

**UNITED STATES ARMY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**



**Hybrid Structures
White Paper**

26 September 2014

Table of Contents

Section 1 Introduction	Error! Bookmark not defined.
1-1. Purpose.....	3
1-2. Background.....	3
1-3. Assumptions.....	4
Section 2 Operational Context	4
2-1. Mission Command in Hybrid Structure.....	4
2-2. ARSOF 2022. ARSOF 2022 provides the guidance for developing the future ARSOF missions, structures and capabilities.	5
2-3. Future Operating Environment.	6
2-4. Operational Challenge.	6
Section 3 Military Problem and Components of the Solution.....	8
3-1. Military Problem.	8
3-2. Central Idea.	8
3-3. Solution Concepts and Components.	8
Section 4 Conclusion	11
Appendix A References	1
Appendix B Historical Precedence	2
Appendix C Hybrid Structures.....	3
Glossary	GL-8
Section I Abbreviations	GL-8
Section II Terms.....	GL-9

Section 1 Introduction

1-1. Purpose.

This white paper both informs the reader of the emerging idea of a special operations led hybrid structure at the joint task force (JTF) level and advocates for development of the concept.

The paper posits that the synchronization between conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF) is frequently inefficient and may be ineffective when each force is conducting operations in the same region. The paper advances the idea that guided by ARSOF 2022, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) can assemble, organize and deploy an operational level hybrid structure organized to improve CF-SOF coordination and better achieve strategic goals. This paper is intended to serve as a catalyst to generate discourse among the ARSOF and Conventional Force communities to explore new and innovative concepts, doctrine, partnerships and technological advancements to fulfill the ARSOF mission command capabilities required after 2022.

In the aftermath of a decade of war, today's organizational designs have been optimized for predominantly U.S. Conventional Forces or SOF operations, and does not consider the possibility of transitioning between one or the other, or to a hybrid command structure organized for specific operations or phases. In the future, complex threats and environments may necessitate the design of CF-SOF hybrid structures that are developed for a combination of both the traditional and irregular warfare environments prior to the onset of conflict, or to assume Phase IV and V responsibilities post conflict. The Strategic Landpower effort could explore the potential for scalable, deployable, SOF commanded hybrid structures capable of planning and executing missions using a joint force framework comprised of special operations forces, conventional forces, indigenous security forces, non-governmental organizations, federal agencies, and foreign militaries. This new structure would be designated a functional Combatant Command as described in the Unified Command Plan (2011), and will be able to provide a shared common operating picture and enhanced situational awareness to assist in the planning and execution of future complex operations.

1-2. Background.

Global trends and enduring conflicts present the future as complex, dangerous and unpredictable. The U.S. will face an era of continuing fiscal austerity resulting in military budget cuts and personnel drawdowns. This fiscal challenge, and the nation's experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, will cause a shift in national policies, objectives and global engagement. Military strategy will shift from large scale conventional operations to air and naval power supporting expeditionary forces conducting short duration missions without occupation. A key to the success of these operations will be establishing and sustaining relationships with regional partners and governments, with an understanding of the global effects.

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) recently released two key documents – "*SOCOM 2020*" and "*USSOCOM Operating Concept*." These documents outline employment of the Global SOF Network (GSN) in the years 2020 and beyond. The GSN is a world-wide network of SOF strategically stationed and employed with enhanced forces, capabilities, infrastructure and support. The

GSN will provide U.S. leadership and decision makers with strategic options in protecting national interests without engaging in costly long-term conflicts.

The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) conducted an extensive analysis of the future operational environment and required capabilities for ARSOF. The resulting plan, ARSOF 2022, is the Commanding General's vision and guidance for maintaining ARSOF as the world's premiere force for conducting special warfare and surgical strike operations in support of national and regional objectives.

