Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

CASE STUDY IN GUERRILLA WAR:

GREECE DURING WORLD WAR II

REVISED EDITION

United States Army Special Operations Command
ASSESSING REVOLUTIONARY AND INSURGENT STRATEGIES

The Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) series consists of a set of case studies and research conducted for the US Army Special Operations Command by the National Security Analysis Department of The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

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SORO STUDIES

INTRODUCTION TO REVISED EDITION

This case study was originally published by the US Army Special Operations Research Office in 1961. As we developed the Assessing Resistance and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) project and work began on the new studies, we determined that this text is still important and relevant and thus should be republished. As noted in the Foreword to the original edition, this case study considers many aspects of tactical operations, offering a glimpse of the complexities in working relationships between individuals and groups with diverse backgrounds and aspirations. The record of the German performance against the Greek guerrillas gives insight into the reasons for the Germans’ tactical success in antiguerrilla combat and their simultaneous failure to eradicate the guerrilla movement. The description and analysis of these events are quite relevant to study of today’s movements and operations.

The majority of the book was reproduced exactly as it appeared originally, with some minor spelling and punctuation corrections as well as changes in formatting to conform to modern typesetting conventions and to match the new ARIS studies in presentation. The process for creating this revised edition entailed scanning the pages from a copy of the original book; using an optical character recognition (OCR) function to convert the text on the scanned pages to computer-readable, editable text; refining the scanned figures to ensure appropriate resolution and contrast; and composing the document using professional typesetting software. Then, word by word, the revised text was compared to the original text to ensure that no errors were introduced during the OCR and composition processes. In addition, the original edition included two fold-out maps that were re-created at a smaller scale for this updated edition.

These efforts resulted in the creation of this revised edition in the following formats: a softbound book, a hardbound book, a PDF, and an EPUB. The EPUB was generated by creating a new set of files from the print-ready files, adjusting various settings in the files to facilitate maximum compatibility with e-readers, exporting the files to .epub, and reviewing and revising the code to allow for optimal viewing on standard e-reading devices. The final step was to test the book on multiple e-readers and then repeat the entire process as necessary to address any remaining issues in the code.

Although the processes for creating the various formats of this edition are for the most part straightforward, they take several weeks to complete and require considerable attention to detail. Several staff members from the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory devoted time and effort to making the various formats of this
This study and the other products from the ARIS project are essential learning tools developed to enhance Special Operations Forces personnel’s understanding of resistances and insurgencies. For more than fifty years, Special Operations Forces have conducted missions to support resistances or insurgencies (unconventional warfare); to counter them (counterinsurgency operations); or to support a partner nation in eliminating them (foreign internal defense). These operations are collectively referred to as special warfare. Special Operations doctrine gives general principles and strategies for accomplishing these operations but in most cases describes the resistance or insurgency only in generalities. The ARIS project was designed to serve as an anatomy lesson. It provides the necessary foundational material for the special warfare practitioner to learn the elemental structure, form, and function of rebellions, thus enabling him or her to better adapt and apply the doctrine professionally. Additionally, these products inform doctrine, ensuring that it is adapted to meet modern social and technological changes.

When citing this study in scholarly work, please refer to the PDF version available at www.soc.mil.

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GREECE DURING WORLD WAR II

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FOREWORD

Because of recent developments in Southeast Asia and other areas where Communists have exploited guerrilla movements to the detriment of the non-Communist world, interest in the United States is focused on guerrilla warfare as seldom before. Several facts about guerrilla movements—a field of activity too long regarded as “adventure”—have emerged from these experiences of the 20th century. One is that world communism has systematically utilized guerrilla warfare to extend its power and that the West has not always been able to counter these thrusts. China and Indochina are classic examples. Another point is that the Communists frequently attempt to subvert resistance and guerrilla movements not originally Communist, so that they will become the tools of communism.

The Special Operations Research Office is convinced that this case study of guerrilla warfare, utilizing the example of Greece during World War II, holds many lessons for the 1960’s, from both a military and political standpoint. While many of the lessons may be known to a few United States experts, it is also true that not all persons who will be intimately concerned with guerrilla warfare in the near future have this expert knowledge at their fingertips. In this sense, this study should prove most useful to a variety of military and non-military audiences.

For the policy maker, this study represents a detailed and comprehensive review of the major aspects of a guerrilla campaign, including its political implications and long-range effects. For the military planner, the study indicates not only many of the problems inherent in such a campaign—of selection and training of men, of logistics and communication, for example, but also some possible solutions. For persons who may someday be in the same position as that handful of Allied men in Greece during World War II, the study considers many aspects of tactical operations and affords a glimpse of the complexities in working relationships between individuals and groups with diverse backgrounds and aspirations. For those responsible for countering guerrilla operations in the future, the record of the German performance against the Greek guerrillas gives insight into the reasons for their tactical success in antiguerrilla combat and their simultaneous failure to eradicate the guerrilla movement.

In presenting this study, I feel confident that it will aid in the understanding of a subject of telling importance.

Kai E. Rasmussen
Director
Special Operations Research Office

October 1961
Greece was selected as a logical subject for a pilot study on a guerrilla campaign by this Office for a number of reasons. Many similarities and cogent analogies exist between the guerrilla war in Greece in the early 1940’s and those conflicts which have since broken out in other areas. On the other hand, certain aspects of the Greek situation are unique and of specific value. A study of the guerrilla warfare in Greece provides extremely useful insights into various perplexing problems concerning the exploitation and countering of guerrilla groups.

A specific example may clarify how certain similarities in guerrilla warfare, even in diverse situations, appear and reappear, thus making even “old” experience pertinent. Although guerrilla warfare in Greece during World War II differed from that in Cuba during the latter 1950’s—if for no other reasons than that the one campaign was directed against a foreign occupier and the other against a repressive indigenous government—there were a number of likenesses. In both instances, the main base of operations was in the mountains. Despite the time interval between the two campaigns, the tactics were remarkably similar—night fighting, sabotage, and attack on lines of communication, utilizing mobility, flexibility, and surprise. In Greece, the Germans found encirclement the best counterguerrilla tactic; in Cuba, according to “Che” Guevara, guerrillas feared encirclement as the one way they might be “forced into a decisive battle that can be very unfavorable. . . .” Not only military but political tactics in the two situations appeared similar in concept. In both cases, Communist groups adopted as their avowed objectives the social aspirations of the people and were careful at first not to betray any other intent. In Greece, indoctrination of the people was a standard procedure of the Communist-dominated guerrilla group; in Cuba, the revolutionary movement, according to Guevara, found it “necessary to undertake intensive work among the people . . . .”

Despite these similarities, the example of Greece during World War II is probably most important because of its specific lessons. One aspect that is examined in this study with particular care is the technique used by the British to manage, support, and control the guerrilla movement. Once they became aware of the Communist element in the strongest guerrilla force, they worked to keep it from establishing complete military and political control over the country during a period of extreme political weakness. Their success in this undertaking was certainly an outstanding accomplishment. Another interesting point is that the British took special care to legitimize sending their own troops into the country as the Germans left. Having parried the Communist thrust
until then, at that crucial moment they determinedly and effectively countered an expected Communist bid for power.

This study is also particularly concerned with certain continuing problems in both the exploitation and the countering of guerrilla warfare. For example, some of the data on interpersonal relations between staff and field members of the British Special Operations Executive and between the British liaison men and local guerrillas provide very useful and pertinent information. The German counterguerrilla operations are at once a model of what to do and what not to do. The Germans, with a minimum of resources, exhibited defensive and offensive tactics which went far toward destroying the guerrillas. At the same time, their brutality toward the civilian population earned them its hatred and generally strengthened its support of the guerrillas. Hence, the Germans were never able to eradicate resistance; when they left, guerrilla groups harassed their departure.

Some brief explanation needs to be made as to the general focus of this study. Since the work was undertaken with the possible future role of an Allied army in mind, the experience in Greece has been viewed from the perspective of a sponsoring power—in this case the British. This viewpoint has two corollaries. One is that, since British control involved many political factors, these quickly became the dominating feature of a study of the Greek guerrilla war. The other corollary is that this dominance of the political made it advisable and logical to limit the study’s attention to those elements of the resistance movement that played a major political role.

Although political events are covered in this study only insofar as they concerned the guerrilla war, it is difficult to say what political happenings were not pertinent, or indeed what guerrilla operations did not have political repercussions. The first British officers who worked with the Greek guerrillas quickly learned that the prime factor in controlling them was the political one. In time, politics came to permeate every aspect of the guerrilla war, even its technical details. It follows therefore that political understanding is essential to comprehension even of the operational war. The study treats the political side of the guerrilla war first and develops it chronologically. This sequential treatment of events allows the user to follow the play and counterplay of Greek politics and provides a time frame for the later analysis of operational elements in the guerrilla war.

Since the major political and operational aspects of the Greek guerrilla war involved only a few of the very many resistance groups that operated in Greece during World War II, this study has had to be delimited to consider only the most important groups. Those that were outside the mainstream of events, as for example the gallant resistance
on Crete or the Andon Tsaous band in Macedonia, have been given only the briefest mention. Where pertinent, however, data based on British experience with these bands have been utilized in the later, nonpolitical chapters.

The study has utilized historical methods and techniques as the most appropriate and feasible. On the other hand, this report is not a simple attempt to recreate past events. The focus has been placed on the significant features of guerrilla warfare as it occurred in Greece during World War II. In short, the study has treated those aspects of guerrilla warfare that would have been treated had any method other than the historical—e.g., a social science technique of interrogation or experimentation—been possible.

The report is mainly based on the remarkably frank memoirs and accounts published by a number of the principal military participants, including Brigadier Myers, commander of the British mission to the Greek guerrillas; Colonel Woodhouse, his successor; and a number of the other British liaison officers. The memoirs of major political participants, for example, Prime Minister Churchill and Ambassador Leeper on the British side and Prime Minister Papandhreou on the Greek side, have been utilized. Of the Greek guerrillas, Colonel Saraphis has given us his account of the Communist group, and lesser figures such as George Psychoundakis and Chris Jecchinis have added the flavor of guerrilla warfare as seen by the non-Communist tactical practitioner. A manuscript written by Maj. Matthew J. Vlissides, formerly of the Greek Army, detailing his firsthand experience with guerrilla warfare in the Greek islands, has been useful to this study. Comments by another Greek observer have also been helpful. Accounts of antiguerrilla warfare in Greece by German commanders have been used, as have some captured German war records. It should be noted that this study has not exploited any official classified records. A complete, annotated list of the literature from which data were obtained is given in the Bibliography at the end of the report.

Only a final mention needs now to be made of the organization of this report. The first chapter deals with the opening British moves in Greece and gives the economic, political, and military background necessary to understand what later occurred. Chapter II develops the political and strategic aspects of the guerrilla campaign. Chapter III concerns some of the functional problems inherent in supporting a guerrilla war from outside the area. The focus in Chapter IV is on the non-tactical aspects of life behind the lines in Greece—guerrilla structure, command, organization, working relationships with liaison officers, etc.; Chapter V, on the other hand, treats tactical military operations, giving a number of specific examples. Chapter VI, making
an about-face, views the guerrilla effort from the German side—not as a movement to support or control but as a thing to destroy. Finally, for the benefit of the reader who must restrict his reading, a Summary of the entire study, giving its Conclusions and Implications, has been placed at the beginning of the report.
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SUMMARY

Problem

To prepare a case study of guerrilla warfare, using the experience of Greece during World War II in order to—(1) increase knowledge of resistance and guerrilla warfare; (2) describe and evaluate German anti-guerrilla measures and tactics; (3) derive conclusions relevant to operational concepts of waging guerrilla warfare; and (4) provide a basis for eliciting or suggesting general principles for guerrilla warfare doctrine.

Background of Events

In September 1942 German victories were at their height. The German war machine was in high gear and the summer campaigns still going strong. In Europe, only Great Britain and Russia were actively fighting, the latter in a desperate struggle on her own soil. In Africa, German forces under General Rommel had recaptured Tobruk and advanced into Egypt to the El Alamein line, only 70 miles west of Alexandria. The British breakout attempt from El Alamein was still a month away. Allied fortunes of war were at low ebb.

One of the major supply routes for General Rommel’s forces in Africa was from Germany through Greece. There was only one north-south railway line through Greece, but the British, lacking sufficient naval or air forces, were unable to interdict it. To prevent Rommel from being supplied via Greece, the British therefore turned to a desperate expedient: they planned to send a behind-the-lines party to cut this important rail line.

Discussion

In late September 1942 the British airdropped a small, uniformed party under Col. (Brig.) E. C. W. Myers into the mountains of Greece with orders to enlist the help of guerrilla groups believed to be operating and, with their aid, to cut the north-south rail line by blowing up one of three major railway bridges. The demolition was successfully accomplished with guerrilla help; the rail line was cut for 6 weeks. The

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a Austria and Czechoslovakia had been bloodlessly incorporated into the Reich; Albania had been annexed by Italy. Vichy France, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Turkey were officially neutral. Northern France, the Benelux countries, Norway, Denmark, Poland, the Baltic countries, much of Russia to Stalingrad, Yugoslavia, and Greece had been overrun and occupied. Italy, Finland, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria were actively supporting Germany.
success of this operation led the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) in Cairo not to exfiltrate the sabotage party, as had been planned, but to leave it in Greece to build up and work with the guerrilla forces.

Myers, now Brigadier and leader of the British Military Mission to the Greek guerrillas, soon found that he faced problems more complex than any he had previously encountered as a professional soldier. The resistance movement was split into a number of factions of varying political views. Though the two largest guerrilla groups had collaborated in the bridge demolition, they were bitter rivals. EAM/ELAS, ostensibly a coalition of republican elements dedicated to fighting the occupying forces and working for a freely elected postwar government, was actually controlled by Communists. EDES, largely the personal instrument of a former regular Greek army officer, Col. (Gen.) Napoleon Zervas, was originally republican in politics but moved to the far right as the war progressed.

The British faced all the usual technical problems encountered in supporting guerrilla warfare. The major question confronting Brigadier Myers, however, was how to reconcile conflicting military and political needs. In order to get military results from the Greek guerrillas, he felt that Britain had to use—and therefore support—EAM/ELAS, since it controlled the largest amount of territory and the areas containing the main targets, and was the strongest guerrilla group. On the other hand, if the British were to prevent Greece from falling into the Communist orbit at the end of the war, they would also have to keep EAM/ELAS from growing powerful enough to absorb the entire guerrilla movement, which was clearly its aim.

Meanwhile, at its highest level, His Majesty’s Government was apparently unaware of Myers’ dilemma or the dangers on the Greek scene, and British policy in Greece remained unclear until Myers and some of the resistance leaders were exfiltrated to Cairo in midsummer 1943. A constitutional crisis involving the Greek monarch and government-in-exile then occurred, alerting Prime Minister Churchill to the Greek problem. He soon clarified British policy: from this time forward, the military value of the Greek guerrillas was subordinate to the fact that they posed a postwar political danger.

At this point, the mission of the British liaison officers (supported by the Americans, who now entered the scene) was clear but still complex: to support and work with the guerrilla forces, to get them to fight the enemy rather than each other, and to keep EAM/ELAS from becoming strong enough to seize political control in Greece when the Germans left. This was easier said than done.
The means that the British used to sustain the guerrillas, while at the same time trying to prevent EAM/ELAS from obtaining hegemony of power, involved off-stage political maneuvering combined with military measures in Greece itself. As much was accomplished at the conference table—in Egypt, Lebanon, Italy, Greece—as in the field. The role of the liaison officers in maintaining some degree of control over the guerrillas in Greece, particularly in sustaining EDES against the military attack of EAM/ELAS, was essential to final British success. The complicated story of these political-military maneuvers—their effect upon guerrilla warfare and its effect on them—is examined in Chapter II of this study.

The problems of supporting guerrilla warfare in a foreign country are considered and analyzed in Chapter III. The British agency responsible for supporting the Greek guerrillas was SOE Cairo. It reported to its London office, which was under the Ministry of Economic Warfare; in the Middle East Command, SOE Cairo was eventually brought under Army control. It underwent its own growing pains at the very same time its workload was at its peak. Frequent reorganizations, staffing problems, and friction between staff and field members also contributed to the agency’s difficulties. However, SOE Cairo managed to select and train future liaison officers, maintain communication with them once they were in the field, and get supplies and money to them. The transportation of men and supplies provided few difficulties. Airdrops were remarkably successful; sea deliveries were maintained with fair regularity. In early summer 1943, the first airstrip was built in guerrilla Greece, making it possible to land Allied aircraft behind enemy lines.

The internal organization and administrative problems of EAM/ELAS and EDES, and the working relationships of the liaison officers with these two groups and the Greek people are examined in Chapter IV.

The military role of the guerrillas, though weakened by their involvement in politics, was still substantial. Twice they were called upon to undertake large-scale coordinated sabotage, and twice they responded: in Operation ANIMALS, intended to convince the Germans in the early summer of 1943 that the Allies meant to invade Greece rather than Sicily; and in Operation NOAH’S ARK, designed to harass and retard the German withdrawal in 1944. Guerrilla operations were directed mainly at the enemy’s lines of communications. In addition to an overall view of operations, Chapter V contains descriptions of a number of specific operations. Military value and the cost of the guerrilla operations are also assessed. Although no specific values can be assigned, the parameters are indicated.
Finally, the antiguerilla warfare waged by the occupying forces is described and appraised in Chapter VI. After the fall of 1943, when the Italians withdrew from the war, the main forces of occupation left in Greece were German. With thoroughness and ruthlessness, the Germans set out to destroy the guerrillas. Although their tactical defensive operations and their large-scale offensive encirclement tactics particularly, were well planned and executed, they never succeeded in stamping out the guerrilla forces. The principal reason for this failure was that German terror tactics used against the population were not effective in suppressing popular support of the guerrillas.

Conclusions

Conclusions are grouped according to the following topics: Strategic Significance, Political Aspects, Tactical Aspects, Command and Control, External Support, Role of the Underground, and Antiguerilla Warfare.

Strategic Significance

1. Guerrilla operations in Greece did not defeat the Axis troops in that country in terms of “closing with the enemy and destroying his military power.” The guerrillas, however, did perform valuable military services for the Allied cause.

2. Accomplishments:

   a. Greek guerrilla forces were responsible for a partial tiedown of German troops within Greece.

      (1) The ratio of Greek guerrillas to Axis forces in Greece in mid-1944 was, roughly, 1 to 3. At the most, therefore, the Greek guerrillas could have possessed only a 1:3 tiedown value.

      (2) Even this 1:3 ratio, however, did not reflect a Greek guerrilla tiedown of Axis troops. Since the Germans also had to protect the Greek coast against any Allied landing attempt, some Axis troops would have been in Greece even if there had been no guerrillas.

      (3) The British credited the Greek guerrillas with the tiedown of at least one and possibly two German divisions in Greece for the short but crucial period of the Allied invasion of Sicily in the summer of 1943. They felt that this was the major military contribution of the Greek guerrillas.
b. Since the only significant fighting in Greece between June 1941 and September 1944 was between Axis troops and Greek guerrillas and Allied auxiliaries, Axis casualties in Greece for this period may be attributed mainly to guerrilla activity.

(1) EAM/ELAS claimed to have produced a German casualty rate of 1 of every 4 troops. This claim is dismissed as unjustifiably high.

(2) For the Balkan theater as a whole, the German casualty ratio has been estimated as 1 of every 7 troops. Using this ratio as the maximum possibility, it is estimated that Greek guerrillas produced German casualties ranging from 1 of 20 to 1 of 7 troops, or between 5,000 and 15,000 dead, wounded, or missing.

c. Greek guerrillas aided both directly and indirectly in the interdiction of German supply routes.

(1) The Gorgopotamos Bridge demolition, in which the guerrillas participated directly, stopped through rail traffic for a period of 6 weeks.

(2) The demolition of the Asopos bridge was performed by an all-British party, but its success was indirectly owing to guerrilla control of the area. Its demolition stopped German rail traffic for approximately 16 weeks.

(3) “Trainbusting” attacks by combined parties of guerrillas and small units of Allied troops impeded German usage of the few railroads in Greece.

(4) Great precautions—expensive in manpower and materiel—were required of the Germans to protect their roads in Greece.

(5) Nonetheless, despite an all-out guerrilla effort to interdict lines of communication during the German withdrawal in the fall of 1944, the Germans were able to fight their way north and to protect their orderly withdrawal from Greece.

d. Along with the interdiction effect, the guerrillas cost the Germans supply and equipment losses.

(1) Much of the materiel thus lost, however, was Greek in origin—e.g., the railroad rolling stock.

(2) The mounting of counterguerrilla operations did, however, put a drain on German materiel resources, particularly trucks and gasoline, both of which were in short supply.

e. The guerrillas provided a number of miscellaneous services to the Allies.
(1) They provided safe places and escape routes for downed airmen and escaped Allied prisoners of war.
(2) They just about stopped production in the Greek chrome mines.
(3) They helped in the collection of intelligence.
(4) Losses inflicted by the guerrillas on senior German commanders affected German troop morale and aggravated the shortage of German leaders.

f. Guerrilla warfare in Greece represented a psychological operation against German power.

3. Costs:

a. Allied costs in men and materiel—although the evidence examined for this study does not set these definitively—were apparently low as compared with other military operations.
(1) In the summer of 1944 there were fewer than 400 Allied troops in Greece.
(2) A total of 2,514 tons of supplies were airdropped to Greek guerrillas by Allied planes, at a transportation cost estimated to be in the vicinity of $2,550,000. This includes operating cost, operational attrition, and nonoperational attrition (see Appendix G). Since transportation was generally the greatest cost in supplying guerrillas, it is probable that the cost of the supplies themselves was somewhat less than this figure. In addition, some supplies came into Greece by sea, both in British and Greek craft.
(3) Even in comparison with Allied support of other resistance movements, the cost for support of the Greek guerrillas was low. Compared with the 2,514 tons of supplies airdropped to Greece, 6,000 tons went to Italian guerrillas, 16,500 to the Yugoslav guerrillas.
(4) The British supplied gold sovereigns to the Greek guerrillas, partly to aid in supporting the guerrillas, partly to help sustain homeless and destitute Greeks. Extremely rough estimates indicate that this effort cost in the range of £22,000 to £44,000 per month for a period up to 18 months—or a total in the range of $1,600,000 to $3,200,000.

b. Guerrilla casualties were considerable.
(1) EAM/ELAS set its own casualty figure at 4,500 dead and 6,000 wounded, or one out of four ELAS guerrillas. There is little reason to doubt this figure.
It has not been possible to estimate the casualties in EDES. It would be surprising, however, if EDES casualties were proportionately as high as those of EAM/ELAS.

c. The effect of the occupation and the guerrilla war on the Greek community was disastrous—in executions, destruction of villages, galloping inflation, and economic devastation.

(1) During the occupation alone, 70,000 Greeks were killed as reprisal victims by the Axis occupiers; in comparison, there were a total of only 72,000 Greek casualties for the period of active war operations in 1940–1941.

(2) At war’s end, only 415 miles of the original 1,700 miles of Greek railway track was usable; over 1,300 bridges had been destroyed.

(3) Whereas the aggregate corporate value of about 1,300 Greek corporations was estimated to be about 12 billion drachmae in 1941, it took approximately 170 trillion drachmae to purchase one gold sovereign in November 1944. Gold sovereigns used to help finance the guerrillas also helped to increase the inflationary spiral.

**Political Aspects**

4. Although political aspects became the most important factor in the guerrilla war in Greece, they were not initially recognized as such by the British.

   a. The initial decision to support the Greek guerrillas was made on a purely military basis without thought of any possible political repercussions. The single consideration was opposition to the common enemy.

   b. The head of the original British mission had no background in Greek affairs, nor was he given any political briefing.

   c. The original orders to centralize control of the guerrillas worked to the advantage of the Communist-dominated group.

   d. Political-military coordination on Greek affairs was not initially provided for although trouble should have been expected; Great Britain was giving political support to the Greek monarch but there were only predominantly antimonarchist guerrilla groups, whether Communist or non-Communist, to which to give military support.

5. The British paid a price for not immediately recognizing the political aspects of the Greek situation. When upper echelons of the British government did become aware of these, policy was quickly changed—but only at a cost.
a. The first head of the Mission became a casualty in the bureaucratic struggle that accompanied the policy change. This in turn resulted in disruption of personal relationships in the field.

b. SOE Cairo, which viewed EAM/ELAS as a military arm to support, was brought under policy control of the Foreign Office, which saw EAM/ELAS as a political force to oppose. Thus the situation existed in which the organization supporting the guerrillas and selecting men to go into Greece was not completely in harmony with its own country’s political objectives.

6. British personnel failures had political repercussions in Greece.

a. Both British commanders in Greece recognized quite clearly that the Greek people viewed every liaison officer—no matter how low in rank—as the embodiment of his country. A single indiscreet or foolish remark was taken quite seriously; for example, if a liaison officer made a statement supporting EAM/ELAS objectives, it was taken as an expression of British policy rather than of individual opinion.

b. The personal failure of a British liaison officer to hew to the proper line of conduct similarly reflected discredit upon his country in Greek eyes, clouding acceptance of British political intentions.

c. Personal failures of British liaison officers were used by the Communists of EAM/ELAS to discredit Great Britain politically.

7. Through a combination of political-military action, the British kept the situation in Greece fluid until they found the time and opportunity to use purely conventional military measures to curb EAM/ELAS.

a. The British were quite astute, once they recognized the political dangers in the Greek situation, in maneuvering the Greek government-in-exile to make it more representative in nature and more acceptable to Greek moderate opinion.

b. Action (e.g., curtailment of supplies to EAM/ELAS and increased support of EDES) by the liaison officers helped to keep EAM/ELAS off balance until the German withdrawal occurred.

8. If the British had been unable to use conventional military forces to suppress EAM/ELAS in December 1944, there seems little doubt that EAM/ELAS would have achieved political control of Greece at that time.

a. It already controlled most of the countryside.

b. It would have been able, by political pressure, to bring about the downfall of the first government in liberated Greece. In fact, only intensive British support kept this from occurring anyway.
c. It was at the height of its popularity in Greece and many observers felt that it could easily have won a free election at that moment.

**Tactical Aspects**

9. Indigenous leadership was a crucial element in Greek guerrilla operations; however, it was insufficient to meet the military needs of the guerrilla war.

   a. EDES guerrillas were more capable than those of EAM/ELAS, mainly because the first organization had attracted a larger number of officers from the former regular Greek Army. For a number of reasons, however, EDES was engaged with enemy forces less often than EAM/ELAS and thus had less overall impact.

   b. EAM/ELAS realized its own lack of trained military leadership and took strenuous steps to fill the gap by attracting trained leaders and training new leaders. These steps helped considerably but never did quite fill its needs.

   c. Liaison officers often had to assume the responsibility of commanding specific guerrilla operations.

   d. Lack of trained leadership resulted in lack of training and battle discipline on the part of the guerrilla rank and file. Liaison officers were sometimes called upon to help with training, although this was nominally outside their area of responsibility. It is noteworthy that EAM/ELAS was less inclined than EDES to solicit or accept British tactical training.

   e. To support guerrilla operations, the Allies sent in small detachments of specially trained, well-armed British and American troops. These units helped considerably in making the guerrillas more effective, particularly those groups whose military competence was initially low. The guerrillas’ political affiliation had little bearing on this particular aspect of operations.

10. The technical proficiency of the Greek guerrillas was low.

   a. Liaison officers usually handled and laid the demolitions during guerrilla operations.

   b. The British acknowledged the technical deficiency and supplied simple destructive devices for use by the guerrillas. Rock mines, which resembled local stones and were laid by merely placing them on the road, were used very successfully in Greece. According to German accounts, these mines caused much trouble and were difficult to clear off the roads, since they looked like any other stones and contained so little metal that mine detection devices were ineffective.
11. Greek guerrillas proved vulnerable to German large-scale encirclement tactics.

   a. Such tactics forced the guerrillas into large-scale defensive and offensive tactics, about which they knew little and which they were not particularly successful in executing.

   b. Nonetheless, despite large casualties, the guerrillas were usually able to extricate the majority of their encircled forces.

12. No evidence has been found to indicate that the guerrillas were able to use psychological warfare tactics as such against Axis troops with any appreciable degree of success. (The fact that guerrilla warfare existed in Greece was, of course, in itself a psychological operation against the occupying forces.)

**Command and Control**

13. Although the British had no way to impose direct field control over the Greek guerrillas, they utilized at least five major means to obtain indirect control: manipulation of supply delivery, simultaneous support of rival guerrillas, imposition of new operations with deadlines, use of information reported by liaison officers to manipulate political events, and the personal effectiveness of liaison officers.

   a. Over EDES, entirely dependent on British support for survival against attack by EAM/ELAS, the British maintained almost complete control through these means.

   b. Over EAM/ELAS, Communist-dominated and unwilling to accept any measure of British control, the British managed to obtain only a minimal degree of control. This was sufficient, however, to keep the situation unsettled so that EAM/ELAS could not obtain hegemony of power and take over political control in Greece as the Germans withdrew.

14. Greece provides an interesting example of the limits within which an external power can manipulate supply deliveries to enforce control over guerrilla behavior. Certain dangers in applying the supply “stick” become apparent.

   a. During the period of internecine guerrilla fighting in Greece, the British stopped supplies to EAM/ELAS—an action which had some effect in bringing about an armistice. Poor relations still prevailed between the British and EAM/ELAS, however, even after deliveries were resumed. Curtailment or stoppage of supplies bred a certain amount of ill will that was not automatically replaced by good will when deliveries were resumed.
b. The British, in stopping supply deliveries, took the calculated risk that EAM/ELAS would not be able to find a new, independent source of supply from another external power.

15. The British did not originally support rival groups of guerrillas with the idea that they would be useful pawns to parlay against each other; events conspired, however, to make this come about.

a. Had there been no EAM/ELAS to threaten the life of EDES, it is uncertain whether the commander of EDES would have been so responsive to British desires.

b. The fact that there was an EDES completely responsive to British control was a major factor to worry EAM/ELAS.

16. In order to give EAM/ELAS something else to think about besides its political objectives in Greece, the British in early 1944 pressed for planning on Operation NOAH’S ARK, guerrilla harassment of the German withdrawal. To make NOAH’S ARK seem urgent, the British set its expected operational date for the spring of 1944, even though the German withdrawal was not expected that soon.

a. There was, however, a boomerang effect: EAM/ELAS apparently reasoned that it must step up work to obtain its political objectives if the German withdrawal was to take place so soon.

b. It is possible that, in stepping up its political work, EAM/ELAS was guilty of mistiming. If so, the British imposition of early planning for NOAH’S ARK was successful.

17. The British found that the information reported back by the liaison officers was vitally useful as a gauge of the true state of EAM/ELAS power in Greece, its hold over the Greek people, its weaknesses, and its intent. Such information was extremely helpful in making off-the-scene political adjustments to undercut EAM/ELAS in Greece.

a. Since British influence was high with the Greek people, EAM/ELAS could not totally ignore or betray the British liaison officers. In this sense, they could not “shake” these reporters.

b. There is no evidence to suggest that liaison officers were selected because of their ability to observe and obtain such information, or that scientific survey techniques were used for this purpose.

18. The personal characteristics of the liaison officers and their relations with the Greeks had an important bearing on their control function.

a. The age and high rank of the first British Mission Commander appear to have been distinct aids in his relations with guerrilla commanders. There is some evidence to support the contention that the youth and lower rank of the second commander were factors in the bad personal feeling that marked his relationship with EAM/ELAS.
b. The Greeks showed a marked preference for British liaison officers who looked British. Liaison officers of Greek descent, despite their language proficiency, appear to have been resented by the Greeks and were unable to maintain as much control over the guerrillas as officers who were obviously Anglo-Saxon.

c. Evidence examined in this study has not disclosed any instance where the personal characteristics of any British or American liaison officer had a critical effect on the decision process of a Communist guerrilla leader. There are indications, however, that the actions of non-Communist Greeks may have been swayed by their personal relations with the British. For example, it is probable that not only British supply but excellent personal relations with the liaison officers helped to keep Zervas from casting his lot with EAM/ELAS.

d. On the whole, the British appear to have adjusted easily to most of the customs, values, and mores of the Greek people.

e. The Greek guerrillas' acceptance of torture as “sport” apparently upset many liaison officers; it was the outstanding trait to which the British did not easily adjust.

f. There is noted in this study some tendency among Greek guerrillas to see the liaison officer as a father-figure. For his part, the liaison officer does not appear to have expected, sought, or wanted this role. It speaks well for the liaison officers that they often appear to have accepted the role as a necessary responsibility in order to fulfill their control function.

g. An extreme sense of tact on the part of the Greek guerrilla, a reluctance to say anything that might not be what the liaison officer wanted to hear, tended to impede communication between the two groups. In this regard, such reluctance increased the problem of control.

h. There were many temptations for the liaison officer to linger in the pleasant company of upper class Greeks. When this occurred, the control value of the liaison officer was largely destroyed, since guerrilla warfare was taking place among the more simple mountain people.

19. The value of the liaison officer as an instrument for control was diminished when the British could not maintain a clearcut line of command authority among themselves.

a. Where the authority of the mission commander was not quite clear—as was the case for a short time—the situation became intolerably confused.
b. Distance, isolation, and abnormal living conditions made ordinary command and control in Greece extremely difficult. The British commander utilized regional mission headquarters to keep check on subordinate liaison officers, and the commander himself made frequent visits to missions. Conferences of liaison officers apparently also aided in maintaining a sense of responsibility and discipline.

c. Inspection trips from SOE Cairo were sometimes made to check on the situation in Greece. There is no indication that any system of undercover traveling inspectors was used to check up on the liaison officers.

d. The nature of behind-the-lines duty—the close contact among officers and men in the same mission and their isolation from other missions—underlined the need for personal compatibility within a mission headquarters. At the same time, there was obviously little difficulty in keeping useful but incompatible personnel separated.

e. When difficulties arose between liaison officers and the guerrillas they were with, it was relatively easy to change the assignment of the liaison officer. Most liaison officers apparently liked the guerrillas they were with.

f. The difficulties of maintaining command control over British liaison officers in the field emphasized the importance of the process by which such officers were initially selected.

**External Support**

20. Critical organizational problems affected the stability of the agency set up by the British to support resistance movements in the Middle East Command, Special Operations Executive (SOE) Cairo.

a. No peacetime agency had existed which could form the nucleus of SOE Cairo, or upon whose work that of SOE Cairo could be patterned. There was no peacetime work which adequately trained a man for wartime service in SOE Cairo.

b. The work of SOE Cairo was not even clearly coordinated into the military command chain at first. This was accomplished, however, without undue difficulty.

c. The early lack of definition of British policy in Greece and the initial failure to provide for political-military coordination of the work of SOE Cairo had highly disruptive effects on the agency when, as the result of the Greek crisis in August 1943, SOE Cairo lost policy direction in Greece, had its senior officers recalled, and was internally reorganized.
d. There is some evidence to indicate interagency friction between SOE Cairo and its American counterpart, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), at the administrative and organizational level (not in the field).

e. The rapid growth in the resistance movements which SOE Cairo was responsible for supporting resulted in the agency’s undergoing frequent organizational changes and extremely rapid expansion, all of which had to be affected at the peak of its workload.

21. The organizational problems of SOE Cairo decreased its efficiency, which in turn increased hostility between its administrative staff and the liaison officers behind the lines in Greece.

a. Actual mistakes by SOE Cairo—e.g., the loss of all record of who was in Greece at one point—exacerbated the latent hostility between men behind the lines and men at agency headquarters.

b. Some improvement in staff-field relations was noted when men scheduled for field duty were given semistaff jobs in order to familiarize them with administrative problems.

22. The selection process might best be termed a consensus of intuitive judgments.

a. This study yielded no evidence that a scientifically constructed evaluation program was used in Cairo to assess and select potential British liaison officers for Greece.

b. There are some indications that motivation did not have a direct bearing on field performance. Men who were eager to go to Greece did not always work out well, whereas men who apparently did not particularly want to go sometimes worked out quite well.

c. Peer judgments appear to have generally been a fairly good index of a man’s abilities.

d. Despite the informal nature of the selection process, apparently most of the men sent into Greece worked out well.

e. Some liaison officers of leftwing political orientation were selected, although British policy in Greece was to support the Greek monarch.

23. Training of future liaison officers, limited by both time and facilities, was insufficient to overcome their general ignorance of guerrilla warfare problems and tactics, of means of handling groups of foreign nationals, or of the Greek language, customs, and terrain.

a. Most liaison officers learned their job by doing it.

b. Most had to depend on interpreters, which was not always satisfactory.
c. Many liaison officers were unprepared for the fact that any training of the guerrilla had to start at a level much lower than that necessary for a recruit in the British Army. For example, they were amazed at Greek casualness with regard to time, either in the sense of the length of time it would take for something to be done or of setting a time for meeting. Again, the low mechanical skill level of the average Greek also appears to have surprised the liaison officer.

24. Liaison officers were not trained to recognize the political overtones of the guerrilla war.

a. A number of the liaison officers appear to have been politically naive. Some appear to have carried over from their own culture the mistaken assumption that Greek military leaders were also non-political.

b. The ragged, dirty, undisciplined guerrilla appeared to some of the liaison officers as completely unimportant, either militarily or politically. Some liaison officers seemed unable to realize that the guerrillas had become a tool of the highest importance in relation to the potential political position of Greece.

25. Few technical problems were experienced in logistically supporting the Greek guerrillas.

a. The political decision to hold down supplies to EAM/ELAS made it easy for SOE Cairo to meet the logistical requirements without difficulty.

b. Air delivery of supplies was the major means of getting support to the mainland Greek guerrillas. Of 1,333 sorties flown to Greece, 1,040—78 percent—were listed as successful from the air side; that is, a drop was made. Only three planes were lost.

c. Although the percentage of sorties successful from the ground side—that is, sorties from which supplies were collected—was lower than 78, it is apparently true that the guerrillas were supplied to the extent that the British wished them to be.

d. Although many liaison men parachuted into Greece under conditions that would today seem somewhat primitive—improvised static release mechanisms, ejection through emergency hatch, containers attached to a man's rigging—the casualty rate was low. In over 200 jumps into Greece, only 2 deaths are known to be directly attributable to the jump—a safety record of 99 percent.
26. The major technical problem was in the field of communications.
   
   a. Message traffic between SOE Cairo and Greece increased tremendously at the same time that message traffic between Cairo and other resistance movements expanded. Furthermore, stations within Greece did not communicate directly but through SOE Cairo, again increasing the headquarters’ message load.
   
   b. This inability to handle communications expeditiously had important ramifications in the August 1943 crisis: SOE Cairo had not decoded and delivered the messages from Greece of the political observer of the Foreign Office to the British Ambassador to the Greek government-in-exile. This lapse aroused the British Ambassador’s hostility towards SOE Cairo and was a factor in the bureaucratic struggle that followed the crisis.
   
   c. Army facilities eventually had to be provided to assist SOE Cairo with communications.

**Role of the Underground**

27. The resistance group in Greece that had the best underground organization—by all odds, Communist-dominated EAM/ELAS—was the best equipped to field guerrillas.

   a. Prior experience in clandestine activity under a repressive Greek regime gave Greek Communists important practical experience in organizing a viable underground apparatus. Those Greeks without such experience were apparently never able to catch up and successfully compete with the Communists.

   b. The underground behind EAM/ELAS made it possible for that organization to postpone fielding guerrillas but still assured its ability to put guerrillas into the field at the time it chose.

   c. The underground organization of EAM/ELAS was the major factor in that group’s dominance of the whole resistance movement.

   d. The underground strength of EAM/ELAS was largely responsible for that group’s ability to remain almost independent of British control measures.

   e. The underground strength of EAM/ELAS was a major reason behind its ability to survive both the internecine fighting and the German encirclement operations.

28. The Greek experience does not suggest any formula regarding the degree of underground organization and popular support needed to maintain effective guerrilla forces.
a. It does indicate that 100 percent support is not necessary. The Greek guerrillas never had this degree of support, even in those areas where they were most active and militarily most successful.

b. The study gives some indication that the lower limit for support may vary considerably, depending on local conditions.

c. Mass opinion could not be disregarded with impunity. EAM/ELAS was successful in its underground organizational moves when it identified itself with the national Greek aim of resistance to the occupier. When it destroyed this identification (e.g., by attacks on other guerrilla groups) it faced unpleasant repercussions. When it proved itself unfeeling and cruel to fellow Greeks in December, 1944, it was discredited.

29. The appeals used by EAM/ELAS to attract persons into its underground apparatus were based on its desire to create the broadest possible underground support structure.

a. EAM/ELAS utilized the symbol of universal hatred: the occupiers of Greece.

b. It suggested positive action against the symbol of hatred: resistance to the occupiers.

c. It completely identified itself with national aims and accused all other groups of being unpatriotic, if not treasonable.

d. It took in and gave prestige to repressed elements in the Greek population: in a patriarchal society, women and young people were low on the social totem pole. In the underground of EAM/ELAS, both groups were welcomed.

e. At the same time, the role of men and elders was also upheld, so that the offense to these groups from d above, was held to a minimum.

f. Where persuasion alone did not work, EAM/ELAS did not hesitate to use force. Surprisingly enough, persons upon whom force was used appear to have often become faithful supporters of EAM/ELAS.

Antiguerrilla Warfare

30. The Germans in Greece were not able to destroy the guerrillas entirely; but they were able, with forces approximating only three times the strength of the guerrillas, to contain them and prevent their becoming a crucial military factor.

a. The Germans did not attempt to dominate the entire area of Greece but limited their effort to control of the major towns and villages and the transportation network.
b. This acceptance of a limited control function was possible since the German strategy in Greece was limited—the Germans did not need to maintain an orderly government throughout Greece or to protect the Greek people themselves from the guerrillas.

c. German military policy within Greece was therefore dominated by the following major elements: (1) defense of lines of communications; (2) immediate reaction to and punishment of any guerrilla activity; (3) destruction of known guerrilla bands by large-scale encirclement operations; and (4) subjugation of the population, by terror if necessary.

31. The Germans used psychological measures in the antiguerrilla fight, with differing results.

a. Using the theme of fighting against Communist-dominated EAM/ELAS, they were extremely successful in recruiting Greeks into antiguerrilla security battalions. The battalions helped to alleviate the German troop shortage, as well as being, per se, a psychological triumph in the antiguerrilla fight.

b. The Germans successfully exploited the theme of Communism in EAM/ELAS to make the schism between EDES and EAM/ELAS extremely severe. They chose a time of internecine guerrilla fighting to begin their own counterguerrilla operations.

c. The Germans were unsuccessful, however, in the larger effort of converting the majority of the Greek people to the German rather than the Allied view of the war.

32. Although German commanders viewed the separation of the Greek people from the guerrillas as a tactical necessity (in order to identify the guerrillas, to prevent guerrilla recruitment to make up battle losses; etc.), they did not take effective steps to obtain such separation—either by physical or psychological means.

a. The Germans apparently felt that they lacked the necessary resources to effect a physical separation of the guerrillas and the population. This left only the possibility of a psychological separation.

b. Needless German brutality toward the Greek population was a major factor in preventing a psychological separation of Greek guerrillas and inhabitants.

(1) For example, the indiscriminate selection of retaliation victims meant that pro-German Greek families suffered as much as anti-German Greeks and increased resentment against the occupier.
(2) Also, the indiscriminate destruction of villages and shooting of villagers for events over which the latter had absolutely no control tended to induce hatred for the Germans greater than any fear of Communist domination of EAM/ELAS.

c. German actions toward the Greek inhabitants seemed to prove to the villagers that their own actions had no effect on their fate at German hands. It was actually safer to be a guerrilla than to be a villager living near the place where a guerrilla attack occurred. This helped rather than hindered the recruitment of guerrillas.

33. The Germans found the use of special guerrilla-hunting units extremely helpful in counterguerrilla operations.

a. These units were able to get quite close to guerrilla groups, since their troops were not in uniform but dressed as guerrillas. They accepted their illegal status as immaterial since they expected death if captured, whether or not they were in uniform.

b. The units were better trained in guerrilla tactics than the guerrillas. They were extremely proficient in “dirty” fighting and in exploiting the mountainous terrain. They also used local guides when possible, to help overcome any guerrilla advantage in terrain knowledge.

c. The units were useful either used alone or in conjunction with regularly uniformed troops, and in both minor and major operations.

