful nation building effort lasting less than five years. However, while leaving early guarantees failure, staying longer does not necessarily guarantee success (RAND 2003, xxiv). Seventh, the adoption of democratic institutions or ideals does not guarantee success. When the democratization does not address the problems within the nation or external problems affecting the nation, the nation may still falter (RAND 2003, xxiv). Eighth, although multilateral nation building is more difficult and longer, it is cheaper for the participants, can produce greater transformations, and produces greater regional reconciliation (RAND 2003, xxv). Ninth, the greater the number of the forces providing security, the lower the number of casualties suffered by the stabilization force and the population (RAND 2003, xxv). RAND also makes some general observations
about the United States conducting nation building over the past decade. Although the United States has made significant improvements in its ability to conduct combat operations since the Gulf War it has made limited improvements in its ability to conduct post combat stabilization or reconstruction operations (RAND 2003, xxviii). Also, both the Department of State and the Department of Defense have resisted taking the lead on nation building and each administration has approached each operation as if it were the first one the United States had conducted (RAND 2003, xxix). Finally, RAND concludes that not until the United States accepts the fact, that as the only superpower, it has a responsibility to nation build, will it prepare to do so.

In *Play to Win: Final Report of the Bi-Partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) combine to research the relevance of nation building and discuss some key elements of successful nation building operations. CSIS and AUSA state that although the United States would like to avoid nation building it will not be able to do so due to its global interests, global presence, and the negative results of ignoring the problem of weak or failing states. This report proposes that there are four main areas that must be addressed during postconflict reconstruction: security; justice and reconciliation; economic and social well being; and, governance and participation (CSIS and AUSA 2003, 1). The report further specifies that the leadership or direction of the reconstruction effort should be turned over to the host nation as early in the process as possible (CSIS and AUSA 2003, 4). Additionally, this report stresses that if security is not achieved, the effort will ultimately fail (CSIS and AUSA 2003, 4).
In Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, the Department of the Army establishes the Army’s role in the conduct of nation building type activities under Stability Operations. It states that, “The national security and national military strategies establish an imperative for engagement. The US will remain politically and militarily engaged in the world and will maintain military superiority over potential adversaries” (FM 3-0 2001, 1-4). This engagement will strengthen our relationships with our friends and allies as well as develop democratic institutions within those nations (FM 3-0 2001, 1-5). FM 3-0 states that Army forces, especially ARSOF, are suited for peacetime military engagement (PME) which includes all military activities that involve other countries, and, PME is conducted to shape the security environment during peacetime (FM 3-0 2001, 9-2). Additionally, PME promotes the stability of a country or region by increasing a host nation’s capability and willingness to take care of its population (FM 3-0 2001, 9-3). FM 3-0 includes PME under the umbrella of Stability Operations. It specifies that Stability Operations may be conducted before crises, during crises, during hostilities, or following hostilities (FM 3-0 2001, 9-6).

In FM 3-07, *Stability and Support Operations*, the Department of the Army outlines the objectives of, considerations during, and methods employed during the conduct of Stability Operations. Some of the objectives outline in FM 3-07 for Stability Operations include: to promote peace and deter aggression; reassure allies, friendly governments and agencies; maintain and restore order; protect life and property; prevent, deter, or respond to terrorism; promote sustainable and responsive institutions; and promote freedom from oppression, subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (FM 3-07 2002, 1-2). FM 3-07 offers the following considerations during Stability Operations:
enhance the capabilities and legitimacy of a host nation; leverage interagency, joint, and multinational cooperation; understand the potential for consequences; display the capability to use force; act decisively to prevent escalation; and apply force selectively and discriminately (FM 3-07 2002, 1-3/4). Also, FM 3-07 specifies numerous areas that must be addressed if the operation concerns securing or establishing components of the nation’s infrastructure. These include vital human services, civil administration, communications and information, transportation and distribution, energy production, and commerce (FM 3-07 2002, 1-13). Additionally, FM 3-07 specifies some potential methods capable of being employed during Stability Operations. These include Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Security Assistance, and Humanitarian Civic Assistance.

In *The State of Special Operations Forces*, General (GEN) Holland outlines to the Senate Armed Services Committee’s Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee the current status, roles, challenges, and future employment of US SOF. In relation to nation building, GEN Holland emphasizes SOF’s capability to conduct surrogate warfare by organizing and training friendly foreign forces to help them contend with hostile challenges (Holland 2002, 14). Additionally, the participation of SOF within each Combatant Commander’s theater engagement plan enhances the professionalism of the armed forces of third world nations, encourages responsible regionally-based forces, facilitates US access to third world countries, assures friends and allies, dissuades potential adversaries, and promotes US values and interests (Holland 2002, 14). General Holland addresses the increased workload of SOF and outlines ways to mitigate the effects of this workload. These include tailoring the force to the task, using the Reserve Component, utilizing conventional forces for non-SOF specific missions, and outsourcing
or using coalition forces, when they are available (Holland 2002, 16). General Holland outlines the need for SOF to improve their ability to transition operations to conventional forces. This is due to the expectation that SOF will be called early during times of conflict and will need to transition quickly in order to allow SOF the time to reconstitute and prepare for the next conflict (Holland 2002, 27-28).

In *Special Operations Forces: Opportunities to Preclude Overuse and Misuse*, Mr. Mark E. Gebicke, the Director of Military Operations and Capabilities Issues within the National Security and International Affairs Division of the US General Accounting Office, reports to the House of Representatives on whether SOF are being used in a manner that best supports national security objectives. Mr. Gebicke outlines some distinctions between SOF and conventional forces. SOF “are specially organized, trained, and equipped to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional means” (Gebicke 1997, 2). Additionally, SOF “differ from conventional operations because of their enhanced physical and political risks, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets” (Gebicke 1997, 2). Mr. Gebicke found that there is general agreement between the Combatant Commanders and SOF commanders on mission priorities and the Combatant Commanders often considered SOF as their force of choice during combat and peacetime engagement missions (Gebicke 1997, 3). Mr. Gebicke also found that the increase in SOF deployments has, or threatens to, degrade SOF’s effectiveness and that SOF are performing missions that could be conducted by conventional forces (Gebicke 1997, 4). Gebicke also notes the overall satisfaction major commands have with SOF, especially during crisis situations due to
their level of training, maturity, language skills, and cultural orientation (Gebicke 1997, 5). Some areas Gebicke found that could be performed by conventional forces rather than SOF include: humanitarian assistance; embassy support; support to other government agencies; and combat search and rescue (Gebicke 1997, 13).

In the 2003-2004 SOF Posture Statement, as the Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict Marshall Billingslea and General Charles Holland, Commander, USSOCOM, provide a comprehensive look at the current state of US SOF, its organization and functions, current operations, and the future of US SOF. Each service component is examined, detailing how it is organized to accomplish its assigned missions while providing examples of its current employment in support of the Global War on Terrorism. The following operational priorities for SOF are outlined: preempting global terrorists and CBRNE threats; enhancing homeland security; performing unconventional warfare and serving as a conventional force multiplier in conflict against state adversaries; conducting proactive stability operations; and executing small-scale contingencies (Billingslea and Holland 2003, 29). Also, the posture statement provides some characteristics of SOF, to include: specialized skills, equipment, and tactics; a regional focus; language skills; political and cultural sensitivity; and a small, flexible, joint-force (Billingslea and Holland 2002, 35). Additionally, the posture statement outlines the way ahead for SOF through transformation and future initiatives to maintain SOF’s ability to meet the challenges of tomorrow.