1-3. Assumptions.

a. Mission. GCCs, through the TSOCs, will request SOF-led JTFs up to the three-star level in support of regional CONPLANS, OPLANS, contingencies, or crisis action planning.

b. Force Structure. There will be no growth in the Special Operations force structure and it may be reduced proportionally with the rest of the US military during any drawdowns.

c. Readiness. ARSOF will continue to be resourced at a level which allows them to maintain mission readiness. This includes the structures proposed in this white paper.

d. Future Operating Environment. The future operating environment will increasingly feature irregular warfare. The nature of the future fight will require a command element that is capable of providing mission command of forces comprised of special operations forces, conventional forces from all services, and an extensive mix of unified action partners for campaigns that are predominantly irregular warfare centered.

e. In addition to operations in Phases 0 and I, Special Operations Forces will continue to conduct most, if not all, steady state activities throughout Phases II and III¹, particularly when conventional forces are concurrently engaged in major combat operations. This will include working with host nation government ministries and agencies, and training, mentoring, and operating with host nation military forces during phases led by conventional forces. This will enable a more complete, expedient, and successful transition of these activities and operations to host nation control in Phases IV and V. Steady State (continuous Phase 0) activities will continue worldwide.

Section 2 Operational Context

2-1. Hybrid Structure.

“(In Afghanistan) Special operations forces and conventional military forces have failed to combine routinely in ways that increase the U.S. capacity to conduct small-footprint operations.” Linda Robinson, *The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces*.

a. While the quote from Ms. Robinson specifically speaks to "small footprint operations," the organization of both conventional and special operations force structure are traditionally exclusive, regardless of size or organization. An example of cultural separation was the SOJTF within the US Forces

Afghanistan headquarters in Kabul. If you did not have the correct authorization on your access badge, you were not allowed access without escort, even if you had the right clearance and were conducting special operations business. There is an unspoken requirement for our SOF leaders to be able to visualize, describe and operate in a way that conventional forces can understand, accept and leverage.

b. Hybrid organizations and structures which combine the mission command for special operations and conventional forces have been part of doctrine in some form since the development of special operations forces. Whether consciously written into plans, included in organizational structures, or the subject of historical works, lessons learned, or contemporary studies, hybrid structures, the elements that comprise them and their utilization continue to drive future concepts and capabilities. One example of the resurgence of this line of thought is the re-awakened realization of the need for command elements that comprehend and leverage the cultural nuances of countries with whom the U.S. is engaged, in order to achieve strategic goals. We can learn much by integrating past doctrinal publications such as FM 31-22, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces* (November 1963), considerations for the future operating environment, the lessons learned from various military engagements over the last dozen years, and examining how operations were conducted in the austere years of the 1990s.

c. The requirement for a flexible, modular, scalable hybrid structure led by SOF commanders up to the three-star level will be driven by a combination of an increased need for situational awareness, skill in understanding the cultural nuances and impact of regional events, a transition from conventional warfare or expansion of unconventional or counter-unconventional warfare campaigns, the need to adapt at the speed of change, and the options available when operational art is applied by special operations planners. The GCC and TSOC activities will produce effects which require evaluation to the second and third order producing a greater understanding of impact on relevant actors.

d. A proposed hybrid structure would be draw pre-identified elements from existing structures such as a corps and division headquarters, the Special Warfare Command, regionally aligned conventional forces, and government agencies. An appropriate level general officer with special operations experience would be appointed as commander.

2-2. ARSOF 2022. ARSOF 2022 provides the guidance for developing the future ARSOF missions, structures and capabilities.

a. Vision. Provide our nation the world's premiere special operations units, capable of prosecuting the most sensitive special warfare campaigns and executing the most difficult surgical strike operation, while providing seamless and persistent special operations support to joint-force commanders worldwide.²

b. Intent. USASOC matures the Army SOF profession, addresses capability gaps and improves integration at the 'seams' to better enable application of combat power across the spectrum of responsibility.³

c. Objective. In 2022, ARSOF provide joint-force commanders scalable nodes, with unmatched levels of tactical skill and language and cultural expertise, which establish persistent and distributed networks that provide the nation precise and nuanced asymmetric capability.⁴

d. ARSOF 2022 Priorities.