34. The Germans found large-scale encirclements to be their most successful means of destroying the guerrilla groups.

a. The major lesson they learned was to make the initial encirclement area so large that the guerrillas, despite their maneuvers, would still be within the circle.

b. The Germans found—even during active operations—a daily review of the past day’s fighting and tactics to be a useful training and operations technique.

c. A number of the specific tactical lessons that the Germans felt they had learned during large-scale encirclement operations are individually listed beginning on page 259. These lessons concern:

Operating Information  Combat Force
Planning                  Combat Communication
Secrecy                  Combat Intelligence
Tactics                  Unit Boundaries
Area                      Combing Passed-Over Terrain
Troops                      Flank Attacks
Implications

Whereas the conclusions given above were derived strictly from the facts of the Greek case, the implications stated below, while stemming from this study, also reflect previous study in the field of resistance warfare, general knowledge of world affairs, and applied commonsense. Two things need to be noted concerning these implications. First, although these seemed to be the most compelling ones, no attempt has been made to be exhaustive in treatment. The careful reader will find others implicit in the conclusions or derivable from the text of this study. Second, the reader should understand that the implications form principles of a tentative nature rather than proven laws. Analytic studies of guerrilla warfare similar to this one are much needed to further test and refine these implications. Until such work has been done, the military user will find them most helpful only after careful consideration of the unique factors in the situation to which he is applying the findings.

The Strategic Aspect
1. The “single criterion” problem. It has been common practice, in unconventional as in conventional warfare, to accept as an ally any group willing to fight the common enemy. Sometimes circumstances make this practice necessary, but such acceptance, indiscriminately accorded, may also have dangerous repercussions, as was the case in Greece.
   a. Fighting the common enemy may be the only shared goal—with the possibility that once this goal is met, there will be serious difficulties and political embarrassment for the supporting power.
   b. While acceptance of a politically incompatible group as an unconventional warfare ally may postpone interallied difficulties for later settlement, it may also make these problems more serious and even create new ones.
   c. Careful consideration of nonmilitary (e.g., political) criteria is critical to making a wise decision on the matter of giving support to a resistance group.
2. *The escalation problem.* The employment of conventional forces by a supporting power in a follow-on operation to unconventional warfare may not be feasible in view of the danger of escalating a limited conflict to general war.

   a. It seems highly unwise to make the use of conventional forces a fixed planning assumption in unconventional warfare strategy.

   b. To prepare for the contingency that conventional forces may eventually have to be involved, it is wise to create a legal basis that sanctions such use. This legal framework is a necessity if such use is to be defended before world opinion and condoned by the international community of nations.

3. *The integrated command problem.* One of the most pressing problems for a power supporting unconventional warfare is to create a truly integrated and functioning military-political command for the unconventional warfare area. This implication refers only to the command structure of the supporting power and not to any combined command created of elements of the supporting power and the indigenous guerrilla forces; the latter is an entirely separate question.

   a. Creation of such a command will permit due consideration of both military and political problems in the decision-making process.

   b. The supporting power will be able to speak with a single voice to indigenous groups. Conversely, it will be less likely that resistance leaders will be able to play one element of the support group against another.

   c. The effective functioning of an integrated command for unconventional warfare needs to be assured before it goes into the field.

   d. Consideration might be given to attaching political advisers to lower level military commanders with unconventional forces.

4. *The control problem.* Supply manipulation and the personal effectiveness of officers in the field have been widely accepted as instruments of indirect control of an indigenous resistance by a supporting power. There are strong indications that popular opinion within the area of unconventional warfare operations also acts as an indirect control.

   a. If, within the area of operations the population perceives the supporting power in a favorable manner and believes in its eventual victory, it will be easier for representatives of that power to exert indirect control and more difficult for indigenous groups to oppose that power.
b. A psychological operations effort to help the forces of a supporting power in an unconventional conflict might well use these themes: the strong, benign, and compatible nature of the supporting power and the inevitability of final victory for the side it represents.

c. These themes must, of course, be reinforced by the actions and attitudes of representatives within the area.

5. *The underground problem.* Doctrine that states, quite correctly, that guerrilla forces cannot survive as an effective organization in an area of unconventional conflict without some degree of underground support from the population needs to be more specifically delineated. Studies of Communist methods of creating and using undergounds have been or are currently being done. However, the minimal degree of support required for the successful operation of guerrilla warfare and the means of obtaining and maintaining that degree of support are still not known with any certainty.

**The Tactical Aspect**

6. *The officer qualifications problem.* There is a special need for the supporting power to choose for unconventional warfare duty, officers possessing not only the necessary physical and technical qualifications for leadership, but also the equally essential qualifications of psychological fortitude, general social and cultural insight, political skills, and specific area knowledge.

   a. The emphasis placed on physical stamina in selection of unconventional force members has led to what may be an overemphasis on youth—at the expense of other equally or more important qualifications.

   b. Selection instruments and training techniques are needed to identify men possessing the necessary qualifications and to train them to use these attributes effectively.

   c. It is suggested that proficiency testing of unconventional forces might include scientifically developed and standardized intermediate field criteria for nonphysical and nontechnical skills (e.g., role playing with foreign personnel).

7. *The indigenous forces qualifications problem.* Guerrillas have often proved to be unskilled in military tactics and technology. Furthermore, local leadership, even with supporting power help, may not be adequate to bring guerrilla operations up to the minimum military standards required.
a. It is suggested that indigenous skill levels be determined before unconventional warfare plans are made for an area, that realistic training plans be made for raising the skill level, and that the unconventional warfare plan for the area take into account the probable indigenous skill level that may eventually be attained after training.

b. In addition to supplying cadres for training guerrillas, the supporting power might create small detachments of specially trained, highly armed men, dependable in battle situations, to stiffen the guerrilla operational effort.

c. A study throwing light on the ratio of untrained guerrillas that can be gradually absorbed into a trained guerrilla group without loss of its military efficiency would be of considerable value for planning purposes. This study should take into account the degree and kind of relationship obtaining between the indigenous guerrilla group and the supporting power.

8. The weapons problem. The weapons problem is traditionally associated with a number of conflicting philosophies, viz., (1) guerrillas should use the weapons they can find and capture—but this leads to a problem in supplying the proper ammunition; (2) guerrillas should use the regular arms of the supporting power—but these are often too complex for use by the technically backward guerrilla and he is burdened by being over-armed; (3) guerrillas should use extremely simple, durable weapons and the variety of ammunition supplied should be kept to a minimum—but this requires that such weapons be designed and produced in quantity by the supporting power and it probably further means that the guerrillas will be dependent upon the supporting power for all their ammunition. Measures that may help resolve the problem are suggested below.

a. A supporting power planning to utilize unconventional warfare to a considerable degree might develop, standardize, and be ready to produce in quantity a simple, tough, durable, nonrusting, light weapon suitable for use by nontechnical personnel.

b. Where highly specialized equipment and weapons would be of value in unconventional warfare, they might be supplied with trained crews, to assure maximum utilization.

c. Since in an area of unconventional warfare the civilian population is committed, whether or not it wants to be, some thought might be given to a weapon (e.g., the rock mine used in Greece) that could be supplied to all friendly persons. This weapon should appear innocuous, so that its possession would not arouse suspicion.
The Antiguerrilla Aspect

9. The population problem. This problem, of primary importance in a guerrilla area because of the close conjunction of guerrilla success and popular support, may be solved by physical or psychological separation of the two elements—guerrillas and population.

   a. The policy of resettling the population in safe areas is one way of handling the problem and has been used successfully in a number of cases. Such a policy requires careful planning and continued work in the resettled area if any initial unfavorable reactions of the population are to be overcome and their successful adjustment to the new situation achieved. Otherwise, the policy is in danger of producing a boomerang effect at some later date. Along with other measures, a concerted and continuing psychological operations effort will be needed.

   b. Psychological separation of the guerrilla from the population must be depended upon when it is not feasible to move the population. It is, however, extremely difficult to achieve. It means that the antiguerrilla power must be clever enough to exploit every guerrilla mistake, show care for the population, avoid provocation or brutality, and successfully safeguard the population from guerrilla reprisals.

10. Troop strength problem. Antiguerrilla warfare places great drains on defending troop strength and the following measures may be taken to optimize available strength.

   a. Inadequately trained or physically unready troops can be used in antiguerrilla operations when necessary, even in difficult terrain, by placing them in stationary positions for blocking operations. Firstline troops are then used for attack operations.

   b. Indigenous persons may be recruited to serve as antiguerrilla troops provided that they are reliable and that their families can be protected against reprisals.

   c. The antiguerrilla commander may want to consider forming guerrilla-hunting units which dress and act like guerrillas. Such units have proved very effective, acting both alone and in conjunction with regular troops, and have been much feared by guerrillas.
CHAPTER I.
THE GREEK STAGE

GORGOPOPOTAMOS
WAR AND OCCUPATION
FIRST GREEK RESISTANCE
THE GREEK STAGE

Gorgopotamos

On the night of 30 September–1 October 1942 three British planes winged across the mountains of Axis-occupied Greece. They were carrying 12 uniformed British—9 officers and 3 enlisted men—who had accepted a daring and dangerous mission behind enemy lines in Greece. None of the planes could sight the expected signals. One group of four men therefore jumped to fires that turned out to be merely shepherds’ bonfires; the second group dropped to the triangular signals of a Greek agent expecting some supplies but not a British party; and the third group, seeing no fires at all, returned home. This last group did not successfully drop until almost a month later, when, frustrated three previous times, it jumped blind. Floating down near an enemy garrison town, it met Italian mortar and small-arms fire before landing, and had to scatter and hide immediately to avoid capture.

Miraculously all 12 men survived unhurt and were able to join up. The first party assembled within one day, its members having landed fairly close together. After a few days they learned from a Greek shepherd that the second group was only 2 hours’ journey away; within 5 days, the first and second parties were united. The third group joined the first two within 2 weeks of its drop into Greece. Its arrival was discovered “by pure chance” by a member of the united party during a trip across the mountains; he sent directions and orders to the third group to join the others. By mid-November, the 12 men were together and making plans to undertake their mission.

The original task of these 12 behind-the-lines British was to demolish any 1 of 3 railway bridges that carried the only north-south railway in Greece across the deep mountain chasms of Roumeli. In September 1942 this railway was transporting enemy supplies from Europe through Greece to the port of Piraeus. From there, the supplies were shipped to Crete and from Crete were transferred nightly by boat to North Africa, where they reinforced General Rommel’s crack German troops facing the British Eighth Army. According to British estimates, 80 percent of Rommel’s supplies were traveling this route. Because the British lacked either naval or air forces sufficient to overcome the German air cover for the sea run from Crete to Africa, they were trying a daring expedient—to go behind enemy lines and cut the railway line carrying the supplies through Greece. The risk seemed worthwhile, since cutting Rommel’s supply lines might well have major significance in helping the British to break out of the El Alamein line. The mission of the British dropped into Greece was thus a one-shot job, but it had strategic military value of a high order. Even though British forces in
Africa had broken out from El Alamein by mid-November, the men in enemy-held Greece received no orders countermanding their original instructions and they continued with their dangerous mission.¹

Fortune smiled upon these British. Not only did they find each other after a difficult drop, but they found friendly Greeks who offered information, sustenance, and guidance. No one betrayed them to enemy troops. Finally, the British were able to make contact with two groups of guerrilla bands whose leaders both agreed to help them in the attack on the selected bridge.

The British personally reconnoitered the three bridges—the Papadhia, the Asopos, and the Gorgopotamos—to decide which one should be attacked. The selection of the northernmost of the three, the Gorgopotamos, was made on the basis that it was the most accessible to approach and that its defending Italian garrison appeared weak and vulnerable to surprise.²
By the end of November, a plan of operations had been made by the British leader, Col. E.C.W. Myers, and agreed to by the guerrilla leaders. One of these was Col. (Gen.) Napoleon Zervas, whose republican forces had just taken to the mountains; the other was the Communist, Athanasios Klaras, known as Aris, who had been operating in the mountains for several months. Both men agreed to cooperate and to supply about 150 andarte (guerrilla) fighters who would neutralize the Italian garrisons at either end of the bridge before the British demolitions party started its work.  

On 24 and 25 November 1942, the entire party—now consisting of the 12 British, approximately 150 guerrillas, and 3 colonial British troops who were left over from the British expedition of 1941 and had been living undetected in Greece until Myers arrived—marched to the take-off point. Here they waited in the cold, drizzling, cloudy weather for night to come. One of the British officers later recalled that he had the sensation of being “in a cold gymnasium, in vest and shorts, before going into the ring to fight someone I had never seen before.”

If the British felt miserable even in their uniforms, the guerrillas were far worse off. Their clothes were rags, and some lacked shoes. Their arms were a hodgepodge and ammunition was scarce. To the British, the young, shy, suspicious men under the Communist Aris seemed hardly trustworthy. Aris himself estimated that his men could fight for only 30 to 45 minutes; he did not think they would make another attempt if the attack that night should fail. The men under Zervas, although they seemed older and friendlier, were hardly better armed, and the British did not know how they would react to combat. Nevertheless, the guerrillas were the key to the entire operation: unless they neutralized the guard posts, the demolitions party would not even start to work.

At 1800 hours on 25 November the final approach was begun. In place some hours later, the men waited for H-Hour at 2300, when the two guerrilla groups were to attack the Italian garrisons. A last train rumbled across the bridge, the mist cleared slightly, and a full moon gave sufficient light for the operations. Myers, waiting at an improvised headquarters, saw 2300 hours come and go; about 15 minutes later the assault began. Within a few minutes, however, the attack at the north end was failing. Myers, in desperate straits, had to throw in all guerrilla reserves. After an hour’s fighting, the south end of the bridge was in andarte hands, and word came that the north end too was falling. Because time was short, and the target pier was under the safe south guard post, Myers ordered the demolition party in.

The party went to work immediately. It completed its work at the same time the fighting at the bridge guard posts ended. The signal to
take cover was given, all firing ceased, the explosion occurred. A first look at the now-leaning bridge reassured both British and Greeks; nonetheless, the bridge was blown again to assure its demolition and make it harder to repair. Then the signal was given for a general withdrawal.\(^a\)

At their mountain rendezvous the parties exchanged news and counted heads. The second explosion had twisted the already broken spans, but had failed to bring down the pier. Nonetheless, German use of the only railway from Europe through Greece would be halted for 6 weeks to come. Of the enemy garrison, numbering perhaps 80 Italians, 20 to 30 were reported killed by the guerrillas. Myers himself had seen more than six Italian bodies. Within 24 hours Myers was able to account for every man who had taken part in the attack. None of the British party of 12 had even been hurt. No guerrilla had been killed, but a few were wounded.\(^8\)

Myers now expressed his gratitude to both Zervas and Aris for the support they had provided: without the guerrilla attack the Gorgopotamos could not have been demolished. Since three of the British were scheduled to remain in Greece with Zervas, Myers sent a runner to Athens to ask that a supply drop of boots, clothing, arms, and whiskey be made to Zervas. Aris requested that he also be assigned a liaison officer and given a supply drop, but Myers had no authority to agree to this. Instead, he gave Aris 250 gold sovereigns.\(^9\)

Myers and most of his party now considered their work in Greece finished and prepared to set out for their rendezvous with the submarine scheduled to evacuate them. Little did they think, as they began this long, cold march across occupied Greece to the western coast that their one-shot operation was really only the first of many operations to come.

Back in Cairo, however, the British, once they were informed of the success of the Gorgopotamos operation, were considering what further value the Greek guerrillas might have in support of Allied military strategy. A quick policy decision was therefore made—to keep Myers and his party in Greece in order to build up guerrilla strength and direct guerrilla operations behind the enemy lines.\(^10\) It was a decision that would give rise to many complications, both strategic and tactical, not only for the Greeks and the Germans in Greece, but for the British themselves. But before one can understand these complications, one must examine the setting of the Greek stage on which Myers and his party were to play their new roles.

\(^a\) For a detailed discussion of the tactics of this operation see Chapter V.
War and Occupation

At the Outbreak of World War II

The generation of Greeks from among whom Myers had found civilian aid and succor and drawn his guerrilla attack parties had undergone a succession of difficulties in the period between the two world wars. A disastrous war with Turkey in the early 1920’s had brought an influx of more than a million extraterritorial Greeks into the country, creating problems of clothing, feeding, and assimilating the newcomers. This influx was accompanied by an exodus of non-Greeks. The net effect of the population exchange, however, was advantageous for Greece. It gave her an extremely homogeneous population, of whom 96 percent spoke Greek and 97 percent were Eastern Orthodox. Ethnic minorities—the Jews, Turks, Chams, Vlachs, and Slavophone Greeks—constituted less than five percent of the total population. 11

This homogeneous population numbered approximately 7,300,000 individuals—fewer than reside in New York City. It had a high birth rate and a high death rate. At the time of the last prewar census, in 1928, over 40 percent of the Greeks could neither read nor write. Even in 1936–37, educational opportunities were rare beyond the elementary school years. The universities had fewer than 11,000 undergraduates.12

Greece’s people had to forge a living on 50,000 square miles of territory, more than half of which is mountainous, a quarter of which is forest or poor pasturage, and only a fifth of which is suitable for farming—upon which 60 percent of the population depended. Lacking adequate water and livestock, using primitive tools, and ignorant of modern methods of agriculture, the average Greek farmer strove to eke out his family's living on a farm of twelve and a half acres or less, the size of almost 90 percent of the nation’s 953,000 prewar farms.13

Although most of the arable land was used for growing cereals, Greece was unable to support her own population, but was forced to import about 40 percent of her grain needs. Unfortunately, the crops for which Greece possessed ideal growing conditions—tobacco, currants, wine, olives, fruits—were those for which world demand was elastic; thus her position in the world market had been extremely vulnerable to the depression of the 1930’s.14

The situation with regard to manufacturing and industry was almost as bad. Although Greece had more industry than the other Balkan countries, she was able to meet only two-thirds of her own modest needs for manufactured goods. To redress the unfavorable economic balance, she depended on income from her merchant marine. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the general standard of
living in Greece, by Western European or American standards, was very low at the outbreak of World War II.\textsuperscript{15}

Politically, Greece had gone through a period of great instability in the interwar years. In 1935 the monarchy under George II had finally been restored; the following year the King acceded to a dictatorship under Gen. Ioannis Metaxas. The dictator suspended personal liberties when they interfered with his economic and political measures. Anti-royalists of all shades of opinion were repressed; many of them were interned in jails or sent into semi-exile on the Greek islands. Despite their inability to stand alone, the liberal and republican parties could find no common ground for cooperative effort during the Metaxas era. Only the Communists, disciplined and accustomed to operating illegally, were able to cope with the situation. The Party went underground, thus giving its members experience in clandestine activity that was later to stand them in good stead.\textsuperscript{16}

These facts were to have their effect in the later period this study will consider. It was never possible for the Greek parties of the center to cooperate in forming a resistance nucleus. The Communists, on the other hand, were able to form a coalition of resistance parties. Partially, at least, this was the result of their clandestine experience, and the opportunity was enhanced by the inactivity of the middle-of-the-road groups.\textsuperscript{17}

At the outbreak of World War II, Greece was a poor country, predominantly agricultural, with a large segment of her population uneducated, poverty-stricken, and living under primitive conditions. It was furthermore a land where political dictatorship had alienated a number of groups from the monarchy and had given practical experience in clandestine activity to the Communists.

\textit{The Greeks at War}

In October 1940 Mussolini, in a unilateral decision, ordered the Italian armies in Albania to invade Greece, unless Metaxas would allow Italian troops to occupy strategic points in Greek territory. The Greek dictator was given three hours to reply. Surprisingly—because he was known to be pro-Axis—Metaxas, backed by the King, rejected the Italian ultimatum. Untrained and unready as they were, the Greeks\textsuperscript{b} immediately rallied to the call to arms, walking over the mountains

\textsuperscript{b} The role of the Greek Communist Party during this period apparently varied. A letter of 2 November 1940 by the imprisoned leader of the party, Nicholas Zakhariadhis, called for Communist support of the Metaxas government. According to Papandhreou, however, in a second letter of 15 January 1941 Zakhariadhis termed the war “fascist” and “colonial” and called for a separate truce under the mediation of the U.S.S.R. This was before German intervention in Greece or their attack on Russia. (George Papandhreou, \textit{The Liberation of Greece} [3d ed., Athens: Greek Publishing Co., 1948], p. 17. In Greek.)
to the battlefields. By the end of the year the Italian Eleventh Army had been driven out of Greece and 30 miles back inside Albania. By February 1941, the Italian units were fighting for their very lives. For a number of reasons, particularly because of an inadequate supply system and the defensive point of view of the command staff, the Greek counteroffensive stalled in Albania.18

During this period of Greek victories, several events occurred that had a bearing on the later period of resistance. First, the popularity of King George II soared along with that of Metaxas. While Metaxas died in January 1941 at the height of his fame, George II was forced to flee the country in the spring of 1941, and the absent monarch’s popularity in Greece sharply declined during the occupation. Second, Metaxas refused to permit several hundred republican senior officers purged in the 1930’s to come back and fight for their country. This left a nucleus of trained men, latently antimonarchical, who were spoiling to prove their patriotism and accordingly were a ready-made cadre for a resistance movement. Third, since the Greek Army was equipped mainly with German-type weapons, the men of Greece had great familiarity with German arms, another factor which was to have its effect on the later guerrilla war.19

With the Greeks and Italians stalemated in Albania, Hitler decided in the spring of 1941 that he would have to intervene. In his plans for the coming offensive against Russia, Hitler regarded domination of the entire Balkan peninsula, including Greece and the Greek islands, as vital to the future security of the southern flank of the German armies. The Balkans also represented a supply route to the vital African theater; and they would provide Germany with airbases for the Mediterranean area. Those countries that did not voluntarily join the German side would therefore be forced into cooperation. By spring of 1941, German plans were ready. Yugoslavia and Greece were to be invaded immediately.20

As German intentions became obvious, the British decided they must buttress Balkan resistance and fulfill their treaty commitment to defend Greek territorial security. They increased the token force they had sent into Greece, even though to do so meant recalling troops from North Africa. But when, on 6 April 1941, the Germans attacked through the Balkans with 27 divisions, the situation was hopeless. Yugoslavia capitulated on 17 April and Greece on 23 April. The main force of the British troops, some Greek troops, and the Greek Government, including the King, withdrew to the Greek island of Crete. A number of British forces, however, and the 5th Cretan Division, which contained most of the island’s population of military age, could not be evacuated from the mainland.21
Nonetheless, Crete was a formidable fortress for the Germans to assault, buttressed not only by the remnants of British forces from Greece but by a heavy contingent of British Dominion troops. On 20 May the Germans attacked in great strength, using airborne troops. The fighting was fierce and lasted for 10 rather than the scheduled 4 days. In addition to the regular forces, the Cretans themselves took up arms against the invader. Old men, boys, and even women, using their own rusty weapons and later picking up arms on the battlefield, engaged in direct combat with the German airborne troops. The “epic of Albania,” which that winter had fired the imagination and national pride of the mainland Greeks, was thus matched by the insular Cretans’ own heroic defense. Their sense of pride and personal fulfillment was swelled by the high price they made the enemy pay for Crete, for the striking power of the German airborne troops was definitely blunted in the attack. By the end of May 1941, however, Axis troops controlled both Greece and its islands.22

**Start of the Occupation**

To the Germans, control of defeated Greece was necessary, but, insofar as it required a commitment of German manpower, it was a liability. Every effort was therefore bent to minimize the cost of occupying Greece. The immediate problem of what to do with the defeated Greek Army was solved by paroling it on the battlefield—a gesture that appeared both psychologically and economically sound. By its generosity, the parole was designed to show German admiration for Greek valor and to establish rapport with the Greek people. At the same time, the parole obviated any need to shelter, clothe, or feed a large body of men who would have prisoner-of-war status.23

To minimize their troop commitment in the occupation of Greece, the Germans retained control only in areas in northeastern Greece either surrounding the key transportation point of Salonika or bordering Turkey; and in southern Greece adjacent to and including the key port of Piraeus. They also took over the occupation of most of Crete, which was important to them as a supply base for North Africa and for possible future operations in the Mediterranean.24

Much of the psychological value of these moves was offset, however, when, in the spring of 1941, the Germans divided the rest of Greece into three zones to be occupied by hereditary or beaten enemies. The hated Bulgarians on the northeast received two islands and a mainland area adjacent to their Greek boundary. The largest share of the occupied mainland area, various islands, eastern Crete, and the capital city of Athens went to the despised Italian Eleventh Army, which the Greeks had beaten the previous winter. To administer most of the Greek mainland, the Axis established a Greek puppet government. These
arrangements lasted until the surrender of Italy in the fall of 1943, when the Bulgarian occupation was extended and German troops took over the majority of the Italian posts.25

The occupational policies followed by the victors were sufficiently rigorous to drive many Greeks to desperation. Bulgaria annexed her share of Greek territory, most of it farmland, and began a brutal policy of colonization; within a year 100,000 Greeks had been driven out of Western Thrace alone and those remaining were subject to decrees that amounted to extreme or even total economic deprivation. Italy looked towards annexation of the Ionian Islands. In Crete the Germans

Figure 2. Occupation Zones in Greece (1941–43).
alienated any latent sympathy among the population by their food policy and by reprisals against the people for their participation in the battle of Crete.  

Economic conditions, bad as they had been for many before the war, rapidly deteriorated under the occupation. By May 1942 over half of Greece’s ocean-going cargo vessels had been lost; the rest were at the disposal of Allied powers and not producing income for occupied Greece. Industrial production was controlled by the Axis powers for the benefit of their own national and individual interests. They used Greek food, already scarce, to feed their own troops and civilian populations. Fiscal matters, complicated by occupation costs, were so handled by Axis and puppet authorities as to ruinously increase the galloping inflation. As more and more money went chasing after fewer and fewer products and less and less food, only the black market could operate. Its prices were beyond the reach of the average man. After two years of occupation, prices had climbed to a thousand times the prewar level. The wage level meanwhile was only a hundred times the prewar level; in addition there was considerable unemployment.

This statistical expression of the difficulties faced by the Greek population, particularly those in urban areas, does not begin to convey conditions under the occupation. In the Athens-Piraeus area, as
early as the winter of 1941–42, hunger and starvation were not unusual. About 500,000 persons depended on soup kitchens for their daily meals. The bread ration, normally 406 grams per day in peacetime, averaged between 84 and 137 grams that winter; on some days there was no bread to ration. The fuel supply gave out. Each morning the government collected in carts the corpses of those who had died on the streets the night before from cold and hunger. The young, the old, and the homeless veterans of the Albanian battlefields were the first to die. Some Greeks estimated that of every 10 children born during this time, only 1 lived more than a month. Even the Germans reported that infant mortality had risen from 6 to 50 percent. Those who did not starve faced the ravages of disease. Conditions were almost as bad in many of the smaller cities.28

First Greek Resistance

The conditions of Greek life in 1941 and early 1942 were conducive to a spirit of resistance. It had been hard for the Greeks, flushed with their first victories over the Italians, to accept defeat at the hands of the Germans. This was followed in turn by the greater humiliation of the occupation. The famine that assailed Athens and the nationwide hunger that began at the end of 1941 did nothing to foster better relations between the Greeks and their occupiers. Although Hitler himself had gone to pains to pay tribute to Greek heroism and to assure the Greeks that he respected their classical heritage, Axis food policies made it only too obvious that the victor was willing to see the Greeks starve.29

It was in the cities that conditions were the worst, and it was in the cities that resistance started. Its development was facilitated by the fact that the cities had always been centers of political awareness. Reaction to events there was traditionally swift and volatile.30

By the end of May 1941, while the Germans were still consolidating their victory in Crete, the people of Athens had already shown a disinclination to accept the occupation. The German High Command, in fact, published a notice that those Greeks found guilty of pulling down German flags, hoarding foodstuffs, or helping British soldiers would be shot. In Italian-occupied areas much the same sort of activity went on. By August the Italians were imposing severe penalties for those Greeks passing communist propaganda, wearing badges of enemy countries, listening to foreign broadcasts, or meeting on the streets in groups of more than two persons. Many civil servants refused to serve under the puppet government, and those who stayed on appear to have engaged in slowdowns.31
Rumors and stories symbolic of resistance floated across Athens, probably untrue but symptomatic of Greek feelings. One such story concerned a Greek guard who, rather than replace the Greek flag with the Swastika, wrapped his flag around himself and jumped over the side of the Acropolis. The Greek press, of course, was Axis-controlled, but editors and printers often managed to overstate the Axis news to the point of ridicule or to print it carelessly while printing Allied news neatly. Illegal or stenciled news sheets were soon circulating in Athens, although the penalty for distributing them was death. Inscriptions appeared overnight on walls and pavements. “Zito R.A.F.” was one of the first. “AERA,” a famous Greek battle cry, came to mean, in resistance parlance: Anglia (England), Ellas (Greece), Rossia (Russia), Ameriki (the United States).32

Responding to the spirit of the people and the temper of the times, a number of resistance groups were organized beginning in the summer of 1941. These groups were originally small; they originated mostly in Athens; they all had political orientation and aspirations; many were influenced by the needs of a large unemployed officer corps; and only a few of them ever fielded forces of sufficient size to be accorded any stature as guerrilla groups.

Merely to give some idea of the number and variety of resistance groups started in Greece, a few of the organizations formed during the occupation are listed below: (1) the Committee of Six Colonels, (2) PEAN (the Patriotic Union of Fighting Youth), (3) RAN (whose initials stand for northern areas that Greek irredentists wished to add to their country), (4) “X,” (5) SAN (the League of Young Officers), (6) LAE, (7) EDEM, (8) AAA (the Liberation Struggle Command), (9) National Committee, (10) the Sacred Brigade, (11) Union of Enslaved Victors, (12) EOA (National Organization of Officers), (13) ES (the Greek Army), (14) EOK (National Organization of Cretans), (15) Athos Roumeliotis’ band (Roumeliotis standing for the area of Roumeli), (16) Andon Tsaous’ band, (17) YVE (Protectors of Northern Greece, later the PAO, Panhellenic Liberation Organization), (18) PEK (Panhellenic National Party).33

Some of these minor organizations, like the Committee of Six Colonels, never actually fielded guerrilla forces, but restricted themselves to intelligence activity. Some, like PEAN, died with their first overt act of sabotage, the destruction of the headquarters of the Greek Nazi Party in Athens. Some, like the Athos Roumeliotis band, were the work of an eccentric individual who took on the “functions of a medieval chieftain.” A number of the organizations, such as the Sacred Brigade (its name refers to the senior officers of the regular Army) or SAN, represented the wartime efforts of the Greek officer corps to
find a respectably non-Communist resistance activity to their liking. The “X” organization (pronounced “Khee” in Greek) contained many unemployed officers in Athens, but was unknown as a wartime resistance group. After the Germans left Athens, it acquired “the sinister significance of a Ku Klux Klan.” Two groups, Andon Tsaous’ band in Northeastern Greece and the EOK in Crete, are remarkable in that they survived the war intact, being eliminated by neither the Axis occupiers nor rival Communist-led bands. 34

Of these minor groups that actually put guerrilla forces in the mountains, many were eliminated, not by the enemy but by attack from the larger, stronger Greek guerrilla bands fielded by the Communists. This happened to EOA and ES in the Peloponnesus, to AAA and Athos Roumeliotis’ band in Central Greece, and to PAO (originally YVE) in Macedonia, to name a few.

**Major Resistance Parties**

Extermination at the hands of the Communists was the eventual fate of the first sizable resistance group to be formed—EKKA, standing for National and Social Liberation, but it survived for nearly three years. EKKA was organized in July 1941. Its political views were those of the center; it opposed not only Communism but the Monarchy, which it associated with the Metaxas dictatorship. EKKA did not field any guerrilla forces until March 1943, when Col. Dimitrios Psaros took to the mountains with British support. Psaros’ band was destroyed by the Communist guerrillas under Aris in the spring of 1944. Its most lasting achievement was not military but political: it left a rallying point in Athenian politics—the *Eleftheria* (Liberty) group—for a centrist point of view that existed long after EKKA itself had died. 35

The second most powerful resistance group, one that survived both the war with the enemy and the war with its Communist rival, was also formed in 1941. EDES, the National Republican Greek League, was founded in Athens, with the dual aim of resisting the Axis occupiers and restoring a measure of republicanism in Greece after the war. During 1941 it appears to have been inactive in the field, but in 1942, having received promise of support from the British, it put guerrillas into the field under the leadership of Col. Napoleon Zervas. Three of the British party that demolished the Gorgopotamos Bridge were, from the very first, scheduled to stay with Zervas’ group. Zervas, of course, was instrumental in the British and Greek success at Gorgopotamos. He and the men of EDES formed one of the major contenders in the story of the Greek guerrillas. 36

The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) was not far behind in its work of organizing a resistance group. Drawing on its experience in
clandestine organization from the days of Metaxas, the KKE in September 1941 took the lead in forming a coalition of Communist and leftist parties called the National Liberation Front, to be known by its Greek initials as EAM. Of the parties that joined EAM, only two were really independent—the Socialist Party of Greece (SKE) and the Popular Democratic Union (ELD); the others were the KKE and two nominally independent but actually KKE-satellite parties. 37

The aims of EAM were expressed in the broadest military and political terms—resistance to the occupiers, and government based on the people’s will as shown in free postwar elections. These aims, so generally stated, not only subsumed those of most other resistance groups but indeed came to express the will of most Greek people during World War II. The aims were universally acceptable: for such aims, all political parties could collaborate in a Popular Front movement, and all classes of people from workers to landowners could participate in the national struggle. 38

It has been said that there was a Communist corollary for each of these broadly stated aims. For the aim of resistance to the occupiers, the Communist version was that EAM and its subsidiaries should be the only resistance; for the aim of “government based on the people’s will as shown in free postwar elections,” this government was to follow the pattern of social revolution, and Greece would be a Communist state in the postwar world.

If its aims were expressed in broad and beguiling generalities, EAM left no vagueness in the organization that it built to realize those aims. Taking advantage of the training and experience of its members, EAM devoted its first year of existence—most of 1942—to setting up or tying into EAM a series of subordinate agencies which would give EAM a voice in the total structure of Greek society. The most important agency of EAM was its Central Committee of 25 members, drawn from representatives of functional groups, urban centers, and rural community life. This was the supreme policy-making body of EAM and it was KKE-(i.e., Communist-) controlled. Each of the political parties comprising EAM held one seat on the EAM Central Committee; the others were to be held by functional urban and rural organizations. 39

The most important urban organization of EAM was EEAM, the Workers’ National Liberation Front, which contained, even by the account of an unsympathetic observer, “all that was best of organized labor in Greece.” 40 EEAM was entitled to nominate one of the 25 members on the EAM Central Committee. In addition to representation on the Central Committee through EEAM, the large cities of Greece were entitled to send one representative each to the Central Committee.
These were chosen from a base of neighborhood and functional EAM organizations.\textsuperscript{41}

EAM organized the rural life of Greece through another series of organizations operating on a local level—where necessary in an underground fashion, where possible openly. Sometimes EAM was represented in a village by only one man, often the schoolmaster. From this base, EAM set up in each village four groups: EA, for relief work; ETA, a commissariat and tax-collecting body; EPON, an organization of Greek youth; and a local EAM committee. A less attractive subsidiary, OPLA, performed the “functions of Gestapo and SS.” Although EAM in any village contained many non-Communist members, the local organizer was usually a Communist; and the secretary of the local EAM committee, or \textit{Ipefthinos}, was almost always one. From among a group of village \textit{Ipefthinoi}, the next highest official, a district representative, was chosen. From the district representatives, a prefectural representative was in turn chosen. Finally, from this last group was chosen a regional representative who sat, along with the functional and urban representatives, on the EAM Central Committee.\textsuperscript{42}

It is thus obvious that the KKE worked to build an underground apparatus by which a small Communist minority, controlling the all-important EAM Central Committee, could control EAM. In turn, EAM was to exert a dominating influence on both rural and urban life. According to independent estimates, from 500,000 to 700,000 Greeks participated in some form of EAM organization during the occupation; EAM estimated that, in late 1944 at the height of its strength, its enrollment reached 1,500,000.\textsuperscript{43}

Although most of its efforts in 1941 and 1942 were devoted to organizing an apparatus for controlling Greece, EAM did foster civil disturbances in the cities. As a first measure it established a large number of underground printing presses, which flooded Greece with resistance literature. Through its affiliated labor organization, EEAM, which was strong in Athens, Piraeus, Salonika, and other industrial and commercial centers, EAM supported a number of strikes. Between October 1941 and March 1942 a number of small-scale strikes and demonstrations occurred. In April 1942, the first EAM-supported strike on a large scale took place when the civil servants went out. They demanded an increase in pay and the organization of soup kitchens and other means of maintaining themselves under the stressful economic situation. The strike ended when the Greek puppet government agreed to meet the conditions. The government later reneged, however, and in September 1942, a second large-scale strike was called. This time the puppet government did meet the conditions.\textsuperscript{44}
By mid-1942 resistance had spread and taken a more serious form. In June there were frequent acts of sabotage, both on the mainland and on Crete. In August, the first German recruitment of workers to go to Germany netted fewer than 8,000 men, a small number under the circumstances.\textsuperscript{45}

Guerrilla bands were now operating in the mountains. The EDES bands, under the leadership of Zervas, numbered several hundred men and were recruiting more. Under Aris there were a number of small bands, loosely affiliated with EAM. Aris himself was under EAM discipline. Both groups assisted Colonel Myers in the Gorgopotamos demolition, although Aris claimed to have done so in contravention of his standing orders “not to attack formed bodies of the enemy.” In December 1942, just after the success of Gorgopotamos, EAM took the step of forming its National Popular Liberation Army, usually designated by its Greek initials, ELAS.\textsuperscript{46} Hereafter, these inseparable components will be referred to as EAM/ELAS.

**The Meaning of Gorgopotamos**

By the time of Gorgopotamos, the spirit of resistance had taken overt guerrilla form; it was at the point where, with only a little encouragement, it would grow and expand. The success at Gorgopotamos was the catalyst for future growth. British support was to provide the necessary sustenance.

British support was peculiarly welcome in Greece. The traditional ties of friendship between the two countries had been strengthened by their common disaster in 1941. Growing Greek hatred for the occupiers nourished growing empathy for the British. One of the major signs of the spirit of the resistance during the period between the German defeat of the Greeks in April 1941 and Gorgopotamos in November 1942, was the sympathy and aid that the Greeks gave to the British who had been left behind when the British Expeditionary Force pulled out. From the very first, people cheered British prisoners of war when they were marched through the streets. Those British who escaped capture were able to count on the Greeks to hide and feed them even during the worst days of the famine. Almost as soon as Myers dropped into Greece, he was joined by three British colonial soldiers who had been living on Greek hospitality since the spring of 1941. Recounting those hard days, one British officer reported, “I saw the famine in the winter of 1941, when people were dying in the streets of Athens, and ate grass and thistles myself; but everyone would share with me what he had; I had nothing but kindness from these people . . . .”\textsuperscript{47}

The cumulative effect of these developments—the defeat of 1941, the occupation, the stirrings of resistance, the early guerrilla operations
culminating in Gorgopotamos, and finally the British decision to continue support of the guerrillas—brought about a radical change in Greece's war role. Passive resistance and minor sabotage gave way to full-scale guerrilla warfare in the mountains, which continued for two years. This in turn had tremendous impact, not only on such tactical problems as organization and logistics for guerrilla warfare but also on the strategic situation of Greece during and after the war. This study will consider each of these major areas; it will review first the greatest, the most complex, the all-pervasive problem—the strategy and politics of the guerrilla war in Greece.
CHAPTER II.
STRATEGY AND POLITICS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE

INTRODUCTION
GAINING GUERRILLA COOPERATION
POLITICS AND DISILLUSIONMENT
GUERRILLAS FIGHT GUERRILLAS
NEW COMMUNIST MOVES FOR CONTROL
INDIAN SUMMER AND THE DECEMBER WAR
STRATEGIC RECAPITULATION
STRATEGY AND POLITICS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE

Introduction

In November 1942, when Myers’ party destroyed the Gorgopotamos Bridge, Greece was playing a not inconsiderable strategic role. It represented a major supply and staging area for its occupiers and a possible target for a future landing by the Allies.

During 1943, the Mediterranean was the major Allied theater of the war in Europe, and Greece’s importance rose and declined as the year wore on. By the end of May, Greece was no longer so important to the Germans as a supply route, since Rommel had by then been defeated in North Africa. On the other hand, throughout 1943, the Germans anticipated Allied landings in the Balkans, particularly Greece. After the Allies captured Sicily in July, thereby obtaining an airbase to cover a Mediterranean landing, the Germans rushed troops into Greece to meet any invasion threat. However, an insufficiency of landing craft, as well as other factors, precluded major Allied landings in more than one area of the Mediterranean throughout 1943, and the choice fell on Italy, not Greece. At the end of 1943, still plagued by lack of landing craft, the Allies agreed that, except for the already planned landing at Anzio, Italy, there would be no additional large scale forays into the Mediterranean or Balkans—that all resources would go into the landings planned for France.¹

The Germans, however, did not know or immediately deduce these Allied decisions. The German Commander of the Southeast Theater, which included Greece, continued to have the dual mission of defending the coast against a possible landing and of securing the occupied area. Control of Greece was important to the Germans not only as a still vital link in the defense of the Balkans, but as a means of maintaining pressure on Turkey. After D-Day in Northern France on 6 June 1944, however, it became clear enough that the Germans in Greece were in a backwater. Since they faced no Allied landing attempt, their major problem was to secure their lines of withdrawal from their outposts on Crete, the other Greek islands, and southern Greece. As for the Allies, Greece had become unimportant in their military strategy even earlier, by the end of 1943; in 1944 it was simply an area from which the Germans would retire in due course.

This decline in Greece’s military importance was offset by a growing British realization that the country would play an important role in post-war political strategy. Great Britain could not afford to have Greece fall into the Communist orbit. Yet the strongest guerrilla groups were
those backed by the Communist party, and there appeared to be a very real possibility that they would be able to seize control of the country at the very moment of its liberation.

The British commitment of special forces to work with the guerrillas therefore took on major political significance. As it developed, the Communists’ determination to take over postwar control became increasingly evident. To this end they used both political infiltration and military aggression, simultaneously or alternatively. In the process, they involved the entire guerrilla movement, both Communist and non-Communist, and the Allied officers and men who worked with the guerrillas.

This section of the study reviews the strategic phases of the guerrilla war in Greece in both its military and its political aspects. It was a war of wits. It was a war where the key policy decisions were made by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, of Great Britain, and by George Siantos, a who headed the Greek Communist party (KKE) during World War II. It was the war of Brigadier E. C. W. Myers, head of the British Military Mission; of Maj. (later Lt. Col. and Col.) Christopher Woodhouse, second-in-command who later replaced Myers; of Maj. G. K. Wines, the American officer who backed up Woodhouse when the Mission became Allied; of Napoleon Zervas, military leader of the nationalist guerrillas of EDES; of Stephanos Saraphis, the non-Communist who became the military commander in chief of the Communist EAM/ELAS guerrillas.

This story of political maneuvering, so far from the military ken, came to be the all-engrossing work of the Allied soldiers who dropped into Greece in the fall of 1942 for that “one-shot” operation, the Gorgopotamos—and for those men who followed them. Myers, for example, in August 1942 a Major in the regular British Army ready for home leave, an engineer by training, with no knowledge of the Greek language and little understanding of Greece, was to be catapulted within the year to a pre-eminent position on the Greek stage. It was Myers who would tell King George II that he could not safely return to his own country. The fact was that the guerrillas’ operations had both military and political purposes and results; and the Allied men who dealt with the guerrillas had to deal with political as well as military strategy.

For purposes of clarity, this strategic review has been divided into five phases.

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a Siantos was deputizing for Nicholas Zakhariadhis, Secretary General of the KKE, who was in a German concentration camp and did not return to Greece until after World War II, when he resumed control of the KKE. (Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, pp. 65, 114–15.)
The first, extending from Gorgopotamos in November 1942 to ANIMALS, the large-scale sabotage operation devised to cover the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943, was a period in which the British were beginning to assess correctly the political complications of the guerrilla movement and the difficulties of controlling it strategically. It was a time, however, when the military value of guerrillas remained foremost. They were making distinct military contributions to Allied strategy in the Mediterranean Theater. It was therefore a time when the major problem was to secure guerrilla cooperation.

The second phase, from August through September of 1943, was marked by the political disillusionment or disappointment of all parties concerned with guerrilla warfare in Greece. The third phase ended all hope of amalgamating the guerrilla effort. Internecine guerrilla war had broken out and EAM/ELAS was earnestly seeking to eliminate all non-communist guerrilla bands. This phase came to an end with the Plaka Armistice of February 1944. The fourth phase, from February to August 1944, was characterized by a restless, insistent attempt by the communists, through political infiltration and military action, to consolidate their gains.