The literature reviewed provides a foundation from which to examine nation building, the requirements within nation building, how nation building has been conducted in the past, and the US’s policy toward nation building. These resources,
combined with additional resources further detailing the capabilities of ARSOF and how ARSOF has been used in past nation-building operations will allow an analysis of how ARSOF can contribute to nation building.
In order to determine the role of Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) in nation building, this chapter will utilize a clear definition and the key tasks of effective nation building to determine what military tasks must be performed to successfully support a nation building operation. The key tasks of effective nation building will be derived from an analysis of successful and unsuccessful nation-building operations. The military tasks that support these key tasks will be derived from CJCSM 3500. 04C, the *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)*. A template of probable tasks needed to support nation building will be created. This template will be similar to the templates found in Appendix A to Enclosure E of CJCSM 3500. 04C, “Suggested Operational Templates by UJTL Task.” This template of military tasks will then be analyzed against ARSOF’s core tasks and capabilities. This analysis will determine whether a core task of ARSOF resides within the task, if ARSOF has a capability that can be utilized within the task, or if ARSOF has neither a core task nor a capability to contribute to the task. This analysis will result in identifying the support ARSOF can provide to a nation-building operation. Figure 1, Nation Building Task Evaluation Method, graphically portrays the method that will be used to analyze ARSOF’s role in nation building.
Nation-Building Definition

As identified in chapter 1, the definition of nation building used in this thesis is as follows: Nation building is the application of diplomatic, informational, economic, and military resources in support of another nation in order to: establish sustainable key infrastructure and institutions; enable a nation to provide internal and external security to its population and nation; correct the conditions that have caused instability; and promote internal development. The end state is a nation that can function independently of foreign assistance or administration.

Nation-Building Key Tasks

During chapter 2, “Literature Review,” lessons learned from previous nation-building operations were identified. These lessons learned varied, dependent upon the operation which the research was based. However, the nation-building key tasks listed in table 1 are the actions or activities that are consistently identified as required in order to effectively nation build.
The security of the government and the population from internal and external threats is the foundation that must be established for the remainder of the key tasks to occur (CSIS and AUSA 2003, 9). This includes establishing and maintaining the forces, institutions, and capabilities to effectively mitigate threats to individual citizens and the government that are both internal and external to the country. This may include border security forces, immigration control and customs checkpoints, police forces, and military forces. Each newly formed or modified organization must be capable of providing a specific, needed function that can mitigate a threat to the population or the government. The threats may be internal to the nation, such as acts of violence or lawlessness, or external such as a bordering nation who is willing to conduct operations against the nation. Not only the specific threats, but also the capabilities of the threats must be identified in order to assist in prioritizing the efforts and resources against the most likely and most capable threat to the security of the nation and its population. The amount of foreign assistance (resources, training, and equipment) provided to the nation building effort and the level of indigenous resources that can also be applied to internal and external security must be considered. The forces, institutions, and capabilities established
must be self-sustainable by the recipient nation. This will prevent the nation from indefinitely relying on foreign assistance and enable the nation to continue to provide the security needed for its survival and growth following the withdrawal of external support.

The development of needed infrastructure and key institutions involves establishing or enhancing the host nation’s capability to provide the basic services required to meet the needs of its population. These needs include, but are not limited to: food; water; electricity; medical care; education; employment; police and judiciary services; financial services; and the ability to transport goods, services, and personnel. Adding to the complexity of this task is the fact that many of the needed infrastructure requirements are co-dependent. For example, an increase in the ability of the host nation to produce food and potable drinking water may not benefit the population without an increase in the host nation’s ability to transport these commodities to the towns and villages needing the foodstuffs the most (CSIS and AUSA 2003, 12) Additionally, the host nation’s ability to provide these functions is directly related to several other key tasks, including: economic development; legitimacy of the government and its leaders; justice and reconciliation; and political stability. Each of the institutions developed must be compatible with and fulfill the needs of the population within the nation. Additionally, the authorities within the nation must have the technical capability to independently maintain and improve the infrastructure and institutions. This requires a nation building operation that provides the resources and expertise to both establish the needed infrastructure and key institutions and train personnel within the recipient nation to maintain the infrastructure and key institutions once foreign assistance has been reduced or withdrawn.
Economic development encompasses the production, distribution, and exchange of goods and services both within the nation and with the international community. This task is critical to the nation’s ability to obtain the resources needed by its population, improve the living conditions of its population, and obtain the resources needed to sustain the rebuilding effort.

The legitimacy of the government and its leaders involves ensuring both the population within the nation adhere to the government’s rule and the international community continues to support the nation in the future when it begins to operate independently. Due to the amount of time involved with nation building, the legitimacy of the government and its leaders must be emphasized early during the campaign and reinforced repeatedly to ensure the population remains supportive of the government. At every opportunity it must be stressed and reinforced that progress is being made as a result of the host nation government’s actions.

Justice and reconciliation involves establishing the mechanisms, or adapting the existing institutions, capable of upholding the rule of law and addressing past and present grievances and abuses (CSIS and AUSA 2003, 10). The method used to accomplish this task depends upon the system used in the past to resolve conflicts, the cause of the current instability, and the amount of injustice (or perceived injustice) felt between groups within the population. Ethnic cleansing, religious conflicts, failed government programs, or any situation that causes discontent within the populace must be addressed. Groups or parties who have grievances or feel that they have been oppressed must be made aware that their issues are understood and observe that actions are being taken to correct the actual or perceived injustices.
Political stability involves ensuring the recipient nation’s system of government is able to address the issues confronting the government and is able to operate independently of any foreign assistance or influence. In order to do this, the root causes of the instability must be addressed. Although this task is largely dependent upon other key tasks, other considerations and indicators of whether the nation will achieve political stability include: the system of government previously utilized; the participation of the population in the political process; if any groups or parties have been excluded from the political process; the ethnic composition of the population; if the causes of the instability have been rectified; and the ability of the government to form a consensus of the nation’s priorities for re-building. Unsuccessful nation building efforts in the past have tied the withdrawal of international assistance to the establishment of a formal election process, as was done in Haiti. This failed because it is a functioning national government, able to harness and focus the efforts of its population and the assistance provided by the international community toward its re-building, not an election, which will determine whether the nation building will be either successful or unsuccessful (CSIS and AUSA 2003, 13).

The transition of the effort to the recipient nation must be accomplished as early in the nation building operation as possible. This task must be considered throughout the nation building effort to ensure the capabilities of the recipient nation are not exceeded. It must be understood that the objective is for the recipient nation’s government and its population to direct the nation building effort. The recipient nation must be willing and capable of accepting the responsibility for successful and unsuccessful aspects of the nation building operation. Success depends upon the recipient nation’s acceptance of
ownership, direction, sustainment, and improvement of the nation-building effort within its sovereign country.