- Invest in Human Capital,
- Optimize SOF/CF/JIIM Interdependence,
- Operationalize the CONUS base,
- Develop SOF capabilities at the operational level,
- Facilitate SOF Mission Command, and
- Optimize Resourcing and Commodity areas⁵

e. 2022 Vision "Facilitate SOF Mission Command": ARSOF will possess a wide array of scalable and deployable C2 nodes, capable of projecting SOF mission command in the most austere and politically sensitive environments, with the requisite level of expertise, experience and architecture to plan, integrate and synchronize SOF operations and SOF campaigns at any echelon of joint command, in an interagency country-team environment or with partnered indigenous forces of any size, including SOF operational headquarters above the TSOC level that are designed to conduct SOF-centric campaigns.⁶

2-3. Future Operating Environment.

a. The Future Operating Environment (FOE) will be complex and demanding. Threats in 2022 and beyond may include conventional and unconventional forces, irregular militias and paramilitaries, or trans-national violent extremist organizations (VEO) and trans-national criminal organizations. The threat may be networked vice hierarchical, and may be independent of a sovereign, functioning state. Threats will be complex and adaptive and may be equipped with sophisticated technology.

b. WMD technologies will proliferate and information and communications technology capabilities will explode among actors of all types. Threats will attempt to asymmetrically oppose our efforts and will leverage increasingly complex urban, difficult, and human terrain. Threats will employ anti-access and area denial strategies to restrict our global posture.

c. Experience, over the last twelve years, indicates that to defeat networked, complex, non-traditional threats requires a mission command structure capable of providing near real time, situational awareness to support decentralized operations and responsive interagency/inter-organizational coordination. The FOE will demand the ability to understand and interact with local populations and governance, producing results in accordance with strategic objectives. To meet these objectives requires the capability to build capacity, legitimacy, and – in the case of unconventional warfare – transition authority to the host nation government.

d. Recent events involving Russia in the Ukraine are an example of another factor, one of a resurgence of a nationalistic power in its attempt to reclaim aspects of former power and influence. The Russian land mass alone crosses three GCC boundaries. Combining this complexity with the numerous ellipses of possible activity greatly compounds the difficulty factor in consideration of the possible global effects of international actions to mitigate or resolve incidents.

2-4. Operational Challenge.

a. The perceived "operational seam." Writing from a conventional force perspective, James Bright, in a study of operational seams defines the lack of integration and interoperability between SOF and

conventional forces during execution of operations. His thesis is that the lack of unity of command between Special Operations Forces and conventional forces constitutes this operational seam.⁷ Using two examples, one from Afghanistan and one from Iraq, he details the difficulties experienced when SOF and CF work in the same battle space without a unified command and coordinated planning. LtCol Bright presents a solution that resembles in intent, but not organization, a joint unified headquarters that has control of all elements within an area of operations. His model resembles the CFLCC headquarters for OIF, and USFOR-A for OEF. LtCol Bright concludes that the greatest single challenge facing SOF today is outdated command and control structures.⁸ While the seam may have come closer to closing since 2007, there is little documentation and the methods have not been captured in doctrine.

b. Over the last decade, there have been numerous and diverse efforts to address this critical gap. This includes the establishment of hybrid C2 nodes, such as TSOCs-Forward, and Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) commands in several regions throughout the world. Ad hoc in nature and insufficiently resourced, these efforts have yielded disparate effects, resulting in missed opportunities to effectively integrate SOF capabilities. In addition, some national security challenges increasingly require SOF-centric solutions that require unique combinations of SOF/CF capability and SOF operational level mission command. This paper recommends a scalable, service integrated (USMC, USN, USAF and USA, Joint, SOF, CF and UAP), deployable mission command organization commanded by a special operations officer.

c. Two factors inherent in the current theater-based organizational design are limiting factors when applied to theater planning, coordination and execution of operations: 1) GCCs and TSOCs are theater-constrained; and 2) there may be a limitation to the expandability of the TSOC span of control of operations. These limiting factors create another type of "operational seam."

d. Theater constraint is based on the GCC and TSOC primary focus on in-theater operations. Experience has shown that the theater desks within those commands are for situational awareness and status reporting rather than planning. This removes the requirement for deeper analysis of events and concurrent operations unless there is a direct impact within the theater. Other-theater events that do not exhibit an immediate effect on events or key actors within the GCC theater will likely be given a less in-depth evaluation while events occurring within the theater are scrutinized more closely. This perspective leaves in-theater events open to influence at deeper levels that may rise to the surface later causing issues that may be mitigated if resources were available to evaluate out-theater events for second and third order effects.

e. USSOCOM's intent is to better enable and operationalize the TSOCs in support of the GCCs. The TSOCs must manage all in-theater Special Operations support to the GCCs, This requires nesting operations and events in the GCC's strategic requirements, coordinating and supporting the Department of State country teams' requirements, cooperating with partner nations, and executing high-priority missions. The question is then, at what point does pushing operational elements forward to the TSOCs become untenable in terms of mission command capability to operational elements employed?