The fifth phase, the final one in which this study has a legitimate interest, began in August 1944. It started with an era of good feeling, the German retreat, and the orderly takeover of the Athens area by British Expeditionary Forces. By November the last of the Germans had departed, soon to be followed by the Allied Military Mission. They left Greece, it must be said, not in communist but in British hands. Then a postlude, one more communist try, their military defeat by the British, and an armistice. The communist guerrilla army was disbanded and war ended, for a while, in Greece.

These were the problems that Myers and his party so unknowingly were to face after they had demolished the Gorgopotamos Bridge.

**Gaining Guerrilla Cooperation**

*(November 1942–July 1943)*

With the destruction of the Gorgopotamos Bridge, it will be recalled, Colonel Myers felt that his party’s task in Greece had been completed. Following orders, they set out for their coastal rendezvous with the British submarine that was to take them out of Greece—all except the three men detailed to remain with Zervas.

Before the party reached the coast, however, British headquarters for special operations in Cairo, Special Operations Executive (SOE) had rapidly reappraised the situation in the light of the success of
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Gorgopotamos. SOE Cairo cancelled the evacuation; the mission was to stay in Greece. Myers was to head it, with the rank of brigadier. The other officers under him would become British liaison officers (BLO's) to guerrilla bands. Some additional officers would be dropped into Greece. Guerrilla forces were to be expanded and centralized, if possible, under the control of Myers and a royalist group in Athens known as the Six Colonels, to whom Myers' second in command, Maj. Christopher Woodhouse was to be sent to make arrangements. An officer bearing specific instructions for implementing this change of policy would be dropped.3

These orders were delivered to Woodhouse, who had remained behind with Zervas. He sent a runner after Myers, who when found, was anxiously waiting at the coast for the submarine. On 3 January 1943, the British party reassembled after an extremely difficult and exhausting month of marching. They immediately established a headquarters, and Woodhouse set out to meet the Six Colonels in Athens.4

First, however, Myers reviewed with Woodhouse the situation as they then knew it. While waiting for Myers' return, Woodhouse had discovered that relations between Aris' and Zervas’ groups were not the best. Aris thought that the entire mission, rather than Woodhouse alone, had remained with Zervas and resented the situation. He also resented the fact that Zervas had received British supplies by airdrop. Aris, in fact, had sent Zervas threatening letters and invaded his territory. A conference of all parties, arranged by Woodhouse at the end of December 1942, ended with an agreement between the two guerrilla groups not to fight each other, but no arrangements were possible at that time to coordinate their efforts against the enemy.5

Coordination of the guerrillas looked difficult not only because of the mutual antipathy of Aris and Zervas, but also because of the political affiliations and background of the two groups. Aris was an avowed Communist with political backing from EAM, nominally a coalition of left-of-center parties presenting a united front against the occupiers of Greece. The guerrilla arm of EAM, of which the Aris-led guerrillas were the earliest band, was ELAS. Zervas assured both Woodhouse and Myers that EAM was Communist-dominated. EAM, said Zervas, had asked him to be commander in chief of ELAS, but he had refused. The guerrillas Zervas headed were backed politically by a group in Athens known as EDES, which was non-Communist and republican. There were no royalist guerrillas in the mountains. At the beginning of 1943, Aris and Zervas were in agreement on one point only: neither wanted the return of the monarch at the end of the war.6

Myers, with Woodhouse’s help, radioed his headquarters on 13 January 1943, acknowledging the SOE change in policy and accepting
his new responsibilities. In this message he pointed out some of the political difficulties in obtaining military cooperation between the two guerrilla bands and the possibility of an EAM/ELAS *coup d'état* under certain conditions. In order to secure cooperation and avoid a future civil war, he suggested that guarantees of a free plebiscite on the question of the monarchy at the war’s end would be helpful. Finally, he asked for specific military targets.\(^7\)

Myers was already convinced that he would have to make use of EAM/ELAS to attain military results of any value, for they controlled the area where sabotage targets existed. Using EAM/ELAS, however, raised problems, because, if Myers adhered to his orders to get a centralized guerrilla movement, it would mean the dominance of the strongest element. This meant the Communist-backed EAM/ELAS. And one could hardly expect Communists to accept control by six royalist colonels.\(^8\)

It was imperative, under any conditions, to find some way to coordinate and control the resistance movement. Myers was bound by SOE's instructions to pursue its idea of using the Six Colonels as a controlling body; should this plan fail, as it was likely to, he was on his own to find other means.

**National Bands**

While Woodhouse was on his trip to Athens to meet with the Six Colonels, Myers struck upon an alternative to the SOE plan for centralized control of the guerrilla movements. On 4 February 1943 he met Col. Stephanos Saraphis, who had recently left Athens to organize a third band of guerrillas in the mountains, and who was seeking British support. Saraphis represented another non-Communist, non-royalist political group. In conversations with him, Myers voiced his worry about the multiplication of bands of varying political coloration. Saraphis agreed and suggested that “purely national bands” could be unified under Gen. Nicholas Plastiras, a republican leader then in France. Myers was “immediately struck” by the idea. He discussed it with both Saraphis and Zervas, who agreed that SOE should be asked to give support to all such nonpolitical bands as their own. When the National Bands became sufficiently strong, ELAS would be invited to join them.\(^9\)

Myers was pleased that the plan would also provide a ready-made place for Colonel Psaros, who was just getting ready to take the field as the military representative of EKKA, yet another political group of republican leanings, whose guerrillas the British were agreeing to support.\(^10\)

On 8 February 1943, Myers wired Cairo concerning his National Bands plan. Three days later, Cairo gave its approval, except for the
idea of a leader “too politically trained as a Republican.” SOE wanted
the organization to have national aims and to act “under military
orders, in conjunction with other forces in the Middle East.” With this,
Myers entirely agreed.11

When Woodhouse returned from Athens on 20 February, Myers
found that their early conclusions concerning Greek politics and their
doubts about the Six Colonels as a control group were well founded.
According to Myers, Woodhouse reported that the Six Colonels—

. . . knew little about the resistance movements
and . . . had few practical ideas about directing them.
They appeared to have little conception of guerrilla
life in the mountains . . . they disliked what they called
the “pin-pricks” of Zervas and Aris, in spite of the fact
that they themselves had contributed nothing to the
andarte movements.12

In Athens, Woodhouse had also met five members of EAM’s Central
Committee, two of whom were high-ranking members of the Greek
Communist party. They were very willing to cooperate with the Middle
East Command, but showed clearly their desire to control all resistance
groups in Greece.13

The lines of future controversy on at least one plane were now fairly
apparent: EAM/ELAS was seeking hegemony over the resistance; and
Myers, representing British policy, was trying to substitute for this a
federation of National Bands operating on a basis of equality under the
orders of the Middle East Command.

Before Myers could do much to implement the National Bands
idea, EAM/ELAS made its first bid for complete power. During the
spring of 1943, ELAS bands captured Saraphis by a ruse and dispersed
his band; threats were made to Zervas, and some EDES bands were
disarmed; somewhat later, an ultimatum was given Psaros, who on
the same day was taken prisoner and whose band was scattered; other
minor bands were eliminated. Although EAM/ELAS had previously
showed little interest in the Peloponnnesus, it started organizing there
in earnest as soon as the British began to pay attention to that area.
The method of operation routinely included liquidation or absorption
of rival guerrilla bands. In many cases, EAM/ELAS units elsewhere
imposed a reign of terror over local inhabitants and recruited by force.
One EAM paper stated that “anyone not joining EAM [not necessarily
ELAS] would be regarded as a traitor to Greece”; but obviously, anyone
joining EAM could hardly join any guerrilla group except EAM’s own
army of ELAS.14
Aware by the end of March 1943 not only of the aims but of the methods of EAM/ELAS, Myers nevertheless had to maintain relations with it. For one thing, SOE Cairo was receiving glowing accounts of the military prowess and nonpolitical nature of EAM/ELAS from Lt. Col. Rufus Sheppard, the British officer who had been parachuted to that group. Sheppard was not under Brigadier Myers’ direct command at that time, and had the only other functioning radio contact with Cairo. With this conflicting testimony at hand as to the “true nature” of EAM/ELAS, and with the complete agreement of all parties as to the necessity for using that organization in any military operations against the Germans, SOE Cairo instructed Myers not to break off contact.

Had he summarily broken off relations with EAM/ELAS, Myers would not only have disobeyed orders but would have lost touch with the area in which major guerrilla targets existed. The only railway line connecting Athens with the rest of Europe ran along the eastern coast of Greece, and it was in this very part of Greece that EAM/ELAS was effectively entrenched and would allow no other band to enter. Myers’ position was made more difficult by the fact that, on 21 February, he had received instructions to organize, train, and equip andartes throughout Greece and to prepare sabotage plans, using the guerrillas in various military eventualities. Given the two almost irreconcilable facts—the challenge EAM/ELAS was posing to British postwar political considerations and the need to use EAM/ELAS to accomplish immediate military ends—Myers felt there were only two alternatives: to stop using ELAS and reduce sabotage targets by about four-fifths, or to “try and keep ELAS under some sort of control, with a measure of allegiance by them to the Middle East Command.” He preferred the latter course: “Rightly or wrongly, I considered that our maximum contribution towards the war effort was of primary importance. . . .”

Myers therefore devoted his energies in the spring of 1943 to coping with events as they arose and to bringing EAM/ELAS under control. He embarked in March on a series of journeys to visit various of the 10 British liaison teams then operating in Greece. He wanted to coordinate their local sabotage plans, to tighten his relations with the now expanding British mission, to meet some new officers, and to check on general conditions. He also visited guerrilla groups, particularly EAM/ELAS. SOE Cairo sent Myers repeats of Sheppard’s telegrams, and, to the disgust of Myers, “almost insinuated that I had got hold of the wrong end of the stick.” Myers did not backtrack: he replied that he thought Sheppard “was having dust thrown in his eyes.” Sheppard apparently never changed his opinion of EAM/ELAS. He was one of the few BLO’s killed in Greece in the December 1944 war, by a mine placed by EAM/ELAS. (Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 127, 282; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 38–39.)
ELAS, in order to aid rival guerrilla leaders captured by that organization and to pursue the National Bands idea.¹⁷

In his effort to save captured leaders, Myers had limited success. He put forth great effort to save Saraphis’ life, for example, only to find that that gentleman had decided in captivity to join EAM/ELAS. Myers was “dumbfounded.” He was “even further taken aback” to find that Saraphis had been offered and had accepted the post of military commander in chief. Psaros and some others were, however, eventually freed to resume their own guerrilla activities in a diminished form.¹⁸

Myers was also stumped in his effort to have the National Bands idea agreed upon. Known in its documented form as “The First Military Agreement of the Greek Resistance Forces with the Middle East,” it provided for the division of Greece into guerrilla areas, in each of which there would be a military commander to be recognized both by Brigadier Myers (representing the Middle East Command) and by the Greeks. All bands would cooperate under the area commander. Bands in one area would respect the territory of other bands and assist each other. Furthermore, bands would be nonpolitical, and enlistment would be voluntary. Zervas, who by this time had declared his band nonpolitical and had, at Woodhouse’s direct request, sent a message of loyalty to the King, signed the First Military Agreement immediately, in March. In an ironic twist, Saraphis, originator of the idea, now supported the EAM/ELAS position. By a runaround technique, EAM/ELAS stalled for time. First Myers could find no one to disagree with the agreement but could find no one with authority to sign it. Then, when persons with authority to sign appeared, they could not agree with certain provisions of the document.¹⁹

It was not until May that Myers was told the specific EAM/ELAS position. The two major points were rejection of British influence over its commands and a demand that the National Bands have a joint general headquarters, in which EAM/ELAS would hold three of five seats. “EAM and their inseparable army, ELAS,” wrote Myers, “would be pleased to accept general instructions from the Middle East Command (MEC); but the method of their execution and the selection of targets for attack must he left to the discretion and decision of the new ELAS GHQ.”²⁰

Myers now wanted to get an agreement without further delay. He knew that he needed the help of EAM/ELAS; he thought that any concessions would be short-lived, as Greece would surely soon be liberated by Allied forces; and finally, he felt he held a trump card in his control of airdropped supplies. He therefore recommended that SOE empower him to sign the amended version.²¹
At the beginning of June 1943, however, Myers faced an impasse: SOE definitely ordered him not to sign the EAM/ELAS version of the National Bands Agreement, and EAM/ELAS would not sign his version. To complicate matters, he had already been given, on 29 May, the date of the forthcoming Allied invasion of Sicily and had been instructed to begin widespread sabotage throughout Greece toward the end of June, in order to make the Germans think that Greece rather than Sicily was to be the invasion target. Without an agreement with EAM/ELAS, however, Myers could not even begin to control its activities in the now all-important areas where the main north-south communications ran.22

The time factor was crucial. Myers therefore arranged to meet with Aris, Saraphis, and Tzimas, the three top men on GHQ ELAS; and with Zervas and his second in command Pyromaglou, of EDES. After two lengthy meetings on 4 and 5 June, in which Myers found Zervas “obstreperous” and GHQ ELAS “obstinate,” he admitted failure. The conference ended.23

Myers was stopped and now asked SOE for further instructions. Nevertheless, he determined to get the maximum sabotage possible. He therefore went directly to ELAS headquarters and had an “earnest conversation” with Saraphis, pointing out that unless some agreement was signed MEC would probably not continue supplying ELAS. On the other hand, Myers said, it had been his intent to allocate to ELAS areas over two-thirds of the supplies dropped in the next 70 sorties. This argument apparently was persuasive, for that same day, 14 June 1943, Saraphis signed a document saying that ELAS bands would obey all MEC orders issued them through GHQ ELAS. Three days later, SOE gave Myers a free hand “to get the best possible terms of ELAS” to ensure their cooperation with other guerrilla groups operating for MEC. After another period of waiting, EAM/ELAS finally on 5 July signed the amended version of the National Bands Agreement offered by Myers.24

The final Agreementd represented a compromise, mostly on the part of Myers. The two major points of contention—the position of the BLO’s and the Joint General Headquarters—were covered by sections 11 and 12. A Joint General Headquarters (JGHQ) was to be formed, composed of representatives of all those guerrilla bands either “recognized throughout Greece or occupying large areas” and of a representative of the Middle East Command (Myers, at that time). Smaller areas and districts were to have similar joint headquarters. Section 12 provided that “the role of the British officers attached to Joint HQ’s

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c See Chapter IV for organization of ELAS.

d See Appendix A.
shall be that of liaison officers to Middle East.” Under pressure from the British and disliking the JGHQ, in which ELAS would have three representatives to his one, Zervas reluctantly signed the Agreement for EDES. Psaros of EKKA was allowed to sign it, at Brigadier Myers’ instance, on 20 July, making the representation of non-ELAS to ELAS on JGHQ three to three. Thus the guerrillas of Greece became recognized forces of the Middle East Command.25

By this time, however, the major need for the agreement was past: the sabotage cover plan, code named ANIMALS, was almost finished.

**Operation ANIMALS**

From its brilliant opening with the destruction of the important Asopos railway bridge on 21 June 1943 to the order to cease sabotage given by MEC on 11 July, the sabotage cover operation remained a sustained endeavor on the part of British and Greeks alike. Its purposes were to cover the Allied invasion of Sicily by deceiving the enemy as to Allied intent, to draw off enemy troops into Greece, and to keep them from leaving Greece promptly. In some measure, it did all of these things.

The destruction of the Asopos viaduct was probably the single most spectacular exploit of its kind in World War II. Asopos was the sister of the Gorgopotamos viaduct, carrying the same rail line. Its destruction was planned by Myers almost as soon as he heard that the Gorgopotamos had been repaired and reopened in early 1943, but Asopos presented even greater problems. “There were only three practicable approaches, two of them being through the tunnels,” wrote Myers. “The third was from below the bridge, from the east, where the gorge opened out into a wide valley. From all other directions the faces of the gorge were too steep for any man or beast.” Furthermore, German troops had taken over sentry duty on the bridge.26

Myers originally planned to use ELAS guerrillas for an assault through the tunnel. EAM/ELAS, however, refused to participate, because of possible enemy retaliation and the guerrilla losses that might ensue. Saraphis claimed the Asopos operation could have “no hope of success unless at least 1,500 men were used, with artillery and machine guns . . . .” Six British officers and men therefore undertook the job alone, making their attack through the gorge. On the night of 20–21 June they demolished the bridge.27

It took the Germans, using Polish and Greek labor, 2 months to make repairs. The first engine to go across the repaired Asopos viaduct fell into the gorge, however, when a pier collapsed, either through

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25 For a discussion of the tactical aspects of this operation, see Chapter V.
sabotage or faulty workmanship, and 2 more months were required
to get the Asopos in working order. Myers could truthfully brag, “The
operation had thus caused the main line to Athens to be cut for over
four months.”

The Asopos operation was, by timing, the opening shot of the Greek
sabotage operations designed to divert German attention from Sicily.
Throughout Greece, telephone communications were cut, and wide-
spread interdiction of transportation facilities was generally achieved.
Myers reported 44 major cuts, at least 16 of which were on the vital
railway lines. A number of minor bridges were blown.

In these operations, both ELAS and EDES bands did their share and
separately cooperated with British Liaison Officers. One ELAS band
ambushed an enemy motorized column on the road through Saran-
daporou Pass and held the road against counterattack for 2 weeks; two
German battalions, with supporting artillery, were finally required to
reopen it. EDES bands in Valtos, under an outstanding leader, were
extremely successful in attacks on enemy personnel; in straightforward
fighting they accounted, according to Myers, “for more enemy killed in
action” than any other bands during the period of ANIMALS.

On 30 June, 10 days before Sicily was attacked, the three Service
Commanders in Chief in the Middle East acknowledged the effect of
guerrilla and British sabotage in Greece in dislocating enemy supply
and troop movements in the Balkans. Prime Minister Churchill later
claimed that two German divisions “were moved into Greece which
might have been used in Sicily.” Enemy soldiers captured by Greek
guerrillas reported that internal travel in Greece was much disrupted.
One enemy unit had taken 17 days to reach southwestern Epirus from
Athens, a distance of approximately 170 miles. Distances usually requir-
ing 3 days to travel by divisional convoy were now reported to take 11.
General Wilson of MEC congratulated the guerrilla army of Greece.
“The Axis was misled and presumed on an attack in the Balkans. The
reinforcements in men and aircraft intended for Italy were occupied
in the Balkans. Their attention was turned towards Greece and a large
convoy passed unmolested into the Mediterranean.”

These sabotage operations were sparked by the 30-odd British Liai-
sion Officers under Myers, operating in conjunction with the Greek
guerrillas. Of these, only the EAM/ELAS and EDES bands were of an
important size. Myers estimated that, at that time, ELAS had 16,000
guerrillas in arms, with another 16,000 armed men in the village
reserves. Zervas had 5,000 armed men in the EDES bands and another
5,000 village reservists. EKKA guerrillas under Psaros numbered only
several hundred; their top strength of 1,000 men was not reached until
August 1943, well after the end of the sabotage operations. Myers has reported that he was often asked how many guerrillas actually participated in these operations; his report put the number at a tenth of those in the mountains. Other estimates have put the number as low as 1,000, leading some to question the wisdom of arming so many men. To Myers the answer was simple—it was necessary, not because all the guerrillas set the demolition charges, but because they secured the area in which these things took place:

Indirectly, practically every andarte band of ELAS, EDES and EKKA had contributed towards them [the sabotage operations of June–July 1943]: for, even in districts where they did not actually carry out the destruction of telephone lines, bridges, enemy convoys or trains, the fact that they were in the district afforded the essential freedom of movement and security to British officers and small parties of picked andartes engaged upon tricky sabotage work.

In addition, Myers felt that civilian morale would never sustain the cost in reprisals for these operations if local resistance forces were not actively operating. And loss of morale would, he felt, mean betrayal of all guerrilla activity.

The summer of 1943 thus opened auspiciously. Both British liaison teams and Greek guerrillas had contributed to the Allied victory in Sicily. Throughout Greece the belief spread that Allied liberation of Greece was imminent. Among the guerrilla groups themselves, a new spirit of cooperation seemed possible. Myers had the satisfaction of hearing a Communist member of the General Headquarters of EAM/ELAS publicly state that EAM’s “past intolerance of other Resistance Movements had been wrong and that now they must all cooperate.” It was a good omen, but not an accurate one.

**Politics and Disillusionment**

*(August–September 1943)*

“In the maintenance of military control over the various Resistance Movements, in particular over ELAS,” Myers was to write after the war, “political problems were the greatest ones which faced me.” Even before the sabotage cover plan had been initiated, Myers had had to

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1 Saraphis estimated guerrilla strength in June 1943 as follows: ELAS, 12,500; EDES, 500; and EKKA, 200. (Greek Resistance Army, p. 67.)

8 On this point, Woodhouse shared Myers’ belief. (Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 142.)
meet situations and make decisions with far-reaching political implications. In the months following, he was confronted with some of the most difficult political problems ever to face a military commander.

The success of the sabotage cover plan was followed immediately, in July 1943, by new SOE Cairo instructions to Myers. All guerrilla groups were to lie low for the time being and limit their activities to the training of recruits and reconnaissance of future sabotage targets. Only minor sabotage in support of training and morale was sanctioned. At this time, however, Greeks and even the British liaison officers expected an Allied invasion of Greece at almost any moment. When Brigadier Myers discovered that it was not now foreseen “before the winter of 1943; possibly early 1944,” he became gravely concerned.38

In a country where the internal balance of the resistance movement could only be maintained by careful management, enforced inactivity meant major problems. Maintaining and feeding both guerrillas and the civil populations of guerrilla territories through the coming winter would be difficult, for the Germans planned to take over all crops at harvest time and allot food only to districts that were entirely peaceable. There was also the prospect that, should the expected Italian capitulation take place, idle guerrilla bands would enforce the surrender of the Italian units in Greece, and thus acquire a windfall of both light arms and divisional artillery. The bands that gained these arms would have clear superiority in firepower over any other guerrilla group. If these arms fell to bands other than EAM/ELAS, they might well be used to redress the score of the spring fighting; even without such firepower, EDES units often provoked EAM/ELAS units into acts of aggression. If the arms fell to EAM/ELAS, as was more likely to be the case, Myers would be left without his supply “stick.” With a clear superiority in arms over other bands, EAM/ELAS might well resume the effort to eliminate all rivals. Myers also worried that civilian morale might not sustain prolonged guerrilla inactivity, in which case the guerrillas would lose their support base. Finally, and not without reason, Myers feared that EAM/ELAS would take this opportunity to turn more and more to political endeavor.39

Politics came almost too easily, Myers thought, to Greeks. It was hard to find a Greek military man who was not also a politician. Whereas the rank and file of every andarte organization seemed much the same, whether they were ELAS, EDES, or EKKA guerrillas, the leaders each represented a limited segment of the political spectrum, and they dealt daily with both political and civil matters. EAM/ELAS wanted complete control of the movement, but the issue of Communism represented in EAM/ELAS was repugnant to the other guerrilla leaders. Zervas himself argued with Myers in July 1943 that British support of
EAM/ELAS would lead to civil war later in Greece. At about this time, however, Zervas began accepting into his group, officers tinged with collaborationist activity, thus making himself vulnerable to political recriminations. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1943, EAM/ELAS was already considering setting up a civil government for the mountain areas it controlled.40

The political question was intensified by the matter of prestige. Because the National Bands Agreement set up a Joint General Headquarters (JGHQ) on which EAM/ELAS held three seats and EDES and EKKA only one each, Zervas and Psaros rarely appeared themselves but sent deputies. Zervas paid a visit to JGHQ on 27 July, but only in response to Myers’ direct request. Since EAM/ELAS was represented on JGHQ by the three officers forming its own General Headquarters, these men had the prestige of principals as against deputies. The result was that JGHQ of the National Bands began to sound very like GHQ ELAS.41

Feeling that he had too little guidance from headquarters in this politically charged atmosphere, Myers requested that he be allowed to return to Cairo for briefing and instructions. Meanwhile he called in all senior liaison officers for a conference, held from 18 to 20 July, at which he congratulated them on their past performance, outlined the instructions he had received from the Middle East Command, and “explained the internal political problems as I saw them and the general methods by which I wanted them kept under control.” In particular, he detailed the need for the British to obtain the surrender of Italian units and to keep Italian arms from falling to guerrillas.42

The problems of control were nonetheless increasing, as was evidenced a week later. A pan-Thessaly conference arranged by EAM/ELAS, at which over 3,000 people simply converged on a small town for two days, gave a visible demonstration of EAM/ELAS control over territory, its organizational ability, and the value it placed on propaganda. Myers, invited to speak at this meeting, prepared his speech carefully and had it checked by Maj. David Wallace, who had been dropped into Greece a few weeks previously as an official representative of the Foreign Office and who was now acting, at Myers’ request, as his political adviser. Myers’ speech was aimed at securing the continued good behavior of EAM/ELAS and at raising the morale of the unarmed masses; in particular, Myers pointed out the falsity of EAM’s propaganda against the British and the Greek monarchy.43
Once Myers’ request that he return to Cairo had been granted, he prepared to leave Greece in August 1943 by airplane. As soon as the trip was mentioned, however, representatives of EAM/ELAS expressed the desire to go along “to explain their political and other views,” to the Middle East Command and to the Greek government-in-exile. EDES and EKKA soon followed with similar requests. As finally constituted, the official party consisted of Myers, his political adviser Wallace, and three other British officers; Kóminos Pyromaglou, second in command and chief staff officer to Zervas; George Kartalis, political adviser to Psaros; and four members of EAM—three from the Central Committee in Athens and Andhreas Tzimas, the political commander of GHQ ELAS.

Myers regarded the forthcoming talks in Cairo as a possible means of preventing civil war; he wrote, in fact, that “the whole future of Greece might be bound up in this visit.” With the help of Woodhouse and Wallace, he therefore prepared an agenda for the forthcoming discussions and cleared it with representatives of EDES, EKKA, and EAM/ELAS. They agreed to take up, in the given order, the major problems of guerrilla Greece: prevention of internecine guerrilla fighting, civil administration of Greece before liberation, and the means of peaceably changing from guerrilla law to constitutional government at the time of liberation. In addition, Myers was fortified by having jointly hammered out with Woodhouse and Wallace his own positions within these three major problem areas.

**Back in Cairo**

The air trip from guerrilla Greece to Cairo was a change, not so much in location as in worlds. As complicated as life in the mountains had been, Myers and the andarte delegates now found themselves, on 10 August 1943, in a world where the verities of mountain life were not only untested but unknown. It was a world with its own complexities, not the least being its many layers of organization. There were three echelons of British organization that now came, for Myers, directly into the picture—his headquarters, SOE Cairo; General Headquarters, Middle East Command; and the British Foreign Office. In addition to the Greek guerrilla delegates, there were the Greek King and his government-in-exile, returned from London the previous spring, to be reckoned with.

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'h Exfiltration was possible because a complete airfield had been constructed behind enemy lines in Greece under the supervision of a liaison officer. See Chapter III.

'i Constantine Despotopoulos, Petros Roussos, and Elias Tsirimokos. The first two, like Tzimas, were Communists; the third was of the Popular Democratic Union (ELD), a Socialist party which had joined EAM. (Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 241.)
Myers found Cairo, despite his messages, less than fully informed about politics in Greece. Although in March 1943 the head of the Greek Section of SOE Cairo had dropped into Greece to report first-hand on conditions there, he had been delayed in Turkey and had not yet returned. Wallace, the only other independent observer to Greece, came back with Myers, but owed allegiance, not to SOE, but to the British Foreign Office. Reginald Leeper, British Ambassador to the Greek government-in-exile, did not even know who the delegates were. He was concerned, angry, and unprepared because Wallace’s personal reports from inside Greece had not yet reached him.46 (It did not help that the delay was due to the SOE decoding staff.) General Headquarters of Middle East Command was even less aware of the serious political problems facing Myers. Some of the officers there who had witnessed the loyalty of the Greeks to their King in 1941, could not believe that George II had since become a most unpopular man.47 The result was that no adequate preparation had been made for the andarte delegates’ visit: “It had not even been decided whether they would be allowed to see members of their own government.”48

The Greek government-in-exile was equally unprepared and in an even more difficult position. The antiroyalist mutinies of March 1943 in the Greek forces in the Middle East had had several results. For one thing they had brought the King and his government from London back to Cairo. Although the mutinies had been dealt with summarily, they had also brought into the government-in-exile a number of republicans.49

Not one member of this government-in-exile, however, had, in August 1943, been in touch with mainland Greece for over two years, with the result that it was highly unrepresentative of its homeland. In Greece, royalist parties were mainly confined to Athens, and no royalist band controlled any guerrilla territory. In Athens, new republican and liberal parties had grown up which had drawn off many members from the old parties. Furthermore, the leaders of the older parties thought it impolitic to back the government-in-exile before the King gave assurances of a plebiscite, lest they lose more followers to the new republican or resistance leaders. Because the government-in-exile was vastly concerned about developments in Greece, its members, particularly the republicans, wanted to meet the andarte delegates. The meeting could hardly be denied.50

On the second day after their arrival the guerrilla delegates met officially with the government-in-exile. Almost immediately, Andheiras Tzimas, political commander in GHQ ELAS, got down to his own order of business. Sweeping aside Myers’ agenda, he went directly to the third and major issue confronting postwar Greece—the constitutional
question of the monarchy. As later analysis of this master stroke showed, Tzimas had bypassed the preliminary phases of Myers’ agenda, on which there might have been internal disagreement in the guerrilla delegations, and “confined the issue to the King’s matter, on which all the delegates from the Greek mountains were formally agreed.” Two Greek politicians of note, who had recently escaped from Greece, joined the guerrilla delegates. Eight signatures thus graced the ultimatum handed to the government-in-exile on the fourth day of the delegates’ visit.51

Figure 4. King George II of Greece.

The major point of the ultimatum was that, since presumably 90 percent of the people in Greece were against the monarchy, the government should guarantee that a plebiscite would be held to determine the continuance of the monarchy before George II should return to Greece. The issue revolved around the timing of the King’s return. It was a crucial point. Greek royalists feared that, if the King did not return before the plebiscite, antiroyalist elements would consolidate their power and the vote would go against the monarchy. On the other
hand, republicans and Communists alike feared that, should the King return with the invasion forces and before the plebiscite, there would be a reversion to the practices of the dictatorship and the vote would inevitably confirm the monarchy.\textsuperscript{52}

The issue of the ultimatum reinforced the political divergence in the government. In quick order, more than half of the Cabinet immediately sided with the delegates and threatened to resign. Only a few members, including the republican Prime Minister Tsoudheros, remained loyal to the King in this crisis.\textsuperscript{53}

The man around whom this controversy raged concealed his anger behind regal stoicism and cold reserve. George II saw Myers the second day after his return. Myers told him quite frankly, that in his “humble opinion,” the King’s return to Greece at the head of his forces would be followed by a sequence of unfortunate events. The King would be supported by Zervas, opposed by EAM/ELAS, and civil war would begin. Myers felt that the King, unless protected by British forces on his return, would be in great personal danger. On the other hand, protection itself would be regarded as interference, leading to the revolt of EAM/ELAS and civil war. Myers wanted the King to give public assurance that he would remain outside of Greece until after a plebiscite.\textsuperscript{54}

The conversation was continued 2 days later at a private meeting after a dinner party. Myers suggested then that the King might visit the guerrillas in the mountains in order to restore popular confidence in himself. The King, “long past middle age,” felt himself too old for this. And he declined to accept Myers’ next suggestion, that he remain “as his country’s Ambassador during peace negotiations, and until the plebiscite . . . .” George II considered it his duty to return to his country with his army, his prerogative to return at the moment of liberation. He resented the fact that the British were supporting republican, let alone Communist, guerrillas.\textsuperscript{55}

The King’s problem was insolvable until British policy became clear. In the first place, the King was totally dependent on British support. In the second place, while the British had previously been supporting George II, they had also been supporting antimonarchical elements in Greece. It was on British advice that George II was in Cairo and had accepted a compromise government that he did not like and that was now an embarrassment. Through British military policy, the Greek guerrillas, largely antimonarchical, had been supported and their delegation brought to Cairo. These two elements, the government-in-exile and the guerrilla delegation—both British supported—had now combined to try to force the King’s acceptance of an ultimatum dictating that he would not return to Greece until a plebiscite had reaffirmed the monarchy.
If the King agreed, he was only a step from abdication. If he did not agree, his government might resign and he might not be able to reconstitute it. Of the three British agencies in Cairo that were involved in Greek affairs, two (GHQ Middle East and SOE) seemed to be in agreement with the ultimatum. Myers had made his unwanted and un-acceptable observations. Not even the British Ambassador could give George II an absolutely firm commitment of support. The King therefore turned directly to Prime Minister Churchill and to President Roosevelt, both at the Quebec Conference, for advice on this “most curious situation.”

Support for the King

The King got the support he needed. He was advised not to accede to the ultimatum; and the British Ambassador, Mr. Leeper, already in sympathy with the King, received a clear mandate to back the monarchy and to prevent the resignation of the government-in-exile.

The arguments for these decisions were many. In the first place, Mr. Churchill felt that he had “a special obligation” to the monarch of a country that had fought “as our Ally in 1941.” Then also, since the guerrilla delegates probably represented only one-fourth of the people of Greece, the British Prime Minister refused to concede that most mainland Greeks were really antimonarchical, or that they would be at the time of liberation. “To concede the King’s legitimate position to the clamour of an acknowledged minority” was therefore considered both unconstitutional and undemocratic.

Since it was generally agreed back in Cairo that a compromise Greek government could probably not be recreated, the question of the current government’s resignation raised three possible alternatives, equally unpalatable: a new all-republican government, which might well become the tool of EAM/ELAS; a new all-royalist government, which would be both unrepresentative of mainland Greece and grist for Communist propaganda; or complete dissolution of the government-in-exile, which would leave Greece with no clear political authority or representation in world affairs—a vacuum for the Communists to fill. Under these circumstances, it appeared desirable to uphold the existing compromise—a predominantly republican government with a legitimate monarch.

It became easier to uphold the compromise at this time because the EAM/ELAS delegates, pressing their initial advantage, demanded that three ministries—war, interior, and justice—be held inside Greece. These demands alienated the members of the government-in-exile. They did not resign. All eyes now turned to the British to end the situation, at least to return the andarte delegates to the mountains from
which the British had brought them. The constitutional crisis of the government-in-exile and the King was over for the summer.\footnote{It was to recur periodically. In December 1943, “it was the view of the British Government that the King should delegate to Damaskinos, the Archbishop of Athens, the authority to act as head of a Regency Committee as soon as the Germans quitted Athens.” The King, presumably supported by President Roosevelt, refused. In the spring of 1944, the King again refused to appoint a regent, thus causing the fall of Tsouderos, his Prime Minister, who had supported him against the andarte delegation in August 1943. In September 1944, the King repeated his refusal to name a regent, even though he had to accept the fact that he could not return to Greece with the liberating troops. When the Regency of the Council of Ministers failed 2 months after the liberation, Mr. Leeper himself urged the appointment of a regent. The unwilling King finally accepted his fate and on 30 December 1944 appointed Damaskinos as Regent, “being ourselves resolved not to return to Greece unless summoned by a free and fair expression of the national will . . . .” (Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 34–35, 40–41, 72–73, 111–20, 126–27.)}

The dichotomy in British policy was also over, and military ends were now made clearly subservient to political ones. But the transition was not effected smoothly. A spirit of recrimination pervaded the British agencies dealing with the Greek guerrillas. The Foreign Office blamed Myers and SOE, not only for bringing out the delegates and thus precipitating the crisis, but for encouraging groups in Greece that might adversely affect the return of the King. SOE replied that its agents were not responsible for what Greek nationals said to their own government, and it defended the policy of supporting guerrilla bands without regard to political affiliation, pointing to the impossibility of controlling the Greek resistance without dealing with its strongest element. General Wilson, Army Commander in Chief of the Middle East, wanted only to get on with the war, using to the utmost whatever weapon he could lay hands on, including the Greek guerrillas. Meanwhile, amid the bickering, there were still the Greek guerrilla delegates in Cairo.\footnote{It was to recur periodically. In December 1943, “it was the view of the British Government that the King should delegate to Damaskinos, the Archbishop of Athens, the authority to act as head of a Regency Committee as soon as the Germans quitted Athens.” The King, presumably supported by President Roosevelt, refused. In the spring of 1944, the King again refused to appoint a regent, thus causing the fall of Tsouderos, his Prime Minister, who had supported him against the andarte delegation in August 1943. In September 1944, the King repeated his refusal to name a regent, even though he had to accept the fact that he could not return to Greece with the liberating troops. When the Regency of the Council of Ministers failed 2 months after the liberation, Mr. Leeper himself urged the appointment of a regent. The unwilling King finally accepted his fate and on 30 December 1944 appointed Damaskinos as Regent, “being ourselves resolved not to return to Greece unless summoned by a free and fair expression of the national will . . . .” (Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 34–35, 40–41, 72–73, 111–20, 126–27.)}

The men of EDES, EKKA, and EAM/ELAS were a major source of embarrassment. When SOE Cairo received instructions from the British Embassy that the delegates be sent back as soon as possible, Myers, “thoroughly alarmed about the consequences,” protested to the Ambassador. By turning away the delegates and supporting the King, the British had made it appear to EAM/ELAS, he said, that they intended to reimpose the King when Greece was liberated. This would give EAM propaganda for further expansion in the mountains and lead to a dictatorship of the left. Myers feared the breakdown of his hard-won National Bands Agreement and the resumption of internecine war. He was supported by the head of SOE Cairo and had the sympathies of General Wilson, who could not, however, overrule his instructions.\footnote{It was to recur periodically. In December 1943, “it was the view of the British Government that the King should delegate to Damaskinos, the Archbishop of Athens, the authority to act as head of a Regency Committee as soon as the Germans quitted Athens.” The King, presumably supported by President Roosevelt, refused. In the spring of 1944, the King again refused to appoint a regent, thus causing the fall of Tsouderos, his Prime Minister, who had supported him against the andarte delegation in August 1943. In September 1944, the King repeated his refusal to name a regent, even though he had to accept the fact that he could not return to Greece with the liberating troops. When the Regency of the Council of Ministers failed 2 months after the liberation, Mr. Leeper himself urged the appointment of a regent. The unwilling King finally accepted his fate and on 30 December 1944 appointed Damaskinos as Regent, “being ourselves resolved not to return to Greece unless summoned by a free and fair expression of the national will . . . .” (Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 34–35, 40–41, 72–73, 111–20, 126–27.)}
get on with the war they agreed to and everything was laid on.”63 On their way to the airport several days later, however, the delegates visited Prime Minister Tsoudberos, who had supported the King throughout the crisis, and actually persuaded him to demand that they remain in Cairo. The delegates therefore stayed on, presumably in order to conclude the military aspects of their mission. These were accomplished within a week, and in mid-September they finally returned to Greece.64

Myers himself was ordered to London, where he saw representatives of the various agencies and a number of highly placed people, including Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, Prime Minister Churchill, and King George VI. He got back to Cairo on 10 October; 9 days later he heard that civil war had again broken out in Greece. In November he finally learned that he would not be returning to Greece: he was persona non grata to the King of Greecek and the British Foreign Office. The news came to him “almost with relief . . .; but at heart, I was miserably disappointed because I was being denied the opportunity of completing the task which I had begun among a people whom I had grown to love and whom I believed I understood.”65 Myers thus leaves the story of the Greek resistance at this crucial point, but not without a final accolade from General Wilson: “I therefore recommended the return of Myers, who was most likely to get them [the Greek guerrillas] round to the right way of thinking; the diplomats, however, were too strong for me and I was overruled.”66

The auspiciously begun summer was now nearly over; it had proved a turning point and disillusionment in many ways. For the British, the policy of supporting the Greek guerrillas because of their military value now became a policy of controlling the Greek guerrillas because of their latent political value. The repercussions of this policy change were internally significant: not only Myers but the head of SOE Cairo and several subordinates were recalled to London and replaced. SOE lost all control of policy-making in regard to the Greek resistance, and the military needs of the Middle East Command became secondary. For the Greek government-in-exile, the strong Communist position in the resistance on the mainland was now apparent, but not fully comprehended. The difficulties inherent in the government’s own position were also clear, and its lack of ability to cope with the situation had become apparent. Having no policy or means of controlling the guerrillas, the government-in-exile had become, in fact, totally dependent on the British. Meanwhile the guerrilla delegates, full of bitterness, were back in Greece, reviewing the causes of their failure.

k “... the single thread of decision which stood out from the tangle was that King George II declared his intention to abdicate if Brigadier Myers returned to Greece.” (Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 157.)
Guerrillas Fight Guerrillas

(October 1943–February 1944)

Whether Myers could in fact have brought the guerrillas round to the “right way of thinking” is at best doubtful, but there is little doubt that the British decision not to send him back to Greece was interpreted by EAM/ELAS as essentially unfriendly. Saraphis, professional soldier that he was, wrote that—

We had the impression that Brigadier Eddie’s [Myers’] replacement was due to the fact that in Cairo he had shown himself sincere and objective and that he was a professional soldier and, as such, took a realistic view and transmitted it in his reports and he wanted to show himself impartial in the disputes between the different organizations. . .

Impartiality could not be the stock in trade of Lt. Col. Woodhouse, Myers’ second in command, who had become acting commander of the BMM while Myers was in Cairo. “From . . . [the middle of August], the EAM/ELAS members of JGHQ had noticed in the acting commander of the BMM,” wrote Woodhouse himself, “a propensity to take the side of anyone but themselves in any dispute that arose.” The situation that had arisen in Cairo and the problems in Greece had had their effect on the orders that Woodhouse received. It was not “a personal matter,” continued Woodhouse, “it was because the intentions of EAM/ELAS directly contradicted the intentions of the British authorities.” The difficulties imposed by the atmosphere of mutual suspicion were compounded for Woodhouse by his lack of information about the situation in Cairo, Myers’ troubles, and the serious political ramifications of the problem. On the other hand, both Aris and Saraphis were adequately briefed by the returning and indignant EAM/ELAS delegation.

In the stocktaking that followed the return of the guerrilla delegation in mid-September 1943, EAM/ELAS was bound to reach a number of conclusions. First, the debacle in Cairo, the dismissal of the delegation by the British authorities, the absence of Myers, and the upgrading of Woodhouse—all combined to confirm the EAM/ELAS impression that the British intended to reimpose the monarchy at the moment of liberation. A second conclusion was that liberation was near. (It was expected from week to week throughout 1943.) If the monarchy were going to be reimposed by the British at liberation, and liberation was almost here, EAM/ELAS had little time to carry out its plan to be in complete control of the resistance movement and thus be able to cope with the King’s return. It was clear that the time had come to clear the decks and eliminate all possible postwar rivals.
A decision to act, however, depended not only on logical necessity but on feasibility. This seemed close, however, as a possible means of managing the British had now appeared. On the plane bringing back the guerrilla delegations were two American officers, the first to enter occupied Greece; and Woodhouse informed the guerrilla leaders that the BMM had now become the Allied Military Mission (AMM). He would himself be acting commander of the AMM, but there would be an American component in Greece. EAM/ELAS, having already seen a small wedge driven in Allied policy on Greece, especially in Cairo, therefore “hoped that the arrival of the Americans might do something to change the situation and that they would inform the service which had sent them of the true state of affairs.”

The senior American officer, Capt. Winston W. Ehrgott, a cavalryman who was marked for duty with an ELAS cavalry unit, did not, however, share command responsibility at JGHQ level. Although this lessened his value as a possible tool, EAM/ELAS handled him very cleverly. It renamed the ELAS 3rd Cavalry Regiment the 3/7th, after Ehrgott’s own regiment in the U.S. Army, the 7th Cavalry, and appointed him honorary commander. Both Saraphis and Woodhouse were under the impression that the American officer was extremely sympathetic to the EAM/ELAS guerrillas. In the fall of 1943, the relationship between Woodhouse and the American must have been quite bitter. “Although his declared interests were confined to cavalry warfare,” Woodhouse wrote, “the KKE convinced him that crusading for EAM/ELAS against the British was practically the same thing.”