**Nation-Building Military Tasks**

With these key tasks established as the required actions or activities that must be accomplished for a nation-building operation to be successful, the tasks listed in table 2 are the military tasks that support those activities. These military tasks constitute a starting point when beginning to plan for a nation building operation. This starting point, showing the probable tasks that will be involved in the operation will enable a commander to more clearly identify the particular capabilities, and as a result, the units needed to successfully accomplish his assigned mission. The tasks selected are focused at the strategic and operational level for three reasons. First, the critical aspect of the operation is the integration of the four instruments of national power across the differing agencies and departments of the US government involved in a nation-building operation and the decision to integrate these instruments will be a strategic decision. Second, the specific tasks, or tactical tasks that will have to be accomplished will be developed based upon the specific needs of the nation that is to be the recipient of the nation-building effort. And third, to remain consistent with the operational templates established for specific operations in Appendix A to Enclosure E of CJCSM 3500. 04C. Each military task listed in table 2 will be described, to include: its general definition; the nation-building key tasks it supports; and its associated subtasks.
### Table 2. Military Tasks to Support Nation Building

| ST 8. 1  | Coordinate coalitions or alliances, regional relations and security assistance activities. |
| ST 8. 2  | Provide support to allies, regional governments, interagency organizations or groups. |
| OP 1. 5  | Control operationally significant areas. |
| OP 2. 2  | Collect and share operational intelligence. |
| OP 4. 4  | Coordinate support for forces in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). |
| OP 4. 7  | Provide politico-military support to other nations, groups, and government organizations. |
| OP 5. 4  | Command subordinate operational forces. |
| OP 5. 7  | Coordinate and integrate joint/multinational and interagency support. |
| OP 6. 5  | Provide security for operational forces and means. |

The strategic theater (ST) task, “Coordinate coalitions or alliances, regional relations and security assistance activities,” focuses on building relationships with other nations, regional organizations, and international commands and agencies (CJCSM 2002, B-C-B-133). It supports the nation-building key task, security of the government, and population from internal and external threats. Its subtasks include: enhance regional politico-military relations; promote regional security and interoperability; develop headquarters or organizations for coalitions; and develop multinational intelligence/information sharing structure (CJCSM 2002, B-C-B-7).

The ST task, “Provide support to allies, regional governments, international organizations or groups,” includes the support needed to further US national objectives. This support may include intelligence, logistic, civil-military operations, security assistance, nation assistance, and command and control support (CJCSM 2002, B-C-B-136). It supports the nation-building key tasks: security of the government and population from internal and external threats; develop needed infrastructure and key institutions; economic development; justice and reconciliation; and transition of nation-building.
efforts to the host nation. Its subtasks include: coordinate security assistance activities; coordinate civil affairs in theater; coordinate foreign humanitarian assistance; coordinate humanitarian and civic assistance programs; coordinate nation assistance support; coordinate military civic action assistance; assist in restoration of order; support peace operations in theater; support multilateral peace operations; establish and coordinate a peacekeeping infrastructure; coordinate peace enforcement; coordinate theater foreign internal defense activities; coordinate multinational operations within theater; cooperate with and support nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in theater; cooperate with and support private voluntary organizations (PVO) in theater; and coordinate countermine activities (CJCSM 2002, B-C-B-7).

The Operational Task (OP) task, “Control operationally significant areas,” includes controlling areas within the joint operations area (JOA) that provide an advantage to either side and denying the enemy the ability to operate within that area (CJCSM 2002, B-C-C-29). It supports the nation building key task, security of the government and population from internal and external threats. Its subtasks include: control of operationally significant land area in the JOA; gain and maintain maritime superiority in the JOA; gain and maintain air superiority in the JOA; isolate the JOA; assist HN in populace and resource control; and control operationally significant riverine area(s) in the JOA (CJCSM 2002, B-C-C-2).

The OP task, “Collect and share operational information,” includes the collection of information related to operational and tactical threats, characteristics of the operational area, data to support combat assessments, and sharing the information with both Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD agencies and departments (CJCSM 2002, 31
B-C-C-36). It supports the nation building key tasks: security of the government and population from internal and external threats; develop needed infrastructure and key institutions; and economic development. Its subtasks include: collect information on operational situation; directly support theater strategic surveillance and reconnaissance requirements; collect and assess meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) operational information; determine logistical capability of the JOA; and collect target information (CJCSM 2002, B-C-C-2).

The OP task, “Coordinate support for forces in the Joint Operations Area (JOA),” involves providing trained personnel, units, replacements, and health services support within the JOA (CJCSM 2002, B-C-C-73/74). It supports the nation building key task, security of the government and population from internal and external threats. Its subtasks include: coordinate field services requirements; coordinate support for personnel in the JOA; coordinate mortuary affairs in the JOA; provide for personnel services; coordinate rotation planning; manage personnel accountability and strength reporting; provide for health services in the JOA; manage the joint blood program in the JOA; manage flow of casualties in the JOA; manage health services resources in the JOA; reconstitute forces; train joint forces and personnel; provide religious ministry support in the JOA; and provide for legal services (CJCSM 2002, B-C-C-4/5).

The OP task, “Provide politico-military support to other nations, groups, and government agencies,” includes support from military forces to civilian authorities and the population such as security assistance and civil-military operations to include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (CJCSM 2002, B-C-C-90). It supports the nation building key tasks: security of the government and population from internal and
external threats; legitimacy of the government and its leaders; political stability; and 
transition of nation building efforts to the host nation. Its subtasks include: provide 
security assistance in the JOA; conduct civil military operations in the JOA; provide 
support to the DOD and other government agencies; transition to civil administration; 
coordinate politico-military support; coordinate civil affairs in the JOA; conduct foreign 
internal defense; and establish disaster control measures (CJCSM 2002, B-C-C-5/6).

The OP task, “Command subordinate operational forces,” involves the authority 
of commanders, the delineation of responsibility among commanders within the AO, 
developing a common understanding of the objectives of the campaign, ensuring a unity 
of effort among the participants, and the identification of the missions the military forces 
are assigned (CJCSM 2002, B-C-C-112) It supports each of the nation building key tasks 
by ensuring that all of the forces involved and the activities conducted are directed 
toward a common objective. Its subtasks include: approve plans and orders; issue plans 
and orders; provide rules of engagement; synchronize and integrate operations; 
coordinate/integrate components, theater, and other support; and conduct operational 
rehearsals (CJCSM 2002, B-C-C-6).

The OP task, “Coordinate and integrate joint/multinational and interagency 
support,” involves coordinating between other government agencies, allies, coalition 
partners, and the joint force to ensure a consistency of understanding, effort, cooperation, 
and support between all the parties involved in the operation (CJCSM 2002, B-C-C-123) 
Similar to the previous task, this task supports each of the nation building key tasks by 
focusing all the efforts within the nation building operation toward a common objective. 
Its subtasks include: ascertain national or agency agenda; determine national/agency
capabilities and limitations; develop multinational intelligence/information sharing structure; coordinate plans with non-DOD organizations; coordinate host-nation support; coordinate coalition support; and conduct civil administration operations (CJCSM 2002, B-C-C-7).

The OP task, “Provide security for operational forces and means,” involves identifying and reducing friendly vulnerabilities, to include protecting and securing critical installations, facilities, and lines of communications (CJCSM 2002, B-C-C-151). It supports the nation building key tasks: security of the government and population from internal and external threats; legitimacy of the government and its leaders; political stability; and transition of nation building efforts to the host nation. Its subtasks include: provide counterreconnaissance in the JOA; protect and secure flanks, rear areas, and COMMZ in the JOA; protect and secure operationally critical installations, facilities, and systems; protect and secure air, land, and sea lines of communication in the JOA; and integrate host-nation security forces and means (CJCSM 2002, B-C-C-9).

With an understanding of the military tasks needed to support a nation building operation, Special Operations Forces will now be examined to determine the capabilities they possess to support those military tasks.

**Special Operations Forces**

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the Functional Combatant Command that exercises Combatant Command (COCOM) of all SOF based in the United States. Upon their assignment to a specific theater, SOF are under the COCOM of the geographic combatant commander who normally exercises command and control of SOF within the SOF chain of command (Joint Pub 3-05 1998, ix).
Within USSOCOM, forces designated as SOF include elements of the US Army, the US Navy, and the US Air Force. US Army forces consist of Special Forces (SF), Ranger, rotary-wing Special Operations Aviation (SOA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Civil Affairs (CA) units. US Navy forces consist of Naval Special Warfare (NSW) units to include sea-air-land teams (SEALs), SEAL delivery vehicle teams, special boat units, and patrol coastal ships. US Air Force elements consist of rotary and fixed-wing SOA, special tactics teams, PSYOP, and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) units (Joint Pub 3-05 1998, II-1).