Section 3 Military Problem and Components of the Solution

3-1. Military Problem.

Army Forces at Brigade/Group, Division and Corps level do not fully integrate and synchronize SOF (Army and Joint), Conventional Force and Unified Action Partners core capabilities/competencies to achieve operational and strategic objectives across the range of military operations . Additionally, ARSOF lacks a regionally-expert, campaign-capable augmentation and support construct by which it can deploy a responsive and scalable joint mission command structure to address emerging requirements worldwide, while maintaining responsibility for the necessary administrative, "day-to-day" functions.

3-2. Central Idea.

a. To effectively plan and control extended, small footprint theater engagement, and Phase IV (Stabilize) and Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) operations, the Army requires an established, scalable, deployable mission command structure/organization capable of unified command and control of special operations forces, conventional forces and elements of US and host nation governmental, and non-governmental departments, agencies, and organizations. Such command structures would allow the Army to execute command authority over specific operations as well as smaller regional operations and engagements.

b. Over the next decade, ARSOF will evolve the existing mission command capability to encompass a more responsive and flexible force structure capable of leveraging the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational (JIIM) spectrum and GSN partners; and incorporate advanced technologies to conduct long-term relationship-building exercises, assist in peace and stability operations, and to provide assistance to establish or reestablish governance where required.

3-3. Solution Concepts and Components.

a. Unity of Command. “The lack of unity of command between SOF and conventional forces is a recurring comment found in after action reviews on almost every major operation from Operation DESERT STORM of 1991 to the current operations ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan.”⁹ The doctrinal principle of unity of command applies to special operations and conventional forces, just as it applies with all forces operating in the same territories against the same adversaries. Leadership is often able to follow this imperative to eliminate the operational seams between the military services, between other USG agencies and between the unified action partners – it must not allow the seam to exist between CF and SOF.

b. Mission Command by JOPES Phase. The resultant unified command structure can be made more effective through overall command being exercised by the component with the preponderance of experience and expertise with the core activities within an Operational Plan Phase.¹⁰

(1) Conventional forces are organized and trained to defeat and disable an enemy’s military assets and capabilities, which is the focus of Phases 2 and 3 (*Seize the Initiative* and *Dominant* respectively). In the Notional Operation Plan, these phases involve the largest commitment of forces.

(2) SOF possess the training and expertise to conduct persistent engagement and the Phase 0 (*Shape*) activities, and are generally in-country in advance of conventional forces for preparation of the environment. ARSOF include the Civil Affairs and Military Information Service (MIS) personnel which support Phase V (Enable Civil Authority), allow the civil authority to persist as a stable and stabilizing government, and to win in the human domain to create enduring support for the U.S. and U.S. objectives.

(3) Since every conflict is unique there cannot be strict adherence to a single template to determine when the CF and when the SOF component should be responsible for overall mission command. In addition, most warfare in the past has been irregular warfare and this will not change in the FOE; conflicts such as unconventional warfare campaigns may be completely and successfully conducted without U.S. conventional forces. However the principle should be applied of using the CF or SOF component to organize, synchronize, command and conduct operations during the Phase which corresponds to their training, experience, and mission focus.

d. Command Structure Considerations.

(1) Manpower sourcing. Two of the example command structures require a duplication of staff elements to meet the readiness requirement. The first, using a primary/deputy or secondary arrangement allows the existing staff officers and non-commissioned officers to stay engaged in day-to-day activities and maintain situational awareness of on-going current contingencies and operations. The second diagram depicts a separate organization that duplicates the existing command. In this instance the CONUS command handles generating force requirements while the deploying command is responsible to conduct operations.

Command elements designated as deployable and drawn from existing structure have to consider existing requirements as well as contingencies. One question is: "How can USASOC best position the personnel identified as available and yet maintain currency in day-to-day operations?" There will be no authorization for additional manpower within no-growth guidelines. Is there enough existing manpower to create a duplicate/nested staff structure or is double-slotting in positions an option? During the late 1980's through the 1990's there were instances of units receiving authorization to double-slot personnel in selected positions. This allowed for increased manpower availability for missions while at the same time sending personnel for training and exercises. An alternate method might be to identify a fully-capable deputy within each staff section that would be trained and ready to assume the staff responsibilities, either at the CONUS headquarters or deployed.