The attempt to eliminate rivals was feasible for EAM/ELAS in the fall of 1943 because its own organization was strong. It held the territory of greatest strategic importance to both the Germans and the Allies. Despite this fact, it had not exhausted its resources during operations for the Sicily cover plan in June and July of that year. From that operation, in fact, EAM/ELAS had emerged by all standards the largest and best organized of the guerrilla groups. In early September, GHQ ELAS had organized divisions, regiments, battalions, etc., with a hierarchical command structure. While these echelons were in no way comparable in strength to their conventional army counterparts, the fact that they could even be simulated said much for ELAS growth. With a number of new officers and recruits, ELAS claimed strength of 20,000 active guerrillas. Their tactical deployment was made more efficient by the fact that telephone communication between major commands was in operation and a start had been made on establishing radio connections. Furthermore, EAM/ELAS enjoyed strong popular support throughout the country.
Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II

Arms for EAM/ELAS

The one factor lacking in EAM/ELAS strength was sufficient arms and ammunition for an all-out offensive against their rivals. Events in the autumn of 1943 remedied even this defect. It will be remembered that in the organization of the occupation, Italian units held the largest amount of Greek territory and were mainly responsible for the security of the country. In the summer of 1943, however, the Italian government was deep in negotiations with the Allies over the possibility of surrender. During the summer there were some lower-level negotiations among various Italian commanders, the guerrillas, and British liaison officers over the possibility of individual Italian units in Greece surrendering to the guerrillas or the BMM. These early negotiations were abortive; however, they alerted all parties to the importance of the issue. The BMM could not itself control such large bodies of men, and Woodhouse could not be sure either of getting the Italians out of Greece or controlling the guerrillas to whom they might surrender. Whichever guerrilla group received the surrender would, of course, get a windfall of trained fighting men and both light and heavy arms. Neither EDES, EKKA, nor EAM/ELAS was under the slightest misapprehension as to the value of these arms to itself or to its rivals. Neither were the Germans. Neither was Woodhouse, who had “categorical instructions from General Wilson to acquire every possible Italian weapon; to reserve to itself [his mission] the responsibility for realloacting them; and on no account to allow the whole booty to fall into the hands of ELAS.”

When Italy capitulated on 9 September 1943, most Italian units in Greece surrendered to the Germans and were disarmed. The major exception was the Pinerolo Division, commanded by the pro-British General Infante. On 11 September, at a meeting with JGHQ, General Infante laid down the conditions of his surrender to the guerrillas—that his action be approved by his High Command and that Woodhouse guarantee the surrender terms. These stated that Infante’s troops would come over to the guerrillas in formed units with their weapons, that Italians willing to fight the Germans would keep their weapons, and that only the division’s surplus arms would be turned over to the guerrillas. Since most of the men chose to remain in formation, the surplus arms had little importance for the guerrillas. However, since the Italians were concentrated in Thessaly, the prize was still within EAM/ELAS’ reach: in Thessaly, EAM/ELAS held a monopoly of guerrilla power. Although the terms of the armistice1 were hardly satisfactory to anyone but EAM (and not entirely to them), it was signed at once (12 September) in order to keep German forces from overtaking the

1 See Appendix B.
Pinerolo Division. The delegations returning from Cairo thus found approximately 12,000 surrendering Italian soldiers with divisional weapons in EAM/ELAS territory.77

Neither Woodhouse nor Infante could save the Pinerolo Division. “By presenting ridiculous excuses for scattered dispositions, by insinuating Communist propaganda among the bewildered Italians, by borrowing specialists and weapons that were never returned,” wrote Woodhouse, “the commanders of ELAS from the first set about preparing the Pinerolo Division for despoliation when the time was ripe.” By the end of September the Pinerolo had become a paper division. In October EAM/ELAS urged what was left of the Italian Division on to an attack on Larisa Airfield, an operation requested by the Middle East Command as part of a plan to destroy six airfields simultaneously in order to help the Allies defend the Aegean Islands against a new German onslaught. On 10 October the Pinerolo attack was repulsed, and EAM/ELAS complained that the Italians had “no will to fight.” On the 14th EAM/ELAS agreed to General Infante’s request that the division be concentrated and given a definite sector. Later that day, however, ELAS proceeded to disarm the entire division. The Pinerolo was no longer even a paper command, and EAM/ELAS had gained not only its weapons but the entire Aosta Cavalry Regiment. Woodhouse had, at least for a time, completely lost his supply “stick.”78
Winter Fighting

For EAM/ELAS, the disarming of the Pinerolo Division came at a good time, for the opening actions of the internecine guerrilla war had already taken place. The weapons collected from the Pinerolo were needed immediately and were carried over the Pindus Mountains for Aris to use against Zervas. It is almost impossible to determine who really struck the opening blow of this war. Saraphis has accused EDES of open collaboration with the Germans, invasion of ELAS territory, provocative actions against ELAS troops, armed interference against ELAS candidates in village elections and, finally, armed assault on ELAS forces. Colonel Woodhouse, on the other hand, has written that “on 8th October ELAS attacked units of EDES in Thessaly,” as well as other minor bands. On 12 and 13 October ELAS enlarged the attack to include all rivals, except EKKA with whom they had at that time reached temporary agreement.79

According to Woodhouse, these actions had followed a great many other signs of EAM/ELAS intransigence, including “judicial murder of several heroes of the Gorgopotamos operation” and of some EDES men; a request that the BMM pay all maintenance money for several months ahead; and refusal to take part in the airfields operation. (Although they later consented to take part, they never did so.) It is probable that there was always enough happening between the two groups of guerrillas to give either side an excuse to attack the other almost any time. Whichever side started the fight, it is clear that EAM/ELAS found the time ripe to press the attack.80

The week that saw the outbreak of general fighting between Greek guerrillas and the EAM/ELAS disarmament of the Pinerolo Division proved to be perhaps the most disastrous in the history of the British mission. While Greek was maneuvering against Greek, the Germans struck. On 17 October they began a major drive against the feuding guerrilla forces, who were caught completely by surprise. The joint headquarters was overrun and disintegrated. All of Myers' work for the National Bands agreement was now undone.81

For the next 3 months a three-cornered war went on, fought by the Germans, EAM/ELAS, and EDES. In a series of three major mopping-up operations—in which they used aircraft, artillery, tanks, and motorized troop transports; burned villages and shot hostages; and played guerrilla force against guerrilla force in a most successful propaganda war—the Germans regained control of the major lines of communication.82
They did not, however, eliminate ELAS. In an exchange with Woodhouse that well illustrates the relationship between the two men, Saraphis recalled that, “Lt. Colonel Chris [Woodhouse] said to me, ‘The Germans will at last have been convinced that they cannot eliminate ELAS.’ I replied that not only the Germans but others, too, must have been convinced that they could not eliminate ELAS. By this I meant the British . . . .”

Indeed, despite the German operations, EAM/ELAS pressed its fight with EDES. By December 1943 EDES was desperate and had to withdraw to a small area in Epirus to regroup. At this point, Zervas was in such a precarious position that Woodhouse recommended that the British discontinue support of him “as the only hope of making further resistance to the Germans possible, even on terms chosen by EAM/ELAS.”
The British, however, declined to accept such terms. As early as 22 October, General Wilson had broadcast to the guerrillas an appeal for unity, blaming “unspecified” guerrillas for the civil war. Allied leaflets dropped in Greece, however, placed the blame squarely on ELAS. On 28 October the King and the ministers of the government-in-exile added their appeals for cessation of the war between Greeks. All British military support for ELAS was discontinued for the duration of its attacks on other guerrillas.85

In December the Allies made an additional show of their determination to stand up to the ELAS threat by designating the unpopular Woodhouse as commander of the Allied Military Mission. Woodhouse received further moral support when the Americans sent Maj. G. K. Wines to represent them on the AMM. Without offending EAM/ELAS or Saraphis, Wines gave Woodhouse his support. Allied policy now spoke with one voice. Also in December, the British disregarded Woodhouse’s reluctant recommendation to drop Zervas and instead doubled their support.86

The decision made at the time of the Cairo conference to treat Greece as a political rather than a military objective now became apparent even in Greece. “This was a decisive moment in the history of British relations with Zervas,” wrote Woodhouse, “because hitherto the military motive for supporting him had predominated over the political; but now the former had all but disappeared. Although Zervas’ military power could be resurrected, the motive for doing so must henceforth be nakedly political.”87

Determination paid off. On 19 December, EAM/ELAS requested the Allies to mediate between them and Zervas. There followed a series of highly complex moves. The guerrilla leaders were asked to listen to and comment on a speech by the Prime Minister in exile, who on 21 December, speaking for General Wilson as well as the Greek government, appealed for unity. Giving cognizance to one of EAM/ELAS’ major points, he stated that collaborators should be expelled from the guerrilla bands. But he also said that the bands should either unite or go home.88

A couple of days later, the Allied Military Mission suggested a cease-fire in Greece for the Christmas and New Year holiday season. About this time also, in order to suggest a reason for another kind of fighting, Middle East Command instructed the AMM to prepare a plan (code named NOAH’S ARK) for guerrilla harassment of German troops at the time of their withdrawal from Greece. The plan was timed for the spring of 1944, mainly to make it appear urgent. Woodhouse broached it to EAM/ELAS early in January 1944.89
Before an armistice could be agreed on, however, Zervas attacked EAM/ELAS forces in an attempt to regain lost ground and improve his bargaining position in the discussion of truce terms. EAM/ELAS, out, raged by the attack and by Zervas’ silence on the matter of collaborators in EDES, turned its anger on the Allied Mission also. On 31 December, the Prime Minister in exile added fuel to the fire by charges that EAM/ELAS used dictatorial methods. Appeals for Greek unity broadcast on New Year’s Day by both King George II and Radio Moscow had no effect.

Late in January, ELAS counterattacked and drove the EDES guerrillas back. In response to Woodhouse’s request for an immediate armistice, EAM/ELAS now stated its terms. Zervas was to repudiate all collaborators in EDES; guerrillas were to remain in their positions at the moment of armistice; and a conference of representatives of the guerrillas and of the Allied Military Mission was to be held to discuss a united guerrilla army and a government of national unity. The AMM relayed these terms to Zervas. Pressed militarily by ELAS and politically by the AMM, Zervas could only accept. On 4 February 1944 the ceasefire finally took effect.

**Plaka Armistice**

Conferences in southern Epirus took the rest of the month. First came preliminary talks between EAM/ELAS and the AMM; then the talks moved to Mirofillon, where the EDES delegation—without Zervas—joined the group. The armistice conference opened officially on 15 February. On the question of repudiating collaborators, EDES complied. All the delegations joined in a statement condemning all armed Greeks in the service of the Germans. The question of territorial status quo was also quickly settled in the affirmative. Since Woodhouse refused to go into political questions, discussion now centered upon other military questions—the creation of the united army that ELAS wanted, integration of guerrilla units in a united army, the choice of a commander in chief for a united army. But even these basically military questions raised a new political specter. “We pointed out,” said Saraphis, “that, in order for there to be a commander in chief, there must be a political authority to give him his instructions; but that no political authority existed, and therefore a political committee would have to be created . . . .” Woodhouse told the guerrillas he was incompetent to make political decisions and refused to discuss the political committee. The talks again reverted to military matters.

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^m Woodhouse puts the date of Zervas’ attack before 31 December 1943; Saraphis gives the date of 4 January 1944.

^n See Appendix C.
Thus the meeting dragged on, with only Woodhouse reassured, since he felt confident that the guerrillas could never agree on any matter that the British would find unpleasant. The longer the delegates talked, therefore, “the less likely the civil war was to break out again.” By 23 February, the conference was deadlocked and ready to dissolve. A further meeting between Aris and Zervas personally was, however, arranged for at Plaka, on the eastern bank of the Arakhthos River, which divided EDES and EAM/ELAS territory. It was eventually broadened to include all the conferees. On the 27th the conference reconvened at Plaka and “simply began again from the beginning.” Within 2 days, another deadlock was reached.93

In the face of the new deadlock, EAM/ELAS now proposed a definite armistice: all ELAS and EDES forces were to remain in current positions with the line separating them to be the new ELAS-EDES boundary; in the future they would cooperate in actions against the Germans. With enemy gunfire as a backdrop, a Protocol of Agreement was drawn up to this effect and signed the same day, 29 February 1944. The Agreement also asked the Allied Military Mission to secure supplies for guerrilla bands “on the basis of their operations against the Germans and in proportion to the real requirements of the war.” The armistice provided, further, that prisoners or political hostages held by either side would be released. A secret clause, inserted at Colonel Woodhouse’s request, stated that the guerrillas of EAM/ELAS, EDES, and EKKA would cooperate closely to implement NOAH’S ARK and would accept the infiltration of special British and American units that were scheduled to participate. This clause, Woodhouse has said, being freely negotiated, provided a legal basis for “subsequent agreements” and “the eventual restoration of a recognized government from exile.”94

The Plaka Armistice put an end to a civil war that was as unpopular with Greeks as with the British. It had never involved many casualties, possibly a few hundred. “The cost of killing a man was incalculable.” Woodhouse has written somewhat bitterly; “it had taken several thousand rounds at slightly more than extreme range even to frighten one.”95 The truth is that, below the leadership level, Greeks were not pleased to be killing or to be killed by other Greeks. Saraphis, in fact, recognized and even emphasized the common bondage of all Greek guerrillas in the Plaka talks when he pushed the concept of a united army.96 At the leadership level, also, EAM/ELAS failed to win friends by the civil war: Athenian politicians were disturbed at a national resistance movement turned so sour. Even within EAM/ELAS there were persons who felt that the military violence advocated by men like Aris

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93 See Appendix D.
was less effective than political infiltration. The Plaka Armistice, in the view of EAM/ELAS, thus represented a turning point—an end to one attempt for control of Greece. In Communist terms, the end of one attempt is always prelude to the next.97

New Communist Moves for Control

(March–August 1944)

Although the Plaka Agreement had officially ended hostilities between the two guerrilla camps, it had not really settled anything with finality. Both EAM/ELAS and EDES still existed and the differences between them remained as acute as ever. On the personal level, in fact, rapprochement was well-nigh impossible.

From the point of view of EAM/ELAS, the winter war had been a disappointment. Whereas EAM/ELAS had regrouped and was almost 30,000 strong in the spring of 1944, the major rival, EDES, still existed. True, EDES had been driven into a small and relatively unimportant area for operations, but that area represented a hard core which the army of ELAS had been unable to annihilate. In addition, bands in Macedonia under Andon Tsaous98 were flourishing; and in Eastern Roumeli, Psaros’ EKKA still existed independently. These bands were being liberally supplied by the British. EAM/ELAS, on the other hand, could not pry any arms out of His Majesty’s Government.98

In addition to the guerrilla armies which EAM/ELAS wished to dispose of, it now faced a new and imposing array of power. The Germans had recruited Greeks to fight the guerrillas. These Greeks, organized by the Greek puppet government into security battalions, had proved their mettle against the guerrillas and had been joined by members of the guerrilla bands that EAM/ELAS had broken up. EAM/ELAS thought that the security battalions fought with tacit British approval. Saraphis has written that they used the claim of British sanction as an inducement in recruiting; he was inclined to blame the British secret intelligence service, rather than the Allied Military Mission under Woodhouse.99 It was Woodhouse’s opinion that the security battalions flourished because of the excesses of EAM/ELAS. Knowing that the British were anti-ELAS, the security battalions expected sympathy from the AMM. Woodhouse has called the security battalions “the gravest problem which exercised the Communist leaders of 1944.” Their existence provided a source of potent anti-EAM/ELAS propaganda, and

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P An alias for Andonios Fosteridhis, Tsaous standing for sergeant; thus Andon the Sergeant. His bands were the right-wing Greek Nationalist Guerrilla Groups.
they augmented the “handful of Germans and second-rate satellite troops” in Greece.100

The problems of EAM/ELAS, however, were not only military. Given their objectives and the setback they had received in the winter fighting, they needed now to accomplish certain political aims—to re-establish their integrity, retrieve their position with non-Communists at home and abroad, and place themselves in such a position that no postwar government could overlook their claims to participation in, if not domination of, such a government.

Given time, the leaders of EAM/ELAS probably would not have regarded the problems as too difficult, but in March of 1944, time seemed of the essence. With NOAH’S ARK scheduled for April, EAM/ELAS thought it had only another month to prepare for the German departure from Greece. The spring of 1944 was therefore a time of major activity on both political and military fronts.101

Politically, the leaders of EAM/ELAS had, by their anti-Zervas war, exposed the Communist nature of their organization. As a result, EAM could no longer “front” as a coalition of left-of-center parties. What the Communists now needed was “a more ambitious device for drawing recruits . . . from the respectable and professional classes, and from the newer generation of politicians.” The plan coincided with the need, and on 11 March 1944 the political Committee for National Liberation hereinafter called Political Committee, or PEEA, from its Greek initials) was inaugurated under the sole sponsorship of EAM/ELAS and without participation by EDES or EKKA102

The Political Committee for governing mountain Greece was composed of both Communist and non-Communists. President and Secretary for Foreign Affairs was Col. Euripides Bakirdzis, friend of Psaros and formerly, under the cover name Prometheus I, the most successful secret agent of the British. He had returned to Greece on the same plane that brought the guerrilla delegations from the Cairo talks in September 1943. Secretary for War was Col. Emmanuel Mandakas, a Cretan resistance leader, formerly (like Saraphis and Bakirdzis) an able officer of the regular Army. The posts of justice, home affairs, and agriculture were filled by former members of EAM, the last two being also Communists. A number of cabinet offices were held dually until men could be found to fill them. The oath of office was given by the parish priest of Viniani, where the Political Committee established itself.103

Respectability flowed over the Political Committee. Elections were held in Guerrilla Greece for a national council, which, with members of the 1936 Parliament, actually assembled in May 1944. The Political Committee, meanwhile, invited EKKA and EDES to participate. New men joined PEEA, still further enlarging the proportion of
non-Communists to Communists. With the demotion of Bakirdzis to Vice President and Secretary for Food, Alexander Svolos, a mild and cultivated Professor of Constitutional Law at Athens University, against whom “there could be no cavil,” became President and Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Other men also came into PEEA, and “the new names,” wrote Woodhouse, “raised the political quality of the resistance movement to a new level.”

The Political Committee embarrassed both the Greek government-in-exile and the British. The exile government was now clearly unrepresentative, because PEEA was actually performing the functions of government within Greece. In early April, mutinies supporting PEEA broke out in the Greek army and navy forces in Egypt, precipitating the usual crisis: Prime Minister Tsouderos resigned, but, when a new government-in-exile could not be formed, agreed to carry on. King George II was recalled from England. The Political Committee in Greece was asked for assurances that it indeed intended to work for national unity.

Finally, on 13 April 1944, a new cabinet was formed in Cairo under Sophocles Venizelos, son of the great Cretan statesman. On 17 April it announced that both EAM/ELAS and EDES would send representatives from Greece to discuss a new Government of National Unity, which would subsume the Political Committee. This conference was to meet the next month in Lebanon.

Back in Greece the political offensive was again inextricably mixed with military affairs. Difficulties over the boundaries between EDES, EKKA, and EAM/ELAS had continued despite the Plaka Agreement; and the Allied Military Mission called another conference within Greece. It was scheduled to take place at Koutsaina in May, at the same time as the forthcoming political conference. Before it could meet, however, EAM/ELAS gave Psaros an ultimatum. When he rejected it, he was attacked on 17 April and was killed in the fight. His forces were dispersed in what had become by then a classic Greek pattern—some were killed, some joined EAM/ELAS, and some escaped to the security battalions. At the Koutsaina Conference, Woodhouse reported, the Communists were triumphant over EKKA's annihilation and refused any compromise on the boundary with EDES. Within Greece, the Communists felt the spring military offensive was going well.

**Lebanon Conference**

The Greek delegation to the political conference being held in Lebanon with the government-in-exile was meanwhile pursuing Communist political objectives, although the seven-man delegation was itself mainly composed of non-Communists. The delegates included Svolos
and two other non-Communist members of PEEA, one Communist and one non-Communist member of EAM, one representative of KKE, and Saraphis, military Commander in Chief of ELAS, who served as technical adviser. They left Viniani on 25 April, and some days later enplaned from Greece. The first stop was at Brindisi, Italy, where all the delegates except Saraphis were taken to Bari for rest. Saraphis was flown immediately to Middle East headquarters in Cairo, where he was asked to bring his influence to bear on the conduct of EAM/ELAS at the Koutsaina Conference back in Greece. This, he claimed, he was unable to do because he had delegated all his military responsibilities for the period when he would be out of Greece. Feeling as usual quite antagonistic toward the British, Saraphis rejoined Svolos and the rest of the delegation at the Grand Hotel du Bois de Boulogne in a remote village of Lebanon, where the political conference was scheduled to take place.¹⁰⁸

In Lebanon the Svolos delegation did not meet quite the reception it had expected. The month that had intervened between the eager sending of the invitation and the conference itself had seen a number of changes in the lineup of Greek politics. The Greek democrats in the exile Cabinet, by supporting the mutinies of the Greek forces in Egypt, had brought about the downfall of Prime Minister Tsoudheros and had put their own man, Sophocles Venizelos, into power. But when Venizelos proved unable to stop the mutinies,⁹ they became a major source of embarrassment to the government. It was also apparent that much of the propaganda being given to the mutineers and in turn issuing from them emanated from EAM/ELAS. Determined Greeks supported by the British put down the navy mutiny, and British troops stopped the army mutiny.

On 26 April Venizelos resigned. He was succeeded by George Papandhreou, a Social Democrat who had only recently made the trip from Athens, along with a number of other Greeks who were also coming to the conference. The new Prime Minister, although temporarily unable to form a government, was a determined foe of EAM/ELAS. With strong backing from the British, he was ready to take on the job of converting the army of EAM/ELAS into a national army and of absorbing PEEA into a Government of National Unity. Thus for the first time there was a possibility that the favorite tactics of the Communists would be used against them.¹⁰⁹

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⁹ Since the war, Greek sources have indicated that EAM/ELAS obtained power in the Greek forces in the Middle East through its control of the escape routes from that country. It is claimed that only those persons known to be pro-EAM/ELAS were allowed to escape to join the free Greek forces.
When the conference opened on 17 May—belatedly, as a result of Papandhreou’s illness—the Svolos delegation was surprised and alarmed by their treatment. “We expected him [Papandhreou] to begin in a friendly atmosphere . . . ,” complained Saraphis. “Instead . . . he began a violent attack on EAM and ELAS, saying that they were not fighting a war but were exercising terrorism and that their first victim had been Saraphis, who was present, and their latest the absent Psaros. Venizelos spoke next . . . . He too attacked EAM and ELAS.”110 And so it went. r

After two and a half days devoted either to castigation or defense of EAM/ELAS, the conference finally settled down to work on a plan Papandhreou had outlined. This included eight points, substantially comprising what later became the Lebanon Charter: (1) reorganization and re-establishment of discipline in the Greek armed forces in the Middle East; (2) unification of all guerrilla bands under a central government; (3) end of terror in Greece; (4) adequate relief for Greece; (5) restoration of order and liberty in liberated Greece and a quick decision on the question of the government; (6) punishment for traitors; (7) arrangements for reconstruction measures; and (8) satisfaction of Greece’s national claims. In addition, Papandhreou stood ready to offer the Svolos delegation 25 percent of the cabinet portfolios in a Government of National Unity.111

The Svolos delegation found this program hard to swallow, but they were unable to extract any major concessions. Possibly because they were non-Communists sent to do Communists’ work, at least partly because the other delegates had closed ranks, Svolos and his colleagues were forced into major concessions.

On the matter of the mutinies, Svolos found feeling so high that his delegation added its own condemnation to that of the others, thereby strengthening Papandhreou’s position on the rest of his points. Point three, concerning terror in Greece, was an insult to EAM/ELAS but it was swallowed whole. Point six, concerning traitors, adopted a major demand of EAM/ELAS. Points four, five, seven, and eight did not arouse great controversy.112

The mountain delegation found itself in an awkward position concerning the Government of National Unity, since its instructions were to insist on 50 percent of the portfolios, not 25, and specified the ministries.113

r Preliminary conversations, Saraphis wrote, had already indicated complete disinterest in the guerrillas; he was especially indignant, according to his own report, when Venizelos asked him if he kept a mistress in the mountains. (Greek Resistance Army, pp. 194–95.)
On Point two, concerning unification of guerrilla bands, the Svolos delegation fought hard. They could not allow such a serious matter to be settled against themselves. “We declared,” wrote Saraphis, “that we would not consent to the disbanding of ELAS unless the army which was to take over its task was ready first. Regarding that army, we said we would consent to the integration of all guerrillas in a united national army under a commander who inspired general confidence.” The only man acceptable to all parties was General Othonaios, whose name was kept secret, since he was still in Athens and in danger.\(^{114}\)

In the end, the Svolos delegation accommodated itself to the situation as soon as a compromise on the matter of ELAS was reached. The accepted phrasing provided that the transformation of ELAS to a national army was to be accomplished in such a way as not to “lead to a reduction of resistance,” and it was to be undertaken by consultation between the Greek government and British military forces. On 20 May 1944 the mountain delegation joined the rest of the conferees in signing the Lebanon Charter,\(^{4}\) virtually the whole of Papandhreou’s program. “This agreement,” wrote Woodhouse, “had been achieved by battering the delegates of PEEA, EAM, ELAS and the KKE into a mental daze in which they were hardly responsible for their actions.”\(^{115}\)

The delegation itself was aware of its predicament, for it had “made many concessions,” as Saraphis conceded, “and departed very far from the Political Committee’s instructions.” It telegraphed to the Political Committee, asking that the Charter be approved, but the answer was almost a repudiation. Svolos was extremely hurt at this cavalier treatment and Saraphis was sent back alone to Greece to explain.\(^{116}\)

Meanwhile, in early June, Woodhouse was called out of Greece to advise British authorities on the Greek situation and to be briefed on future plans. He did not return to Greece until September.\(^{117}\)

**Holding the Line Against EAM/ELAS**

As time went on, it looked more and more as if the Government of National Unity would be without EAM/ELAS, PEEA, or KKE participation. Early in June, Papandhreou formed the new government, including representatives of EDES and the defunct EKKA and leaving five seats vacant for EAM/ELAS. Early in July, EAM made its demands known; the major ones were that it should nominate not 5 but 7 of a total of 15 cabinet members and that ELAS should remain separate from the national army. On 13 July, PEEA President Svolos came back into the orbit of the Political Committee. Complaining that he had been treated “like an accused person,” Svolos announced that

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\(^{4}\) See Appendix E.
his delegation could not join the Papandhreou government and would return to Greece. Before the end of July, an ultimatum came from the mountains demanding that the Prime Minister resign.\textsuperscript{118}

All of these demands were rejected. Backed by a unified Government and the determined British, the strengthened Prime Minister filled the five seats that had been saved for the Svolos delegation. There was no giving way on the matter of the army. Svolos was allowed to return to Greece. Papandhreou did not resign.\textsuperscript{119}

Furthermore, a number of plans for dealing militarily with EAM/ELAS were now considered. Papandhreou suggested that the Allied Military Mission be pulled out of Greece and that EAM/ELAS be publicly denounced. This plan—like one considered in April, when EKKA was annihilated—was rejected, as before, on the basis that it might jeopardize British and Greek-royalist lives and that it would certainly leave the British without information on EAM/ELAS and its attempts to take over Greece. By withdrawing, the British might even help EAM/ELAS to gain in popularity. They would also most certainly be unable to have any direction over affairs during the German withdrawal.\textsuperscript{120}

Another proposal, made by the Allied Military Mission, and sanctioned, as Woodhouse pointed out, by the Plaka Armistice, was to build up Allied troops in Greece. To some limited extent this had already begun, since several American Operational Groups from OSS and elements of the (British) Raiding Support Regiment had been sent in to perform interdiction sabotage. Allied troops in sufficient numbers to counterbalance EAM/ELAS were simply not available, however.\textsuperscript{121}

The most important military measure taken against EAM/ELAS at this time was the stepping-up of supplies to Zervas, well in excess of his needs. By the summer of 1944, in fact, EDES had grown to about 10,000 to 12,000 men, concentrated in a small section of the country, whereas EAM/ELAS had to spread 40,000 guerrilla troops over an area considerably more than four times the size of Zervas’ territory. Now Zervas began attacks on the ELAS 24th Regiment, without, according to Woodhouse, protest from the Allied Military Mission.\textsuperscript{122} These attacks, as well as what it had learned of other Allied plans, made EAM/ELAS apprehensive. Saraphis, for example, saw a great anti-EAM/ELAS strategy in every move. Concerning the EDES attacks on the 24th Regiment, he wrote—

Their object had been achieved; the whole area west of the Arakhthos had been cleared of ELAS. Thus they [the British] would have a base for reinforcing Zervas with Greek troops from the Middle East and, in case of need, would be able to transfer the Papandhreou Government to Epirus, and from there to wipe us out. It
was rumored that a British landing was contemplated, with military seizure and occupation of Greece and imposition of British policy as its object.\textsuperscript{123}

Faced with this growing threat, EAM/ELAS decided to eliminate EDES once and for all. Saraphis, however, pointed out that ELAS could not take on this task so long as the Germans remained strong in Epirus, the EDES stronghold. He was ordered, however, to take the first steps toward attack and spent 3 weeks in visiting the units that were to make the fight.\textsuperscript{124}

Meanwhile the Germans began a whole new series of mopping-up operations, directed mainly against ELAS. Not only did the 9th ELAS Division suffer heavy losses, but the Germans burned and plundered villages and carried off cattle. Even worse was the behavior of the Eastern troop units in the German Army and the Greek collaborators. To get arms and ammunition ELAS carried out new operations against the Germans and security battalions, with some success. Its calls to the British for supply drops of arms, however, fell on deaf ears.\textsuperscript{125}

The question of arms was never more important to EAM/ELAS than in the summer of 1944. In the previous January EAM/ELAS had established contact with Tito in Yugoslavia and had requested ammunition from him or from Russia, but without result. Now at this crucial point (the fight over the Government of National Unity and the decision to annihilate EDES), EAM/ELAS received good news: a Russian Military Mission was to arrive in Greece. Consisting of 11 officers, the Russian Mission arrived by plane from Italy on 28 July 1944. The plane left Italy surreptitiously and landed in Greece without the knowledge of the British.\textsuperscript{126}

With Russian supplies EAM/ELAS might have had a good chance of annihilating EDES before its forces could join a National Army and before anyone could build a counterforce. This hope, however, turned out to be a pipe dream. Lt. Colonel Popov, head of the Russian Mission, soon informed Saraphis that he had no mandate to promise supplies, although he would forward requests to Moscow. “He asked for a list of what we needed,” wrote Saraphis, “and, within two days, lists were provided. But, to the very end, we never received any assistance.”\textsuperscript{127}

The failure of the Russian Military Mission to provide supplies was only one of the disappointments that the Communists in EAM/ELAS received throughout the summer of 1944. Unlike the other Balkan states, which expected to be overtaken by the Russian Army, Greece was to be, by Allied-Russian agreement, in the British sphere of interest. (In October, Churchill and Stalin agreed in Moscow, among other things, to trade 90 percent Russian predominance in Rumania for 90 percent British predominance in Greece.) Since Russian military forces would
stop at her northern boundaries, Greek Communists could not expect supplies or military aid from the Northern giant. Within Greece, the Germans, expected momentarily to leave ever since 1942, still threatened, now abetted by the Greek security battalions. Anti-ELAS guerrillas, even EDES, were still in existence and “the reactionary thugs of X under Colonel Grivas” were making their first appearance. Furthermore, the British at last could rely on a strong Greek government-in-exile, in which all anti-EAM/ELAS voices were united. They had American support for their policy, and in the field, Woodhouse and Wines were in entire accord.

Finally, it seemed to EAM/ELAS that the Allies were tired of Greek antics: they now appeared ready to fight fire with fire. Above and beyond any or all of these reasons, however, the one suggested by Woodhouse for the sudden about-face in EAM/ELAS policy—that the Greek Communists lost their nerve in the summer of 1944—may supply the key to the situation. At any rate, the Political Committee now ruled out, at least temporarily, the possibility of successful military action. The balance in the inner councils, as always, shifted immediately to the advocates of peaceful penetration. Since it was important to hold the non-Communist fellow-travelers, it is probable that the moderating words of Svolos were listened to. At any rate, the planned ELAS offensive against EDES was called off. Saraphis, who felt he had finally found a successful plan for destroying EDES, was called in by the Political Committee and told that PEEA and EAM/ELAS had reversed their position—they would send five, not seven, members to participate in the government of Papandhreou, who had suddenly become respectable. Saraphis was “a little distressed” that his work had been for nothing. But by now he had learned to flow with the tide; he was “pleased with the solution. . . .” On 2 September the new ministers joined the Government of National Unity in Cairo.

The fourth phase of the wartime resistance movement in Greece was, from the standpoint of the future of the country, the time of greatest moment. In the words of Woodhouse, the communists tried both “political and military blitzkrieg,” and almost captured the grand prize. But the opposition also became stiffer than it had ever been before, and control of Greece thus remained just beyond their grasp.

Indian Summer and the December War

(September 6, 1944—V–E Day)

The decision to enter the Papandhreou government on its terms marked the beginning of what Woodhouse has called the “Indian
summer of the well meaning” between EAM/ELAS and the Allied Military Mission. Saraphis took steps to improve the unfriendly relations of the Allied Military Mission with specific EAM/ELAS divisions. He actually undertook to convince the commanding colonel of the EAM/ELAS 9th Division, for example, that some of the responsibility for friction with the AMM was his. When Brigadier Benfield, current head of SOE Cairo, visited guerrilla Greece in order to avert civil war between the guerrillas of Saraphis and Zervas, he found the leaders of EAM/ELAS rational, agreeable, and friendly. They became even more so, as they discovered that he was well disposed toward them. The threat of war between Saraphis and Zervas had, of course, already disappeared. Benfield presented Saraphis with a gift from British General Alexander, a pair of English field glasses which had been engraved in 1943 for the “loyal ally of Great Britain and my close colleague in the common struggle for the liberation of all peoples.” The gift, “forgotten” during the black days of 1943 and early 1944, was now remembered. “Our relations with the Allied Mission,” wrote Saraphis, “. . . became really friendly.”

Brigadier Benfield’s entry into Greece coincided with the beginning of the German withdrawal. At this point, before the Germans speeded up their retreat, General Wilson summoned both Zervas and Saraphis to his headquarters at Caserta, Italy, for another conference.

**Caserta Conference**

The era of good feeling was continued at the Caserta conference. One of the main points made by EAM/ELAS at the Lebanon Conference in May had been that its guerrillas should be disbanded only when the national army was ready to take over the task of defeating the Germans. “Regarding that army,” wrote Saraphis, “we said we would consent to the integration of all guerrillas in a united national army under a commander who inspired general confidence.” The commander discussed at Lebanon and generally agreed upon had been the Greek General Othonaiois. Before Saraphis left for Caserta, however, he received an Allied order presenting British Lt. Gen. Ronald Scobie “in the character of commander of Greek forces.” Since Saraphis had orders from EAM/ELAS to insist on the appointment of General Othonaiois, he now asked for instructions. He was surprised to discover that EAM/ELAS would cooperate and honor Scobie’s order, thus accepting an Allied commander. In Caserta, Saraphis received more advice to cooperate from Professor Svolos, who was now in Papandhreou’s Government of National Unity.

Saraphis accepted most of the British conditions. Although he insisted that General Scobie should not be considered a commander in
chief in the Greek sense, “with political authority in domestic matters,” but only as a “military commander for operations.” Saraphis did place all his guerrilla units under the orders of Papandhreou’s Government of National Unity with full knowledge that they would be immediately signed over to General Scobie. Saraphis then accepted Scobie’s operational orders. In the matter of delineating the boundaries of EDES and EAM/ELAS, Saraphis refused to give up the important area around Metsovon, but he accepted a boundary that EAM/ELAS had refused in May at Koutsaina. He also agreed to articles in the Caserta Agreement forbidding any attempt by the guerrillas to seize power, barring guerrilla units from the Athens area, and promising coordination of action between EDES and EAM/ELAS.135

The signing of the Caserta Agreement on 26 September 1944 was extremely important from the British point of view, for it legitimized their coming military action in Greece and left EAM/ELAS with no ground to claim governing authority. “The agreement,” Woodhouse noted with satisfaction, “completed the work, begun at Plaka seven months earlier, of ensuring that the return of the Allies (and with them Papandhreou’s Government) should be unchallenged by EAM/ELAS.”136 From Plaka to Lebanon to Caserta—the conference table had been fruitful. The conferences could, of course, resolve the issue of legality, but they could not enforce the law. It is therefore interesting to note that both EDES and EAM/ELAS honored the Caserta provisions in the main during the German withdrawal. No guerrillas entered the Athens area; there was no attempt to seize power.137

Liberation of Greece

By now Operation NOAH’S ARK, officially begun on 10 September, was in full swing, for the Germans were pulling back into the cities and to the north, preparatory to final withdrawal from Greece. In harassing this withdrawal, the guerrillas of both EDES and EAM/ELAS operated with considerable success. According to Woodhouse, many guerrilla units distinguished themselves in the fighting, and both Zervas and Saraphis did their individual best.138

Despite the activity of the guerrillas and the Allied Military Mission, however, the Germans were able to pull out in an orderly fashion. They left the Peloponnesus by early October. Athens was evacuated on 12 October; Salonika, on the 30th. The Germans were completely out of mainland Greece by early November. In Crete, Rhodes, and the Aegean Islands, some German forces lingered until the final Allied victory in

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1 See Appendix F.
Europe, but no matter. General Scobie’s forces in Operation MANNA entered Greece beginning 1 October; Papandreou came into Athens on 18 October; EAM/ELAS installed itself at Lamia on 23 October.\(^{139}\)

During this period EAM/ELAS appeared quite sincere. Its guerrillas stayed out of Athens, and the Greek communists’ handling of the so-called Macedonian question left little to be desired. Even before the summer of 1944, when autonomist activity started in earnest in Macedonia, rumors had persisted in Greece that EAM/ELAS had made an agreement with the Bulgars, who had occupied parts of Macedonia and Thrace for 3 years, whereby a part of Greece would remain in Bulgarian hands and another part become the separate state of Macedonia. Members of EAM were even termed the “Eamobulgarians.” Whether such an agreement existed is not known; it was categorically denied a number of times. In September 1944, when the Bulgarians changed from Axis to Russian hangers-on, their army was strong enough both to fight the Germans and to maintain internal law and order in Macedonia. Nonetheless, they did not take over any Greek territory. Bulgarian troops left Greece by 25 October to help the Russians fight Germans in Yugoslavia and Hungary. On the 28th, the armistice with Bulgaria was signed. Meanwhile the various guerrilla bands in Macedonia had remained politically quiet. Not only had the Macedonian Group of Divisions of EAM/ELAS not participated in autonomist activity, but Saraphis claimed that they had even attacked a Macedo-Slav battalion belonging to themselves. “From the Greek point of view,” wrote Woodhouse, “the satisfaction of being rid of the Bulgarian occupation was almost equalled by the relief of finding the sincerity of PEEA vindicated.”\(^{140}\)

In that same October, the Allied Military Mission ceased to be an important factor in Greece. It handed over the country to the returning Papandreou Government and British forces with satisfaction but little confidence. The Communist threat had been parried; would it continue to be? Woodhouse has stated fairly enough that “If there had been no AMM in Greece from 1942, the Communists would have been in total control of Greece when the Germans left.” He could hardly believe,  

\(^{139}\) Operation MANNA, complementing NOAH’S ARK, was the landing of British and proroyalist Greek forces in the south of Greece after the German withdrawal from Athens. It was planned, according to British official sources, “to prevent, not to counter, a seizure of power by the Communists, and to hold the ring until a representative Greek Government had arranged a settlement of the constitutional question.” (Ehrman, Grand Strategy, VI, 45, 61.)

\(^{140}\) At the time the Germans left, three English officers and a handful of men were in Athens. “These three, although remarkable men,” observed Woodhouse, “did not constitute an insuperable obstacle to the immediate seizure of Athens by ELAS.” (Apple of Discord, n. 1, p. 211.)
however, in the lasting sincerity of EAM/ELAS or PEEA. Certainly General Scobie’s force knew of the Communist threat. Its main reason for being was, in fact, to prevent a *coup d’état*. On the actions taken to prevent such an occurrence, however, the AMM was not consulted. “Of responsibility for the decisions taken after that date [12 October 1944] and their consequences,” Woodhouse wrote, “the AMM alone must be entirely acquitted, because it was entirely excluded.”

With the liberation of Greece and the disappearance of both the Germans and the Allied Military Mission, this story logically comes to a close. Yet the exclusion of the Allied Military Mission from the command scene in October 1944 did not end the Greek problem, any more than sending the guerrilla delegation from Cairo back to the mountains had ended it in September 1943. In essence, this problem was that the force controlling most of Greece was EAM/ELAS, whereas the incoming Government and the British force were anti-EAM/ELAS. Something would have to be done to accommodate these two irreconcilable facts of life, or war would undoubtedly result. For the sake of continuity and coherence, therefore, the postlude to the guerrilla war is treated here.

**A “Discreet Threat of Force”**

By the end of November 1944, EAM/ELAS knew that political infiltration would not necessarily serve to obtain political control in Greece. Saraphis was convinced that Papandhreou was “playing a cynical game” against EAM/ELAS. Owing his office to British support, Papandhreou relied upon British advisers. And British intent appeared to be constantly anti-EAM/ELAS. Such actions as the sudden demobilization of small ELAS units and Scobie’s decision against ELAS in favor of EDES in the area of Levkos appeared to be more than straws in the wind. General Scobie’s attitude annoyed Saraphis immensely. From the point of view of EAM/ELAS, in fact, the exchange of Woodhouse and the Allied liaison officers for Scobie and his conventional forces had produced surprisingly ungratifying results. It was an added irritation that General Scobie had shared with EAM/ELAS not a single experience of the past 2 years and had little understanding of the intricacies of the Greek situation. EAM/ELAS now realized that participation in the Government of National Unity had given it very little control over the course of action taken by that government.