The nine core tasks of SOF are: Unconventional Warfare (UW); Foreign Internal Defense (FID); Direct Action (DA); Special Reconnaissance (SR); Counterterrorism (CT); Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CP); Psychological Operations (PSYOP); Information Operations (IO); and Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) (USSOCOM Msg 2003, 3). For a detailed definition of each task see Glossary.

Army Special Operations Forces

The United States Army Special Operations Forces’ (ARSOF) core tasks are the same as those listed above for SOF, however, within ARSOF, each type of unit (SF, Ranger, SOA, PSYOP, and CA) are organized, trained, and equipped to perform distinct missions within these nine tasks.

The Special Forces are organized, trained, and equipped to perform the following seven missions. They are: UW, FID, SR, DA CT (only specially trained forces, normally used by the geographic combatant commander), IO, and CP of WMD (as directed) (FM 100-25 1999, 3-6). Special Forces are geographically oriented, trained in a language within their region, and understand the cultural and political environment in which they
operate (Fuller 1996, 8-9). These attributes allow them to work and live with another nation’s forces and population, thereby building strong relationships that develop friendships, understanding, and ultimately trust and respect (Fuller 1996, 9).

The Rangers are organized, trained, and equipped to quickly provide a highly capable military force to any region of the world. They are globally oriented, performing special operations against strategic or operational targets. Their Direct Action operations may consist of deep penetration raids, forced-entry operations, airfield seizures, and the capture or destruction of targets requiring specialized skills and involving greater risk to the force (FM 100-25 1999, 3-7 – 3-9). Additionally, Rangers are capable of acting as an operational reserve, providing a commander a responsive and skilled force. Rangers are not regionally oriented, nor do they receive linguistic training.

The US Army Special Operations Aviation Regiment is organized, trained, and equipped to infiltrate, resupply, and exfiltrate SOF units in support of their primary missions in all operational environments, to include clandestinely penetrating hostile and denied airspace (FM 100-25 1999, 3-11). SOA possess the capability to provide reconnaissance, surveillance, electronic warfare, airborne command and control, aerial firepower, and armed escort to SOF elements (Fuller 1996, 23). Additionally, SOA provides support in complex urban areas, long-range support through aerial refueling, personnel recovery support, and close air support to ground SOF (Billingslea and Holland 2003, 16). Special Operations Aviation personnel are not regionally oriented nor do they receive linguistic training.

Psychological Operations units operate at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels “to convey selected information to influence the emotions, motives, objective
reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals” (FM 100-25 1999, 3-15). They support both conventional and SOF units using various mediums and products to influence their target audience. They often must work with other government agencies, coalition forces, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the host nation (FM 100-25 1999, 3-17). They are geographically oriented, trained in a language within their region, and understand the cultural and political environment in which they operate (Fuller 1996, 20). PSYOP are a tool a commander can utilize to communicate information to the local population. This information can prevent rumors, counter disinformation from adversaries, and provide a common understanding among the population of the mission and intent of US forces (Fuller 1996, 20-22). Through their interaction with host nation forces and the population, PSYOP elements are a valuable source of information to the commander and US forces. Additionally, they provide a method to reinforce the legitimacy of the host nation government and assist the host nation and US forces in accomplishing their objectives (Fuller 1996, 20-22).

Civil Affairs (CA) units support the commander’s relationship and interaction with the host nation government and the civilian population, promote the legitimacy of the mission, and enhance military efforts. CA units provide support to the civil administration, address nonmilitary aspects of the operation, and support Civil-Military Operations (CMO) (FM 100-25 1999, 3-19). CA units interact frequently with US, host nation, international, nongovernmental, and private volunteer organizations in order to support an operation. CA units are geographically oriented and understand the cultural and political environment in which they operate. CA units and personnel attempt to
effectively communicate with both nongovernmental entities and the host nation in order to provide a linkage between the diverse groups and the US military forces present within the area of operations (AO). This linkage enables all of the parties present within a nation to collectively contribute to accomplishing the assigned mission (Fuller 1996, 13-14). This can be achieved by establishing a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) which facilitates the exchange of information and the coordination of each group’s operations within the AO. In addition, CA units conduct Area Studies to support its mission. Area Studies provide information about the country and its people, to include: geographic, hydrographic, and climatic factors; political characteristics; economic characteristics; the civilian population; military and paramilitary forces; resistance organizations; and the effects of these subjects and characteristics on US courses of action (Fuller 1996, 15). Other functions CA personnel may perform include: coordinating for host nation support; assisting the local government by providing technical advice; assisting in population and resource control activities; and operating within US forces, as attachments, to provide advice to commanders on the use of their forces in civil-military operations within the unit’s area of operations (Fuller 1996, 17-18). Also, through their interaction with host nation forces, host nation institutions, and the population, CA elements are a valuable source of information to the commander and US forces. A limitation to the use of CA personnel and units is the US Army structure. Approximately 98 percent of CA personnel are in the reserve component with the remainder in the active component. This results in the active component being classified as “generalists,” capable of performing initial assessments within an AO, followed by the deployment of specialists who possess
functional expertise needed within the AO. The functional expertise within the Civil Affairs is found within the reserve component (Fuller 1996, 18-19).

Each of the five different units (SF, Ranger, SOA, PSYOP, CA) within ARSOF brings unique capabilities to a nation-building operation. These capabilities provide a commander a better understanding of the operational environment, a stronger relationship with host nation units and the host-nation population, and a number of specialized capabilities he can utilize to accomplish his mission.

**Analysis of ARSOF within Nation-Building Military Tasks**

With the nation-building military tasks established, and an understanding of the core tasks and capabilities of ARSOF, an analysis will be conducted to identify how ARSOF can contribute to a nation-building operation. Table 3, Nation-Building Military Tasks and ARSOF, depicts the results of this analysis. This table describes which unit within ARSOF (Special Forces, Ranger, Special Operations Aviation, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs) has an assigned core task within the military task, a capability within the military task, or neither a core task nor a capability within the military task.

Within the task, “Coordinate coalitions or alliances, regional relations and security assistance activities,” and its subtasks, the Special Forces, Rangers, and Civil Affairs have capabilities that can be used. Specifically, each of these units participates regularly in combined exercises and training which promotes regional security, the interoperability between US forces and host nation forces, and enhances the relationships between the US soldiers and the host nation soldiers participating in the exercises and training. Also, the Special Forces and the Civil Affairs have the capability to establish coalition headquarters. The Special Forces can establish a Coalition Joint Special
Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) and Civil Affairs can establish a Combined Joint Civil-
Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF). These headquarters further improve the
relationships and interoperability between US and host nation forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3. Nation-Building Military Tasks and ARSOF</th>
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<td>TASKS</td>
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<td>OP 6.5</td>
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<td>SF</td>
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Legend:
T – Core Task within Military Task
C – Capability within Military Task
-No Core Task or Capability to contribute within Military Task

ST 8. 1 Coordinate coalitions or alliances, regional relations and security assistance activities.
ST 8. 2 Provide support to allies, regional governments, interagency organizations or groups.
OP 1. 5 Control operationally significant areas.
OP 2. 2 Collect and share operational intelligence.
OP 4. 4 Coordinate support for forces in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).
OP 4. 7 Provide politico-military support to other nations, groups, and government organizations.
OP 5. 4 Command subordinate operational forces.
OP 5. 7 Coordinate and integrate joint/multinational and interagency support.
OP 6. 5 Provide security for operational forces and means.