(2) Mission Command/Authorities. Objectives of any organizational structure will include streamlining the ability to establish mission command elements, and mission command of special operations and conventional forces in cooperation with unified action partners.

The process to coordinate and transition command elements from special operations to conventional, and back to special operations, requires planning and early integration. Efficiencies can be gained by retaining the steady state and Phase 0/I elements, either integrated into the conventional force maneuver elements or by allowing them to keep elements in theater to maintain situational awareness and continue planning for on-going parallel operations. These elements could ultimately reassume Phase IV/V operational planning responsibilities. The Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) must establish responsibilities and authorities for both the special operations command and the conventional maneuver

force. It is likely that in steady state and Phase 0/I a fully empowered and operationalized Theater SOC will manage the planning, activities, and operations on behalf of the GCC, incorporating special operations and regionally aligned conventional forces to maintain a presence level in line with strategic objectives. As events dictate and the GCC decides to ramp up operations, the conventional forces can flow into the area. When the GCC makes the decision a conventional force task force commander can take authority for operations in the area.

(3) Interagency, Intergovernmental Coordination.

There are numerous interagency and intergovernmental partners operating both at home and abroad in the interests of the US. The number of ARSOF liaisons with these partners, CONUS and OCONUS, is severely limited compared to what will be required in the FOE. These partners can enhance SOF regional understanding and cultural awareness. Cross pollination of liaisons between TSOC staffs and corresponding interagency and intergovernmental partners greatly facilitates information exchange and provides mutual support during world-wide engagement exercises conducted in support of theatre campaign plans and US strategic objectives. This would allow the TSOC to streamline information flow, enhance situational awareness and leverage all possible national assets during initial and on-going engagement exercises and missions in support of national or theatre objectives.

(4) Peace Enforcement operations. The 2022 Vision includes: ARSOF will possess a wide array of scalable and deployable C2 nodes, capable of projecting SOF mission command in the most austere and politically sensitive environments. These will include the requisite level of expertise, experience and architecture to plan, integrate and synchronize SOF operations and SOF campaigns at any echelon of joint command, in an interagency country-team environment or with partnered indigenous forces of any size, including SOF operational headquarters above the TSOC level that are designed to conduct SOF-centric campaigns.

The command of choice for peace enforcement or peacekeeping should be a special operations led command. Enforcing a peace agreement requires more than a "boots on the ground" presence. It requires an understanding of the belligerents and populations involved, knowledge of the US strategic intent, and the ability to interact with the host nation government, international partners and apply a variety of solutions and techniques in an ambiguous environment. Language proficiency, deep cultural understanding, and information specialization are prerequisites for any enduring success and are intrinsic to special operations forces.¹¹

A command led by special operations leaders and trained operational planners from the special operations community and the conventional force, where the planning cell includes unified action partners in the planning and coordination, will most likely apply the correct type of approach to the requirement. This includes utilizing elements of the Army's regionally aligned force when appropriate. The regionally aligned forces would provide the hybrid special operations-led command an additional asset and capability that can be employed in support of regional missions. This task organization would serve to reinforce the concept of a hybrid organization and a role in SOF/CF interdependence.

(5) Partner Nation Engagement. 2022 Vision: Develop habitual relationships with key partner nation government representatives to leverage host nation capabilities and resources and achieve US strategic intent. When the "host nation" is friendly or supportive to U.S. personnel and objectives, the

same rationale applies to the previous section in order to leverage SOF training and expertise in the language, culture, and civil affairs and military information specialties. When the “host nation” is adversarial the better approach will often be a conventional force mission command structure to focus on changing the attitude of the host regime, or the regime itself.

(6) Organizational Design. The required capabilities of ARSOF mission command elements must evolve and expand to support the future operating concepts of the US Army, SOCOM and ARSOF. Mission command elements must be lethal, flexible, globally responsive and self-supporting in order to support Theatre Phase 0/IV/V Campaigns and respond to regional conditions. To succeed, mission command elements must be optimally task organized, manned, trained, equipped, stationed and supported.

(7) Layered, Multi-technology Concepts. In the future, many technology advancements will be readily available to the public, which may in turn be used by potential adversaries of the U.S. Over the next decade, the potential areas for significant technological advancements include: C4ISR, cyber, electronic warfare, directed energy, 3-dimensional printers, information technologies, kinetic penetrators, non-lethal weapons, sensors, robotics, space, unmanned ground vehicles, energy storage and low-visibility/stealth technologies.