The most pressing problem for EAM/ELAS in November 1944 was that it faced the loss of the ELAS army: by the Lebanon Agreement,

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*w* Some ALO’s remained in Greece to disband guerrilla forces. The last liaison officers left early in January 1945. (Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, VI, 64.)
EAM/ELAS had acquiesced in the principle that the guerrilla army was temporary. Now the Papandhreou Government took steps to set up a Greek army under the command of General Othonaios. In the formation of this army, however, ELAS was allowed practically no role. The British reviewed the politics of candidates for the top officer jobs. This point, indeed, brought about the resignation of General Othonaios, who demanded that he have equality with General Scobie, that the latter control only British forces, and particularly that he not interfere with individual appointments in the Greek army. The role of Saraphis was one of the points of friction. After Othonaios left, Saraphis found, in conversations with Scobie, that the new Chief of Staff would be General Vendiris, a promonarchist who had been unacceptable to Othonaios, and who Saraphis “did not imagine . . . could very well act as my superior officer. . . .” On down the line, monarchists were favored by the British over leftist officers.144

The same discrimination prevailed against ELAS troops. The nucleus of the new National Guard was the Mountain Brigade (also known as the 3rd, or Rimini, Brigade) which was brought into Greece in early November.x This brigade had been formed of Greek troops who had taken no part in the Middle East mutinies of 1944 and were therefore safely promonarchist. EAM/ELAS guerrillas were alarmed at the thought of a strong, well-trained, right-wing brigade presumably ready to act against them as soon as they were demobilized. They also complained that collaborators, even former members of the security battalions, were being taken into the National Guard, whereas ELAS troops were not called up. They foresaw that, when the guerrilla armies were demobilized, the troops of EDES would be called up in preference to those of ELAS. By the end of November ELAS faced the double-edged situation of demobilization of its own force and simultaneous growth of a strongly anti-EAM/ELAS army.145

To counter this unfavorable trend of events, EAM/ELAS contended, through its Cabinet Ministers, that the Mountain Brigade should be demobilized at the same time as ELAS. In lieu of this, it proposed the integration of ELAS with government forces down to the section level, with ELAS troops equal in number to all right-wing elements. Neither Papandhreou nor the British would agree. Meanwhile, the British insisted that demobilization of the guerrilla armies begin on 10 December.146

As the policy of political infiltration again seemed to be failing, the proponents of force in EAM/ELAS now took a stronger stand. Chief

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x Against the advice of Woodhouse 3 months earlier. He later wrote that this was “the most important single factor contributory to the loss of faith by EAM/ELAS.” (See Apple of Discord, p. 215, n. 2.)
among them was Saraphis, who appeared as eager as any Communist to get at the British. For example, when Scobie complained to Saraphis that Greek relations with the British no longer seemed friendly, blamed ELAS, and reminded Saraphis that guerrillas could not stand up to regular troops, Saraphis took it as a prime insult. He repeated Scobie’s words to his Communist backers and told them that “it constituted an open threat which they ought to bear in mind.” Saraphis as a military man was, of course, cognizant that the British forces in Greece were extremely thin, that they had little armament, and that British forces elsewhere were busy fighting the still active enemy. Outside of Athens, the army of ELAS controlled the countryside.147

Still, political action continued. On the question of demobilization, the EAM/ELAS ministers in the Papandhreou Government at first agreed to a government plan, then changed their minds and refused to sign the draft agreement they themselves had prepared. At this point, Scobie went over their heads, proclaimed that demobilization would begin on 10 December, and distributed leaflets of the proclamation by aircraft to hinterland units of EAM/ELAS. This action consolidated behind EAM/ELAS its Cabinet Ministers, who were already annoyed with Papandhreou for his lack of decision and dependence on British Ambassador Leeper. On 1 and 2 December the EAM/ELAS ministers left the government. Presumably this maneuver was aimed at bringing on a government crisis and overthrowing the Papandhreou Government. By this move and by a “discreet threat of force” the British were to be forced into amenability.148

The “discreet threat of force” took several forms that early December. Outside Athens, the Communists put GHQ ELAS on the alert and ordered ELAS troops to move nearer to the capital. In Athens a general strike was called for Monday, December 4; the ELAS Reserve was called up; and the old ELAS Central Committee, superior to GHQ ELAS, was re-established. On 2 December, EAM/ELAS requested permission to hold a demonstration in Athens the very next day, a Sunday. Permission was granted and preparations went ahead on a mammoth scale. Although the British tried to withdraw the permission later, EAM/ELAS was able to say, plausibly and truthfully enough, that it was too late to recall its followers. The demonstration was designed to support the resignations from the government. By showing its vast popular base in a mammoth rally, EAM/ELAS would prove that no government without it could be representative; Papandhreou’s Government would fall, and a new one would then be created in which EAM/ELAS would presumably take a leading role.149

The plan misfired: instead of leading to political action, it led to military operations. The Athenian police, ordered to keep the crowds
out of Constitution Square in the heart of Athens, were unable to do so, became afraid, and fired. Although they were supposed to have had only blank ammunition, some of it must have been exchanged for live, for seven persons were killed and as many more wounded. The excitement became frenzy; girls dipped their skirts in the blood and paraded; papers were bloodied and carried as flags; some of the police who did not get away were literally torn limb from limb. Finally, worn out, the crowd dispersed peaceably when British soldiers arrived. But newspapers around the world suddenly became interested in the question of Greece; and EAM/ELAS became, in most instances, an international hero, with the British playing the role of blackguards trying to enforce the return of an unpopular and undemocratic King. Clearly, the Left now had its martyrs, its cause, its excuse, and even its propaganda.150

EAM/ELAS pressed its advantage. In Athens, the ELAS Central Committee ordered the capture of police stations; a number were taken and the police in them executed before the British could rescue them. The next day, 4 December, the general strike began. In addition, EAM/ELAS attacked the right-wing X organization.151

Without British intervention, the events of 3 and 4 December would undoubtedly have brought the political results desired by EAM/ELAS. Prime Minister Papandhreou, alarmed by the Sunday tragedy and the reaction of EAM, offered his resignation the next day, and arrangements were made to form a new government under a man more acceptable to EAM/ELAS. King George II, who had to give his approval, was in London, however, and this delay gave Churchill time to bring pressure on Papandhreou to change his mind. The Prime Minister withdrew his resignation.152

The British also took military measures. On 4 December, General Scobie, in the name of the Greek Government, ordered that all ELAS units leave the Athens area peaceably within 72 hours, midnight of 6–7 December. EAM/ELAS, still undecided about war with the British, answered that the Papandhreou Government hardly represented the will of the Greek people, and asked that the British remain neutral.153

**December War**

Within the EAM/ELAS leadership, the question of open warfare with the British was now being thrashed out behind closed doors. It is reported that the moderates wanted to compromise with Papandhreou and the British and that the Communists now wanted battle. The final decision was “a sort of compromise”—ELAS would defy Scobie and stay in Athens, but would not attack British troops. In addition, EAM/ELAS would quietly take over the main government buildings on Wednesday
morning, 6 December, so as to be in a position to claim that it was in fact the government.

This compromise plan was foiled when the attackers on Wednesday found one British sentry in front of each government building. Few in number and with no orders to attack British troops, the ELAS retreated or acted half-heartedly. In those cases where ELAS pressed forward, however, British soldiers joined Greek police in firing on the attackers. General Scobie followed up with an air attack on an Athens park where ELAS had concentrated some troops. The strafing killed not only ELAS troops but civilians living nearby. Both Leftists and moderates reacted strongly to this attack. The war was on.154

Figure 7. Street in the Plaka District of Athens. Heavy fighting occurred in this district during the December War between EAM/ELAS and the British.

Neither side, however, was ready for action. British forces in the Athens area totaled about 10,000 men, of whom about 6,000 were combat troops, organized in three brigades. They were, however, scattered throughout Athens in small groups. Scobie’s other resources included 24 tanks, 2 squadrons of armored cars, and an air squadron of Spitfires. EAM/ELAS had in Athens only about 2,000 trained men. The ELAS reserves in Athens numbered between 10,000 and 15,000 men, but these were completely unseasoned—just called up, untrained, and unorganized. Near Athens there were two divisions of about 8,000 ELAS guerrillas that could be called upon. They, of course, had no
tanks, armored cars, or aircraft; they did, however, have arms picked up from German supply dumps. ELAS forces in this Athens fighting were commanded by General Emmanuel Mandakas.\textsuperscript{155}

At first, EAM/ELAS was able to apply increasing pressure. Its command shaped up reserves, mined the streets, brought seasoned guerrillas into the city, and took up positions. It repulsed the Greek Mountain Brigade (also known as Rimini Brigade) when it was brought out to clear the guerrilla-controlled suburbs. ELAS also put up a sharp fight when British troops, using armored cars and tanks, undertook the same task on 10–11 December. By the 12th, the British were confined to an area approximately two miles long by five or six blocks wide. The Mountain Brigade was under constant pressure and unable to leave its quarters outside of Athens, getting supplies and maintaining communication only with difficulty. The British themselves were in trouble over supply, with only 3 days' ammunition available. A rumor circulated that General Scobie had decided against withdrawing because he lacked the trucks to do it speedily and safely. On 15–16 December, ELAS made a major attack against the British but was repulsed. On the 18th, it attacked an RAF Detachment outside the British perimeter and, after 2 days of fighting, overran it and took several hundred British airmen prisoner.\textsuperscript{156}

A combination of events turned the tide, Scobie refused to make any concessions and all negotiations between the British and ELAS were fruitless. Meanwhile, General Alexander, now Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Theater, came to Athens on the 11th to assess the situation. He sent reinforcements of more than two British divisions over the period of 13–27 December. When the ELAS attack on the night of 15–16 broke down in its timing and the British were able to repulse it, a turning point was unknowingly reached. British units in Athens had maintained themselves and relief was on the way.\textsuperscript{157}

While the British were bringing in reinforcements, the Greek National Guard, formation of which had begun the month before, was being rapidly expanded. By the end of December, 19,000 men had been formed into 36 of these “Athens Battalions.” These men, taken without question and including rowdies, criminals, collaborators, and even former security battalion members, were of great assistance in the British fight against ELAS street snipers. Another measure, that of taking all “suspicious” persons into custody, was also helpful. In the December fight against EAM/ELAS, therefore, the forces of the political right were very much increased.\textsuperscript{158}

ELAS was unable to reinforce itself in Athens to the same extent. Its main forces were concentrated in Thessaly, 11 days’ march away. British aircraft patrolled the roads and the guerrillas could move only at night.
Not only that, but ELAS had other matters to attend to: it used many of its guerrilla troops to disband what was left of the Andon Tsaous forces in Eastern Macedonia, to eliminate EDES finally and completely, to keep British garrisons pinned down in the north of Greece, and to protect the coast against possible British landings. During the latter half of December, the balance of military power in the Athens area shifted from ELAS to the British.\textsuperscript{159}

At the same time, the swing was psychologically away from the Left. At the beginning of December, emotions were with EAM/ELAS. In power, however, EAM/ELAS looked consistently less attractive. That it was Communist-dominated became public knowledge as its spokesman shifted from its moderate or leftist fellow-travelers to its real head—George Siantos, Secretary-General of the Political Bureau of the Greek Communist Party and wartime leader of the Party. In various parts of the Athenian suburbs, EAM/ELAS had set up People’s Courts, where judgment was often based on slight evidence and always severe. Punishment was carried out summarily and, although at that time there was no definite proof, there were rumors of atrocities. Even some of the ELAS guerrillas became disillusioned when they learned that they had been brought to Athens to fight their ally of October. Some of these ELAS men deserted to the British; others allowed themselves to be taken prisoner. In eliminating the bands of Andon Tsaous and Zervas,\textsuperscript{y} ELAS visibly demonstrated an unpleasant policy of Greek-eat-Greek not lost on Athenian politicians. Control of the Athens area would have consolidated the EAM/ELAS grip on Greece, but the chance was fast slipping away.\textsuperscript{160}

Despite their new strength, the British moved carefully in Athens, probably because of the pressure of world opinion. Churchill himself, with Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, flew in on Christmas Day 1944 and called a conference of all Greek parties, including EAM/ELAS. He was now ready to allow Papandhreou to resign and to support a Greek government headed by a more neutral person, Gen. Nicholas Plastiras.\textsuperscript{z}

Late in December 1944, representatives of the various Greek parties met in a cold British Embassy to thrash out their problems at the conference table. The only agreement was, as usual, on the question of the monarchy: all parties agreed that a Regent should be appointed to take the place of George II until a plebiscite could be held. Siantos, shocking the British by appearing in British battle dress, spoke for

\textsuperscript{y} Zervas’ forces were attacked on 10 December and within 2 weeks were driven into the sea. Approximately half of his followers were saved by British evacuation to the island of Corfu.

\textsuperscript{z} The man originally nominated by Saraphis before his connection with EAM/ELAS, in the spring of 1943.
EAM/ELAS. He demanded a purge of collaborators, demobilization of the right-wing Army forces before demobilization of ELAS, and 40 to 50 percent of the ministries in a Plastiras government. The liberals, disillusioned by Communists, joined the Right in refusing to compromise with EAM/ELAS. The British demands, that ELAS demobilize and evacuate the Athens area, were in turn refused by Siantos. In two days the conference came to a deadlock. Churchill, muttering about Greek politicians and the possibility of an international trusteeship for Greece, decided immediately on two things: to persuade the King to appoint a Regent, and to begin an all-out British offensive against EAM/ELAS in the Athens area, even at the expense of the winter war in Italy.161

Once Churchill had made his decisions, British political action was immediate and dynamic. The Prime Minister returned home on the 29th, and within hours had George II’s reluctant appointment of a Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, who was uniquely acceptable to all Greeks. Damaskinos had been a figure of greatness in wartime Greece, never giving in to the Germans and constantly aiding Greeks of all parties. Forced by the Germans to make out a list of possible hostages, he had placed his own name at its head. Never a leftist, he still had never denounced EAM/ELAS, even under pressure. EAM/ELAS, on the other hand, never denounced Damaskinos, and many of the rank and file were, in fact, his loyal supporters. On 4 January 1945 Plastiras took office as Prime Minister and formed a coalition government that, although anti-EAM, was also antiroyalist. These moves gave the moderates in EAM/ELAS a political home to retreat to and helped undermine that organization.162

Meanwhile the British had reinforced their troop strength to about 60,000 men and had moved against EAM/ELAS. By 30 December 1944, the southern half of Athens and much of its port of Piraeus was clear of EAM/ELAS forces. By 6 January 1945, ELAS was out of Athens: the reserves had gone home and the regulars were retreating. By 11 January ELAS was beaten and suing for an armistice. Hostilities came to an end on the 15th.163

EAM/ELAS was not only dead but discredited. The bodies of those punished by the People’s Courts had been uncovered in a horribly mutilated condition. Furthermore, public opinion both in politically conscious urban Greece and in the world was revolted by the treatment of hostages. In retaliation for British arrest of suspicious civilians in early December, ELAS had officially decided on 16 December to take hostages. On the retreat from Athens, it had carried these poor souls along. Forced to march in bitterly cold weather with inadequate clothing and food, many had given out. Those who fell behind were
sometimes shot out-of-hand, and many others died of exposure. In all, about 4,000 of the 15,000 hostages are estimated to have perished during the ELAS retreat. Furthermore, ELAS refused to release the hostages at the time of the armistice. Its treatment of hostages probably did more to discredit it than any other single thing between 1941 and 1945.  

Figure 8. Damaskinos, Archbishop of Athens and Regent of Greece.

**Varkiza Agreement**

Beginning in February 1945, peace negotiations were held between the British and the Greek governments on one side and EAM/ELAS on the other. This time, at British insistence, the Communist members of EAM/ELAS were forced to the front in negotiations. On 12 February at Varkiza, a sea coast resort near Athens, an agreement was signed.

EAM/ELAS agreed to demobilize its forces immediately and to surrender all arms. It also submitted to the Mountain Brigade’s remaining
part of the National Army.” On these two points EAM/ELAS suffered major losses. Furthermore, hostages held by ELAS were to be freed.

In return, the government agreed to maintain civil liberties; to publish an amnesty for political crimes committed after 3 December; to purge the civil service, the security services, the *gendarmerie*; and to hold a plebiscite on the constitutional question “within the current year,” to be followed by general elections.  

It is generally admitted that EAM/ELAS lived up to the terms of the Varkiza Agreement. Arms were turned over to the British in excess of expectations, and most guerrilla troops were formally discharged and sent home. ELAS, the army that in December had driven Zervas into the sea and that, Saraphis claimed, was “ready to face any fresh attack” at the beginning of February, ceased to exist on 28 February 1945. Thus one by one the contestants in the guerrilla war of 1942–1944 disappeared from the scene.

As they left, the rightwing Greek forces took over the country, staging a small counterrevolution. In most of Greece, followers of EAM/ELAS, whether or not Communists, faced a period of harassment. Right-wing organizations flourished, led by the X Organization. The followers of Zervas returned from Corfu, again taking over in Epirus, their old stronghold. In Eastern Macedonia, what was left of the Andon Tsaous bands returned to control several towns. Only in Western and Central Macedonia did the Left retain any considerable influence. It was now a Left composed mainly of Communists, for in the spring of 1945 the moderates, including Svolos, stalked out of EAM; the National Front days were over.

The counterrevolution, however, did not solve the problems of Greece. As Allied victory and V–E Day came and went, these problems went on and on: instability of the central government, economic poverty, civilian distress, ruinous inflation, foreign influence, political immoderation—and, threaded throughout Greece, the strong hatred of Right for Left and Left for Right.

### Strategic Recapitulation

British strategy in Greece during World War II has been sharply criticized by elements of all political coloration—in Greece, Great Britain, and the United States.

The political right has charged that by giving support to EAM/ELAS, the British themselves created the problem of communism in

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**aa** In the oblique wording of the Agreement, that men “specially trained in modern weapons, shall remain in service so long as there is a formation requiring them.”
Greece and thus made civil war inevitable. Some right-wing elements further claim that support should have been withheld from any guerrilla group; others believe; that the British should have supported only anti-EAM/ELAS groups and should have openly fought EAM/ELAS. One group within Greece goes so far as to claim that the British supported EAM/ELAS only in order to lessen Greek prestige and to avoid the need to act on Greek demands at war’s end.\textsuperscript{169}

The political left has maintained that EAM/ELAS was the only organization able to fight the Germans, that the British should, therefore, have supported EAM/ELAS exclusively, and that the British, by supporting right-wing elements in Greece, precipitated a civil war which diverted EAM/ELAS from its potentially greater efforts against the Germans.

Moderates have claimed that the British, by supporting the highly unpopular Greek monarchy, drove Greek moderates into EAM/ELAS and thus under Communist domination; that, instead, the British should have supported EAM/ELAS, with the intent of encouraging still more moderates to join the organization and gain control over it.

In light of these differing views, it is pertinent to review the conceivable strategies that the British might have followed in Greece during World War II. These may be briefly posited as follows:

1. Stay out entirely; send in neither liaison officers nor supply.
2. Send in supply but no liaison officers.
3. Send in liaison officers but no supply.
4. Send in liaison officers and supply to all groups except EAM/ELAS—i.e., resist EAM/ELAS.
5. Send in liaison officers and supply, mainly to the strongest group—i.e., support EAM/ELAS.
6. Send in liaison officers and attempt, by discriminate apportionment of supply, to harness the power of EAM/ELAS.

The first choice, staying out of Greece entirely, was not feasible in view of the importance in 1942 of the German supply lines running through Greece to Gen. Rommel’s forces in Africa, and the fact that these lines could be attacked only from inside Greece. The original drop into Greece under Myers’ command had the highest military support. Before Rommel was thrown out of Africa in May 1943, in fact, no effort to help the British army facing him could be classed as unimportant. Furthermore, staying out of Greece would have been of little help to British postwar plans for that country. There is little doubt that, left alone, EAM/ELAS could have eliminated all other guerrilla groups. By the time the Germans left in late 1944, it would undoubtedly have
consolidated its military and political control over the country. With no Allied mission in Greece to report back what was happening, the British government and the Greek government-in-exile would have been faced at the time of liberation with an EAM/ELAS *fait accompli*, without any plans of their own to counter it.

The second strategy, sending in support without liaison officers, is included merely to complete the list of conceivable choices. It is not a serious suggestion, since such action would merely have hastened EAM/ELAS domination of Greece.

Had the third strategy been adopted, sending in liaison officers but giving no supplies to any of the guerrilla groups, it is highly unlikely that the officers would have been tolerated. Even if they had been, EAM/ELAS would probably have wiped out EDES—as almost happened in December 1943—and consolidated its military and political power. The liaison officers would have been able to report what was happening but unable to affect the course of events as, in fact, they did. Although preparations could have been made, outside Greece, to overthrow an EAM-sponsored Greek government, such an undertaking would have been fraught with the greatest difficulties and embarrassments.

The fourth possibility, sending in liaison officers and openly fighting EAM/ELAS, was tested briefly and proved unsuccessful. Colonel Woodhouse has written that its effect, when tried, was “to consolidate EAM/ELAS, and to convince even waverers that it was better to cling to an organization that was at least Greek, rather than submit to foreign dictation.”\(^{170}\) Furthermore, as Brigadier Myers and Colonel Woodhouse both noted, without EAM/ELAS and the “operational background” it provided, guerrilla operations in Greece could hardly have been effective. Merely by withdrawing from an area, EAM/ELAS could have allowed the Germans to take over or could have openly betrayed the British.\(^{171}\) Since EAM/ELAS did wage war on the Axis, it would have appeared at least ridiculous and possibly a breach of faith for the British to have deliberately fought EAM/ELAS during the war when Russia herself was an Allied partner.

The fifth strategy, supporting mainly EAM/ELAS as the strongest military element in wartime Greece, had obvious limitations. In the first place, British support for EAM/ELAS would have meant increasing its *bona fides* as an organization, and hence its value as a tool of Communist power. Other organizations would have been discouraged from entering the field and after EAM/ELAS had reached a certain size, there would have been no way for the British to ensure any return on their investment. Furthermore, the idea that political moderates could wrest control of an organization from entrenched Communists appears a highly uncertain proposition upon which to base a major
policy. In all probability such a strategic choice on the part of the British would only have helped the Communists in EAM/ELAS to achieve all their own political objectives, directly contrary to British desires, without assuming any obligation even to help in military operations.¹⁷²

The last strategic choice, sending in liaison officers and attempting by discriminate apportionment of support to harness EAM/ELAS, was the one the British made, or more correctly, fell into. This is the strategy that draws wrath from political right, left, and center. From the British government’s point of view, also, the difficulties of the policy were obvious; but it was the only one that reconciled their two opposing desires, each of which appeared strong in turn—to get on with the war against the Axis and to assure a non-Communist and friendly government in Greece at the war’s end.

The wisdom of the British choice seems apparent from their standpoint: EAM/ELAS was closely supervised, even curbed to some extent, during the occupation; Greek political leaders outside of Greece were made aware of their predicament and readied for action; British forces went into Greece in the fall of 1944 prepared to prevent a Communist coup. When the coup seemed inevitable, the British were ready to send troops in strength sufficient to defeat EAM/ELAS. Greece remained in pro-British hands. Given British aims, serious questions on the choice of strategy appear to concern less the policy than the means by which it was implemented.
CHAPTER III.
SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLAS

“THE FIRM”
SELECTION AND TRAINING
COMMUNICATION
SUPPLY AND MONEY
TRANSPORTATION
Support for the Guerrillas

“The Firm”

The wartime agency that the British created for the purpose of furnishing men and materiel to aid the clandestine and overt resistance that sprang up wherever Axis forces had occupied formerly independent nations was the Special Operations Executive (SOE). The headquarters of SOE was in London, reporting to the Minister of Economic Warfare rather than the War Cabinet. A separate regional office set up in 1941 to operate in the Middle East Command, SOE Cairo, was responsible for supporting the resistance in Greece. During most of the war SOE Cairo was located in Rustom Building. It was known to the city’s taxi drivers as Secret House; to insiders, it was “the firm.”

Because SOE was a wartime agency operating on an ad hoc basis and continuously experiencing growing pains, the relations of its local offices with the military forces with whom they were ostensibly cooperating were not always clear. SOE Cairo reported to SOE in London and received instructions from its parent organization without always informing the Service commanders in chief of the Middle East Command. SOE Cairo, in fact, had only “sporadic relations” with the Middle East Command during 1942 and into 1943, according to the Army Commander in Chief, General (Field Marshal) Henry Maitland Wilson. Early in 1943, he took steps to regularize these relations by directing the SOE Cairo staff to attend the daily conferences of the commanders in chief and to brief, when necessary, on their activities. It was not until autumn 1943, however, that SOE Cairo was brought directly under the commanders in chief.

Equally unclear at the start of the war were SOE’s relations with the British diplomatic corps, the Foreign Office, and the Prime Minister. Since SOE’s work inevitably involved both the internal politics of the country in which it was working and the international relations of that country, it was perhaps not surprising that the Foreign Office and SOE would come into conflict. As already noted, Greece provided the occasion for a showdown. Following the unexpected arrival of the guerrilla delegation in Cairo in August 1943 and the political confusion that resulted, SOE Cairo was firmly harnessed by British diplomacy. Not even the efforts of General Wilson could change matters. By the end of 1943, it could be said that “the firm” was under the orders of the Middle East Command and both were subservient to the dictates of British foreign policy.

Not only was the authority of SOE Cairo restricted by limits imposed from above, but the staff working with resistance groups was
continually fighting a peripheral battle with other British staffs concerned with intelligence activities, escape and evasion nets, political propaganda, subversion of enemy troops, and small-boat raids. The rivalry was sometimes so keen that British liaison officers would be warned by SOE Cairo staff members not to “fraternize” with British intelligence men being infiltrated behind the lines by the same small boat to the same country.4

Hemmed in from top and side, SOE Cairo soon found a new organization coming in from the other side. This was its American equivalent, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which in 1943 set up a branch in Cairo and prepared to send men into Greece. Its first two men entered Greece on the plane returning the guerrilla delegation in September 1943, and, as has been seen, converted the British Military Mission into the Allied Military Mission, British liaison officers into Allied liaison officers. On the whole, and despite the fact that EAM/ELAS was always looking for an exploitable SOE–OSS difference, the British and Americans in the field got along. Back in Cairo, the relations between SOE and OSS were more precarious. SOE Cairo tended to withhold information from OSS, and the latter turned to its own private sources in the Greek government-in-exile. This tended to upset the relations of SOE Cairo with members of the government-in-exile, possibly making the latter feel less dependent on the British and less amendable to British control. It might be said that, in Cairo, SOE and OSS cooperated, with some mutual suspicion.5

As if SOE Cairo did not already have enough problems for any one organization, it was continuously seeking to develop a working internal organization and find personnel able to do its jobs. Since it was a wartime organization, there were no established rules, no standing operating procedure, no experienced staff, no administrative experience—in short, no nucleus to build upon. Set up in 1941, SOE Cairo reached a peak strength during the war of 4000 men.6 It was reorganized eight times, while it was sending men behind the lines and supplying resistance groups. It had eight different names and eight different directors, whose terms in office had no necessary coincidence with the organizational changes. “Three of them were civilians who did not entirely trust soldiers, and five were senior officers who did not entirely trust politicians or diplomats.”7

SOE’s organizational problem, complicated by the constant change, was made critical by the growth of its responsibilities during the war. In 1941 the only area to which SOE Cairo was regularly operating was the Greek island of Crete, a very small commitment. The addition

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a For the major exception, see page 71.
of Greece to its responsibilities in late 1942, the growth of aid to the Yugoslavian resistance, the addition of Italy in late 1943, and the tremendous increase in clandestine message traffic all compounded SOE Cairo’s problems. By 1944 the supply problem alone had reached such proportions that the main body of SOE Cairo was moved to Italy. Special operations in Greece, however, remained mainly under the control of SOE in Cairo under the Middle East Command until August 1944, when they too were moved to the Mediterranean Theater in Italy.8

Even by the fall of 1942 SOE Cairo had added a great number of departments, sections, and subsections and assigned a number of new people. Rather than combining the work for Greece with that for Crete, SOE created a separate desk for Greece. The administrative separation of Crete and Greece in SOE Cairob amazed many liaison officers. The superior of both sections, the head of the Balkan Department, was a classic example of misassignment; he was an expert on the Baltic states. This sort of thing did not make for the easiest comprehension of the problems the field might be facing.9

One of the problems of SOE Cairo was the matter of relationships between staff members who stayed in Cairo and field members who parachuted or sailed behind the lines. Field and staff were often partly envious, partly suspicious of each other. The feelings of the liaison officer were not often assuaged by either “enthusiastic amateurism” or the “business as usual” approach. On the one hand, there was no prewar civilian or military job that would have adequately prepared a man for a staff post in SOE Cairo, and there was little chance to learn on the job since the turnover rate was so high. On the other hand, the liaison officer was behind enemy lines and his life depended on the adequacy of the support he got.10

Even making allowances for human frailty, the liaison men in Greece had many legitimate complaints. It has been reported that Brigadier Myers was outraged to learn, several months after he had been dropped into Greece, that not one of the cables he and his men had prepared for delivery to their families while they were away had been sent. These messages had, as a matter of fact, originally been written at the insistence of the SOE Cairo staff and edited by that staff. Brigadier Myers complained bitterly and asked for a court of inquiry. In his cable, he used the code names of the men in Greece. SOE Cairo was compelled to admit that, in the latest reorganization, they had mislaid their records. They therefore asked Myers to identify his men by their proper names.11

b This may have been justified by the fact that Crete was always a clandestine operation, whereas Greece was an overt one.
Charges that have, since the war, been made against some of the SOE Cairo staff by liaison officers are even more serious. One British captain who went behind the lines to the Cretan resistance has publicly charged the senior staff officer in SOE Cairo in 1942, a brigadier, with “total disregard for the agents in the field, whom he treated like so many expendable commodities.” The captain backed this charge with the case of a 40-year-old staff officer assigned to go to Crete for the express purpose of blowing up H.M.S. York by marine sabotage—meaning that he would have to swim at least a mile and attach to the ship some six limpets “so heavy that even with one strapped to our chest neither Arthur nor I could struggle more than fifty yards without beginning to sink.” Some months later, the brigadier was reported to have asked “Hasn’t that fellow . . . been bumped off yet?” The head of the Cretan Section presumably offered his resignation and the brigadier apologized. Nonetheless, “that fellow” was, after exfiltration, forced to resign his commission as a result of a psychiatric report; only later, after his superiors in the field had returned, was he reinstated in the Army.12

That even one such serious case of misunderstanding and possible malfeasance should have existed hurt the SOE organization. Under the best of conditions there would have been some natural animosity among the field against men who lived in the comfort and relative safety of Cairo. In one sense, Cairo seemed to men behind the lines in Greece and Crete like a “quasi-divine power”; in another, even the slightest staff mistake took on the appearance of terrible stupidity if not malevolence. One real case lent credence to a hundred fancied ones. It would be unsafe, however, to generalize that personal animosities between field and staff men were rampant, or always owing to staff fault. Colonel Woodhouse felt that “the same thing would have occurred in reverse if the individuals had changed places.” It was the system that produced the problems—“the multiplicity, the perpetual flux, the deficiency of internal cohesion” of SOE Cairo.13

It was with this background and these problems that SOE Cairo faced its responsibilities to the liaison officers in Greece—selecting and training men to go behind the lines and maintaining the missions once they had been infiltrated.

### Selection and Training

Although there were liaison officers who fell a good deal short of perfection, who antagonized Greeks, who drank too much, and who

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³ This British ship, damaged and left in Soudha harbor, was being refloated and re-outfitted by the Germans. The British were most anxious to prevent a capital ship of theirs from being used against them; this, in fact, would have been the first such instance.
forgot the elementary rules of safety,\textsuperscript{d} a surprisingly large number of the officers and men who went behind the lines to Greece or Crete proved of high caliber and worth. Consequently it is of interest to review the standards SOE Cairo set for the men it sent behind the lines, how it chose them, the motives of the men themselves, and the training they received. Finally, some individual cases will be reviewed to attempt a closer view of the success or failure of the selection process. Since the operations in Greece and Crete were essentially different—the one being an overt guerrilla war and the other a covert, clandestine resistance—and were handled by different desks in SOE Cairo, the methods and criteria used in the two operations will be compared insofar as possible.

\textit{Selection}

When operations to Crete started in 1941, SOE Cairo had little experience in sending men behind the lines or in picking them for the job of working with local clandestine resistance groups. It was a new business and there were few guidelines. Men knew it would be dangerous, physically taxing, and lonely. The head of the Cretan Section in SOE Cairo had himself, however, been one of the British left on that island earlier in the year and thus had personal experience of the place to guide him. Judging from the background of the men sent over during that first year of operation, the desired attributes appear to have been, first, ability to withstand physical hardship; second, experience in operating alone and at some risk; third, general intelligence and some familiarity with the country, its people, and its language; fourth, emotional toughness. The head of the Cretan section in SOE Cairo often weeded out recruits by casually asking, “Have you any personal objection to committing murder?” The attribute to which all selection led was, of course, the tacit question of whether a given man would be able to get along with the inhabitants and do his job of controlling, guiding, and indirectly directing a clandestine resistance movement. Finally, the selected man had to be willing—he had to volunteer.\textsuperscript{14}

The motives that impelled men to volunteer for duty behind the lines were many. Among these were boredom in deadend military posts, distaste for militarism in general, the fear of appearing cowardly, love for the adventure and camaraderie to be found or sought behind the lines, and the appeal of the primitive life. Examples may be cited of liaison officers who volunteered for any one or a mixture of these reasons. On the negative side, behind the lines duty also appealed to the antisocial,

\textsuperscript{d} For example, the liaison officer who, upon hearing shots outside during the night, flung open the door and fired into the dark. He was promptly killed. (Myers, \textit{Greek Entanglement}, p. 267; and Saraphis, \textit{Greek Resistance Army}, p. 124.)
the childish, the unstable individual, and to the misanthrope and the misfit. The necessity of volunteering therefore had mainly the positive value of screening out those who for reasons of risk, morality, or personal feelings, consciously rejected a life behind enemy lines. It did not constitute any guarantee of individual suitability for that life.

One of the earliest groups infiltrated into Crete, consisting of two officers and two noncommissioned officers, illustrated in some detail the problems involved in finding the right men for the job. Of the four men in the mission, one returned home because of circumstances not under his control, one successfully worked with the resistance forces for over 2 years, and two men failed.

The senior officer, a captain, was one of those who failed. He had served in World War I and had come into service again in World War II. Somewhat earlier that very year, he had won the Military Cross as a platoon leader in Abyssinia; thus it seems safe to assume that, despite his age, he was physically strong. Since he had spent most of his life in the more remote parts of Central Africa and South America, he was familiar with and had proved his ability to live on his own in strange lands and away from his own people. He did not speak Greek and was unfamiliar with Crete. He seemed emotionally tough.

His mission to Crete was to sabotage enemy shipping; to help with this task, four Cretan youths had been trained in Egypt. They shipped out with him; but, since he could speak no Greek, nor they English, there was little communication between them and the captain. To his British comrades, with whom he could speak, the captain was something of a trial. He offered unnecessary and unwanted advice to the master of the small boat that was going to infiltrate the group. At sailing time, he proved his individuality by appearing in full battle dress, carrying camp equipment and a sun helmet. Everyone else, of course, wore Cretan dress since the operation was clandestine. The sun helmet would probably have been as obvious as an elephant in Crete; the captain possibly owed his life to the fellow officer who threw it overboard at the first opportunity during the crossing.

In Crete the captain's troubles increased. He remained in uniform, and to almost universal amazement, had "pyjamas, a wash basin, and... a row of medals on his breast." The officer spent much time collecting stones. His Cretan guide complained that he was made to carry stones until he was forced to hide and throw some away so that he could continue to walk. Even using sign language, the captain offended one of his guides to such an extent that the man left him stranded a half mile from a strange village—an unheard of thing. Instead of retracing his steps, the captain used no judgment and walked alone into the village. Then he was annoyed that no one could understand him when
he spoke English or French. At this point he was in some danger. Since the Germans sometimes used spies who pretended to be British, the Cretans had a custom of roughing up such people and turning them over to the Germans with the remark that here were British spies! Luckily for the captain, no one did this to him although he could easily have been mistaken for the German idea of a British agent. Apparently, however, the experience upset the captain and convinced him that he should leave Crete immediately. He returned to the coast, waited until the next boat appeared, and returned to SOE Cairo. To other liaison officers on Crete, the captain appeared to have “simply abandoned his mission,” although they excused his idiosyncrasies to the Cretans by explaining that he “had been wounded in the head in some battle, and, it seemed, never quite got over it.” The Cretan reaction was probably summed up by one of the guerrillas: “He was a most peculiar man . . . . Fortunately he only remained a little while . . . .”

The second failure was an Australian staff sergeant. Although over 50 years old, he had been in the Battle of Crete earlier in 1941 and had been evacuated after the main British withdrawal. He volunteered to return behind the lines with the mission of reporting on the condition of the weapons on Crete, a job for which, as an expert armorer, he was well qualified. Among the other men of the group, he was not disliked, but he was not taken seriously. With a “clownish instinct for exaggeration and gesture,” the sergeant appeared the buffoon. He also appeared unreliable. His difficulty on Crete was the exact opposite of the captain’s. Instead of being taciturn and unfriendly, he found a host of friends that he had made in his short stay there earlier in the year and got along fabulously well with the villagers. The problem was that on Crete life seemed sunny and pleasant and the war far away. The sergeant spent his time with his Cretan friends, drunk on wine and raki, enjoying a respite from the battlefield—apparently his real reason for volunteering for duty behind the lines. After a few months he reported that he had examined and repaired all the arms “to be found in the length and breadth of Crete” and that his mission was completed. Thus he left the island.

The man who lasted over 2 years on the job was a young officer who was promoted to captain as he left for his post in order to enhance his status with the Cretans. He was physically strong, he gave indication of ability to operate alone, he spoke Greek and was familiar with the people, and someone evidently correctly assessed his emotional toughness. In his early twenties, this officer had lived in prewar Cyprus, where he had worked first as an editor and then tried running a bar. He had joined the Cyprus Regiment in the fall of 1940 and in that unit had had a chance to implement a deception plan concerning a
fictional division, the purpose of which was to deter the Germans from planning a Cypriot invasion. Thus when he was offered a chance to go behind the lines, this young man knew what he was getting into and the kind of work involved. “Even if I had not known,” he has written, “I would have accepted without hesitation; for I recognized in the offer a God-sent release, not only from the military deadend I had reached, but from militarism itself.”17 This dislike of the military pattern, of conforming to a group, this individualism, even eccentricity, appears as a continuing thread in the motives of many men who volunteered for duty behind the lines.

In addition, the young captain was emotionally sympathetic to the idea of resistance, “this simple urge to defend home and property.” Immediate, personal resistance to the invader made sense to him. “I felt that if I had to fight, the least ignoble purpose and most personally satisfying method would be the purpose and method of the Cretans.”18

During his time on the island, the young captain had an opportunity to vindicate the judgment of the man who had sent him. He had an opportunity to test both his physical and emotional capacity and toughness. He managed to survive a number of close brushes with the Germans. He proved to himself, by performing the deed, that he had answered correctly that early question about murder. He also proved able to adapt himself to the conditions of life in Crete, to maintain friendly relations with Cretans in general and the loyalty of close associates, and to sustain the inconveniences, the hardships, and the boredom that were even harder on the spirit than the dangers of enemy entrapment.

Ironically, however, it was his very emotional involvement with the Cretan cause and identification with Cretan aspirations that caused him trouble. By 1944 it had become “quite clear that the Greek Government’s promise to recognize all resistance groups as members of the regular armed forces would never be implemented.” He was forced to recognize the impossibility of any fulfillment of “the dreams I had cherished of a glorious internal uprising supported by a British invasion.” The realization that Crete had become a backwater of the war was a further blow. Without questioning the wisdom of the Allied strategy, he “could not help feeling that because of it our efforts . . . had all
been in vain." He therefore asked to leave Crete, volunteering for duty behind the lines in France. His request was granted.

Although it has been possible to track down the names of some 30-odd officers and men sent at various times to Crete, the number of British on the island was, at any one time, small. In early 1942 there were 3 officers regularly there; during part of 1943, 5 officers; at the time of the partial German evacuation in the fall of 1944, 10 officers. There were also a number of enlisted men working mainly as radio operators. It was a young man’s club: the average age was in the early twenties; only two men were “rather older,” in their later thirties or early forties. Almost all of them were reservists. In general they were of superior intelligence and education. A number were or became scholars, lawyers, writers; one became a priest. Most of these men were well regarded by other liaison officers. One of the enlisted men was considered, by at least several of the officers, the most capable man of them all. Interestingly enough, he had little education of the classic British variety and could speak no Greek. With several exceptions, most were well liked by the Cretans; and most returned the compliment. The success of the selection process, however, appears to have been mainly the success of intuition—either that of the head of the Cretan Section, who, an exception to the rule in SOE Cairo, remained in this post from late 1941 until the end of the occupation; or of the liaison officers who were later asked, while on rest leave, to approach likely prospects they knew.

In contrast to the job on Crete, which was to work directly with resistance leaders and to avoid overt activity, the first mission to the Greek mainland was sent in to attack and demolish the Gorgopotamos bridge. Although the British group was expected to get in touch with Zervas and to receive his help, its prime duty was not to work with the Greeks but to blow up the bridge. As a result the men were picked to work as a team. They were selected, not because they had proved able to work on their own in difficult situations or because they knew Greek, or because they were skilled in interpersonal relations, but because they had certain technical skills the team required to perform its job. Of the nine officers that were dropped into Greece in the fall of 1942,
eight had had either commando or demolitions training and four could serve as interpreters. The three enlisted men were all radio operators.\textsuperscript{21}

Myers was tapped as leader of the group during a conversation between him and a friend on the staff of SOE Cairo, SOE Cairo wanted Myers, at this time a major, because he was an engineer officer who had made five parachute jumps. Myers demurred. He pointed out that he was just ending his seventh year in the Middle East and was due to go home in 2 weeks, that he did not speak Greek\textsuperscript{f} or any other Balkan language, and that he knew nothing of the Balkans except for a “few hours in Athens and Dubrovnik.” His friend tried to convince him that he could command the Gorgopotamos mission and be back in a few weeks and then go home “on the crest of a wave.”\textsuperscript{22}

“I said I was not really interested,” wrote Myers. “It was not my line. I was a regular soldier.” “That’s just why you are so suitable for this particular job,” replied the friend. “We want somebody who is a trained staff officer, who could impress the guerrilla leaders, and who could organize their forces for a concerted attack.”

Still not keen on the assignment, Myers pondered his physical unfitness: he was in his late thirties and had spent the last 4 months in a staff job. During the next few days he decided that “if I was really wanted, I ought to go . . . , but . . . I was not going to move a hand’s turn about going.”

Finally, Myers was told that “It’s all right. We have got you. The C.-in-C. says, ‘You will go.’”

“That’s all very well,” Myers answered, “but this is surely a job for volunteers, and not a question of ordering people to go.”

“Oh, yes,” Myers’ friend replied. “I meant that, but the C.-in-C. is very keen that you should go. You have been personally selected.”

“Many thoughts—of home, parents, duty and of my longing to return to England—rushed, all jumbled up, through my mind,” Myers later wrote. “But I replied, I hope calmly: ‘All right.’”\textsuperscript{23}

Obviously Myers was more a selectee than a volunteer.\textsuperscript{g} At this point he had 4 days to prepare. The following morning he was taken to SOE Cairo offices and briefed; and, for the rest of that day and the next, he

\textsuperscript{f} “I know only two words of Greek, ‘Imi Inglesos’—‘I’m English.’” (Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 32.)

\textsuperscript{g} The same pressure was put upon some of the other men, even if more indirectly. One of the commando officers, on being told that he had been selected, was then asked if he would go: “I gasped inwardly. The proposition was crazier than any I had ever imagined in my wildest dreams . . . . The room was very silent, out of the corner of my eye I noticed that the other two officers had stopped working and were watching me. I was being sized up. As casually as I could, I said, ‘It sounds all right to me.’” (Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 17.)
prepared a plan for the demolition and collected his personal equipment and clothing.

Myers, who was to command the Gorgopotamos operation with the rank of colonel, was now introduced to Maj. (later Lt. Col. and Col.) Christopher Woodhouse, who was to be his second in command. Woodhouse was 25 years old and had already spent some time in 1941 and early in 1942 behind the lines in Crete—the only man on the mission to have this type of experience. He was well educated, a product of the British schools of Wykeham and Oxford, spoke Greek, and was knowledgeable in Greek affairs. Since he was scheduled to stay in Greece after the mission was completed, he spent some time during that last period with some Greek authorities in Cairo. (The King of Greece and his government were still in London.) Myers, not knowing what the future had in store, did not have any such interviews.24

On the second night, Myers motored to the Parachute School near the Suez Canal and met the rest of the men who had been selected for the adventure. Since there were 13 men, of whom only 11 could be accommodated on the 3 planes that were allotted, Myers had to weed out 2 men. He kept all those who could speak Greek and the three radio operators, one for each plane group. This meant there were five Engineer officers, of whom only three could go. In a tactful move, Myers asked his young second in command to help with the selection, because he had seen more of the men than Myers, who had only just met them. One officer was rejected because he seemed to lack stamina and the other because he appeared “highly strung.” All the officers except Myers held reserve commissions.25

Even with only several days’ acquaintance, the group had begun to arrive at its own peer judgments, some of which were not entirely complimentary. One of the commando officers, for example, took a dim view of several of the group: an interpreter officer had “a fluent command of kitchen Greek”; another officer seemed “a most amusing soul, if ineffectual”; and one of the enlisted men was “young, sullen and silent.” Nonetheless, the group forbore self-criticism; “like or dislike at first sight, we were all in the same adventure together, and we were out to discover the best in one another.”26

On the basis of the job it had to do, the mission proved itself. Myers managed to contain the frictions that developed within the group during the long period of waiting that preceded the operation. He organized the party well and saw the Gorgopotamos demolition through to its successful conclusion. When orders were changed and the mission remained in Greece, Myers responded heroically in attempting to rally the group’s support. When some of the men became disaffected during the disastrous return march, Myers’ rank and experience as a regular
officer were probably effective aids in maintaining internal group discipline. Myers’ later role became controversial because of politics, but both his immediate subordinate, Woodhouse, and his theater commander, General Wilson, respected and approved his judgment.27

Woodhouse proved to be liked and respected by almost everyone on the mission. His bravery, strength, energy, diplomacy, and resourcefulness were outstanding. Tall, red-headed, and only lightly bearded in a land of short, swarthy men, he was easily distinguished from the Greeks. Yet he volunteered to walk into enemy-occupied Athens and did it successfully, earning the respect of all hands. Though he was loyal to Myers, Woodhouse could still work effectively with members of the group who appeared to dislike his superior. Among the Greeks he became a legendary figure. Those who liked him viewed him as a new Byron; those who disliked him endowed him with almost satanic qualities. In short, to Zervas’ men, he was heroic, whereas to EAM/ELAS he was anathema. This reaction was not necessarily personal—it was Greek politics.28

Of the seven other officers on the original mission, all worked bravely during the Gorgopotamos operation. At least one performed in an extraordinarily outstanding fashion. Although he had been difficult and unhappy during periods of inactivity, this man was superb on the Gorgopotamos operation, not only in handling the demolitions work, but in general leadership. Myers gave him a battlefield promotion in recognition of his gallantry. He later worked successfully with Zervas’ group until the end of the war. Another officer, who had previously been selected as a leader of one of the jump groups, proved of little value in the field, “through no fault of his own,” according to Myers. Nonetheless, Myers demoted him at the time that he promoted the former officer. There are indications that this officer may have continued to be less effective than the rest of the group. Another of the Gorgopotamos officers proved effective, although he seemed always to carry a chip on his shoulder. He was the sole final holdout against Myers’ request that the mission “volunteer” to stay in Greece. His annoyance at this “double-cross” and his latent dislike for Myers made him want to leave Greece. He had no great fondness for the Greeks and hated EAM/ELAS. Surprisingly, however, when sent out on his own as a liaison officer with EAM/ELAS bands, he proved able to work effectively with the guerrillas.29

Myers was frankly disappointed in the enlisted radiomen. According to him, radio communication was in a “state of almost continuous failure,” until a special officer from SOE Cairo was dropped in. In extenuation of this seeming incompetence, it should be noted that it
was highly unlikely that the three enlisted men had had a chance to inspect their equipment before they left for Greece.\textsuperscript{30}

The selection of the Gorgopotamos men had been made on the basis of their value as a team. But the time they had been able to spend together before dropping into Greece had not allowed for the development of group spirit. Nonetheless, the group survived the ordeals of boredom and inactivity previous to Gorgopotamos and of extreme physical hardship afterward. Its members then went on to act in smaller, separate units as liaison with various Greek guerrilla groups. In general, it was a successful group; several officers remained with the guerrillas until the very end. The selection process, however, had indicated only that the men had the physical attributes without which success was impossible: it had not been able to guarantee that all members of the group could survive the emotional strains of the operation; it had not attempted to predict which men, if any, would be useful as liaison with the guerrillas.