Within the task, “Provide support to allies, regional governments, interagency organizations or groups,” and its subtasks, the Special Forces and CA have assigned core tasks while the Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, and Psychological Operations forces have capabilities that can be used. The Special Forces core task, foreign internal defense, resides within this task. SF can further contribute by coordinating security
assistance activities, assisting in the restoration of order, and coordinating multinational
operations due to its regional orientation and language capability. The subtask, coordinate
CA in theater, is a core task of CA. Additionally, CA units have specific capabilities,
experience, and expertise to contribute to the following subtasks: coordinate
humanitarian and civic assistance programs; coordinate military civic action assistance;
coordinate foreign humanitarian assistance; support peace operations in theater;
cooperate with and support nongovernmental organizations in theater; and cooperate with
and support private volunteer organizations in theater. The Rangers and Special
Operations Aviation are capable of providing support in the restoration of order as well as
forces to conduct peace enforcement operations. Additionally, Special Operations
Aviation can provide a platform from which to provide humanitarian assistance.
Psychological Operations forces can contribute to the subtasks, assist in restoration of
order and support peace operations in theater because of their ability to interact with and
inform the local population and host nation government forces.

Within the task, “Control operationally significant areas,” and its subtasks, each
component of ARSOF has a capability that can be used. The Special Forces’ and
Rangers’ ability to seize and retain ground, deny the enemy access to key sectors of the
operational area, and interdict the enemy’s movement of supplies support both this task
and the subtask, isolate the JOA. The Special Operations Aviation has the capability to
support other SOF elements in this task and the specific subtask, conduct patient
evacuation. Psychological Operations and CA units can support the subtask, assist host
country in population and resource control, by providing a means to communicate with the
affected population and conducting operations to potentially alleviate the conditions causing unrest among the population or the harsh conditions felt by displaced personnel.

Within the task, “Collect and share operational intelligence,” and its subtasks, the Special Forces have an assigned core task while the Rangers, PSYOP, and CA units have capabilities that can be used. The SF mission, Special Reconnaissance, directly supports the subtask, collect information on operational situation. The Rangers also have the capability to conduct reconnaissance in support of this subtask with their organic assets. Additionally, PSYOP and CA elements operating in conjunction with the host nation population and the host nation government provide valuable information to support a more thorough and detailed understanding of the operational environment. As a result, they support the subtask, collect information on operational situation.

Within the task, “Coordinate support for forces in the Joint Operations Area (JOA),” and its subtasks, the Special Forces have an assigned core task. The SF mission, foreign internal defense, directly supports the subtask, train joint forces and personnel because this subtask incorporates training assistance provided to friendly nations and groups.

Within the task, “Provide politico-military support to other nations, groups, and government organizations,” and its subtasks, the Special Forces and CA have core tasks assigned, while the Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, and PSYOP have capabilities that can be used. The subtask, conduct foreign internal defense, is a core task of the Special Forces. The subtask, coordinate CA in the Joint Operations Area (JOA), is a core task of the CA. Additionally, CA commands possess capabilities to support the subtask, coordinate politico-military support, through their interaction with host nation
government agencies and can support the subtask, transition to civil administration, due to their functional expertise in this area. Both the Rangers and Special Operation Aviation possess capabilities to support the subtask, provide support to DoD and other government agencies, specifically, components of this subtask, such as combating terrorism. PSYOP elements have the capability to support the subtasks, transition to civil administration and conduct civil military operations in the JOA, because of their ability to communicate with and facilitate the interaction between the host nation population and US forces.

Within the task, “Command subordinate operational forces,” and its subtasks, the Special Forces, CA, and Psychological Operations forces have capabilities that can be used. Each of these units (SF, CA, PSYOP), interact frequently with allies and coalition partners, which, combined with their regional focus and language capabilities, enables them to support the subtask, coordinate/integrate components, theater, and other support. This interaction allows US, coalition, and host nation forces and commanders to share a common understanding of the joint force commander’s intent, synchronize operations and objectives, and maintain the unity of effort needed to successfully accomplish the mission.

Within the task, “Coordinate and integrate joint/multinational and interagency support,” and its subtasks, the CA have an assigned core task, while the Special Forces and Psychological Operations forces have capabilities that can be used. The subtask, conduct civil administration operations, is a core task of CA. Within the Reserve Component, the CA possesses the functional expertise to conduct the functions of a local government. The Special Forces had the capability to assist with the subtasks, coordinate host-nation support and coordinate coalition support. This is a result of their language
capability, regional focus, and frequent interaction with forces from other nations. PSYOP elements possess the capability to assist during the conduct of civil administration operations because of their ability to communicate with the host nation population.

Within the task, “Provide security for operational forces and means,” and its subtasks, the Special Forces, Rangers, and Special Operations Aviation possess capabilities that can be used. SF, Rangers, and SOA have the capability to conduct defensive combat operations to support the subtask, protect/secure operationally critical installations, facilities, and systems.

This analysis of each of the nation building military tasks provides a description of how ARSOF can contribute to a nation building operation. This analysis is based upon the doctrinal uses of ARSOF and their capabilities. However, each nation building operation will be unique and encompass differing tasks that must be performed to be successful. Similarly, the uses of ARSOF elements may vary based upon the forces available to the Combatant Commander or the commander designated to conduct a nation building operation. This analysis is useful to commanders and their planning staffs as a tool to start an analysis of the forces and capabilities required to successfully accomplish the unique mission, nation building, when it is assigned.
CHAPTER 4
CASE STUDIES

This chapter will identify the involvement of the US Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. An analysis of ARSOF’s use during these two nation building operations will be made to identify how ARSOF were used during these operations, in relation to nation building, and if their use was consistent with the analysis displayed in Table 3, Nation Building Military Tasks and ARSOF. This analysis will identify areas in which, although they possessed either a core task or capability within a nation building military task, ARSOF were not used in support of a nation building operation.

Extensive research and previous studies have been conducted on Operation Uphold Democracy allowing for a thorough review of how ARSOF was utilized and the effects they had on the mission in Haiti. In Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), forces are still engaged, therefore, although the number of articles written and the coverage has been extensive, a similar comprehensive analysis of forces involved and their effects on the mission has not yet been conducted.

**Operation Uphold Democracy: Haiti**

In December of 1990 Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected as President of Haiti. However, he would serve for only 9 months. In September of 1991, General Raoul Cedras, the commander of the Haitian Armed Forces, would lead a coup against the democratically elected Aristide (Wilkins 1997, 4). As a result, regional organizations and the international community imposed sanctions on Haiti. The sanctions increased
instability, crippled the already weak economy, decreased foreign investment, halted
tourism, and caused a mass exodus of refugees from Haiti to the Dominican Republic and
the United States (RAND 2003, 73). The number of incoming Haitians and the resulting
political pressure upon the US administration resulted in the United States preparing to
use military forces against Cedras in Haiti. However, a negotiating party led by former
US President Jimmy Carter brokered a last minute deal for the forces to peacefully enter
Haiti just hours before the forces were scheduled to begin entering the country forcefully.

The US led multinational forces were tasked to secure control of the country and
return the democratically elected Aristide to power. Once security was established, the
US led forces turned control of the operation over to the United Nations Mission in Haiti
(UNMIH). UNMIH was tasked to assist Haiti in sustaining a secure and stable
environment, protecting international personnel and key installations, professionalizing
the armed forces, creating a separate police force, and assisting the Haitians to organize
free and fair elections (UN, 2004). However, US military forces were not allowed to
make any long-term improvements to the Haitian infrastructure. They were limited to
tasks designated as essential, such as restoring electrical power and repairing key roads
and bridges (Bentley 1996, 5). This presented a problem to US Commanders, who
recognized the importance of making improvements within Haiti to improve the force
protection of their soldiers and increase the overall stability of the country.