(8) Regionally Aligned Forces. The Army will begin attaching Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) to Theatres in support of the GCC. These forces are expected to become regionally engaged, culturally aware, etc. The concept has not been tested nor fully implemented yet, AFRICA Command being the only Combatant Command fully engaged in the RAF process at this time.

Section 4. Conclusion

In 2022 and beyond, the operating environment will be uncertain, complex, and multi-dimensional, encompassing numerous variables. To stay globally engaged and strategically relevant, ARSOF must continually learn, anticipate and evolve. This requires forward thinking and the ability to develop concepts, derive required capabilities, and develop innovative training and education, that allows USASOC and the ARSOF community to remain the leaders in Special Operations. To meet this challenge, ARSOF must continuously strive to evolve flexible, modular, scalable, deployable mission command options including the option of a single organization providing unified mission command to conventional and special operations forces within a defined mission area. Command of this mission command structure and the assigned CF and SOF will be able to transition between conventional, special operations and U.S. agency or department as the command authority based on the type of warfare or operations required to meet strategic purposes. For a “typical” conflict the CF-SOF hybrid structure will be commanded by conventional commanders during the Joint Phases I, II, and III where the lines of effort focus on defeating and disabling the adversary’s military capabilities; the structure will be commanded by ARSOF or other U.S. authority during Steady State operations and Joint Phase 0, IV and V in order to build partner capacity, maintain peace, optimize preparation for larger combat, transition to civil indigenous government after victory, and preserving the victory through enduring success in the human domain. This will require identifying opportunities to enhance concepts, methodologies, and partnerships, and adopting emerging technologies. These efforts over the next decade will ensure that

ARSOF remains the most effective mission command organization for preventing conflict and reestablishing partner nation stability and governance in the world.

Appendix A References

Section I

Required References.

Joint publications are available on the Joint Electronic Library at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm or <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=0>.

Selected United States Special Operations Command publications are available at <https://www.milsuite.mil>.

Department of the Army (DA) regulations, pamphlets, field manuals, Army doctrine publications (ADP), doctrine reference publications (ADRP). And DA forms are available at Army Publishing Directorate Home Page <http://www.apd.army.mil>.

TRADOC publications and forms are available at TRADOC Publications <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs>.

United States Army Special Operations Command
ARSOF 2022

United States Special Operations Command
SOCOM 2020: Forging the Tip of the Spear

United States Special Operations Command
Special Operations Forces Operating Concept

United States Special Operations Command
Special Operations Forces 2020: The Global SOF Network

Section II

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Appendix B Historical Precedence

(1) World War II: 1942 – 1944 China Burma India Theater (CBI)

General Joseph Stillwell began his service in the CBI, simultaneously serving as Chinese General Chiang Ki Shek's Chief of Staff and President Roosevelt's Senior US military representative in the CBI.¹² By 1943, Stillwell was directing two Chinese Divisions (Task Force Y), in coordination with Orde Wingate's British Commonwealth forces which included Air Commandos, in attacks on the Japanese across the CBI. In 1944 he was augmented with the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) known as GALAHAD, and ultimately "Merrill's Marauders." These combined forces conducted far ranging Joint Combined Special Warfare operations against the Japanese. With GALAHAD, Stilwell continued to press the attack. He used his two Chinese divisions to keep pressure on the Japanese front while the Marauders went on wide end maneuvers around the Japanese to cut the enemy's communications.¹³ Ultimately, US and Commonwealth forces in the CBI grew and were augmented to include significant air assets and the composite "Mars Task Force". By 1945, after three years of Joint Combined special warfare and conventional operations, the Japanese forces in the CBI had been defeated.

(2) Vietnam: 1962 - 1966

The direction, control, and administration of U.S. Armed forces throughout the early period of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia was vested in a military assistance advisory group and, beginning in 1962, in the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.¹⁴ Both headquarters had joint staffs with representatives from all the armed services, and were members of the Country Team. In April 1962 the Commander in Chief, Pacific, recommended that a coordinated plan be developed for the over-all US effort in support of the government of South Vietnam. The Departments of State and Defense sanctioned this recommendation. In Saigon, the US Ambassador, the chief of the advisory group, and other senior officials, as part of the Country Team, drew up a planning document that dealt with the political, military, economic, and psychological requirements for fighting the Communist insurgency.