Men dropped into Greece later knew, of course, that they were going in for the duration, as liaison men with the guerrilla groups. There is, unfortunately, not sufficient evidence to indicate exactly what changes this circumstance may have entailed in the selection process. Most of the men sent to Greece were reserve officers with wartime commissions, which may or may not have been a result of the selection process. Experience in a similarly risky undertaking seems to have been dropped as a criterion. From the evidence available, it appears that, reliance continued to be placed upon the qualities of youth and physical condition; intelligence and education, including military training; area familiarity and language ability. The situation with regard to selection of men for Greece was apparently that SOE Cairo did not know exactly what sort of men would make the best liaison officer with the guerrillas. Nor could they always get the characteristics they thought they needed. Most liaison officers, wrote Colonel Woodhouse, “entered Greece for the first time with no previous knowledge of the country, the people or the language.” Thus, although the above characteristics could all be measured, they were dropped when necessary. In addition, liaison officers also needed to possess integrity, self-discipline, leadership, tact, adaptability, and patience. But these latter qualities seem to have been only intuitively assessed, if at all.\textsuperscript{31}

It is interesting to compare the characteristics that SOE Cairo appeared to be seeking in the men it sent behind the lines with the characteristics that OSS set up as general qualifications for its field staff. These were: “(1) Motivation for Assignment: war morale, interest in proposed job; (2) Energy and Initiative: activity level, zest, effort . . .; (3) Effective Intelligence: . . . resourcefulness, originality, good
judgment . . . ; (4) Emotional Stability: . . . ; (5) Social Relations: ability to get along well with other people, good will, team play, tact, freedom from disturbing influences, freedom from annoying traits; (6) Leadership: . . . ; (7) Security: . . . caution, discretion, ability to bluff and to mislead.” Physical ability, observing and reporting ability, and propaganda skills were regarded as special qualifications for certain jobs.32

It seems likely that this list of qualifications includes the things that SOE Cairo was seeking. It also seems likely that Americans and British would put different stress on various characteristics. For example, motivation is at the head of the OSS list. Myers’ motivation appears to have been slight, yet once in Greece he was highly desirous of doing a good job. Was it wrong to have selected him?

Another point to be raised before the off-the-cuff selection process used by SOE Cairo is criticized is this: OSS assessment by psychologists and psychiatrists did not even start until the end of 1943—more than a year after the Gorgopotamos team under Myers dropped into Greece.33 Furthermore, there is some question as to whether the psychologists’ assessment was much more objective than that of the SOE Cairo staff’s. In their own self-assessment, the OSS psychologists have written that they had “. . . the strong impression that, by and large, the administration had been furnished with meaningful descriptions of the traits and abilities of the recruits, which were of considerable service in winnowing the wheat from the chaff and in placing the wheat where it belonged. But how valuable is an impression?”34

Searching for a more definitive standard for evaluating the assessment program, OSS turned to a number of appraisal checks. These were, on the whole, unsatisfactory. Appraisal methods were unscientific at best; and “our final over-all correlations between assessment ratings and appraisal ratings are of a low order, a result which proves that errors of considerable magnitude entered into the assessment process, or into the appraisal process, or into both.” Moreover, although certain errors had to be accepted as inherent, owing to conditions which could not be controlled, it is impossible to say what the minimal error rate would have been, if assessment had been perfect. Thus it is impossible to know how far above this minimal rate and therefore how erroneous the assessment judgments of professional psychologists were.35

Granting these factors and the conditions of stress and haste under which SOE Cairo operated, it is not surprising that some liaison officers proved to be duds. That SOE Cairo fielded many effective liaison men is more the miracle.
Training

One of the reasons that SOE Cairo stressed education and previous military training in its selection of men for work behind the lines was that, in the beginning, it had few facilities and little time to spare for additional training. The four men who set out for Crete in December 1941, for example, were given very little direct training after being selected. The captain who proved so successful had reported for an interview with the head of the Cretan Section on one day, had met the other members of his team the next day, had been sent to the Middle East Command Depot for a short sabotage course, and had sailed to Crete with a total of 3 days’ training—much of it spent learning how to demolish railways, of which Crete possessed none. In the autumn of 1942, he returned to Egypt for a rest period and went for a week’s emergency course in marine sabotage at the school establishment at Haifa before returning to Crete.36

The Gorgopotamos mission, setting out in the fall of 1942, was given a total of one-half to 2 days’ training per man, following assembly of the volunteers. The 3 weeks’ parachute course was compressed into 2 days, with two jumps scheduled and given on the second day, one to be at night. “Parachute training at that time,” wrote Myers, “was very much impeded.” The airdrome was full of bombers withdrawn from desert fields because of the German advance into Egypt and they flew day and night on continuous bombing service. Finally, after midnight, the group was able to practice its drop.37

By the spring of 1943 more training was available for men going behind the lines into Greece or Crete. At the Haifa camp, there had been established a course in “resistance warfare,” consisting mainly of training in demolitions, parachute technique, and the handling of enemy weapons. Unfortunately, men scheduled to go into Crete were still learning how to sabotage railways (which Crete still lacked) and finding it somewhat strange. This training was not necessarily restricted to British; SOE Cairo occasionally brought out Greeks and Cretans who were working closely with liaison men and sent them through the Haifa training course.38

In addition, by 1943, SOE Cairo was adding a lifelike training episode, at least for men going into Crete. To give a man some idea of what he was heading into when he went behind the lines, he would be posted as conducting officer for those going in immediately. For this trip, he would be responsible for preparing provisions for liaison men already behind the lines and for escorting the group going in; he would actually make the trip to Crete with them on the motor launch, help them to land and unload supplies, meet the beach party, and then return to the boat for the return trip. This experience taught him more than one
side of his operation: the return run the next morning was the danger time for the crew, when German aircraft would make their attacks on the small and vulnerable craft, and few officers helped the crew fight off the German Arado 196 seaplanes attacking from their base at Canea without appreciating that the crews infiltrating the missions also undertook a dangerous and risky business.39

Nothing, of course, replaced first-hand experience, and all the training in the world would not necessarily have guaranteed perfect performances. But it is surprising that, with so few criteria for selection, so offhand a selection process, and so little training, the British missions in Greece and Crete managed so well.

**Communication**

Integral to every activity of the liaison officer in Greece was the problem of communication with his home base, SOE Cairo. Without such communication his lifeline of supplies was threatened, his activities were performed in a vacuum, and his very existence was endangered.

During the “Great Flap” in 1942, when SOE was evacuated from Cairo, missions in Crete were without contact for months. By the fall of 1942, however, SOE was reinstalled in Cairo and regularly communicating with its men in Crete.

Before the Myers’ mission was dropped onto the Greek mainland, SOE Cairo had a tenuous radio connection with Athens through a Greek intelligence agent code-named Prometheus II. It was obvious; however, that this one contact could not take care of the combined load of intelligence communication and special operations messages. In addition, it was located in Athens far from the mountains in which guerrilla operations would occur. When the Gorgopotamos mission dropped into Greece on 30 September 1942, it carried in three radio sets and three trained operators, two of whom were scheduled to remain with Zervas’ guerrillas. Thus SOE Cairo expected to augment the Prometheus II link with the Greek mainland.

Two of the sets survived the parachute drop, but the operators, to Myers’ chagrin, were unable at first to get in touch with Cairo. Myers could only report his safe arrival into Greece through the Prometheus

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39 Prometheus II was a young naval officer named Koutsoyiannopoulos; Prometheus I had been Colonel Bakirdzis, who had earlier been obliged by “German curiosity” to escape to Cairo. He later returned to Greece and became briefly head of PEEA and a high-ranking member of ELAS. On the other hand, he helped to frustrate a left-wing movement in Salonika during the December 1944 war. He was reinstated in the Greek Army as a general, but in September 1946 was exiled by the Greek government. In May 1947 he committed suicide. (Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, pp. 35–36.)
channel almost a month after his drop. Even after the Gorgopotamos bridge had been destroyed and Myers’ party was on its way to the evacuation rendezvous, the signals sergeants—combining their sets and their talents—could still not reach Cairo. Again a Greek runner had to be dispatched to Prometheus to ask him to radio the news of success and the exact place they would be waiting. In the same message, Cairo was informed of the whereabouts of the men who were remaining behind. Luckily Prometheus II was able to get the message through. SOE dropped a new radio to Woodhouse who had remained with Zervas, and along with it the message for Myers that his party would not, after all, be evacuated. Woodhouse immediately sent to the coast a Greek runner who gave Myers the unwelcome news.40

Thus the channels by which communication was maintained at that time between Woodhouse and Myers were complex—runner to Athens, radio from Athens to Cairo, airdrop from Cairo to the Greek mountains, and runner from the mountains to the coast. It was a difficult business to keep in touch when direct radio contact was lacking.

Steps were immediately taken, however, to remedy Myers’ communication situation. In addition to sending a radio to Woodhouse, SOE Cairo dropped in a new officer who was an expert on radios and, by the time Myers and his party had returned, the set was working well. By January 1943 long messages were being passed back and forth between Myers and Cairo.41 This new, direct communications link came none too soon, for in the following month Prometheus II was captured by the Germans.1

With his direct line to Cairo, Myers was soon sending and receiving a large volume of traffic, all of which had to be coded or deciphered. First one, then two additional radio operators were dropped in to the mission, then an administrative officer was parachuted in to help cope with the signals work. By April, Myers’ headquarters had two independent radios, operating on different wave lengths. When the headquarters moved, one set was sent ahead and radio contact established before the other set was dismantled. “The daily and often twice daily, schedules with Cairo worked so regularly,” wrote Myers, “that it was possible to maintain an extensive flow of traffic both ways on each schedule.” For this efficiency, he gave full credit to the officer dropped in during the evacuation days, a man who had been a press correspondent in New Zealand in peacetime.42

Myers valued his link with Cairo most highly. During a period of travel that spring, he felt that to be out of touch with home base for

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1 He was rescued and left Greece a few months later. (Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 134.)
more than a day was extremely disadvantageous to him. As a result he requested and got an “additional wireless set with batteries and charging engine in order to form a self-contained mobile unit, on packmules, to travel with me wherever I went.”43

Signals work expanded continuously during the summer of 1943. Not only was Myers’ headquarters in constant touch with SOE Cairo, but most of the liaison officers living separately with guerrilla bands had their own sets and direct contact with SOE. By the summer, in fact, one of Myers’ officers from the Royal Corps of Signals had established a radio school at Perivoli to teach Greeks how to help operate Allied radio equipment. The rapid increase in communications between SOE Cairo and Greece, paralleled by similar increases between SOE and other resistance movements, had ramifications for the home agency. By that fall, according to General Wilson, SOE Cairo was unable to meet its signals commitments and Army Signals had to be brought in to help out.44

One of the interesting facts regarding communications on the Greek mainland was that there was very little German interference with the radio signals emanating from the mountains. One liaison officer who operated near German headquarters feared they would use direction-finding equipment. He kept an air sentry during transmissions and stopped all transmitting “if there were more than one plane in the air near us.” During that summer of 1943, however, the Germans apparently never did pinpoint the radio. In Crete, a smaller area more closely patrolled by the Germans, they were far more active in ferreting out radios and British liaison officers, with the result that sets had to be frequently dismantled and moved. In any case, the risk of enemy discovery was apparently far greater in urban areas than in the mountains.45

In addition to keeping in touch with SOE Cairo, liaison officers needed to maintain contact with each other. For this purpose the radios could be used, one station sending messages back to SOE Cairo for retransmittal to the other station in Greece—one reason for the communications jam in SOE Cairo. At one time, Myers hoped to be able to arrange for direct station-to-station radio communication in Greece, but this direct inter-Liaison Officer communication remained the exception. In general, communication within Greece depended on runners, who could also pick up information, find individuals forced into hiding, or carry things that needed to be physically transmitted, for example, gold. On the mainland, Myers not only used willing Greeks but was able to organize a number of the Cypriot leave-behinds from the British expedition of 1941 into a “Cypriot Runner Service,” which ran a regular circuit between the Allied officers. By the summer of 1943 there were about 30 of these runners. On Crete, runners had
been used since the very beginning of the resistance in 1941; by 1943 local legends were already developing about certain ones.46

Communication between liaison officers and with SOE Cairo was essential to the mental well-being of the men behind the lines. “To be out of wireless communication, as I had been for the last fortnight and more,” wrote one liaison officer of his 1942 experience in Crete, “always produced a certain sense of panic and loss, as though God had ceased to exist.”47

Supply and Money

If radio contact with SOE Cairo was valued by the liaison officer, a major reason was that it was his only means of ordering supplies. To the man in Greece, the boxes of food or clothing or arms that came floating down by parachute or were delivered by naval craft and transported across Greece on donkeys seemed indispensable to survival. And in fact, this was often the literal truth.

The liaison officers who went to Crete in the early days carried very little with them. In late 1941, SOE Cairo sent one man into Crete with personal equipment consisting of an “electric torch, a small automatic pistol, a map of Crete printed on linen . . ., and a sum of money” equal to about 45 dollars. He also brought in approximately a ton of arms and ammunition.48

It was not long, however, before SOE Cairo became quite clever at providing special items for use in clandestine warfare. By the end of 1942, infiltrating officers and men were offered their choice of “knives, coshes, brandy flasks, binoculars, cameras, compasses, and Borgia-like poison rings,” all made to resemble more innocent possessions. There were ingenious gadgets like lengths of rubber hose that, when laid inside a plane, were supposed to explode when the planes reached a given altitude. There were mines that looked like logs, or lumps of coal, or stones. Wireless sets were concealed in suitcases. A charging engine for the batteries was set in a demijohn, wicker-covered, with a wine-filled, detachable top.49

For more down-to-earth business, SOE Cairo offered ether pads for quietly getting rid of sentries—these were more usually used for starting fires with wet wood—and sulfur-colored pills to put people to sleep. There was also a grey, rubber-covered pill for self-destruction in case of capture. If sucked, this was supposed to bring on death in 3 or 4 minutes; individuals were warned that, if it were swallowed, the business of dying would be painfully prolonged for several hours. One British liaison officer was almost lost to the resistance when one of these pills became mixed in his pocket with some raisins he was eating.50
SOE Cairo procured authentic Cretan clothing by the simple expedient of saving the clothes worn back to Cairo by returning liaison men or Cretan resistance workers. These men, by custom, left their shoes in Crete; their clothes were apparently whisked away from them upon landing in Cairo. When these did not suffice, liaison men bought used Greek clothing from secondhand shops. Once on the island, they supplemented this raiment as best they could with completely authentic items.51

Men going to Crete in the guise of Cretans also needed and were supplied with identity cards. Most of these appear to have been regarded as sufficiently authentic-appearing to pass routine checks, as on streets or buses; but an identity card could not make up for a non-Cretan accent, and few liaison men were willing to put their voices to a test. As a matter of lack or loss of an identification card does not appear to have worked a great hardship on any of the liaison officers in Crete.52
On the initial drop into mainland Greece, Myers’ group took the maximum amount of stores that the three planes would hold. This was a total of 36 containers, or about 5 tons of stores, consisting of some personal clothing, blankets, and ground-sheets; food and amenities, including bully beef, tea, sugar, tobacco, rum, etc.; medical supplies; explosives for the bridge demolition; and rifles, light automatics, ammunition, and hand grenades for the use of the Greek guerrillas they hoped to find. These supplies plus radio sets remained the prototype for most resupply deliveries to the mainland, which were entirely by airdrop at first. Worn battle suits were used for packing, to avoid wasting space and to ease the clothing shortage in Greece.53

By the summer of 1943 SOE Cairo had, through its liaison officers, armed something under 8,000 ELAS guerrillas (less than half the total number, exclusive of village reserves). It had also armed about 4,000 of the 5,000 EDES guerrillas that had been organized in bands. The reason for the initial discrepancy in proportional support was simply that of geographic accident.54

The British did regard supplies as a means of controlling the guerrillas. In the summer of 1943, they for a time made supplies conditional upon EAM/ELAS acceptance of the National Bands Agreement. During the ELAS-EDES fighting beginning in October 1943 and lasting throughout the remainder of the year, SOE Cairo supported EDES very heavily, even beyond its requirements, and managed to keep it alive. At the same time supplies to the EAM/ELAS guerrillas fighting EDES were practically discontinued. Although this action had some effect it was largely futile as a control measure, since EAM/ELAS had already obtained the surrender of the Italian Pinerolo Division and its arms. For some bands of EAM/ELAS too far away from the site of internecine fighting to be involved, SOE Cairo did continue to furnish supplies. Also it delivered medical supplies to EAM/ELAS guerrilla bands regardless of location. In January 1944, when the civil war in Greece began to quiet down, SOE Cairo resumed support of EAM/ELAS groups.55

From this time forward, however, EDES was supported to the full extent of its strength, whereas deliveries to EAM/ELAS were consistently held down. When shipment of supplies from Italy to Parga in EDES territory on the west coast of Greece became possible in the spring of 1944, deliveries, mainly to EDES, were considerably increased. Clothing and food were in good supply in EDES and heavy arms and guns were also brought in, in anticipation of NOAH’S ARK. The British supported EDES not only as a means of harassing the Germans but also as a counterbalance to the Communist-dominated force of EAM/ELAS.56
At the same time the support base for EAM/ELAS was held down. Saraphis has indicated that at one point in 1943 the British were supporting EAM/ELAS up to a base of 25,000 men, but by the spring of 1944, this base had apparently been reduced to 10,000 men. At that time, the base represented a third of ELAS strength; by the summer, a quarter of their enrolled guerrillas. After September 1944 all supplies to EAM/ELAS were stopped.57

Most deliveries to EAM/ELAS in 1944 were, furthermore, of non-warlike supplies. During that spring and summer the British provided ELAS with 8,000 uniforms and about 350 tons of food through Turkey, to be picked up by ELAN\(^j\) caiques and transported back to Greece. Despite Saraphis’ complaints to the British about the lack of arms and ammunition—especially the latter which he claimed was in short supply—very few deliveries of either were made to EAM/ELAS. Ammunition, even for NOAH’S ARK, was, by Saraphis’ account, to be supplied after the operation, and then only if the local liaison officer certified that the ammunition had actually been expended and should be replaced. According to Saraphis, Allied arms to ELAS totaled 10 mortars, 30 machine guns, 100 submachine guns, 300 automatic rifles, and 3,000 rifles.58

How much support came to the guerrillas through the port of Parga is unknown. Some of what came in went to ELAS, some to EDES, and much to the support of Allied troops that supplemented guerrilla strength in the summer of 1944. A good idea of the magnitude of the supply effort may be gotten, however, by comparing the amount of supplies airdropped or air landed to the guerrillas in Greece, Italy, and Yugoslavia. Air effort, including both British and American planes, carried 2,514 tons of supplies to Greece, some 6,000 tons to Italy, and about 16,500 tons to Yugoslavia. By any standard, so far as direct support to the guerrillas was concerned, the investment in Greece was minor.59

SOE Cairo also supplied liaison officers in Greece with money. From the very first, money was needed for many purposes—for bribery of local officials, or where possible, enemy troops; for supplies and transportation for couriers; for families made destitute as a result of resistance activities. Gold sovereigns,\(^k\) the preferred form of money, were worth a great deal on the highly inflated Greek currency market. One gold sovereign, even in 1943, bought enough food on the black market, noted Brigadier Myers, to feed a family for many weeks. On the other hand, of course, the influx of gold sovereigns on the Greek

\(^j\) Greek People’s Liberation Navy, organized after the surrender of Italy (see Chapter IV).

\(^k\) A gold coin which at that time had been withdrawn from British circulation. Its value depended on the local market for gold.
market added, as Woodhouse was to note, to the inflation that already plagued the economy.\textsuperscript{60}

Gold provided a means not only of supporting the Greek guerrillas but of gaining their support. Brigadier Myers originally carried with him into Greece a large number of gold sovereigns that proved extremely useful, although they had to be judiciously distributed, to avoid giving offense. Both EDES and EAM/ELAS received payments as early as November 1942.\textsuperscript{61}

In 1943 SOE Cairo supported Myers in an arrangement for substantial financing, of the guerrilla movement. It agreed to pay one gold sovereign per month for the upkeep of “each armed and permanently embodied” guerrilla. The money was to be used to buy grain for the guerrillas, their families, and the vast numbers of destitute Greeks who had lost home and livelihood. The gold sovereigns were paid to the guerrilla organizations.\textsuperscript{62}

The handling of the funds soon raised questions of propriety. Brigadier Myers suspected as early as the summer of 1943 that EAM/ELAS was diverting the money to uses other than relief of the destitute Greek people. EDES, on the other hand, apparently made arrangements to give one sovereign a month to the guerrillas or their families. Saraphis immediately complained that, contrary to prior arrangements with the British, EDES was paying its guerrillas, whereas EAM/ELAS was devoting all resources to the larger cause, the conduct of the guerrilla war. Thus every practical detail of guerrilla life was constantly converted into propaganda to fit the political controversies raging behind the lines.\textsuperscript{63}

On the basis of Brigadier Myers’ estimates of armed guerrillas in units in the spring of 1943—ELAS, 16,000; EDES, 5,000; and EKKA, less than 1,000—the cost per month at the outset would have been in the neighborhood of 22,000 gold sovereigns. The guerrilla leaders at the Joint Headquarters in the summer of 1943 argued, however, that it actually took two gold sovereigns monthly to support an armed guerrilla.

In time SOE Cairo acquiesced, and the payments were apparently doubled, but the accepted support bases are unknown. Sovereigns as well as supplies were denied EAM/ELAS during the period of civil fighting in late 1943 and early 1944. Liaison officers in ELAS territory, attempting to alleviate the plight of the Greek people and administering the remnants of the Pinerolo Division were, however, involved in handling large sums of money, much of which had to be disbursed through the guerrilla organization.\textsuperscript{64}

What the total payments to the two guerrilla groups per month amounted to, or how long they were continued, cannot be definitely
determined from the evidence available for this study. In a provocative generalization, Colonel Woodhouse noted that “Once the first sovereign had been let slip, the process became cumulative; the supply increased the demand . . . When the principle of supplying gold was accepted, the quantity could not have been kept within lower limits.”

Under any circumstances, the cost was moderate as compared to other war costs.

Transportation

Though political differences provided one reason for holding down supply deliveries, the plain fact of the matter was that there were also purely practical limitations on the amount of supplies that could be gotten into Greece. In 1942 and 1943, liaison men and supplies were delivered behind enemy lines in Crete mostly by clandestine sea craft, to mainland Greece mostly by airdrop. After mid-1943, aircraft could also be landed on at least one airfield in Greece, which meant that individuals unable to jump could be brought in and other persons taken out. Also, delicate supplies such as radio sets could be landed. There is no record, however, of any Allied plane ever landing behind the lines in Crete. In fact, only 10 men and 39 tons of supplies are known to have been dropped onto the island; the remainder were apparently infiltrated by small naval craft. On the other hand, some 200 men were parachuted into mainland Greece and over 2,500 tons of supplies air-dropped. Also, from the spring of 1944, naval craft delivered men and supplies to mainland Greece through the EDES-held port of Parga on the west coast. Up until 1944, lack of aircraft and naval vessels would, quite apart from the political decision, have limited the amount of support that could have been given the Greek guerrillas.

In 1941, sea delivery of men and supplies was by either small craft or submarine. Conditions on the small clandestine craft used in the earliest days to get SOE men to Crete were usually extremely cramped. There was barely room for the two officers and four men of the crew; the addition of passengers further reduced both comfort and safety. In bad weather the trip was dangerous. An early arrival in Crete described his infiltration experience in such a small craft under winter weather conditions. Of the four crewmen, only one had a sailor’s rating, and he was from the submarine service and became quite seasick a few miles out. The other three, “by temperament and inclination more suited to privateering,” made up in stout-heartedness for their lack of seamanship. When a storm came up, passengers turned to and helped the crew to jettison supplies in an effort to keep the boat afloat and moving. Nevertheless, they had to turn back. The boat was too small to
make the trip from Africa to Crete under winter weather conditions, and the liaison group had to wait until ad hoc arrangements could be made with a submarine commander who “offered to go a little way out of his routine patrol.” This group was lucky not to have drowned and to have reached Crete. For some months during 1942 when the Germans were at Tobruk, clandestine boat service to that island was virtually suspended. 67

By 1943 SOE Cairo had several motor launches available for trips to Crete. Although these boats were somewhat larger than the earlier craft, and carried a complement of 15 men, they were still unable to cope with heavy seas and had to wait for fair weather. Under good sailing conditions, a boat left for Crete every few months. 68

From the base at Derna in Libya, the craft managed to make the approximately 200-mile trip to Crete in a day during calm weather. Crete was usually sighted before day’s end, but the coast was not approached until after nightfall. Since the run was made only in moonless periods in order to avoid being sighted by the enemy, it was quite dark during the approach to landfall. The engine would be throttled down and all hands would stand on deck waiting for the reception committee to give a proper signal, usually two Morse letters blinked out by torch. Having received the proper signal, the skipper of the launch would bring it within about 30 yards of land. In calm weather a dinghy was lowered, the shore party rowed to land, and the dinghy returned for the stores. In heavy weather, these ship-to-shore movements could be the hardest part of a hard trip. 1 Sometimes men had to ride a rubber boat to land literally in the face of a gale; if the boat overturned, as frequently occurred, the men reached shore with only those items secured on their persons. 69

There was not always a reception committee on hand. Now and then—though not often—the liaison men found themselves left on the beach, or more likely the rocky coast—tired, exhausted, wet, cold, and with a sense of overwhelming loneliness and desolation. Usually, however, they were greeted by a local reception committee headed by a British officer. For men drilled to think in terms of clandestine and secretive action to avoid enemy notice, these receptions were often quite a shock. “The cave was a complete parody of the setting for a smugglers’ chorus,” wrote one amazed officer. “It was lit at one end with a fire . . . suddenly illuminating a pirate profile, and on a ledge beside

1 One submarine let its passengers off in a small boat in heavy seas a half mile from shore and sailed away. After several hours of struggling, the party got to shore, where the boat was dashed against the rocks. Most of the stores were lost and the men had to swim for their lives. After they landed, they were almost shot as Germans by the local villagers. (Psychoundakis, The Cretan Runner, p. 92.)
the water stood some dozen Cretans . . . . [who] quivered, jumped, waved and welcomed with a variety of instructions to themselves, each other, and the boat.”

For the crew making the trip back to Derna harbor, the time of greatest danger was still to come, but the crews were as game as the men they left behind. Usually they tried to get some rest before the next morning, when German air attacks were most likely to occur. On one occasion in 1943, when half the crew of 15 men were wounded, some seriously, on the trip back, the ship’s morale never wavered. “There was . . . a feeling of human comradeship . . . . Emotions seemed a little larger than life. Men . . . felt a friendship and trust . . . it was a happy ship.” The seriously wounded asked, when taken to the hospital, if they could rejoin the ship when they recovered. Highest praise must be given to the bravery of those seamen who put SOE men and supplies behind the lines.

Although naval craft were used to land men and supplies on the Greek mainland in 1944, the difficulties of reception along the coast and the distances involved between the SOE naval base in Africa and the mainland of Greece precluded any extensive use of clandestine naval craft throughout 1943. Support of special forces and guerrillas on the mainland was therefore primarily dependent in the first 18 months of operations on the availability of aircraft. Throughout 1942 and into 1943, SOE Cairo had available for all special operations, including Yugoslavia, only four aircraft, all Liberators—and one was usually out of action for mechanical reasons.

The long air trip of approximately 750 to 800 miles from Egypt to the Greek mainland limited the type of aircraft that could be used. In 1942 only the American B-24 Liberator bomber, whose practical payload was 6,000 pounds to a range of approximately 1,000 miles, was available. It was such a plane that Myers’ group dropped from. Since the Liberator comfortably carried only 4 parachutists, 3 planes were required to drop the 12 men. Each plane also carried 12 containers of stores in its bomb bays.

The Liberator was not particularly popular with the parachutists. It did not have a good exit, and the men had to use the small opening of the emergency hatch—not an easy job. When they were rigged and loaded. The Liberator also dropped men at speeds and heights somewhat greater than other aircraft. Also, these Liberators did not have the built-in strong-point, to which the static lines of the parachutes could be attached. When one of the commando officers asked about the strong-point, the SOE Cairo answer was that they were getting one “fixed up” on each plane. “I went a little cold,” wrote the officer. “The
strong-point was the essential factor in the safety of parachuting, and I didn’t like any facile talk about it.”

Jumping was made even harder for Myers’ group by the fact that the three radios and extra batteries did not fit into regular containers and had to be specially handled. This meant that they were attached to a man’s parachute harness, over his head, between him and the parachute. After the man eased himself through the emergency hatch, the dispatcher lowered the radio after him, and the parachute was then opened in the usual fashion by the static line. “As soon as one landed,” explained Myers, who carried a set in this fashion, “one was liable to be hit on the head by the package, and during the descent one swung like a pendulum below it, with no control whatever either upon swaying or upon direction.” Six of the twelve men had this most inconvenient rigging; later the practice was discontinued.

The other stores for Myers’ group fitted into the Liberators easily and were mechanically discharged from the bomb bays. They were dropped on the same runs as the men—two men per run, two runs per plane.

The first jump onto mainland Greece was made under difficult conditions. On the first attempt, the three Liberators roamed over Greece all night looking for the expected reception committee; not finding it, they finally turned back. Servicing the aircraft delayed the second attempt by a day. The third night, they again tried. Myers saw three fires and, although they were not in the right pattern, he decided to jump. The second planeload of men also jumped; but the third returned to Africa yet again and did not make the jump until almost a month later. The fires to which Myers jumped turned out to be only shepherds’ bonfires, so that the group actually went in blind. Myers found the other men from his plane the next day, the men from the second plane within a week, and those from the third plane about 6 weeks later. All had in fact jumped blind, but none of the 12 had been hurt.

Despite the difficulties of parachuting into the mountains of Greece, the record of safety was high. In fact, of all the 200-odd men who parachuted in, Brigadier Myers knew of only two deaths directly attributable to the jump.

The four Liberators remained the only aircraft available for special operations until the spring of 1943. In March, 14 British Halifax bombers, with a payload of 7,500 pounds to a range of 800 miles, augmented the Liberators. Eventually SOE Cairo controlled a total of 40 aircraft used for special operations. In 1944, American C-47 transports, carrying 3,000 to 4,500 pounds and operating from a closer base in Brindisi, Italy, began to carry supplies to Greece. American bombers and transports, in fact, carried a little over a third of all air-delivered supplies.
The additional aircraft quickly resulted in increased attempts to deliver supplies. Whereas in February 1943, Myers reported that only four sorties to Greece had been successful, meeting only one-quarter of his current supply needs, it was possible in that month for SOE Cairo to make arrangements for additional deliveries. “The firm” planned for 8 sorties in March, 12 in April, 16 in May, and 24 per month thereafter until bad weather. In April, SOE Cairo upped the figures from 16 to 40 sorties for May and June; in June, it increased the number for that month from 40 to 70. By May 1943 some reception grounds were averaging two drops a week.80

Although sorties were not always successfully concluded, an increase in attempts did under normal conditions increase supply deliveries. Out of 1,333 sorties flown to Greece by the end of the German occupation in October 1944, 78 percent (1,040) were listed as successful. This percentage of success was, however, a reflection simply of the air point of view. It means that, on 78 percent of the sorties, weather conditions at the takeoff point, over target, and at return base were adequate; enemy action aborted neither the sortie nor the ground reception committee; and communication with a ground reception committee was achieved—in short, that supplies were dropped from the aircraft.81

From the ground point of view, the 78 percent figure must be scaled down as a measure of success. Success to the liaison officer meant that the drop was collected and in his hands. Often, however, supplies landed far adrift of the drop zone, with the result that many containers were in positions where it was impossible to salvage, or sometimes even to locate them. Local villagers—often near starvation—found the temptation to form foraging teams irresistible. Competing guerrilla bands sometimes tried to divert Allied aircraft drops by flashing signals to aircraft in the hope they would fool the pilot into dropping to the wrong reception, and they also picked up containers gone astray from legitimate drop zones. The Allied liaison officer undoubtedly felt that the percentage of successful sorties was considerably less than 78 percent.

Because of the importance of supply deliveries, special operations people and the air units carrying out supply sorties worked constantly to raise both the percentage of successful sorties and of supplies collected. These efforts took various directions. None was more important than the assignment of skilled pilots. Good pilots could practically put the containers onto the signal fires, to the great delight of both the liaison officers and the guerrillas in the reception committees. Even the Greeks could soon tell the good pilots from the bad. “Their contempt of a plane that was afraid to come low and consequently
scattered its containers over a large area was comical to see,” wrote one liaison officer.82

Improvement of communication was another key to more effective air supply. Not only was reliable contact between Greece and Cairo necessary to make arrangements for reception and to give local weather conditions, but good air-ground communication was required to guide the plane onto target, to give directions concerning local wind or topographical conditions, and to identify both plane and reception as friendly. In general, Allied liaison officers relied on signal flares to guide in the pilot. Usually, the reception committee lighted a single fire first; when they heard the plane, they lighted other ready-stacked fires in the agreed-upon pattern of a circle, triangle, letter, etc. After one reception committee was bombed by a four-engine German plane masquerading as a Halifax, however, arrangements were made for planes to flash a signal—a different letter each day of a pre-arranged code sentence—before the pattern of fires was lighted.83

Fire signals were not always satisfactory from the air point of view, and there were some attempts in 1944 to bring in Rebecca/Eureka equipment. The Eureka equipment was the ground complement of an electronic communication device that made contact, when switched on, with the Rebecca component in the aircraft. Some contacts were made between missions on the ground and planes delivering supplies, but for a number of reasons this equipment did not get the complete test in Greece that might have conclusively proved its worth. The equipment did not become available until late in the war; some of the Eureka sets were not reliable; and it was found that aircrews lost interest in using the Rebeccas unless they were used on all missions, unless the weather was bad, and unless indoctrination in their use was more or less continuous. Mountainous terrain, in which most supply drops were carried out, reduced the normal 50-mile open-country range of the Eureka and made navigators even less willing to depend on the equipment rather than on visual signs.84 On the positive side, the sets were easy to use and made drops possible in bad weather, of which there was plenty.m

When air and ground personnel were involved in joint undertakings, each needed to understand the problems of the other; in this respect, special operations personnel were no different from the average. It is easy to understand the frustrations of liaison men who lost

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m S-phone equipment was employed in only a very few special operations after August 1944 and, so far as is known, not at all in Greece. It proved in those few instances a sturdy, useful, and reliable adjunct to the Rebecca/Eureka equipment. Used after the latter equipment had brought the aircraft to the target, the Sugarphone was valuable for giving landing or dropping instructions or for passing intelligence information.
needed supplies because they were dropped to the wrong reception, or scattered over too large an area, or not dropped at all.

Nonetheless, when liaison officers became too critical of the air effort, SOE Cairo sometimes arranged for them to obtain a firsthand view of the aircrew’s problems. One officer who wrote a critical report was invited, on his return to Cairo, to go on a supply sortie, to judge the efficiency of air delivery for himself. His complaint had been that the aircrews failed either to find the drop zone at all or to come low enough to put the supply containers on it. On this sortie, the liaison officer perceived matters through different eyes. He was appalled by the closeness of enemy flak as they approached land and the perilous maneuver that the pilot made to get out of range by edging the aircraft behind some mountain ridges. The liaison officer was further surprised that it was not so easy to find the drop zone as he had imagined. He was unable to distinguish shepherds’ bonfires from reception flares, and the captain of the plane finally picked out the correct blaze. On the drop runs, the liaison officer found the plane was so close to the ground that he could see each person in the reception crew at work. Convinced by now that the aircrews were doing their duty, the officer promised himself, on his safe return, “never again” to complain of the air effort.  

Even General Saraphis came to realize through personal experience that not all aircraft delays were due to British machinations. “On this journey,” he finally wrote, “on which we had made three attempts to land, I came to appreciate the reasons for the delay in our departure . . . ”

The fact that General Saraphis had been taken out of Greece and landed back in Greece was the outward token of an amazing piece of enterprise and ingenuity—Allied aircraft were able to land safely behind enemy lines.

As early as June 1943 SOE Cairo asked all liaison officers in Greece if they knew of any area where a landing strip could be constructed, so that two-way traffic could be started. The major requirements for such a strip, according to SOE Cairo, were that it be 1,400 yards long at sea level, 100 yards wide, built in the direction of the prevailing wind, and at least 10 miles from the nearest enemy garrison. These specifications were based on the expectation that the obsolete Vickers Wellesley plane, which needed a long runway, would be used. Actually the C-47 transport that was used needed only 600 yards for a takeoff, but the correction was never transmitted to the British liaison officer who constructed the airstrip.

The only ground that appeared feasible was near Neraidha, where a plateau ran north-south in an area where the prevailing summer breeze was northerly. It was 2,500 feet above sea level, a fact that would
necessitate adding 300 yards to the length of the airstrip. The actual dimensions of the completed airstrip were therefore 1,700 yards in length and 200 yards in width. The greatest difficulty however, was that the field was bisected by a large stream that, although almost dry in the summer, presented a fill-in problem. Early in July, SOE Cairo gave the go-ahead for construction of the field.

The liaison officer responsible for its construction acted with immense energy. Working through the local ELAS guerrilla leader and using large numbers of Greek laborers, many of them women, in two shifts per day of 350 workers each, he had the airstrip completed in slightly over a month. After it began to take shape and could be observed from the air, the liaison officer had to camouflage it. Although he lacked any special instructions on camouflage techniques, he did so well that the Middle East Air Interpretation Unit described the field, on the basis of photographs taken by an unscheduled Allied plane, as worse than useless, with hillocks, scrub, small trees, and other obstacles on it. Fortunately, Brigadier Myers himself inspected the strip and reported the facts to SOE Cairo. The mission was congratulated on its feat and the Royal Air Force accepted the field, scheduling the drop of a pilot to guide in the first plane.87

At 2200 hours, 11 August 1943, the first clandestine plane landed in Occupied Greece. A C-47 transport, it was guided onto the field by the ground pilot and a crew of Greeks who had been drilled in the use of landing flares. It went down the field and turned at the very spot where the stream had been filled in. One wheel bogged down, but the plane completed the turn and came to rest safely. Within 7 minutes, 6 men and various radios were unloaded, the 12 departing passengers were in their places, and the plane was off the ground. Five and one-half hours after it had landed in Greece it was coming down at an airport outside Cairo. This Greek landing strip is thought to have been the first Allied field built in its entirety in German-occupied territory in World War II.88

Other landing strips were in use in Greece by the late summer of 1943, thus increasing the number of liaison men and the amount of supplies that could be delivered and allowing Allied aircraft to take out escaped prisoners of war, downed airmen, and casualties.89 This was a bonus of the resistance work which could hardly be translated into dollars.

The cost of air transportation to Greece, on the other hand, was one of the largest single items in the maintenance of the liaison officers and in support of the guerrillas. On the basis that 1,333 sorties were attempted to Greece and three aircraft were lost, and assuming parity between bomber and transport sorties and losses, it has been roughly
estimated that air support added a little over $1,000 per ton in transportation costs.\textsuperscript{n}

Actually, except for some of the winter months, when air transport practically ceased at times, transportation to Greece offered the Allies no insuperable problems. This was due to the fact that the decision had by then been made to limit supply deliveries in order to avoid a large build-up of guerrilla forces. The aircraft available for special operations work were thus sufficient for the degree of support allotted to the Greek resistance.

In reviewing the work of SOE in Cairo, much may be said both for and against it. It was organized quickly in an \textit{ad hoc} way to take care of one of the most complex and most difficult of all wartime jobs. It was unable to cope alone with the vast communication problem that arose. It crossed the paths of many agencies with much conflict of interest. The military judgment of the work of SOE Cairo by General Wilson seems balanced between generosity and fairness: “. . . it was over control and policy that difficulties had occurred; on the training of personnel, the provision of special equipment for liaison teams and the organizing for packing and dispatch of supplies to the ‘andartes’. . . , the work of S.O.E. was first rate.”\textsuperscript{90}

SOE Cairo got the men and the materiel into Greece. The big story, of course, was what happened behind enemy lines.

\textsuperscript{n} See Appendix G.
CHAPTER IV.
BEHIND ENEMY LINES—VILLAGERS, GUERRILLAS, AND LIAISON OFFICERS

MOUNTAIN GREECE
ELAS, GUERRILLA ARM OF EAM
EDES, GUERRILLAS OF ZERVAS
ALLIED TROOPS WITH THE GUERRILLAS
BEHIND ENEMY LINES—VILLAGERS, GUERRILLAS, AND LIAISON OFFICERS

Mountain Greece

The battlefields of the guerrilla war existed wherever guerrillas faced the soldiers of the occupation, but in the main, operations occurred in the mountains of Greece. It was here that transportation targets were most vulnerable. It was here that hideouts abounded. It was here that guerrillas could use terrain to neutralize the superior firepower of their adversary. It was in the mountains that guerrillas found staunch support from their countrymen who were living in what had become an area of military operations.

Greece’s overriding physical feature is its mountains. These comprise over 60 percent of the total land mass and have had tremendous influence on Greece and its people. So extensive are the mountains that, although there are plains in Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace, and the Peloponnesus, the major topographic feature even in these areas is the mountains. In general, they are steep and their slopes are barren or scrubby. They contain deep caves and a number of forests that effectively hid bandits in prewar days and were a boon to guerrillas in time of war.¹

The mountains limit the location of the villages. Most are situated in the valleys, consist of several hundred dwellings, and have from 500 to 2,000 inhabitants. Many villages in Greece are so remote that no roads lead to them; they can be reached only by trails over the mountains. Some villages constructed during difficult times in Greece’s past had been built with defense in mind; these could be and often were turned by guerrillas into veritable strongholds. In general, however, the villages were vulnerable to attack; at the same time, surprise attack was unlikely. Shepherds on nearby mountains would see the dust cloud raised by the motor vehicles of the occupation troops as soon as they left a few paved roads; the villagers generally knew that enemy troops were coming long before they arrived.² Despite their vulnerability, the villages were used by the Greek guerrillas. Sometimes villages that had been burned were used again in guerrilla combat.³ “For our troops,” a German battalion commander testified, “every Greek settlement away from the supply roads was just the same as the enemy’s main line of resistance. It was suicide to approach them.”³

Rural Greece provided many hideouts and good camouflage for the guerrillas. Along the shore there were wide strips of reeds; in the valleys

¹ Since Greece has generally dry summers, the dust cloud was a reliable indicator during the major season of troop action, as German commanders have testified.
and on the lower slopes of the mountains, there was dense underbrush; in the mountains, there were gorges, crevices, and caves. The mountains were safe only for those who knew them well. “A stranger becomes lost in this stony desert,” wrote a German troop commander, “because of its changing yet often so similar appearance.” Few roads and only one railway line went through these mountains, winding through high passes, serpentine curves, and long, lonely stretches ideal for surprise attacks.