Nonetheless, positive results were achieved. These included establishing security
throughout the country, returning Aristide to power, creating civilian police forces, and
holding local and national elections. However, the US and the international community
failed to sufficiently train Haitians in how to maintain this security and the limited
infrastructure established (Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel 1998, 197). This was largely due to the emphasis placed upon US forces exiting Haiti as soon as possible following the recent disastrous experience in Somalia and the limited ability of US forces within Haiti to build a meaningful long-term infrastructure or institutions.

Army Special Operations Forces in Haiti

Operation Uphold Democracy showed the importance of Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) and their contribution to a nation building operation. Special Forces (SF) secured the countryside while CA (CA) teams provided assessments in the countryside and assistance to Haitian government ministries. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) elements were utilized throughout the country to inform the population, dissuade acts of violence, and support the multinational forces in accomplishing their objectives. Rangers, as needed, were available to quickly provide additional combat power throughout the country. Special Operations Aviation provided support to SOF, when needed, while operating under the control of the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF).

Special Forces units were used as an economy of force element to move into the countryside and establish security. A technique termed “hub and spoke” was used for the SF elements to move into an area, provide security, then move forces on from that area to other areas needing security (Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel 1998, 116). While in the countryside, acting as the sole US presence, SF personnel adapted to the local conditions and reached out to local leaders (Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel 1998, 116). This ability to interact with the population facilitated a mutual trust and understanding between the Special Forces Detachments and the Haitian population which allowed the Special Forces
to obtain information from local residents and community leaders (Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel 1998, 116 - 122). SF personnel gave civics lessons, held town meetings, forced judges to preside over cases where suspects were being held without trial, participated in a weapons buy-back program, and used Haitians to repair basic infrastructure such as generators and water pumps (Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel 1998, 118-119). Because of SF’s ability to build relationships with the Haitians in the countryside they were able to operate freely throughout the country (Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel 1998, 189). This freedom of movement, combined with the ability to call in additional combat forces, when needed, allowed SF to establish order and security in the countryside (Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel 1998, 168-169).

CA units were engaged in the countryside with SF teams, within Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitian with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and private volunteer organizations (PVO), and within the Haitian government, providing assistance and guidance to Haitian ministries and agencies.

With the Special Forces, CA Direct Support Teams conducted assessments and collected information on the conditions within the countryside to determine what support and resources the population needed. In addition, the CA teams supported the SF mission to provide security by distributing food and fuel and by assisting the SF teams restore local governments to the towns and villages (Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel 1998, 123-124). CA teams conducted the projects critically needed by the population but were careful not to do things the Haitians could do themselves (Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel 1998, 123-124).
CA units also established two Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC), one in Port-au-Prince and one in Cap Haitian. These CMOCs were established to provide a link between the military and civilian organizations in Haiti, of which there were about 400 (Wilkins 1997, iv). The CMOCs were successful by providing a mechanism to share information between the two entities, providing a way for civilian organizations to request assistance from the military, and coordinating the actions of the numerous civilian organizations (Wilkins 1997, 8-9). Approximately 90% of the actions of the CMOCs involved responding to requests for assistance by the NGOs and PVOs (Wilkins 1997, 9). US military forces understood the importance of providing whatever assistance they could to the population in order to gain the public’s support for the US forces within Haiti (Wilkins 1997, 20). However, due to the limited resources allocated to projects, funds were exhausted after a month. This limited CA units to conducting assessments with no resources to implement their recommendations (Pattee 1996, 64).

CA Ministerial Advisory Teams (MAT) were formed to provide a link between the US and Haitian governments and assist the US ambassador provide advice to the Haitian government (Rubini and Cleary 2000, 26). The MATs were tasked to maintain a safe and secure environment and promote conditions for economic growth (Rubini and Cleary 2000, 26). In order to accomplish this, they conducted assessments on numerous Haitian ministries, including: Justice; Finance and Banking; Education; Foreign Affairs; Agriculture; Health; Public Works; and Interior (Rubini and Cleary 2000, 26). The MATs also utilized reports from the countryside conducted by Special Forces and Psychological Operations units to assist their travel throughout Haiti to conduct their own assessments relating to the specific ministry they were advising (Rubini and Cleary 2000, 27-28). The
MATs were capable of providing technical advice, leveraging financing, and applying pressure to elected officials and the Haitian Armed Forces (Rubini and Cleary 2000, 29).

Psychological Operations forces were used throughout the operation and proved to be effective in a variety of situations (Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel 1998, 144). Used by both conventional and SOF forces, PSYOPS used multiple methods to disseminate information, to include: radio messages; loudspeakers; billboards; and posters. Initially, they focused on stopping Haitian on Haitian violence and preparing the population for the return of President Aristide (Pattee 1996, 62). Additionally, they communicated support for the Aristide presidency, stopped or countered rumors among the population, provided education on democracy, calmed violent crowds, and assisted convoys moving through urban areas (Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel 1998, 126-130).

The Rangers were used in Haiti as a quick reaction force to respond to acts of violence and threats or as a show of force to potential aggressors. Following the wounding of a Special Forces soldier, a Ranger company was sent to Les Cayes (Pattee 1996, 57) to demonstrate the ability of US forces to move quickly throughout the country in response to threats against US service members. This ability reinforced the credibility of small SOF elements working in outlying areas and enhanced their ability to influence the actions of local groups and community leaders.

Special Operations Aviation elements were retained under the control of the JSOTF and provided support, as needed, to SOF units. This support included inserting and repositioning teams, conducting resupply, and supporting the movement of a quick reaction force.
Operation Enduring Freedom: Afghanistan

After 11 September 2001, the United States began Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan to destroy the Al Qaeda terrorist network within Afghanistan and remove the Taliban, who controlled the Afghanistan central government (Carson 2003, 21). The Taliban had allowed Al Qaeda to operate freely from within Afghanistan while Al Qaeda planned, trained, and directed operations against the US and its interest in the Middle East, Africa, and the United States.

The United States began by providing support to the Northern Alliance, allowing them to topple the Taliban regime in Kabul in November (RAND 2003, 129). This assistance mainly consisted of the use of Special Operations Forces and the support they were able to provide and coordinate from other elements of the US Armed Forces. Following the Taliban’s demise, a meeting was held in late November between the Northern Alliance and other Afghan leaders to discuss Afghanistan’s future. This meeting culminated in the signing of the Bonn Agreement, which outlined a map and timetable for peace and security, reestablishing institutions, and reconstructing Afghanistan (RAND 2003, 130). The United Nations followed the Bonn Agreement with Security Council Resolution 1386, which outlined international assistance to Afghanistan (RAND 2003, 130). Overall, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is mandated to promote national reconciliation, fulfill UN tasks outlined in the Bonn Agreement (including tasks pertaining to human rights, the rule of law, and gender issues), and managing all UN humanitarian, relief, recovery, and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan (UNAMA 2004). However, many factors will hinder the ability of the US forces within Afghanistan and UNAMA from seeing any immediate improvements.
The first obstacle to achieving any significant improvements in Afghanistan is the lack of security. The current administration lacks the ability, outside Kabul, to exercise any form of control or administration to outlying areas. The countryside is essentially run by regional warlords (Carson 2003, 22).

Secondly, the country lacks any industry upon which to build its economy. Its primary revenue generating export in the past has been cultivating poppy (Carson 2003, 22).

Thirdly, the infrastructure within Afghanistan was destroyed when the Taliban was removed. Many institutions required to function as a nation were either incapable of functioning or did not existent. Roads were impassable, buildings were destroyed or damaged, electricity and water were unreliable, and employment opportunities were limited. In addition, ministries to perform banking, civil administration, and judicial functions were not operational (RAND 2003, 132).

And finally, the following are some of the factors that contribute to the inability of the central government to harness the efforts of the collective population and reach any consensus on priorities for development of the country: ethnic, language, tribal, and racial differences; Islam practiced a hundred different ways; loyalty to local authorities rather than a central government; and the rugged terrain across which the country is divided (Edens 2003, 6).

**Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan**

Operation Enduring Freedom again demonstrated the importance and ability of the US Army Special Operations Forces to contribute to a nation building operation. Special Forces and CA worked extensively in the countryside to defeat Al Qaeda and the
Taliban while conducting assessments to identify the needs of the Afghan population and the Afghan government as it establishes itself. Special Forces units assisted in the creation of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and its movement into the countryside to begin providing security outside the capital, Kabul. CA soldiers were also used to establish a Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) in Kabul to coordinate Civil-Military Operations (CMO) throughout the country. Psychological Operations forces, like CA units, were distributed to both SOF and conventional forces operating throughout Afghanistan to support both operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda and operations to support the efforts of the newly formed Afghan central government. US Army Ranger and the Special Operations Aviation elements deployed to Afghanistan focused on defeating the Taliban and locating and destroying Al Qaeda within Afghanistan.

Initially, the Special Forces conducted Unconventional Warfare with various elements or factions within Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban and to locate and destroy Al Qaeda. Following the defeat of the Taliban the Special Forces continued to utilize Afghan Military Forces (AMF) to locate and defeat remnants of both the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Presently, the Special Forces continue working with the AMF in the countryside. A Special Forces Battalion also began the creation of the Afghan National Army in late April 2002. The ANA training was designed to develop a force which was loyal to the central government rather than the warlords in the countryside. Although the training began slowly, ANA units have been deployed outside the capital to increase the ability of the Afghan government to exercise control and provide security to the population in the
countryside. The Special Forces turned the mission of training the ANA over to a conventional unit in 2003.

CA personnel from the 96th CA Battalion were quickly deployed to Afghanistan to support SOF and begin disaster-relief and recovery operations (Sepp 2002, 24). Also, CA personnel established a Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force in Kabul in late December 2001 (Sepp 2002, 25). Additionally, two coalition humanitarian liaison cells were formed by Reserve Component CA soldiers to continue the effort begun by the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. These cells were to assess and prioritize humanitarian needs, coordinate the delivery of need supplies, and establish and supervise contracts that support the needs or requirements of the local population (Briscoe 2002, 36). Other CA teams, operating in hostile areas, conducted assessments of the needs of the Afghan population, coordinated the delivery of needed supplies, oversaw the establishment or repair wells, schools, and roads, and even acted as combat forces, when required (Schroder 2002, 50)

PSYOP forces have supported conventional and Special Operations Forces during Operation Enduring Freedom. A Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) was established to coordinate PSYOP within the area of operations (Kiper 2002, 19). Themes developed by the JPOTF included: undermining the Taliban and Al Qaeda; emphasizing the inevitability of the Taliban and Al Qaeda defeat; promoting the capture of Osama bin Laden; offering rewards for the capture of Al Qaeda leaders; and strengthening the friendship between Afghans and the United States (Kiper 2002, 20). PSYOP forces directly supported detachments from the 5th Special Forces Group, TF 1-187 during Operation Anaconda, and the 75th Ranger Regiment during its airborne assault on the
airstrip southwest of Kandahar (Kiper 2002, 19-20). An analysis of the effects of PSYOP indicated that it contributed to the Afghan population discontinuing its support of the Taliban and al-Qaeda (Kiper 2002, 21). PSYOP forces continued to integrate themselves within conventional and SOF as units rotated into Afghanistan. PSYOP elements also assisted in the establishment of the Afghan National Army by facilitating the integration of traditionally warring factions into a combined national military force. PSYOP themes evolved as conditions in Afghanistan changed. New themes developed included: the legitimacy of the newly formed Afghan government; the US force was not in Afghanistan to occupy the country; and the importance of Afghan unity (Kiper 2002, 33).

The Rangers conducted an airfield seizure southwest of Kandahar in order to: “destroy Taliban forces; to gather intelligence; to provide a casualty trans-load site; to establish a forward aerial refuel/rearm point, or FARP, for rotary-wing aircraft; and to assess the capabilities of the airstrip for future operations” (Kiper 2002, 6). Additionally, the Rangers participated in other combat operations within Afghanistan, including attacking an enemy position on top of Takur Ghar Mountain. During this operation, the Ranger force neutralized the enemy position and suppressed additional enemy elements for fifteen hours until the entire force could be exfiltrated during the next period of darkness (Schroder 2002, 50).

Elements of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment deployed initially to Karshi Kanabad, Uzbekistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The 160th provided the rotary wing assets needed to support the infiltration, resupply, and exfiltration of Special Operations Forces.
Analysis of ARSOF in Haiti and Afghanistan

The case studies of Operation Uphold Democracy and Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrate both the flexibility of ARSOF and the capability of ARSOF to support nation-building operations. Both operations show the unique contributions linguistically trained, regionally oriented, and culturally aware forces can make to a mission requiring the interaction between US forces, an indigenous population, and a foreign government. Several areas in which ARSOF were used during these nation building operations were particularly effective, including: the use of Ministerial Advisory Teams in Haiti; the use of Special Forces teams to provide security throughout the countryside in Haiti; the use of Civil-Military Operations Centers in Haiti; the use of Special Forces to create the Afghan National Army; and the use of Psychological Operations forces in both Haiti and Afghanistan.

The Ministerial Advisory Teams provided both a link between the US and Haitian governments and assisted the US ambassador advise the Haitian government leadership by analyzing each of the Haitian ministries with whom they were aligned and providing that information to the ambassador. They utilized the functional expertise found within Reserve Component CA soldiers to conduct thorough assessments, enabling the United States to understand the situation within the Haitian government and apply additional resources and expertise, as needed. Without the expertise of the soldiers within the Reserve Component these assessments and the subsequent ability of the United States Government to understand the situation within Haiti would have been severely degraded.

Special Forces teams throughout Haiti provided security, established local governments, provided information on the conditions in the countryside, assessed the
needs of the Haitian population, developed relationships with the Haitian population, and were able to react to changes in the environment in Haiti. The SF teams’ ability to communicate with the Haitian population and understand the operational environment allowed them to make a valuable contribution in a short amount of time.

The Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOC) in Haiti proved to be effective in communicating with the numerous NGOs and PVOs within Haiti and coordinate operations between these organizations and the US military forces operating in Haiti. In addition to communicating with these organizations, they were able to coordinate support for these organizations with available US military forces and resources. This increased the effectiveness of these organizations, improved the living conditions of the Haitian population, and provided an environment conducive to US military forces, rather than a hostile environment, requiring additional US forces, resources, and a longer period of time.

The use of the Special Forces to initiate the creation of the Afghan National Army demonstrated the ability of the Special Forces to rapidly train, equip, and lead indigenous forces. The start of the training with the ANA began slowly due to recruitment problems, primarily caused by regional warlords resisting the formation of an army controlled by, and loyal to, a central government. However, the Special Forces Battalion tasked to conduct the initial training adapted to the conditions by employing innovative recruitment measures to bring Afghan recruits to the Kabul Military Training Center from each area of Afghanistan in order to build an ethnically balanced force. The Special Forces battalion overcame the challenges of the regional warlords, the ethic backgrounds of recruits, and the limited resources devoted to the training effort. This resulted in trained,
battalion-sized formations of Afghan soldiers who supported the newly formed central government and their military chain of command.