Historically, Army conventional units are led by conventional force commanders, and special operations units are led by SOF officers and non-commissioned officers. For special operations and conventional forces to work habitually and seamlessly in the future, some pre-conceptions and paradigms will have to be overcome.

(1) Iran: 1979 – 1980.

A principal example of ineffective command and control via a non-hybrid command structure is Operation Eagle Claw, the unsuccessful attempt to rescue hostages at the American embassy in Iran in 1980. The ensuing investigation found a lack of command and control and inter-service coordination as significant factors in the failure of the mission. The findings of this investigation led to Congress establishing the United States Special Operations Command on 16 April 1987.

(2) Afghanistan: 2001 – Present.

Currently in Afghanistan, the coordination of operations between conventional and special operations forces takes place at the highest levels in the regional commands and at the joint command level in Kabul. If no specific command relationship is designated, cooperation between elements is personality driven.

Mission planning, coordination, deconfliction and execution is sporadically shared at the tactical level when there is a battle space owner, and then only when absolutely necessary. Any effort to integrate at the operational and tactical levels tends to be personality driven, and then usually out of necessity. Operation Anaconda (Afghanistan: 2002) is offered as an example of the operational consequences that can result from ineffective synchronization of conventional and special operations. Details concerning this operation may be obtained in other sources.¹⁵

(3) Iraq: 2007.


As mentioned above, cooperation between elements will depend on the personalities of the elements' leadership when no specific command relationship is designated. The following interview was with the conventional force commander for the Haditha Triad, An Anbar Province, Iraq from September 2006 to August 2007, shortly after his return to CONUS.

“There was no command and control relationship between 2/3 (2nd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment) and the ODA (the SOF Operational Detachment Alpha assigned in that area). It was even worse than my previous relationship with the SOF in Afghanistan. ... We resided on the same base and they had little to no interaction with us in regards to intelligence sharing and none in regards to joint operational planning unless they needed our support. ... There were tribal engagement issues and humanitarian assistance projects that we were executing with the tribal leaders that were nearly botched because of the ODA. The ODA had different priorities and were offering conflicting humanitarian assistance projects to the same tribal leaders.

- LtCol James Donnellan, USMC¹⁶

Appendix C Hybrid Structures

c. Command Structure Alternatives. This paper focuses on the strategic and operational command levels. The sample structures are provided as a starting point, to be refined as the hybrid structure idea is developed and input is gained from the community of interest. Three possible command structures are presented based on identifying a generating force structure and an operating force structure:



Key:

- operational control —————
- administrative control - - - - -
- coordinating - · - · - ·
- command relationship — · — · — ·
- determined by mission — · — · — ·

Figure 3-1A: Nested Dual Staff

Figure 3-1: To create a deployable and scalable headquarters requires establishing a duplicate structure within the Command. The force provider half of will remain in CONUS to carry on day-to-day activities of the service component command. The operational elements can be deployed in phases as required for the scalable mission. At the point that the 3-star HQ moves to theater and is subordinate to the GCC, the TSOC would become subordinate to the 3-star headquarters.




Figure 3-2A: Standing Dual Staffs

Figure 3-2: To create a deployable and scalable headquarters requires establishing a parallel structure. One half will remain CONUS to carry on day to day activities of the service component command. The opposite, operational half that can be deployed in phases which are mission contingent. The TSOC then morphs into SOJTF Main (TSOC) and SOJTF Operational (GSN/OSW/UW)




Figure 3-3A: Joint Manning Document

Figure 3-3: The manning document is held in reserve at the Joint Staff (JS) level, to be mobilized/ deployed when/as required. The argument for JS positioning is that Army will argue that it has corps and division deployable headquarters ready to go, and USSOCOM has the TSOCs as operational headquarters.




Figure 3-4A: 3-Star Designated TSOC with TSOC CDR forward

Figure 3-4A depicts a three-star SOF commander at the Theater Special Operations Command with the two-star TSOC Commander forward with the Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF). The SOJTF is supported by a subordinate Division Headquarters. The TSOC exercises OPCON of the SOJTF. The SOJTF can function in a Supporting / Supported command relationship to a CJTF if present. The TSOC Deputy Commander commands the SOC and manages the theater focused activities supporting the GCC.