Guerrilla operations took place not only on the mountain sides and in the mountain villages but right in the middle of Greek life. Mountain society formed the milieu in which the guerrillas operated. What kind of society was this? What sort of people lived on this battlefield?

The mountains affected most aspects of the life of their inhabitants. They kept the average Greek poor. They isolated him from the main currents of life. Pocketed into a small geographic area, many Greeks lived and died without going more than a few miles from their native villages. As a result, that suspicion of strangers traditional to an insular people was reinforced. This isolation was so complete in some cases that not even the central government of Greece had asserted a real grip over the people. Poverty, suspicion, remoteness from central authority, and complete exposure to the accidents of nature accentuated in the Greek mountain population two further characteristics of importance in the guerrilla war: a strong feeling for religion and an underlying primitivism.

Religious feeling underwrote the resistance. The clergy of the dominant Greek Orthodox Church were generally men of the people, with little academic training, and very close in spirit to their parishioners. Almost without exception the clergy secretly aided the guerrillas and some actually joined them, without regard to political affiliation. Priests blessed the guerrilla bands, including those which were Communist. Individual Greeks spoke of the resistance with the imagery of religious devotion. “God has sent us Englishmen from heaven,” Nikolaos Beis said to himself on learning that British officers of Myers’ party had parachuted near his village; “it is my duty to go and help them.”

Social forces underlined the elements of primitivism in Greek mountain life. In 1942 this life was organized along the same lines that had sustained it for hundreds of years. It was a strongly patriarchal society in which decisions by the family head bound all family members. A decision to join or to aid the guerrillas thus tended to bring into the resistance orbit all relatives, even those far removed. It stilled the voices of women who might have preferred not to risk the lives of husbands or sons. It gave to those who joined or helped the guerrillas the aura of respectability and morality. There were actually guerrilla bands composed entirely of members of the same family.
A concomitant of the patriarchal society, reinforced by the mountain Greek’s remoteness from and distrust of his central government, was the system of vendetta that prevailed in many regions. By this, family members were responsible for punishing transgressions against the family. Vendettas had led to long-standing feuds between families. In many ways, vendettas and the resulting feuds complicated guerrilla life; for example, when members of rival families joined the same guerrilla band. One British liaison officer was faced with a situation wherein a guerrilla who had turned traitor and had been judged guilty could not be punished by his guerrilla group without starting a new vendetta against the group; the problem remained unsolved until the traitor’s family was persuaded to punish its own member. “Even the Occupation,” wrote one British officer who worked on Crete, “. . . failed to suppress this minor universal warfare; private vengeance . . . laid many
villagers low.” On the other hand, the vendetta was a sort of guerrilla war in microcosm—a training ground for 1942–44. Psychologically, it had accustomed Greeks to extralegal activity, resort to violence, and the taking of life.⁸

These tendencies to violence had been reinforced by history. Through the long years of Turkish occupation and the wars of independence, the Greek developed a tradition of individual resistance to oppression. One guerrilla leader of a Cretan band was a veteran of guerrilla warfare in Macedonia against Bulgarian komitadjis; he was not an exception.⁹

Banditry was endemic in Greece before World War II. In the Grammos Mountains, for example, bandits had successfully hidden out for many years. When the guerrilla bands came into regions where bandits lived, many joined the guerrillas in an effort to regain social status; some were faced with the choice of joining the group or being destroyed by it. In either case, the bandits, already brutalized by their vocation and their life, raised questions of control. But brought into guerrilla cadres and accepting at least the minimum discipline required by the band, they formed a rough-hewn addition to the ranks of villagers-turned-guerrillas.¹⁰ At the same time their presence accentuated the primitivism and brutality that often marked guerrilla life.

In addition to all of these factors, there was in Greek mountain life a certain passivism, an acceptance of fate, a stoicism in the face of disaster. Relentlessly pressed by guerrilla bands on one side and by enemy retaliation on the other, the Greek mountain peasant accepted the lot of Job without complaint. On aspect of this stoicism was what one liaison officer called “a happy disregard of human life.” Torture and execution did not seem to upset the mountain Greeks.

They also accepted their own ghastly misfortunes. When Greek peasant women watched guerrillas prepare for sabotage operations nearby, they did not berate the guerrillas—they loaded what family possessions they could on the available donkeys and went off to mountain hideouts. When Greek men from Kaitsa—a village that had already been burned twice in retaliation for sabotage—saw new preparations for interdiction operations, they visited the guerrillas. “They didn’t ask us to stop sabotaging the railway line, but requested modestly that if we did anything it would be on a scale comparative to the reprisals that would follow,” reported the British liaison officer.¹¹ It was this uncomplaining endurance of bitter fate that encompassed and supported guerrilla warfare in Greece. It is not surprising that liaison officer after liaison officer has said, “The real heroes of the Greek war of resistance were the common people of the hills.”¹²
The environment of the mountains and the “peculiarity of character” of the Greek people who lived in the mountain villages formed a medium of uncommon support for guerrilla warfare. As one German counterguerrilla commander reflected, Greece was “an Eldorado for partisans.”

Although the men who led the guerrillas generally came from the cities, the rank and file of the guerrilla forces were the village and mountain Greeks. Despite their national and racial homogeneity, they were divided and subdivided into many mutually exclusive groups of guerrillas. The two largest guerrilla armies, those of EAM/ELAS and EDES, could never be successfully amalgamated, either through British manipulation or the brute force exerted by EAM/ELAS. EKKA, the next largest group, much smaller than either of the others, was ruthlessly crushed by EAM/ELAS and eventually disappeared from the scene. It never figured seriously in guerrilla operations against the enemy. This was true of most of the myriads of guerrilla bands that appeared and then faded away. Even those that survived the war intact, such as the Andon Tsaous band in Macedonia or EOK in Crete, are
disregarded in this study because they were local in organization or limited in effectiveness. Discussion of the guerrilla contestants, for the purposes of this study, is therefore confined to the two major organizations that were able to field guerrillas—EAM/ELAS and EDES.

The development of these two organizations differed in almost every significant particular. EDES guerrillas under Zervas broke away from their founding group, EDES in Athens; but ELAS never became independent of its founding parent, EAM. Unlike EDES, which became the child of one man—Zervas, ELAS never had a single outstanding and all-important commander. Whereas EDES eventually attracted too many officers for its own needs, ELAS always lacked a sufficient supply of trained officers. Although EDES operated mainly in Epirus, EAM/ELAS stretched out to become strong in almost all areas of mainland Greece.

**ELAS, Guerrilla Arm of EAM**

In December 1942 EAM, the National Liberation Front, formally announced the formation of a guerrilla army to carry on the fight in occupied Greece. It was designated ELAS, the National Popular Liberation Army, a psychologically felicitous choice of titles in that it so closely resembled Ellas, the Greek name for Greece. At the time of its announced creation ELAS controlled several hundred men grouped in small bands.

Having bands already organized in the mountains, EAM/ELAS now faced the major problem of finding a suitable military commander for ELAS. The obvious first aspirant for such a job was Athanasios Klaras, alias Aris Veloukhiotis, and best known as Aris, who had already laid his claim to fame by helping Myers on the Gorgopotamos operation and who was known throughout the Greek mountainside for his implacable will.

Colonel Woodhouse regarded Aris, along with Zervas, as one of the two great personalities produced by the Greek resistance. By force alone, this small, silent, dour, and guarded man with his black beard and black Cossack hat merited the appellation. Although Aris’ background was middle class, he had long since left the ranks of the bourgeoisie. He had been a school teacher, had become a Communist, had been trained in Moscow, and had presumably taken part in the Spanish Civil War. He was known to Denys Hamson, a British liaison officer who knew him well, as a practicing homosexual and pederast; he had reportedly been convicted for homosexual offenses. “I suppose,” wrote Hamson, “he was the most ruthless man I have ever met, the most cold-blooded, the cruelest . . . an intelligent, able man with no heart, without human pity, an excellent psychologist, a fanatical leader of men. Later, when I came to know him better, I had no doubt that after one of our all-day drinking
sessions in the most friendly atmosphere, he would have literally flayed me alive if it had suited his purpose.” Aris was also extremely brave physically, an exponent of force almost without exception.14

To the mountains of Greece, Aris brought not only guerrilla warfare but a primitive, elemental, brutal form of justice with many overtones of sadism. For example, Brigadier Myers has recorded an instance during the buildup for the Gorgopotamos operation when Aris slipped away for a while. He went to a near-by village to investigate a reported case of cattle stealing. “He had had the culprit stripped and publicly beaten in the village square,” wrote Myers, “by the newest recruit, a mere boy. It was in this way he ‘blooded’ his new adherents. He had then pulled out his revolver and shot the guilty man. . . . Small wonder that his name was on the lips of every man in the district.” It was a scene often repeated during the war years.15
Although Aris’ claim to high place in ELAS was first and greatest, it did not suit the leaders of EAM/ELAS to name him military commander of their guerrilla force. They were seeking a more respectable figure, not a man who would attract just the wild, eager young mountain lads, but one who would prove a rallying point for the unoccupied, un-employed, politically-conscious officers of the regular army. In this search, they were at first extremely unsuccessful. A number of offers were made to Zervas, for example, even in December 1942 after he was already involved with EDES; but he refused them because he disliked the idea of Communist participation in EAM/ELAS and of sharing his command with a political adviser. Other senior officers of the regular army likewise turned down the offers.\textsuperscript{16}

Finally in April 1943, under rather strange circumstances, EAM/ELAS found its military commander in Col. Stephanos Saraphis. Saraphis had proceeded to the mountains in the early months of 1943 under the auspices of an organization known as AAA and had conferred with Brigadier Myers and General Zervas. Myers promised him British support. Soon after, he was captured by EAM/ELAS bands and charges were prepared against him. Surprisingly, during the period of his imprisonment, Saraphis was converted to the cause of EAM/ELAS. Many persons have claimed that he was the victim of force—this was said to his face at the Lebanon Conference in 1944\textsuperscript{17}—but the conviction and enthusiasm with which he fulfilled his role make this charge hard to credit.

Whatever motives led Saraphis to join EAM/ELAS as its military commander, they were strong enough to override any resentment over his imprisonment. On many points, indeed, he appears to have found a political home in EAM/ELAS. In the first place, Saraphis seems to have been latently anti-British, even in early 1943. He was an extreme nationalist, even something of a chauvinist, in his feelings concerning his own country; at the same time, he was a violent antimonarchist.\textsuperscript{b} The fact that Zervas was veering in the spring of 1943 towards an Anglophile and proroyalist position deepened what seems to have been a personal antagonism between these two men. Also Saraphis wanted to play a dominant role in the resistance, and the possibilities open to him as a freelance guerrilla leader appeared rather limited either as commander of a guerrilla band on the same level as Zervas or in a shared command. And Saraphis was enough of a realist to wonder how

\textsuperscript{b} Saraphis had been publicly degraded in the barrack-square in 1935, when he was condemned to life imprisonment for mutiny against the royalist regime. When he joined ELAS in 1943, he was given a suitcase containing the same uniform he had worn that day in 1935. He himself sewed on the republican buttons he found in one pocket. (Greek Resistance Army, p. 53.)
the smaller organizations then in the mountains could operate without taking into account the already greater and still growing power of EAM/ELAS.\textsuperscript{18}

Figure 13. General Saraphis, Military Commander of the EAM/ELAS guerrillas.

During his early period in the mountains, Saraphis claimed to have been taken aback by some of the nationalist guerrillas. “Appearance not good,” he noted of one Zervas group, “clothing motley, discipline doubtful. They were continually firing into the air and throwing handgrenades into the river to catch fish.” On the other hand, he professed to have found ELAS forces more to his liking: “Discipline and uniforms almost completely military. Cleanliness. Canteen mess and camp life.” The ex-regular military officer liked a military appearance.\textsuperscript{19}

During his imprisonment by EAM/ELAS, Saraphis became more disgusted by the conduct of his fellow prisoners and more impressed by the conduct of ELAS guerrillas, even as they tied him and the others in pairs and walked them through villages where the inhabitants shouted
“Traitors” at them. With growing disillusionment, he wrote of his fellow prisoners:

There was no solidarity; nothing but petty-mindedness and egoism; lack of any discipline or respect. I made comparisons with the guerrillas, who guarded us, with the people in the villages through which we passed, and I realized that we were wrong in wanting to form a separate guerrilla force which would end by becoming an instrument of the British.  

Early in April 1943, Saraphis was told by Aris and Andhreas Tzimas of EAM/ELAS that the organization would give him and the majority of his fellow officers their freedom. At the same time, he was asked if he would be willing to work for ELAS. He reported that he agreed at once to do so. He also agreed to return to Athens with Tzimas, who was on the EAM Central Committee, in order to clear the matter with z, his former organization, and to seek the approval of the EAM Central Committee.

With an acceptable and willing senior officer at hand, the EAM Central Committee lost little time in approving the appointment of Saraphis as military commander of ELAS and in setting up a General Headquarters (GHQ). As first organized in May 1943, this GHQ was a triumvirate command, consisting of military commander, capetan, and political adviser. (All lower commands followed this pattern down to the tactical level, where they became dual, dropping the political adviser. Since, however, the capetan was a Communist, he took on the duties of the political adviser at company or lower levels.) Saraphis, with the rank of colonel, was military commander of ELAS, but had prime responsibility only in the field of military operations.

Saraphis shared command of ELAS GHQ with two other men, Aris held equal responsibility in the role of capetan. This position, sometimes confused with that of the political adviser, even by Allied liaison officers, was usually filled throughout the command levels by a Communist, often a man of the people who had worked himself up. The capetan had control of propaganda and unit morale; and, since he was also in charge of administration, quartermaster duties, recruitment, etc., he maintained relations between guerrilla forces and the civilian

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\[c\] The ELAS Central Committee promoted Saraphis to the rank of major general in the spring of 1944.

\[d\] Aris did not remain in this position. He was later transferred to the Peloponnesus in a strong EAM/ELAS drive to take over that region. In the December 1944 war with the British, Aris played a leading role. In 1945 he was killed under uncertain circumstances. One report says that his head was severed and displayed on a pole in Trikkala. (Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, p. 177; McGlynn, *Special Service in Greece*, p. 10.)
population. In 1944 capetans were given reserve officer ranks. At the point of ELAS’ greatest strength there were 1,070 capetans, forming 21 percent of the officer corps, whom Saraphis found “very useful.”

The third member of the GHQ, the political adviser, was the most important member of the command: he was the representative of the all-powerful EAM Central Committee. The political adviser was always a Communist. Political advisers, as well as capstans, held officer rank in ELAS. The first man to occupy the post of political adviser in ELAS GHQ was Andheeras Tzimas. When he left in the autumn of 1943 to take a post as EAM/ELAS liaison with Tito in Yugoslavia, he was replaced by George Siantos, the acting Secretary General of the Greek Communist Party (KKE). In the spring of 1944, the post of political adviser was abolished, not only in ELAS GHQ but throughout the various ELAS commands. The former holders of such posts, however, generally turned up as chief of staff or in some other position at a lower level. Although the triumvirate form of command was changed, the principle by which EAM maintained control over ELAS was never lost.

ELAS GHQ, although comprised of the three commanders of ELAS, did not control all of the ELAS guerrilla forces. Some were directly under the ELAS Central Committee. This body was subsidiary to the Central Committee of EAM, but was independent of and superior to ELAS GHQ. It controlled operations in Athens and the Peloponnesus. The Greek islands, eastern Macedonia, and Thrace were also outside of the authority of ELAS GHQ. ELAS reserves, although organized along military lines, were used mainly for communications and local security purposes and were controlled in the villages by the local EAM organization.

The advent of Saraphis as military commander of ELAS and the creation of a General Headquarters were immediately followed by a reorganization of the guerrilla forces to more closely resemble a regular army. In June 1943, ELAS GHQ controlled approximately 4,500 men in Macedonia, 4,000 in Thessaly, 3,000 in Roumeli, and 500 in Epirus. These district forces, named either headquarters or general commands, were in turn divided into commands and subcommands. With the approval of the ELAS Central Committee, the new ELAS GHQ undertook in July 1943 to change this organization, giving all units regular army designations after 1 September. The headquarters

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* Known to Myers and Woodhouse by his code name of Evmaios, Tzimas is referred to in Saraphis’ memoirs as Samariniotis. Throughout this study, he is referred to as Tzimas. Although an avowed Communist, Tzimas seemed rather reasonable to Myers, who credited him with Woodhouse’s safe return from Athens in 1943, when the Germans almost captured him. (Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, pp. 145, 223–24; Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, p. 137.)
or general commands became divisions; commands became regiments; and subcommands became battalions, which were further divided into companies, platoons, and sections. The strength of ELAS divisions, however, never reached that of conventional army division; at their greatest strength, they contained about 4,000 men; and battalions apparently contained about 400 men.\(^26\)

Despite the increased complexity of the new organization of ELAS, Saraphis never intended to billet large groups of men together. ELAS guerrillas, like all others, lived in small units, sometimes in villages, more often in mountainside cabins, or even in caves. These units assembled for special events and for tactical operations. Then they returned to their own quarters, living in close contact with their immediate officers. This practice was continued throughout the occupation. Nonetheless, within these limitations, ELAS managed to conform more closely than before to the organizational structure of conventional forces.

Regular military regulations were also put into effect. Saluting became obligatory during duty hours, and the approved form of address was “fellow combatant”—for example, Fellow Combatant Colonel Saraphis. Discipline was rigorous. Instead of the usual army penalties of confinement to barracks, detention, and imprisonment, troops’ assemblies were held to mete out the varying guerrilla penalties of reprimand, public contumely, disarmament for a specified period, dismissal from ELAS, imprisonment, and finally death. The penalties were carried out after approval by the command; in case of serious difficulty, the command could act at once. Saraphis found the assemblies extremely strict and very effective in maintaining discipline. By 1944 Saraphis claimed that regular courts-martial had been established, one in each division, observing all proprieties.\(^27\)

Allied liaison officers who saw this guerrilla justice in operation found it harsh. A concept of justice applied by tribunals of peers, meted out in strictest fashion, and mercilessly executed was not very appealing in operation. It was, however, a form of law acceptable in mountain Greece. It is ironic that many Greeks should have learned to respect a legal code, roughhewn, inelastic, and even cruel as it may have been, while they were acting as or under guerrillas.\(^28\)

By the autumn of 1943, ELAS was growing by leaps and bounds. The advent of Saraphis as military commander was paying off. It was well known in Greece that he had joined EAM/ELAS. In Athens, in the spring of 1943 he had even written a message calling upon other regular officers to join him in ELAS, and this had been circulated through an EAM newspaper. As a result, a number of young Army officers came out to the mountains to join EAM/ELAS. They were immediately directed to the various divisions being organized at that time.
In addition, regular officers belonging to other guerrilla organizations sometimes joined EAM/ELAS after that organization had eliminated their own—thus a number of EKKA officers, for example, joined ELAS in the spring of 1944. A total of 800 officers from the regular army of the days of the Greek monarchy and 1,500 from the army of the republic eventually entered ELAS, forming 44 percent of its officer corps.\(^{29}\)

In July 1943 ELAS set up a training school: to train guerrillas to become reservist officers. Each district (divisional) headquarters sent 30 or so guerrillas suitable for training and commissioning. By the end of September 1943, the training school openly graduated its first class, with festivities and a review. One hundred thirty-six men were commissioned reserve second lieutenants in the ELAS guerrilla army. The second course started on 1 October, with about 300 officer candidates in attendance. By liberation, the training school had graduated some 1,270 reservist officers or 24 percent of all ELAS officers.\(^{30}\)

Figure 14. "A Typical ELAS Officer," according to Brigadier Myers.
With officers available to train and lead guerrilla units, new recruits could be taken in. Although there was little difficulty with recruitment in most cases, it is apparently true that in some areas ELAS drafted men without regard to their own feelings. Sometimes village elders decided which men should join. However, the success of Greek guerrilla operations, the belief that Greece was soon to be liberated by an Allied invasion, and the obvious coming defection of the Italians from the Axis led to spontaneous increases in strength in both EDES and ELAS in the summer of 1943. Since ELAS controlled a far larger territory than its rival, it was able to recruit more men faster. From a strength of less than 5,000 men in the spring, ELAS claimed close to 20,000 men by the fall of 1943. Brigadier Myers estimated that there were 16,000 armed men in units and 16,000 more in the village reserves.

For the rank and file, training usually consisted of a few days’ basic training in camp; tactical training took place on actual operations. Recruits were bound to ELAS by a fearsome oath and the penalty for desertion was death. Bravery, on the other hand, was rewarded by promotion and even peasants could become reserve officers. Later on, in the summer of 1944, awards and honors were instituted.

ELAS also made an attempt in mid-1943 to regularize some technical services. In general, arms and ammunition were obtained mainly as booty from the occupiers or through Allied supply drops. After the surrender of the Italians in the fall of 1943, EAM/ELAS had relatively few arms problems and most of these concerned distribution rather than acquisition. Because of the variety of arms, however, ammunition scarcities developed.

Quartermaster supplies came from a number of sources. Allied supply drops provided a considerable quantity. On the other hand, ELAS was never totally dependent on these, as was proved during the winter of 1943–44 when all Allied drops to ELAS were suspended. Through EAM control of the countryside, it was possible for ELAS to levy regular tithes of foodstuffs which were collected by the Guerrilla Commissariat (ETA) from the peasants and villagers. In addition to the tithes, for which no payment was made, ELAS got other foodstuffs, for which it paid at its own scale of prices—clearly an advantageous system.

Clothing, particularly shoes and boots, was a more or less continuous problem for ELAS. Supply drops did not fill the need. Also, clothing

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1 An additional 11 percent of ELAS officers were directly commissioned from the auxiliary services. (Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, p. 276.)

2 Mistreatment of the local population by EAM/ELAS reached major proportions in the Peloponnesus, where Aris had gone and where the peasants were naturally conservative. EAM already regarded anyone not taking part in one of its organizations as a traitor. (Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, p. 61, n. 1.)
supplied by the Allies was often old battle dress, which was incriminating and could be used only by those guerrilla forces who lived apart from the villagers. ELAS, through ETA, openly requisitioned clothing from prosperous civilians in its neighborhood, and it even set up workshops to make clothing and boots. These items were also often stripped from fallen enemy soldiers when time permitted. Clothing was taken from the Italian soldiers after their surrender in the fall of 1943. In 1944, when ELAS had naval resources to get Allied supplies stored in Turkey, it received about 8,000 uniforms and pairs of boots, which helped to ease the burden of finding clothing.35

In addition to a naval component, ELAS had a cavalry regiment. Horses were requisitioned from the peasants as they were needed. When during the winter of 1943–44 it became hard to feed the weak or sick animals, they were simply placed on farms in ELAS territory. The peasants were expected to feed and care for the horses during the winter in return for such work as the animals’ condition or the weather allowed. In the spring ELAS took back the animals.36

Medical care for the sick and wounded was primitive in ELAS, but probably not far below the general run of medical practice in the Greek mountains. In the summer of 1943, ELAS GHQ directed that each division should have one or two surgeries and that each regiment should have a sickbay and dressing station. If no volunteer doctors were available, local doctors were to be drafted. These were ambitious plans, but by the fall of 1943 some divisional hospitals had been established in houses or school buildings and were in use. In this work ELAS was helped by EAM control of the villages and by its ability to commandeer, if necessary, houses, supplies, and doctors.37 In 1944 divisional hospitals were sometimes caring for as many as 80 or more patients. There were both doctors and nurses, the latter often supplied through EPON, the youth organization controlled by EAM in the villages. Some sickbays were also established at regimental level in 1944. Allied supply drops were a major source of medicines. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that these hospitals were at all similar to those of Europe or the United States; by such standards they would be poor substitutes. The remarkable thing is that they could be set up and could function at all. For a guerrilla army operating in the poverty-stricken Greek mountains, their mere existence was an achievement.37

This was made very clear in one instance where a hospital, established by the Allied Mission and serviced by two doctors, a senior British major and an American junior medical officer, was in distress because weather precluded supply drops and no local help was made available until Saraphis ordered the villagers to do so. (Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 153.)
Guerrilla transportation was rudimentary. Motor vehicles were almost unknown in the Greek mountains; the appearance of an automobile was an occasion. Guerrilla troops moved by self-propulsion. This limitation precluded fast relief of beleaguered units and was a problem ELAS never overcame.

The usual Greek manner of transporting supplies was also the guerrilla way. Village pack animals carried supplies as 'far as the animals could negotiate the animal trails; after that, mountain dwellers loaded the supplies on their own backs and took them the rest of the way. ELAS made no payment for this transport, although sometimes guerrilla rations and food for the animals were furnished. According to Saraphis, many people said that the reason people worked in this way was that ELAS had established a reign of terror in the mountains. He denied the rumors, of course. In some places terror was certainly used, but the constant reiteration of Allied liaison officers that the Greek people showed complete devotion and loyalty to the resistance cause would appear to uphold Saraphis’ contention that transportation was freely given by the Greek people—“This they did with great good will and often singing.”

Besides the problem of moving supplies within Greece, ELAS faced another transport problem when sufficient Allied aircraft were not available to bring in Allied supplies earmarked for ELAS. In early 1944 Woodhouse informed Saraphis that ELAS would have to undertake the transport of Allied supplies by sea from Turkey to Pelion on the east coast of Greece. Although a few Greek ship captains had made isolated naval attacks on enemy craft in 1943, it was not until the surrender of Italy in the fall of 1943 that EAM/ELAS controlled sufficient shoreline even to think seriously about a naval section. In the spring of 1944 the development of ELAN, the Greek People’s Liberation Navy, was fairly rapid. Three types of craft were used: motor sailing vessels of over 7 knots speed and carrying over 10 tons load, small motor vessels of similar speed, and all other craft useful for transportation duties. The first two types of craft carried crews of 12 to 18 men and were armed. These were formed into four squadrons and one flotilla—later into five squadrons—under the direct orders of ELAS GHQ. The unarmed craft were formed into a reserve squadron. ELAN reached a final strength of over 100 motor-sailing vessels and other craft. Several vessels had a displacement of 200 or more tons. There was one large tug and one torpedo boat. Total ELAN strength, according to General Saraphis, reached about 1,200 officers, capetans, and guerrillas.

The naval squadrons were brought under the direct orders of ELAS divisions controlling the shore bases. They were employed both for offensive action and for logistical support. In the former capacity, they
were supposed to harass and plunder enemy transport, protect ELAS marine transport, and keep the enemy under surveillance; in the latter and more important capacity, ELAN transferred friendly forces and transported food, equipment, and supplies. To move the Allied supplies from Turkey, for example, Saraphis reported that ELAN employed 20 caiques formed into the 4th Pelion Squadron. In 8 months, this squadron made 40 successful voyages. From the coast ELAS used convoys of 100 to 300 pack animals to carry the supplies through German lines to Macedonia, Thessaly, and Roumeli. Thus ELAN played a major role in the transport of supplies from the outside world into Greece.\(^{10}\) In this capacity it was a mainstay of ELAS’ transportation service.\(^{i}\)

Communication was another of Saraphis’ major problems. He felt it important to be able to get in immediate touch with the various commanders under the orders of ELAS GHQ. Communication by courier was the simplest system but also took the most time and was inadequate for many contingencies, certainly any that required immediate action. The guerrillas of ELAS therefore turned to the telephone. In the summer of 1943 every division in ELAS was directed to form a communication company and each regiment was to form a communication platoon, in order to develop a telephone system.\(^{41}\)

Using for lines anything and everything they could lay their hands on, including rusty barbed wire from entanglements, EAM/ELAS could claim by August 1943 that telephone communication had been established direct from GHQ to the four ELAS divisions then operating. This service, though good during periods of inactivity and fine for giving alerts, broke down during emergencies, for the Germans soon learned to cut telephone wires at the onset of combat.\(^{42}\)

For this and other reasons, Saraphis was very eager that all ELAS divisions be interconnected by radio. In May 1943, he had been completely dependent upon the British for radio communication with his commands in Thessaly and Macedonia. When he saw Myers traveling around the Greek countryside with his wireless operator and the set itself installed on a donkey, thus giving him direct contact with headquarters in Cairo, Saraphis felt doubly envious. He was, of course, entirely dependent during his own journeys on courier and local telephone service.\(^{43}\)

British liaison officers, however, opposed this ELAS plan for radio contact between stations in Greece, giving as their reason the fear of

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\(^{i}\) In addition to the squadrons of ELAN under the control of ELAS GHQ, another separate section of ELAN was under the ELAS I Army Corps (Athens and Piraeus). Both sections of ELAN were active during the December war with the British. They were demobilized, along with ELAS, by the terms of the Varkiza Agreement in 1945. (Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, pp. 284–85; Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, p. 309.)
enemy locators. They themselves never intercommunicated, but all messages were radioed direct to Cairo and retransmitted from Cairo to other stations in Greece. It was never possible, however, to convince Saraphis on this point. These fears, he felt, were merely “a pretext” to keep ELAS GHQ from communicating easily with its units, and thus to keep it dependent on an Allied communications system. Even though he himself later complained that the Germans were “always informed in advance” about ELAS moves, he apparently never connected this fact with his communication system. Eventually, all ELAS divisions did obtain radio equipment, by booty, barter, or scrounging. It was never supplied by the British. Neither did it always work.\footnote{44}

Woodhouse painted a more rosy picture. “Their communications, including wireless, extended as far as Crete and Samos . . . ,” he wrote of the situation in mid-1943. “Communications in the mountains, by wireless, courier, and telephone have never been so good before or since . . . .”\footnote{45}

In the same way it had set up other services, ELAS GHQ in the summer of 1943 formed engineer companies at divisional level and engineer platoons at regimental level for demolition purposes and road maintenance. There is little evidence of their effectiveness. During the period of liberation in October 1944, one British unit requested that ELAS repair bridges to facilitate pursuit of the enemy. Saraphis pointed out, however, that without bridge-building equipment, ELAS could not accomplish this task. Nor is it clear that the demolitions work was generally well done; guerrilla demolitions do not appear to have ever come up to the standards of conventional forces.\footnote{46}

The efforts made by ELAS GHQ in the summer of 1943 to expand its guerrilla bands and to organize them into a regular army, to recruit and train a large number of men and officers and to form auxiliary technical services for this expanded army were tested in the fall of 1943. At this time, the Germans began a series of mopping-up operations while ELAS was engaged in fighting with the guerrilla army of EDES. At the same time supplies to ELAS were stopped by the British.\footnote{47}

Examining this new situation, Saraphis found much wanting. Although he blamed his major problems on enemy advantages in firepower, transport, and aircraft, he had to admit shortcomings in his own organization, particularly in training.\footnote{48}

ELAS therefore spent the winter of 1943–44 in intensive training and regrouping. Incompetent, insubordinate, or disaffected guerrillas were, according to Saraphis, either brought to trial or discharged. The EPON youth groups were brought directly into the ELAS divisions, with the formation of a model EPON platoon for each regiment and a model group for each battalion. Other EPON members were now
enlisted in companies like any other guerrillas. Training was carried out on a unit basis, down to the platoon level. Limited offensives were carried out against easy enemy targets primarily for training purposes. All unit weapons were repaired, and the men were trained in their use, in both technical and tactical aspects. The training school took on additional importance.\textsuperscript{49}

All this talk about divisions, regiments, battalions, technical services, and training schools might mislead one into thinking that ELAS was a completely disciplined army. This may have been the ELAS dream, but it was never the actual case. Some of the liaison officers with small ELAS units would have been the first to laugh at such an idea; what they saw was more often a rabble of men behaving in a disorganized fashion. ELAS admittedly could not control all of its elements, as was evidenced by guerrilla excesses that destroyed the very image it sought to build up. Nonetheless, despite units which did not come up to its own standards, EAM/ELAS was able to field a guerrilla army of considerable size and competence.\textsuperscript{50}

By the spring of 1944, ELAS was incontrovertibly in first place in the resistance movement. Saraphis estimated his strength at about 30,000 men, formed into about 10 divisions. EDES was confined mainly to Epirus. And the Germans were limited to the major transportation lines and the larger villages on a day-to-day basis. This strength was upheld until liberation, by which time ELAS had grown to about 50,000 men.\textsuperscript{51}

Despite its growth, EAM/ELAS still faced problems. Although most of Greece was in its orbit, the Germans could still concentrate forces and move into any area on mopping-up operations. The Greek security battalions working for the Germans were still going strong. Furthermore, ELAS was “faced with formidable shortages” as Saraphis was forced to admit.\textsuperscript{52} And the rival that EAM/ELAS had hoped to smash had survived the onslaught: there was still an EDES to reckon with.

**EDES, Guerrillas of Zervas**

EDES, the National Republican Greek League, had been founded in Athens in 1941 as a political resistance group. Its charter called for continuation of the fight against the Axis and for such political goals as a democratic constitution, a plebiscite on the question of the monarchy, and a postwar government containing no collaborators. Since its

\textsuperscript{1} These figures are highly credible. Colonel Woodhouse estimated ELAS strength at 40,000 men in the summer of 1944. In addition there was the ELAS of Athens and the islands which did not come under the jurisdiction of Saraphis’ GHQ. (*Apple of Discord*, p. 195.)
political head, Gen. Nicholas Plastiras was in exile, EDES had a Central Government Committee of three men in Athens.\textsuperscript{53}

By mid-1942, EDES had found a commander in chief for its guerrilla arm and had fielded a small force of guerrillas who had successfully drawn and tasted blood. Its commander, Gen. Napoleon Zervas,\textsuperscript{k} was one of the republican officers who had been ousted from the Greek Army in the 1930’s and had not been allowed to fight against the Italians and Germans in 1940 and 1941. Understandably anxious to take an active role in the growing resistance movement and having already rejected an offer to become military commander of EAM/ELAS, Zervas entered EDES in the spring of 1941, countersigning its political charter. When the British committed themselves to support EDES guerrillas, Zervas took to the hills.\textsuperscript{54}

When Myers’ group dropped into Greece in the fall of 1942, they knew about Zervas and in fact expected his support in the assault on the Gorgopotamos Bridge. In turn, Colonel Woodhouse was scheduled to remain in Greece with Zervas.\textsuperscript{55} When the attack on the Gorgopotamos took place, Zervas upheld his end of the bargain: EDES guerrillas, along with those of EAM/ELAS, formed an integral part of the guerrilla assault wings that neutralized the enemy garrison defending the bridge.

From this time forward, Zervas’ fortunes were intimately connected with the British. He was dependent upon them for support, not only in the guerrilla war against the occupation troops but in the internecine fighting with EAM/ELAS.

Myers has described with affection his first meeting with the short, plump Greek general, who was wearing an old army uniform without insignia and was armed with a small automatic pistol and a jeweled dagger. “He kissed me warmly on both my now bearded checks,” wrote Brigadier Myers, “Undaunted, I kissed him back.” Since this immediate impression of Zervas was good, Myers took him fully into his confidence, describing the work that the British had dropped into Greece to do—at that time the single Gorgopotamos operation.\textsuperscript{56} Although Zervas and Myers later disagreed on various points, their relationship—at least from Myers’ point of view\textsuperscript{l}—remained extremely friendly. His final comment on Zervas, “an outstanding and gallant leader,” evidenced his esteem.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{k} The title of general was assumed; Zervas’ rank in the regular Greek Army had been that of colonel. During his service, he had been engaged in a number of small-scale coups aimed at overthrowing the unstable governments before Metaxas.

\textsuperscript{l} Saraphis had claimed that Zervas’ opinion of Myers was quite low. (Greek Resistance Army, p. 113.)
To Myers second in command and later successor, Col. Christopher Woodhouse, Zervas, “for all his faults,” stood out “alongside his rival, Aris Veloukhiotis as one of the only two great personalities that the Greek resistance movement produced.”\(^{58}\) Most liaison officers liked Zervas. It was a most rational reaction. Not only was Zervas good company, but he was militarily reliable, in good days and bad. He obeyed British orders. For some operations in the summer of 1943, even before Myers left Greece, Zervas gave his troops orders stating that “Between the dates 20th June and 14th July all units will do exactly what they are told by the British liaison officers attached to them.”\(^{59}\)

If Zervas invariably complied with British requests, he exacted the same kind of obedience to his own orders on down the line in EDES. Under his leadership, EDES became a one-man organization. Brigadier Myers, noting Zervas’ unwillingness in early 1943 to delegate authority to subordinate guerrilla commanders, feared that this trait would hold down the growth of EDES, which he still hoped to make a counterbalance to the rising strength of EAM/ELAS.\(^{60}\) Within EDES, too, there were commanders who longed for greater autonomy. “The centralization of power which General Zervas insisted on . . . proved to be unwarranted and injurious,” later wrote his second in command, Komninos Pyromaglou. “Nothing was heard but the slogan ‘Faith in the Leader. All for the Leader. All from the Leader.’”\(^{61}\)

As Zervas dominated EDES in the mountains, he also began to assert his increasing independence of EDES in Athens. This occurrence followed a natural sequence of events. In the first place, General Plastiras, the nominal head of EDES, was in exile, and there was no other outstanding figure in EDES in Athens with the authority to hold Zervas’ allegiance. Second, the fact that the British supplied the major portion of support for EDES in the mountains removed Zervas’ need for Athenian support. Also, because events in the mountains required immediate action for which there was no time to refer to Athens, Zervas took matters more and more into his own hands. In March 1943, he followed Woodhouse’s suggestion and wired greetings to King George II on Independence Day; at the same time, he wired the British government that he would not oppose the King’s restoration “even without the people’s wishes,” although one of the planks in EDES’ charter was in opposition to this stand. Thus Zervas cut his political bonds to EDES in Athens. In July 1943, the name of the guerrilla units under Zervas was actually changed from EDES to EOEA, National Bands of Greek Guerrillas, at British suggestion; but the name change was symbolic only—the old name of EDES stuck, and meant in effect the guerrillas under Zervas.\(^{62}\)
At the same time that Zervas established control over EDES guerrillas independently of its original Athens affiliation, a strange set of circumstances arose that finally came indirectly to control him. With Zervas’ political declaration for the King in March 1943, EDES in the mountains became “respectable” in monarchical circles. Many royalist officers began to come to the mountains; some of these were, however, not only royalist but so right-wing politically that they were tinged, as it was said, with collaboration. Myers remembered, for example, that he could not accept these officers but that he sent them on to Zervas, who found places for them. These officers helped EDES tactically. They provided an abundance of trained leadership which gave EDES’ bands an early superiority over EAM/ELAS in the field. On the other hand, the relationship of the right-wing officer cadre with Zervas led him further and further into political conservatism.

Figure 15. General Zervas, Commander of the guerrillas of EDES.
While Zervas was becoming ever more conservative politically, the Athenian branch of EDES was making a political turn of its own. It was shifting from a centrist republican position to that of extremism, a part becoming very left-wing, a large part becoming an extremely right-wing, even collaborationist, organization. This, in turn, placed Zervas in an equivocal position: he had not only backed the King but was, for all intents and purposes, still allied with EDES in Athens, the majority of which organization was now very right-wing. The turn of events made him extremely vulnerable to Communist attack as a collaborator.65

The charge that Zervas and EDES collaborated with the Germans emanated first from EAM/ELAS, but was widely circulated throughout Greece. Since Zervas himself agreed in early 1944, at the talks leading to the Plaka Armistice, to repudiate various members of EDES as collaborators,66 the charge of collaboration within EDES appears sustained.

Insofar as the charge directly concerned Zervas, Colonel Woodhouse has dealt with it in detail. “Only three examples,” he has written, “have come to my knowledge, purporting to prove collusion between Zervas and the Germans that are based on his actual conduct of operations.” These were (1) an armistice alleged to have been signed, in October 1943, between Zervas and the Germans; (2) the inactivity of EDES in the summer of 1944; and (3) German noninterference with the unloading of Allied supplies on the west coast of Greece, also in the summer of 1944.66

Concerning the first charge—the alleged armistice with the Germans—Woodhouse has pointed out that it originated with Aris, capetan in the GHQ of ELAS. It was based on a message from an ELAS commander, stating that he had been told by Red Cross representatives that Zervas had signed such an armistice for 14 days’ duration. On the basis of this example, the ELAS commander had also agreed to such an armistice, thus incriminating himself and leading to his repudiation by EAM/ELAS. As to Zervas’ collaboration, this evidence is far from conclusive. Woodhouse has stated that the meeting between Zervas and the Red Cross representatives was attended by a fluent Greek-speaking English officer,67 who heard nothing of this sort. Furthermore, the meeting was followed by a long and fierce fight initiated by the Germans.67

As for EDES’ inactivity in the summer of 1944, the record indicates that SOE Cairo had ordered Zervas to lie low and “to refrain temporarily from operations against the Germans” in that very period. The third

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65 Gonatas, Tavoularis, Voulpiotis, etc. (Named by Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, p. 177.)

66 Woodhouse himself?
bit of evidence, that the Germans allowed Zervas to be resupplied without hindrance during the summer of 1944, is apparently neutralized by Woodhouse’s well-taken observation that it proved, not that Zervas collaborated, but that the Germans were fools. 68

Woodhouse was commander of the Allied Military Mission and was in Greece during most of the period under consideration; his refutation of the charges that Zervas collaborated was published in May 1948 and bears great weight. Still the charge will not quite die. If one completely disregards the propaganda against Zervas put out by EAM/ELAS, there still occurs sporadically the evidence of the Germans, who appear to have been under the conviction that, if they did not have a signed armistice with Zervas, they at least had a “Balkan Gentleman’s Agreement.” 69

Lt. Gen. (General der Gebirgstruppen) Hubert Lanz, commander of German forces responsible for the security of western Greece, has written that offers were twice made to Zervas by the local German commander in Epirus, in the fall of 1943, and again in the spring of 1944. In the first case, no overt agreement existed, but a modus vivendi grew up in which “Fighting between the two decreased and, at times, ceased altogether. Contact, although in a rather loose form, was maintained between the German commands and the EDES.” 70

General Lanz recorded more success for the German overtures in the spring of 1944, “Hostilities ceased,” he wrote, “steady contact between Zervas and the German commander in Yannina was maintained and joint operations were carried out against the Communist bands.” 71 Lanz was extremely precise in regard to an actual German operation against a guerrilla band of about 2,000 ELAS men located near Karpenision: “the Nationalist partisans entered into a temporary agreement with the Germans—not so much to help the latter as to eliminate their Red rivals. In short, aside from the superior German fighting power, the help of the local EDES and their familiarity with the region made it possible to surround and annihilate the Reds in their mountain fortress in the summer of 1944.” 72

In July 1944, when EDES attacked some German outposts, the Germans first thought that Allied liaison officers and anti-Zervas elements had seized control of EDES; but they later decided, after negotiations with Zervas, that he had been forced by the Allies to recommence operations. “In several strong raids,” wrote Lanz, “Zervas attempted to annihilate his former ‘partner.’” Only then did the Germans plan to undertake a major operation against EDES. 73

The exact degree of Zervas complicity in collaboration with the Germans is difficult to pinpoint or to prove. The fact that the Germans appeared so certain of their arrangements with him does not, however,
necessarily convict them of being fools. It was as much to their advantage as to his to maintain even a temporary truce. Other elements combined to lend credence to the existence of some form of agreement between Zervas and the Germans: the large number of royalist and rightwing officers who joined EDES; the bitterness of the fight between EDES and EAM/ELAS, which could all too easily have made the Germans seem the lesser enemy; and the temptation Zervas must have felt, on receiving SOE Cairo’s orders to lie low, to assure compliance and improve his own situation by striking a bargain with the Germans. The Germans’ easy assumption that such an agreement existed and their general toughness towards any enemy that really threatened them tend to raise the existence of an agreement of some sort from a possibility to a probability. And if it did exist, it is difficult to believe that it could have been negotiated by subordinates without Zervas’ knowledge: his one-man control of EDES would have made that most unlikely. In any event, the German belief that some form of agreement existed between them and EDES is a major factor in the story of guerrilla operations in Greece.