Psychological Operations Forces proved to be invaluable by developing themes to effectively support each operation and maintaining the ability to adapt the themes to rapidly changing situations. Their ability to rapidly change resulted in a capability to continue to influence the behavior of their target audiences, and as a result, produce conditions which supported both US and host nation forces within Haiti and Afghanistan. Their themes ranged from dispelling rumors and providing information to civilians in Haiti about democracy to supporting the creation of an ethnically diverse military force in Afghanistan. In each case, their ability to interact with and analyze the elements they sought to influence enabled them to apply the appropriate themes to support US objectives in each operation.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to answer the primary question, What is the role of United States Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) in nation building? Previous chapters have answered secondary questions by establishing the definition of nation building, determining the activities or actions that must be accomplished to successfully nation build, deriving what military tasks support a nation building operation, analyzing the core tasks and characteristics of each component of ARSOF, and reviewing historical examples of how ARSOF has been used during nation building efforts in Haiti and Afghanistan.

Conclusions

There are a number of capabilities found within ARSOF that are critical to a nation building operation. These skills include: the ability to communicate with, conduct coordination with, and support allies and coalitions; the ability to control land areas, specifically, small towns and villages, when a country’s government is unable to function; the ability to gather, analyze, and provide information on both the civilian and military characteristics of an area; the ability to work with and through an indigenous population and its military forces. Specific capabilities of the components of ARSOF include: the functional expertise found within Reserve Component CA units; the CA’s ability to communicate with and coordinate military operations with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVO) operating within an area of operations; the Special Forces, CA, and Psychological Operations forces geographic and linguistic training; the ability of Psychological Operations forces to
communicate with, interact with, and conduct operations to influence the behavior of foreign audiences; the ability of the Rangers to rapidly provide a formidable force throughout the area of operations; and the ability of Special Operations Aviation to support the missions of the various components of ARSOF throughout the area of operations.

The units found within ARSOF provide a commander a number of capabilities that are essential to his ability to successfully conduct nation-building operations.

**Recommendations**

However, nation building includes all branches of the Armed Forces and if it is to be successful, incorporates each of the four instruments of national power. In order to incorporate these instruments, their roles must be determined and the resources available must be identified.

An interagency, agreed upon, definition of nation building must be established. This definition will enable each department within the United States Government to define its role within the operation and begin the process of analyzing the resources available within its own department to contribute to the operation. As a result of this analysis, the United States Government, as a whole, will be able to identify a lead agency. The lead agency will be able to establish policy, identify shortfalls in capabilities and resources, establish training strategies, supervise nation building training events, clearly articulate the combined capabilities within the United States Government to conduct nation building, and conduct both deliberate and contingency planning for nation building operations in the future. Additionally, the lead agency would be able to harness the lessons learned from past nation building operations from each agency within the
United States Government in order to incorporate these lessons learned into future nation building operations.
GLOSSARY

Air Force Special Operations Forces (DOD). Those Active and Reserve Component Air Force forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called AFSOF.

Army Special Operations Forces (DOD). Those Active and Reserve Component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called ARSOF.

Civil Administration - (DOD) An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. Also called CA.

Civil Affairs - (DOD) Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. See also civil affairs activities; civil-military operations.

Civil Affairs Activities - (DOD) Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. See also civil affairs; civil-military operations.

Civil-Military Operations - (DOD) The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. See also civil affairs; operation.
Civil-Military Operations Center - (DOD) An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called CMOC. See also civil affairs activities; civil-military operations; operation.

Combatant Command - (DOD) A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. See also specified command; unified command.

Combatant Command (Command Authority) - (DOD) Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. See also combatant command; combatant commander; operational control; tactical control.

Combatant Commander - (DOD) A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called CDR. See also combatant command; specified combatant command; unified combatant command.

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - (DOD) A task force composed of special operations units from one or more foreign countries and more than one US Military Department formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The combined joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions.
Also called CJSOTF. See also joint special operations task force; special operations; task force.

Counterterrorism - (DOD) Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. See also antiterrorism; combatting terrorism; terrorism.

Country Team - (DOD) The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission.

Direct Action - (DOD) Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives. Also called DA. See also special operations; special operations forces.

Foreign Internal Defense - (DOD) Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID.

Foreign Military Sales - (DOD) That portion of United States security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and Training Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred. Also called FMS.

Humanitarian And Civic Assistance - (DOD) Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Also called HCA. See also foreign humanitarian assistance.
Information Operations - (DOD) Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called IO. See also defensive information operations; information; offensive information operations; operation.

Interagency Coordination - (DOD) Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. See also international organization; nongovernmental organizations.

International Military Education And Training - (DOD) Formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a nonreimbursable (grant) basis by offices or employees of the United States, contract technicians, and contractors. Instruction may include correspondence courses; technical, educational, or informational publications; and media of all kinds. Also called IMET. See also United States Military Service funded foreign training.

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force - (DOD) A joint task force composed of civil-military operations units from more than one Service. It provides support to the joint force commander in humanitarian or nation assistance operations, theater campaigns, or a civil-military operations concurrent with or subsequent to regional conflict. It can organize military interaction among many governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies within the theater. Also called JCMOTF. See also civil-military operations; joint task force; task force.

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force - (DOD) A joint special operations task force composed of headquarters and operational assets. It assists the joint force commander in developing strategic, operational, and tactical psychological operation plans for a theater campaign or other operations. Mission requirements will determine its composition and assigned or attached units to support the joint task force commander. Also called JPOTF. See also joint special operations task force; psychological operations; special operations.

Joint Special Operations Task Force - (DOD) A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF.

Military Assistance Advisory Group - (DOD) A joint Service group, normally under the military command of a commander of a unified command and representing the Secretary of Defense, which primarily administers the US military assistance planning and programming in the host country. Also called MAAG.
Military Civic Action - (DOD) The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.)

Nation Assistance - (DOD) Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations.

Naval Special Warfare Forces - (DOD) Those Active and Reserve Component Navy forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called NSW forces or NAVSOF.

Peace Building - (DOD) Post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. See also peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace operations.

Peace Enforcement - (DOD) Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. See also peace building; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace operations.

Peacekeeping - (DOD) Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. See also peace building; peace enforcement; peacemaking; peace operations.

Peacemaking - (DOD) The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it. See also peace building; peace enforcement; peacekeeping; peace operations.

Psychological Operations - (DOD) Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or
reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. See also consolidation psychological operations; overt peacetime psychological operations programs; perception management.

Rangers - (DOD) Rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct highly complex joint direct action operations in coordination with or in support of other special operations units of all Services. Rangers also can execute direct action operations in support of conventional nonspecial operations missions conducted by a combatant commander and can operate as conventional light infantry when properly augmented with other elements of combined arms.

Sea-Air-Land Team - (DOD) US Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations in maritime, littoral, and riverine environments. Also called SEAL.

Security Assistance - (DOD) Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA.

Security Assistance Organization - (DOD) All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. Also called SAO. See also security assistance.

Special Forces - (DOD) US Army forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations with an emphasis on unconventional warfare capabilities. Also called SF.

Special Operations - (DOD) Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO.
Special Operations Command - (DOD) A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations within the joint force commander's assigned operational area. Also called SOC. See also special operations.

Special Operations Command And Control Element - (DOD) A special operations command and control element (SOCCE) that is the focal point for the synchronization of special operations forces activities with conventional forces operations. It performs command and control or liaison functions according to mission requirements and as directed by the establishing special operations forces commander. Its level of authority and responsibility may vary widely. It normally collocates with the command post of the supported force. The SOCCE can also receive special operations forces operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed special operations elements and provide them to the supported component headquarters. The SOCCE remains under the operational control of the joint force special operations component commander or commander, joint special operations task force. Also called SOCCE. See also command and control; joint force special operations component commander; special operations; special operations forces.

Special Operations Forces - (DOD) Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. See also Air Force special operations forces; Army special operations forces; naval special warfare forces.

Special Reconnaissance - (DOD) Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive capability for commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. Also called SR.

Stability Operations – (ARMY) Stability operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis.

Unconventional Warfare - (DOD) A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW.
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