Glossary

Section I Abbreviations

ADCON	Administrative Control
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
C2	command and control
C4ISR	command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
CBI	China, Burma, India Theater
CF	conventional forces
CFLCC	Coalition Forces Land Component Command
CONUS	continental United States
CSC	Component Service Command
CSU	Component Service Unit
DA	Department of the Army
D-CDR	Deputy Commander
D-CoS	Deputy Chief of Staff
FM	Field Manual
FOE	future operating environment
GCC	Geographical Combatant Command
G-Staff	Army General Officer Staff
GSN	Global Special Operations Forces Network
HN	Host Nation
IFOR	Implementation Force
JIIM	joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
LNO	Liaison Officer
NAT	North Atlantic Treaty Organization Advisory Team
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPCON	Operational Control
OSW	Office of Special Warfare
RAF	regionally aligned force
SFG	Special Forces Group
SOF	special operations forces
SOJTF	Special Operations Joint Task Force
TF	task force
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
UAP	unified action partners
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USFOR-A	United States Forces - Afghanistan

USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	unconventional warfare
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

Section II Terms

hybrid structure organization — (In this document) A headquarters level organization with mission command responsibility and authority for the operations of conventional forces and special operations forces. The staff contains SOF (or CF) representatives integrated into CF (or SOF) general staff positions to provide unified action across the SOF and CF forces.

SOF-centric campaigns — Special warfare campaigns executing foreign internal defense , unconventional warfare, or counterterrorism operations. The operations will be small-scale in nature with the majority of forces on the ground are special operations forces. Conventional forces support operations with key enablers such as intelligence assets, forces to provide security or training where SOF has limited expertise, medical support, transportation, sustainment, and additional combat power as required. (*ARSOF Operating Concept 2022*)

unified action partners — Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with which Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. (*TRADOC Pam 525-8-5*)

ENDNOTES

¹ The six Operation Plan Phases per JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (11 August 2011) are: Phase 0: Shape, Phase I: Deter, Phase II: Seize Initiative, Phase III: Dominate, Phase IV: Stabilize, and Phase V: Enable Civil Authority.

² United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), *ARSOF 2022*, 2013, 8,17.

³ USASOC, *ARSOF 2022*, 17.

⁴ USASOC, *ARSOF 2022*, 9.

⁵ USASOC, *ARSOF 2022*, 17.

⁶ USASOC, *ARSOF 2022*, 22.

⁷ James M. Bright (Lt. COL, USMC), *Operational Seam: The Command and Control of Conventional and Special Operations Forces* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007) p#.

⁸ Bright, *Operational Seam: The Command and Control of Conventional and Special Operations Forces*, p#.

⁹ Bright, *Operational Seam: The Command and Control of Conventional and Special Operations Forces*, 2.

¹⁰ The six Operation Plan Phases per JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (11 August 2011) are: Phase 0: Shape, Phase I: Deter, Phase II: Seize Initiative, Phase III: Dominate, Phase IV: Stabilize, and Phase V: Enable Civil Authority.

¹¹ *In 2022, ARSOF provide joint-force commanders scalable nodes, with unmatched levels of tactical skill and language and cultural expertise, which establish persistent and distributed networks that provide the nation precise and nuanced asymmetric capability.* (USASOC, *ARSOF 2022*, 9.)

¹² National Archives, "Records of U.S. Army Forces in the China-Burma-India Theaters of Operations," National Archives, <http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/493.html#493.4> (accessed April 24, 2014)

¹³ For more detailed information of Merrill's Marauders in the China-Burma-India Theater see United States Army Center of Military History, *Merrill's Marauders: February – May 1944* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), accessed April 22, 2014, http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/100/100-4/CMH_Pub_100-4.pdf.

¹⁴ George S. Eckhardt (Major General), *Vietnam Studies: Command and Control 1950-1969* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1991), 25-30, accessed April 28, 2014, <http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/Comm-Control/index.htm#contents>.

¹⁵ *Weapon of Choice, US Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan*, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. xxxx

¹⁶ LtCol James Donnellan, USMC, Naval War College, interviewed 04 October 2007, in James M. Bright (LtCol, USMC), *Operational Seam: The Command and Control of Conventional and Special Operations Forces* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007), 6.