The figure of Zervas thus emerges as extraordinarily controversial. No light is shed by either his previous or his later record. Supporters have termed his career before World War II “adventurous”; detractors have referred to him as the “gambling king of Athens.” His post-World War II career was distinctly second-rate: going into politics in the period after 1945, he served as Minister of Public Order in 1947. Of this period, his most important British supporter, Colonel Woodhouse, has written, “to his true friends . . . it must seem a melancholy anticlimax.” Zervas’ career in World War II, however, is what concerns this story, and any final judgment of that career must apparently rest with the bias of the onlooker.74

The politics of EDES had little effect on the rank and file. Below the level of the officer group, EDES guerrillas were recruited from among the mountain villagers just as were those for EAM/ELAS. The fame of Gorgopotamos drew a large number of volunteers. Also, officer-recruiters went from village to village haranguing the men and often succeeding in getting numbers of them to join. Allied supply drops helped considerably, if indirectly, in initial recruitment. In the first place, EDES gained prestige from the recognition implicit in the sending of Allied liaison officers and Allied supplies to them. In the second place, there was a very real chance that guerrillas getting Allied support would live better than the villagers. Supply drops to EDES included British battle dress which was used to augment the guerrillas’ own clothing. By mid-1943 about two thirds of EDES had been so supplied. Allied supplies helped to feed EDES guerrillas. And Zervas was able to pay his men, by virtue of gold sovereigns given him by the British.75
If force was sometimes applied in the recruitment for ELAS, it is doubtful that EDES had to use much force or that it did. Recruitment became even easier when the occupation forces began to use harsh measures against the villagers: men whose homes had been burned had little alternative and a good deal of motivation to join the guerrilla bands. In a land where life was unbearably difficult, life in EDES was bearably difficult.

From a British military view of any specific type of guerrilla operation, EDES was generally tactically superior to EAM/ELAS. Particularly in the early days of 1943, it combined military experience with guerrilla techniques. Zervas managed the whole show, but he developed small bands of guerrillas under junior officers who were relatively independent within the small area of their operations. The officers themselves had usually had regular army training and were capable leaders. At all levels, the military background of EDES officers gave uniformity to its command structure. “Zervas,” wrote Woodhouse, “was the first [in
Greece] to grasp the essence of guerrilla operations.” In addition, Zervas gave great weight to the counsel of the British liaison officers who were assigned to his various guerrilla groups. “No decision at any level could be wrong,” wrote Colonel Woodhouse, “if it were sanctioned by a BLO.” The working policy was thus established.76

By the summer of 1943, EDES retreated from its informal organization and began to set up companies, battalions, regiments, and a higher structure called units or bands. Each unit contained two regiments of two battalions each. From the summer of 1944, they possessed rather heavy armament brought into Greece through the EDES-controlled landing port at Parga. EDES even had some new mountain guns. Leadership and training were now uniform throughout EDES. New recruits with previous military experience were trained for 4 to 5 days; those without experience attended courses for 2 to 4 weeks. They were taught obedience, drill, and weapons handling; they received some tactical instruction, although most of this occurred during actual operations. By midsummer 1944, the Germans had identified four EDES divisions, or units.77

In comparison with the strength of its rival, EAM/ELAS, the strength of EDES was always low. This was mainly due to two causes. First, Zervas’ one-man control made it difficult at first to enlarge the organization. Second, when the need for growth had become absolutely apparent to Zervas by the end of 1943, he was already engaged in internecine war with EAM/ELAS, and it was too late to overtake his rival. The Plaka Armistice that ended the interguerrilla war in February 1944 defined Zervas’ boundaries, and recruitment for EDES was limited to the area it controlled. Since this territory amounted principally to sparsely populated Epirus in northwestern Greece, there were obvious restrictions on the size that EDES could attain.78

Naturally EDES strength varied from time to time. When Brigadier Myers first met Zervas in November 1942, the latter had approximately 150 men at his disposal and used about 50 on the Gorgopotammos operation. By early 1943 EDES had expanded to several hundred men. In April, Myers estimated that EDES had grown to 1,000 guerrillas. In the summer of 1943, EDES’ strength, again using Myers’ estimate, had reached about 5,000 armed men in guerrilla groups. In the villages an equal number of men were in the armed EDES reserves. In late 1943 EDES was almost destroyed by EAM/ELAS. Woodhouse himself despaired and even suggested that, if the Middle East Command wanted a guerrilla arm in Greece, it would probably have to drop support of EDES. The British refused, redoubled their support, and pulled

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° German estimates of that time put it at four times that figure; Saraphis estimated EDES’ strength at 200 men.
EDES through. In mid-1944, at the approach of the German withdrawal, the British sent some Greek reinforcements from the Middle East to enlarge the structure of EDES. In the summer of 1944, EDES reached a high point of about 10,000 to 12,000 armed and operative men. German estimates put the final strength of EDES in the fall of 1944, after their last mopping-up operations and the start of the guerrilla offensive against the retreating Germans, at about 8,000 men.79

In summing up the guerrilla organization of EDES, it may be said that it was the creature of Zervas and that he was in turn a British creation. Without British support it is most unlikely that there would have been any EDES after 1943 at the latest. This fact had the most important ramifications, both political and military. It alone justified every effort of every Allied liaison officer sent to Greece.

**Allied Troops with the Guerrillas**

The first Allied soldiers sent to work with the Greek guerrillas were the eight British officers and three enlisted men under Colonel Myers. When they were ordered to remain in Greece after the Gorgopotamos operation of 25 November 1942, they became known as the British Military Mission (BMM) and the officers as British liaison officers. Myers was made brigadier in command at BMM headquarters and the individual liaison officers were to provide liaison with the EDES or EAM/ELAS guerrilla groups.

In February 1943 Brigadier Myers divided Greece into four regions—Epirus, Roumeli, Olympus, and Macedonia. To each region he sent a senior liaison officer, under whom other British would serve. Each group had radio contact with SOE Cairo and, through Cairo, with Myers. Thus Myers organized his special forces for easy expansion. Woodhouse, who had been with Zervas, was brought back to headquarters as second in command. By the summer of 1943 there were approximately 30 or 40 British officers with various guerrilla groups, clustered around “about a dozen” radio stations.80

By this time also, Brigadier Myers had managed to work out a means of controlling his far-flung liaison officers. He had brought Lt. Col. Rufus Sheppard, who had parachuted to EAM/ELAS early in 1943 and had immediately championed their cause, under his clear authority, and ended Sheppard’s ambiguous status in Greece.81 Myers maintained close contact with his officers by spending much of his time traveling through mountain Greece, not only stopping at guerrilla headquarters but going from one mission headquarters to another, discussing

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P The Peloponnesus did not come under Myers’ jurisdiction. Neither did Crete.
problems, explaining policy, and smoothing guerrilla-liaison officer relationships. In addition, he called meetings of liaison officers. For example, a major meeting followed the successful conclusion of ANIMALS. At these meetings, personal relations were reaffirmed and command relations reestablished. Myers took such occasions to hold private conferences. “With each officer individually, I then went over his particular troubles,” he wrote, “and solved as many as I could.” After Myers left Greece, Woodhouse continued occasionally to hold such meetings.82

The liaison officers had “express instructions” not to take command of the Greek guerrillas in the field, but to confine their role to that of advisers. Their authority was therefore presumably nominal, but often came to be much greater. Their first undertaking, after meeting the local guerrillas in their area, was to organize their own living and radio facilities. Many liaison officers found it better to live separately from the guerrillas, certainly in their own quarters and often a few miles distant. Heeding the old dictum that “familiarity breeds contempt,” they felt that the separation enhanced their importance.9 The second step was almost certainly to set up and instruct a guerrilla reception committee for supply drops. The liaison officer spent his days traveling his area, inspecting the guerrillas, checking their arms and equipment, and requesting supply drops to bring arms and equipment up to a fixed standard. His nights were often involved in waiting for aircraft to drop supplies. Depending on his relations with local guerrilla leaders, the liaison officer could and did discuss tactics of past and future engagements and help train the guerrillas. Most liaison officers took part in and they often actually led guerrilla attacks on Axis supply lines or troops. One of the most important jobs for the liaison officer came to be the prevention of incidents between different guerrilla groups in his area or attacks by one on the other.83

When Myers left Greece for the Cairo conference in the summer of 1943, Woodhouse became acting commander of the British Military Mission (BMM). Myers did not return with the Greek guerrilla delegation in the fall of 1943. At that time, two American officers accompanied the returning delegates and joined the BMM, which thereupon became the Allied Military Mission (AMM), with Woodhouse as commander. The liaison officers were now known as Allied liaison officers (ALO’s). In December 1944 another American officer, Maj. G. K. Wines, jumped into Greece and seconded Woodhouse on the AMM. The preponderance of the missions with guerrilla groups, however, remained

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9 Another reason was to avoid German bombing of villages because of the presence of Allied officers. (Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 197.)
British—throughout the war Allied support of the Greek guerrillas remained substantially a “British show.”

In the summer of 1944, when the German withdrawal was imminent, the Allies wanted to support guerrilla operations with small units of highly trained men with heavier firepower capability than the guerrillas possessed. Beginning in the spring of 1944 and continuing through the summer, the Americans infiltrated about seven Operational Groups (O.G.’s) of 20 to 30 men each, under a senior American commander, Col. Paul West, who replaced Major Wines for a few weeks during the summer. The O.G.’s were landed at Parga and were guided in groups across Greece to their final destination. As a unit or sometimes in detachments, these groups acted in conjunction with the liaison officers and the guerrillas. Colonel West himself took part in these operations, “sometimes politely” placing himself under the orders of a liaison officer. The British also sent in similar groups from their Raiding Support Regiment (R.S.R.). These British and American units, although operating with the guerrillas, did not have the direct and often touchy personal relations with the latter that comprised the lot of the liaison officers. Including all ranks, Woodhouse estimated that in the summer of 1944 there were fewer than four hundred Allied troops in Greece. About a fourth of these were liaison officers. Of these, fewer than a tenth were Americans.

The major problem facing the liaison officer in Greece was that of adjustment to constantly changing living conditions, to other liaison officers, to the Greek people, and to the Greek guerrillas.

In the first few months of its sojourn in Greece, Myers’ group ran the gamut of these adjustment difficulties. During their first month Myers’ men had little to do, but they had to stay close together and remain in hiding. Most of the time they lived in caves. Monotony and boredom quickly set in among these men, and nothing much seemed to help. First they tried to study Greek in order to pass the time, but that activity brought out tension between one man who studied and another who would not. “Tom took a poor view of these activities of his fellow countryman and would accuse him of further ‘arse-crawling’ in such endeavors. ‘Bloody chap’ he would say in Martin’s hearing, ‘Don’t believe he is a New Zealander at all. Gives me a pain.’” Playing bridge was also impossible because of friction between the same two men.

Boredom and inactivity were not confined to Myers’ group, nor was their effect. One liaison officer in Crete remembered his weeks in a

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7 Wines had been injured in a fall from a horse and was exfiltrated in July 1944 for hospitalization. He returned to Greece in October 1944 and remained until December. Colonel West was Wines’ commanding officer in OSS Cairo. (Telcon, Wines and Condit, 11 September 1961.)
Behind Enemy Lines

The sedentary life of the enlisted radio operators may be viewed with particular sympathy. Tied to their radio sets, they usually lived in a Greek house or possibly in a mountain cave—quarters apt to be drab, cramped, and extremely cold. For companions, they saw daily the same persons. Their diet, like that of the Greeks, was, if not actually insufficient, extremely monotonous. Furthermore, once they had coded and sent outgoing messages and received and decoded incoming ones, there was nothing else for them to do. “Though they lived in reasonable security,” wrote a liaison officer, “... they were almost anaesthetized by boredom, from which they were only occasionally roused by spasms of activity too violent to be really welcome.”

Almost no one who went to Greece failed to experience, at some time, the hardship of dreariness and boredom brought on by lack of activity. Myers’ group was most fortunate, since its energies could be expended in the intense and exciting activity of demolishing the Gorgopotamos bridge.

After that operation, Myers’ group exchanged its alternate diet of boredom and excitement for one of hardship. It was winter: food supplies were at their lowest, and life out of doors was generally unpleasant. The group made its way across Greece to the western coast where it expected the submarine to exfiltrate it. On the march, they were able to billet in villages at nighttime. Although Greek hospitality provided its best, food was in extremely short supply in this territory; so short, in fact, that the men held back a little food each day against the next day’s fortunes. “It was the first time,” wrote Myers, “that I had experienced continuous hunger, and the feelings of insecurity and depression which accompany it.”

Waiting on the coast—living and sleeping out of doors and existing on a slice of maize bread and some muddy, brackish water during the day—the men dreamed of the food they would get on the submarine. After three days of fruitless waiting, however, Myers was desperate and gave the Greek guide some money—it was Christmas eve—to buy whatever food he could. The guide returned with a large pan of boiled pork, a fat and greasy dish which, although it tasted delicious, gave all the men diarrhea for many days. This was their condition when the courier from Woodhouse finally reached them with the news that the submarine would not be coming and that they would therefore have to stay in Greece.
They could not remain on the coast, a highly vulnerable location; they had to return to their starting point. To avoid detection they had to take an even longer route than before, so that they would not retrace their steps. Myers himself felt “too weak and tired” to cheer the others.92

“There were no words for what we felt,” wrote another member of that group, as they started the march back. “In silence and bitterness we looked to our packs and our boots.”93 Their boots, with the exception of one pair, privately purchased at very high cost, had already given out. The rubber soles of the British issue had proved extremely slippery on wet earth; on the march to the coast they went to pieces and the men were continually stitching and patching them.94 Even after the war, Myers recalled, the “memory of our journey back from the coast is still like that of a nightmare.”95

Once back in Zervas-controlled territory, Myers’ group was able to stay in villages again. Even then, there were often sudden alarms that the Italians were coming, and the group was frequently on the move. During one period in January 1943 Myers had to be placed on a mule and moved, even though he was sick with pneumonia. (As a matter of fact, the village doctor thought that he would die if moved, but one of the officers felt it wiser to chance the move than the mercy of the Italians, although Myers was in uniform.)96

By the spring of 1943, Brigadier Myers and most of his men were beginning to experience a few luxuries. Mission headquarters was ensconced in the village of Theodhoriana, which had the rare delight of electric light. The headquarters itself was situated in a comfortable house, and boasted an administrative officer who “organized messing on a comparatively lavish scale.” He bought special items such as chocolate, raisins, and a Greek sweet named halva on the black market. When the black market independently also produced three women, Myers felt things had gone too far. So did the local villagers, who were very upset and had to be reassured. The women were imprisoned, and one was later shot as a spy; the other two were “retired” for the rest of the war. Aside from this incident, Theodhoriana was a pleasant headquarters. Myers noted that “many days of comparative luxury and contentment quickly passed.”97

The other liaison officers, who were by now stationed around Greece in groups of one or two officers and a radio operator, often lived in equal or greater luxury. One luxury was the fairly independent existence, far removed from other groups.
Behind Enemy Lines

One liaison officer working with ELAS guerrillas lived in a rich resort area in a house that was large and in good condition, with working indoor bathrooms.\(^5\) There was adequate furniture, with beds to spare for guests. Meat and bread were sent weekly by the guerrillas, and this ration was eked out, not only by airdropped comforts, but with a home stock of a pig and eleven geese. The garden provided strawberries. The working staff consisted of a maid to cook, sew, wash, and become “a disturbing influence”; a man who acted as interpreter and steward; another man who was messenger and handyman; and a seamstress, who made shirts and pajamas from silk parachutes, sheets and tablecloths from canvas parachutes, and long silk stockings from the rigging lines. A horse, Freddy, allowed the run of the downstairs rooms at breakfast and at certain parties, completed the ménage.\(^98\) During the summer, upper-class Greek families on vacation made the neighborhood more attractive than usual to the hard-working liaison officer.

Ted and Inder seemed to find a good deal of attraction in the younger members of our new neighbors, and when they or other officers came through my H.Q. an excuse was always found to have a long drinking-party in the warm evenings. Ouzo and brandy were all we had, but they did well enough for cocktails. It seemed

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\(^5\) Extremely unusual in the Greek mountains, where even outside facilities were often lacking.
slightly ridiculous and unreal to come up from a day's work at the air-strip and an inspection of the guard-posts in the foot-hills, to find a “cocktail party” in full swing at my HQ with Inder winding up an old gramophone and Ted telling a tall story to some languishing girls from the town.99

Because there were, even among liaison officers, men to whom this type of life spelled only “more,” it was probably just as well that the Germans ended the entire episode by burning the house, down to its bathtub, in the early fall.100

Most contacts that the liaison officers had with the Greek people were, however, not with the wealthy upper-class but with peasants and mountaineers. In some ways these people delighted and pleased them, in other ways they surprised both British and Americans. Allied officers and men usually saw the worst side of Greek life first. This was not strange or unusual, it was and remains the natural order of events: they were brought near to nausea by the overwhelming stench of human sweat or excrement; they were sickened by the death rattle of a sheep being butchered; they were bitten mercilessly by fleas and lice, entrenched residents of a soft bed alluring with white sheets; they were upset by an easy tolerance of cruelty.

Figure 18. Transportation Problems Solved.

One surprise to many of the Allied officers was the Greek villager’s attitude towards women, who were the tillers of the soil and the stevedores of the villages. “I could never get used to this habit of treating
women as not very valuable animals,” wrote a liaison officer adding, “but I could see the advantages of the system and only look forward with sardonic longing to the day when women get the vote in Greece.”

When guerrilla packs had to be carried from village to village and the mule supply was insufficient, or the weather was too bad, the village president called out the women. Brigadier Myers was to remark that snow impeded the animals more than the women. They also helped in the summer of 1943 to build the first Allied airstrip at Neraidha.

Despite their use as laborers, Greek mountain women lived a life of extreme retirement by Western European or American standards. In the house they stayed in the background when men were about. They generally ate after the men, and conversational exchange between the sexes except for family members, was not usual. When one liaison officer on Crete was found outdoors talking to two village schoolmistresses, the man in whose house he was living became abusive. “‘Women,’ he screamed. ‘You’re turning this place into a whorehouse!’”

The reactions of Allied liaison officers to the role of lower-class Greek women is probably summed up by the number of expressions of pleasure at meeting the occasional girl from the town or the “emancipated” young village woman who did not wear the usual black dress with head shawl and who braved social disapproval to engage in conversation. The liaison officers themselves were, of course, also braving social disapproval.

Even the magnificent hospitality of the poorest Greek was not always appreciated by the Allied liaison officer. Sometimes he offered gold and embarrassed or offended his hosts. Sometimes he did not, with the same results. Or perhaps, as he was offered the greatest delicacy on the table—often the sheep’s eyeball or pieces of genitalia—the liaison officer was hard put to play the role of perfect guest. Luckily, the Greeks usually understood and did not take it amiss if their guests refused. The liaison officer was also apt to be upset by the lice and fleas prevalent in many mountain homes. “I awoke to find that I had been bitten from top to toe by fleas,” is a typical comment. “I did not know whether to sympathize with the brothers and sisters of the house, whose beds we had occupied, or to be wildly envious of the immunity which they must

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1 This was not strictly a wartime guerrilla custom. Greek women were in many villages the most usual means of moving supplies. During the war of 1940–41 both men and women carried guns and ammunition across the mountains to the Greek Army. EAM/ELAS, as a matter of fact, offered greater opportunity to Greek women than was their usual lot. Tzimas’ wife spoke in the villages on the role of Greek women in the resistance. Village girls could join the local EPON youth unit. There was even a fighting ELAS girl unit, which suffered casualties. Greek women first exercised the franchise in voting during the 1944 EAM-sponsored PEEA elections. They had not voted previously and did not vote again until 1952. (Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 116 and n. 1 on p. 176; Moss, A War of Shadows, p. 102.)
surely have cultivated against such vicious attacks. . . .” Before DDT, this misfortune was a keen one, both British and Americans have testified. Liaison officers have recalled that they sometimes accepted the hospitality of the bed of the house—to do otherwise would have been rude—and then slept on the floor. Even this expedient did not always save them.105

The average liaison officer did, nevertheless, adjust to Greek mountain life. It was one thing to complain about fleas in the bed or to wince at the sight of a sheep’s eyeball floating in the stew. It was quite another to know that one’s mere presence threatened a village with disaster, that every time one set up an operation, all the inhabitants of the area faced the destruction of their homes and possibly the loss of family members through enemy reprisals. “When a mountain village was about to be raided by the enemy,” Myers wrote of early 1943, “a fatalistic and relatively quiet terror spread through it.”106 Except for those too old to walk, everyone would leave, burdened down with the precious food and blankets needed to sustain life. And these were the days before the reprisals were really severe, when possibly only half of the houses would be burned. Not only to Myers, but to many, many others of the liaison officers, the heroes of the Greek war of the resistance were “the unarmed people of the mountains; the people who endured the full terror of enemy reprisals; who produced no traitors; among whom we always moved freely and by whom we were provided with food, shelter, guides and information. . . .”107

Figure 19. Greek Village Women.

Just as most liaison officers, without previous experience of Greece or Greeks, came to admire the Greek people who sustained the guerrilla
warfare, they also learned to get along with the guerrillas with whom they worked; at least in most cases. If not, Myers or Woodhouse made changes in assignment: “If the unit was bad, they left it; if they were bad, they were relieved; if the two were incompatible, an interchange was arranged. That was the only way the guerrilla war could work.”

Yet it was not quite that easy. It may be questioned how much the political controversy in and about Greece, and especially between the British and EAM/ELAS, affected life in the field. Many British writers of memoirs have shown keen distaste for EAM/ELAS at all levels. For his part, Saraphis was certainly an Anglophobe, and he felt that bad feeling often prevailed between the ELAS commands and liaison officers. It is surprising, therefore, to find that Woodhouse thought that few liaison officers had political opinions, but that “their unconscious sympathies were rather to the left than the right.”

It is true that some few British, like Rufus Sheppard, lauded EAM/ELAS to the skies. It is also true that the men who came to hate EAM/ELAS the most were often those who served with the forces of Zervas. Of particular annoyance to the British was the ELAS habit of demanding that liaison officers not travel through EAM/ELAS districts to which they were not accredited without obtaining travel passes from the local ELAS command. This problem was not really solved until mid-1944, when ELAS decided to issue permanent travel passes. Below the leadership level, however, the rank and file of guerrillas were much alike, whether they belonged to EDES or EAM/ELAS. At the tactical level, there was far less of the friction between the British and ELAS than was the case at headquarters. In the field, relationships were man to man. In most cases, Woodhouse wrote, liaison officers liked “whatever guerrillas they were with.”

The process of getting to know each other was often prolonged and even difficult. There were honest adjustments that liaison officers had to make. One of the most upsetting experiences for the Allied men was the mountain Greek’s apparent penchant for torture as a “sport.” When the Greeks finished at Gorgopotamos, for example, they kept one Italian soldier as an amusement: he was finally killed by an “unblooded” and blundering youngster of 16 elected to do the job. “There was a groan,” reported a British commando officer, eyewitness to the scene, “echoed by the Greeks with laughter . . . Four times the sword fell and the execution party joined us, laughing and joking with the boy who seemed half pleased and half ashamed . . . I reflected that the killing of the Italian ended for me the adventure of the Gorgopotamos.” On the mainland and on Crete there were numerous similar examples of brutality, painful to Allied eyes and ears; by the norm, the Italian got a quick release. Liaison officers have confessed to shooting uniformed
prisoners themselves, rather than leave them to the Greeks. Many men on the battlefields of World War II had little personal sense of direct involvement in bloodshed, but this was not the case for the Allied liaison officer.\textsuperscript{113}

That the Greek peasant wanted to look up to and respect the Allied liaison officer is almost undeniable. Whereas the liaison officer had no real authority, he was paradoxically the living embodiment of it to most Greeks. “The lightest word that falls from the unguarded lips of the youngest second lieutenant in the British Army,” declared Colonel Woodhouse, “is assumed to be an inspired declaration of policy.”\textsuperscript{114} The British liaison officers who came to Greece first, particularly the 30 or 40 on duty during active operations in the summer of 1943, exerted an influence out of all proportion to their numbers. Not only over the ignorant peasants, but even over educated Greeks, they had tremendous influence. It was this very influence that EAM/ELAS was constantly trying to overcome, by propaganda to its rank and file that the British would try to restore the King, by insisting that liaison officers not travel in ELAS districts without getting ELAS-issued travel warrants. Even in ELAS territory, however, the British liaison officer elicited respect. History, tradition, and legend reinforced Greek respect for the liaison officers. “They were on the spot; they \textit{were} England.”\textsuperscript{115}

If the liaison officer \textit{was} England to the Greek guerrilla, he was also supposed to look the role. From Crete to Macedonia, the guerrilla “preferred to regard every Englishman as a direct descendant of Lord Byron.” And the Greek guerrilla expected him to look as he imagined Lord Byron to have looked, to act as he imagined Lord Byron to have acted. This aspect of the relationship between guerrilla and liaison officer helps to account for the fact that, on the whole, the man who looked Greek, or who was Greek, or who was descended from Greeks was not particularly successful, despite his command of the language. Concerning his successor, on Crete, Liaison Officer Xan Fielding wrote, “. . . I was not altogether happy about handing over to him. For, through no fault of his own, he had already proved himself unpopular. His Greek surname and Levantine features made him suspect in the eyes of the local peasants. . . .”\textsuperscript{116} Brigadier Myers had already discovered on the mainland that Greek officers, although in the British Army, had difficulty in maintaining any control over Greek guerrillas. “It was undesirable,” wrote Myers of a young Greek cavalryman whom he personally regarded as excellent, “for us to have a Greek officer in a tricky area where bands of both ELAS and EDES existed.”\textsuperscript{117} Asking about a new
Behind Enemy Lines

British officer who had landed in Greece, an ELAS commander in Macedonia\textsuperscript{118} inquired whether he was “like Byron?”\textsuperscript{u}

The same strictures did not seem to apply to Americans, particularly to members of the Operational Groups. Most of the O.G.’s were first-generation Americans of Greek descent and many spoke the language fluently. They fitted into the Greek scene so naturally that it seemed to some of the Greeks that “they had lived all their lives among us.” The Greeks liked the O.G.’s on the whole—their easy ways, their quick camaraderie, their first questions: “How far away were the Germans? Any room for a baseball-pitch? Any girls?” Luckily, the Greeks appeared to have expected no American Byrons. The relationship with American O.G.’s—even when it was a bad one—was subtly different from the relationship with the liaison officers. For one thing, their role was quite different from that of the liaison officers. The Operational Group gave support to liaison officers and guerrillas in tactical operations. Except perhaps for the greater material wealth of the Americans, relations between guerrillas and O.G.’s were thus on a basis of equality.\textsuperscript{119}

The role of the Allied liaison officer was far more complex. His problem was essentially to maintain some control over the guerrillas while he possessed no authority over them. Personal relationships were therefore the heart of the matter.

In this relationship, there were apparently two psychological counterforces. On the one hand, the liaison officer appeared all-powerful: he descended by parachute; he represented one of the great nations of the world; he commanded, by means of his radio, instant contact with the outside world; he summoned supply drops and gold. How could the poor ragged Greek guerrilla, despite his pride, not look up to him? On the other hand, the Allied officers were young, daring, intensively trained for derring-do, invested with “a levity of outlook upon their grim life.”\textsuperscript{120} Sometimes this levity was admired by the Greeks, but then again it sometimes went beyond the bounds. For example, Greeks on Crete were aghast to see the Allied officers swimming and sunbathing nude, even in all-male company.\textsuperscript{121} Again, the Greeks who saw British liaison officers throwing overripe oranges at each other, then continuing (when the oranges were all spattered around) with sticks and buckets of water, or the Greeks who saw the British throwing stones at each other in horse play felt first astonishment, then chagrin, and then anger.\textsuperscript{122} The most Anglophile Greek took it amiss. Hopefully, Woodhouse was

\textsuperscript{u} One officer who went to Greece with British commandos in September 1944 was the only direct descendant of Byron. “The Greeks got to know this and treated him like a deity.” (Wilson, \textit{Flight Years Overseas}, pp. 232–33.)
right in reporting that most men engaged in such operations grew out of the levity.

A concomitant of their relative situations in life was that many Greeks apparently saw liaison officers in a haze of father-image. When a British major forbade a young Greek at mission headquarters to go visit his girl friend, angry words were exchanged. “It ended with Mac telling me to shut my mouth and my stomping off to bed without supper,” are the exact words of the culprit. Of the end of their association, when the liaison officer went home, the Greek was later to write: “For me Mac’s leaving represented the loss of someone I had come to look on as a big brother or even a father figure—when I meet him these days he calls me ‘son’.” Mac is five years older than his friend. It is a good guess that the guerrilla who, perhaps less consciously, sought a father figure was doubly offended by the liaison officer who did not allow such a projection.

In general, the British or Americans deplored, at least, privately, the guerrilla’s general lack of military training. The liaison officer saw the rank and file fail to attack; he saw them attack too soon, thus divulging the ambush; he saw them melt away too fast, thus leaving other elements uncovered. He saw guerrillas freeze, unable to pull the trigger, he saw them throw away rifles and run; he saw them fire too soon. He saw cowardice and hot-headed, foolish bravery. One young Greek described an operation by ELAS guerrillas: “Young guerrillas, most of them boys under twenty, were running wildly in all directions. None of them seemed afraid. They were just letting off steam like schoolboys, swinging in and out of carriages shooting at every shadow . . . . It was a wonder they didn’t shoot one another . . . . Some even went singing into the night sky . . . .”

Training. Training. Training. If Saraphis admitted the need, liaison officers cried it to high heaven. What came to surprise the liaison officer, even to fool him, was the depth of the training that was required.

Consider the matter of telling time. The liaison officer, at first, took it as a matter of course that one could agree to meet at, say 3 o’clock in the afternoon. Or that the hour of attack would be at, say 1500. Not in the Greek mountains or on the Greek islands. “I was told by Zahari,” begins a not unusual story, “that we should reach our hiding place in one and a half hours. It was midnight when we left the cove . . . and it was four o’clock in the morning when we at last reached our destination.” Or: “More than once I have known what was supposed to be a two-hour journey [to] last from breakfast till dinner.” On Crete it was safe for the liaison officer to treble time estimates for journeys; on the mainland, greater leeway had to be allowed. On the Gorgopotammos operation, which depended on exact timing, and on which Myers, Aris,
and Zervas formed the headquarters command, H-hour occurred only fourteen minutes late.\textsuperscript{127}

Not only their cultural background but their physical condition had much to do with the trainability of the guerrillas. Years of hard work, little food, and poor conditions of life produced a wiry mountaineer but seldom men in top physical form. Liaison officers were often in much better shape. Few Greeks could keep up with Colonel Woodhouse in walking over their own mountains. He was known to have sent guides back because he had tired them out. He made it a practice to pick up fresh local guides from each village as he trekked over the mountains to Athens or back to Epirus. Physical condition obviously limited the pitch of training that men could sustain.\textsuperscript{128}

But if training was needed, the liaison officer was also rarely able to give it, since the guerrillas generally came under their own leaders. The liaison officer had to treat the guerrilla in terms that the latter accepted. This meant that the liaison man often had to give way, to be tactful of the guerrilla leader’s extraordinary pride. Once Brigadier Myers, in an attempt to reprimand a guerrilla leader whom he thought insubordinate, refused publicly to return his salute. Seeing this, Woodhouse warned Myers, “If you weren’t an Englishman, Karalivanos would cut your throat for that!” “Yes,” replied the regular British officer, “But when I meet Aris, Karalivanos may have a job to keep his own head on his shoulders.” In this instance, Myers had assessed the situation accurately and Karalivanos was brought to heel—that is, on the Gorgopotamos operation he literally fought for his life. His bravery in turn was rewarded by Myers’ public congratulations. But such tactics could not be used indiscriminately and might not have worked had not Aris’ reputation been what it was; after all, he had had a man shot for stealing a chicken.\textsuperscript{129}

In general, the key to the job of dealing with the guerrillas was not softness so much as tact and judgment—the knowledge of when to be severe and when to tread lightly. But tact and judgment were hard to exercise when they were also being practiced on one. Even in close relationships between liaison officers and Greeks, the latter often did not divulge their feelings.\textsuperscript{130} “I confess that I told him [the liaison officer], a lie,” wrote George Psychoundakis, a Cretan runner for the British, “because I didn’t want to upset him.”\textsuperscript{131}

The secret was the ability to lead, even to criticize, without offending the intense natural dignity and pride that the often rough-shod, unclean, sometimes uncouth Greek possessed in abundant quantity. Snobbery, superiority, thoughtlessness did not mark the useful liaison officer.
The liaison officers were, first of all, human beings subject to human failings, in an incredibly difficult position. This was also the case for the Greek people and the guerrillas, whether those of ELAS or EDES. It is thus to the credit of all these groups that the military purpose of the resistance was upheld—that tactical operations against the enemy were actually undertaken by the guerrillas.
CHAPTER V.
TACTICAL GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

A QUICK OVERVIEW
THE MAJOR TARGET
EXAMPLES OF GUERRILLA OPERATIONS
WHAT MILITARY VALUE?
WHAT COST?
TACTICAL GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

A Quick Overview

Until November 1942 Greek guerrilla operations had been pin-pricks to the Axis occupiers. At that time, however, the demolition of the Gorgopotamos Bridge deep in Axis territory struck a major blow against the Axis supply system. Afterward, on orders from the Allied Commander, guerrilla operations subsided for the winter months. In June and July 1943, major guerrilla operations were resumed in Operation ANIMALS, designed to make the Axis believe that an Allied invasion would be made in Greece rather than in Sicily. The British were pleased with the results and grateful to the guerrillas. “Two German divisions,” wrote Prime Minister Churchill, “were moved into Greece which might have been used in Sicily.”1 Thereafter, however, the guerrillas became more and more a strategic and political problem for the British, and their military value was diminished.

Although Prime Minister Churchill later thought that ANIMALS marked “the last direct military contribution which the Greek guerrillas made to the war,”2 the Germans had little inkling that this was the situation. Thoroughly alarmed about the expansion of guerrilla warfare in Greece, the defection of the Italian forces there, and the possibility that Allied landings might still be made in Greece, they began, in the fall and winter of 1943–1944, a series of mopping-up operations aimed mainly at the guerrillas of EAM/ELAS.

That organization was at the time also engaged in fighting its smaller rival EDES. At the end of the winter of 1943–1944, the situation was that the Germans had not been able to eliminate the guerrillas and the guerrillas had not been able to eliminate each other.

Primarily to divert guerrilla attention from internecine warfare, the Allied liaison officers in Greece were ordered by Middle East Command to propose planning for Operation NOAH’S ARK, set for the spring of 1944. This operation was to be guerrilla harassment of the German withdrawal from Greece and was to precede and continue simultaneously with Operation MANNA, the landing of a token force of British troops at the time of the German retreat. NOAH’S ARK did not actually take place until the fall of 1944, by which time the Germans had begun their northward retreat from outposts in southern Greece and the islands.

Meanwhile, the summer of 1944 was marked by another series of major German actions designed to eliminate the guerrilla threat. At first these were directed against EAM/ELAS, but after EDES initiated attacks against the Germans, mopping-up operations were also planned.
against that organization. The Germans claimed large guerrilla losses; however, the ability of the guerrillas to regroup and continue operations was not affected.

In late September NOAH’S ARK went into full swing as the Germans pulled back to the Corfu-Olympus line. The guerrillas tried to block transit on roads and rail lines leading to the north, and the Germans had to fight to keep the roads and rails open. Although they were slowed up, they managed to complete a fairly orderly retreat from Greece by November 1944.

The guerrilla war can be operationally summed up in the words of Woodhouse. If, in 1943, “a handful of guerrillas prevented the Germans from total occupation,” in 1944, “a handful of Germans and second-rate satellite troops now prevented the guerrillas from total occupation.” However, this is not the whole story.

The Germans, of course, did not operate on a man-to-man basis. Not only did guerrilla strength never equal Axis strength, but Axis troops were on the whole in a better state of combat readiness than the guerrillas. Even the low-caliber troops of the fortress divisions were better organized, better equipped, and better trained. Their leaders were more uniformly trained and more advanced in tactics. German armament, including armored cars and tanks, had no counterpart in the guerrilla army. The Germans also had some aircraft for raids on guerrilla headquarters and drop zones, or in some instances, for tactical support in mopping-up operations. Furthermore, although the Germans found it difficult to maintain contact with the guerrillas while fighting in the mountains, they were more mobile and could bring up reinforcements quickly to obtain local combat superiority.

The Greek guerrillas, particularly EAM/ELAS, were at best an improvised army. They had no tactical air force. They attempted to establish technical support services, but these were rudimentary compared with those of a regular army. Held down by their lack of transport and the artificial territorial limitations imposed by their own rivalries, the guerrillas were hard pressed to bring up reinforcements of men and supply to areas of local combat. Both EAM/ELAS and EDES operated with one hand, as it were, tied behind their backs—fighting with each other as they tried to harass the German forces. In addition, it must also be realized that, from their point of view, NOAH’S ARK was not altogether sensible: why risk one’s life to impede the leavetaking of a hated enemy? The fact that both EAM/ELAS and EDES operated to Woodhouse’s general satisfaction in this period says much for British control and for guerrilla efforts.
The Major Target

The most important target for guerrilla operations was the transportation system. This meant, in effect, the road and rail system, since the Axis lacked adequate air or sea craft to transport men and materiel through the Balkans and since the inland waterways were generally unsuitable for transportation purposes. By successfully attacking the roads and railways and the users of this transportation complex, the guerrillas could fulfill all Allied desires. They could hold down enemy troops that might be used elsewhere, they could inflict enemy troop losses, they could interdict enemy lines of communications, and they could cause loss of enemy supplies and equipment. Greek roads and rails offered an excellent target to the guerrillas.

The value of the road and rail system as a target was enhanced by the fact that it remained useful and necessary to the Germans throughout the occupation. Until May 1943, when German troops were thrown out of North Africa, the Greek transportation complex served as a main supply route for Rommel’s troops. After May 1943, the German commander charged with defending Greece still needed to control the country’s roads and railways. Since an Allied landing was anticipated in Greece throughout 1943 and into 1944, control of its transportation system was necessary if troops were to be brought up to the point of invasion quickly. German plans, in fact, were based on using second-rate troops to defend the coast and on bringing up frontline troops from the interior to the point of attack. After the invasion possibility practically evaporated in mid-1944, the Germans still had to protect the roads and railways in order to maintain an effective occupation, to supply their outposts in southern Greece and the islands, and to safeguard their eventual withdrawal routes.

The importance of the road and rail net in Greece was further increased by the fact that there was so little of it. In countries with an extensive transportation net, routing could be shifted to bypass breaks made by sabotage. Less important traffic could be sidetracked and left standing in order to secure additional cars or locomotives. In Greece, where the transportation net was rudimentary, every break was a major one.

From Europe through Greece there was only one north-south railroad, the single-track broad-gauge line of the Greek State Railways. This led from the Yugoslav border to Salonika and thence to Athens, where it stopped. Supplies destined for the Peloponnesus had to be reloaded onto the cars of the narrow-gauge Piraeus-Athens-Peloponnesus line.\(^5\)
The Salonika-Athens line constituted practically the whole mainland system. It wound through the eastern part of Greece with several spurs running a short distance to the eastern coast or through Thessaly into the central plain of Greece. The western coast was without rail transportation, except for a small narrow-gauge line that linked Messolongi with Agrinion in extreme southwestern Greece. At the beginning of World War II the entire rail coverage of Greece, including the Peloponnesus, amounted to about 1,700 miles.\(^6\)

It might seem that so comparatively few miles of railroad could be defended by an occupation army without too much difficulty. In Greece, however, ordinary problems of defense were compounded because of the mountainous terrain. All along the railway sudden bends and curves created many blind spots where engineers could not see in time that barriers had been erected or that track had been torn
up. Railroad bridges spanned deep mountain chasms, and bridge garrisons were not always sufficiently alert to avoid demolition sabotage. Trains had to go through a number of tunnels in the mountains, sometimes in approaching a bridge, and these also offered targets for sabotage. One particularly vulnerable stretch of the railway was bounded on both sides by mountains or high hills; it became infamous as the “Five Mile Area” and was particularly feared by the hapless Greek locomotive engineers.

The road system offered the Germans a poor alternative to the railway for transportation of men and supplies. In the first place, the Germans were short of both trucks and gasoline. In the second place, the roads themselves were extremely poor. Only a few major highways were paved. In the dry summer weather a cloud of dust, visible miles away, betrayed any usage. In the rainy season vehicles bogged down in the mud. At all times, holes, pockets, and bumps kept traffic slow. Even on the plains of Thessaly, the road system was “incredibly bad.” Once the major road was left, speed was limited to 10 to 15 miles per hour.7

Furthermore, the roads did not adequately cover Greece. From Salonika in the northeast to Athens in the south—the two largest cities—there was only one usable road paralleling the east coast railroad. On the western side, the Yannina-Arta-Agrinion road was the sole north-south highway. Across northern Greece there was only one major west-east road, that leading from Yannina to Trikkala to Larisa, where it intersected the Salonika-Athens highway. It was of such importance that it became a matter of constant contention between the occupiers and the guerrillas.8 On Crete there was only one major lateral road, along the northern shore. Greece, in short, did not have a road system adequate for the motorized transport of regular troops in combat with fast-dissolving guerrilla forces. Furthermore, although there were fewer miles for the occupier to defend, each road-cut seriously reduced the occupier’s ability to move his supplies and personnel.

As targets for sabotage, the roads, like the railways, were ideally located. The north-south road, Yannina-Arta-Agrinion, for example, ran for some distance along a narrow coastal plain between the mountains and the sea. For vehicles caught in this spot there was little possibility of detour or deployment. Plans for guerrilla operations took full cognizance of the vulnerability of the transportation system.

Examples of Guerrilla Operations

Attacks on the railways took a variety of forms. Sometimes stones were piled on the line or a charge was laid to blow up track as a train passed. These crude attempts were quickly parried by the Germans
and never delayed traffic for long. Some attacks involved demolition of major bridges, as at Gorgopotamos and Asopos. These operations, however, led the Germans to tighten bridge security to such an extent that no further attempts on this scale were feasible. As a result, in 1944 the guerrillas and liaison officers depended upon a combined antirailroad, antipersonnel operation to delay rail traffic. If successful, this operation resulted not only in stoppage of rail traffic for some time, but in personnel and equipment losses.

Attacks on the road system were frequent. They ranged from the simple strewing of mines on the road to complex ambushes of supply convoys. The Germans came to be bitterly annoyed by the frequency of even simple sabotage operations. But they were far more upset by road ambushes which resulted in the destruction of equipment or injury to personnel, sometimes high-ranking. Throughout the occupation there was an endless succession of small-scale incidents on the roads and railways, punctuated by a number of major attacks which resulted in severe strain on the occupiers.9

One secondary value of the roads as a target was that the telephone lines so frequently followed them. Operations against the telephone lines were almost a daily guerrilla duty, performed with dispatch and ingenuity. Some care was taken to choose the sabotage site carefully—where repairs would be difficult and cover available. Poles were then sawed through and lines cut, the wire being taken for use in the guerrillas’ own system. Often the guerrillas would set an ambush for the repair crews that came to fix the damage. Snipers would shoot down the repairmen as they worked, thus causing loss of skilled technical personnel. The truck driver was always shot to avoid his alerting the German base. When ambushes were difficult or dangerous, the guerrillas were likely to plant and camouflage tread mines around the site so that the repair crews would be blown up.10

The Germans reversed that procedure in time by planting tread mines around specific poles to blow up guerrillas who might be trying to sabotage the poles. Dynamite charges were also planted in the poles themselves, to blow up when the pole was sawed through.11

In the following sections, the tactics of a number of specific guerrilla operations will be reviewed, including those of the famous bridge demolitions at Gorgopotamos and Asopos, as well as some lesser bridge operations. Three of these were against railway viaducts; one was against a road bridge. The operation at Asopos was accomplished by a six-man, all-British team, but the others all involved direct guerrilla cooperation.

Train ambushes, usually involving cooperation between guerrillas and liaison officers and sometimes the additional support of the
American Operational Groups or units of the British Raiding Support Regiment, were an extremely important form of harassment of the Germans in 1944. One such operation the train ambush near Katerini on 3 August 1944—is described in detail.

Also described in detail is an ambitious and successful road ambush during the Italian phase of the occupation, and some indication is given of the type of attacks that were possible after the Germans managed to restore control over the major roads in the fall of 1943.

Several examples of other types of guerrilla operations against enemy troops are also considered.

**Tactics of the Gorgopotamos Operation**

The far-reaching results of the famous attack in November 1942 on the Gorgopotamos bridge carrying the Salonika-Athens railway have already been discussed generally, but the tactics themselves offer an almost classic example of a combined special forces-guerrilla operation.

Myers, then colonel in command of what was still a one-shot operation, could count on his own party of 12 British, including himself. In addition, he had three enlisted men of the British Army who had been left behind in 1941 and had lived clandestinely in Greece for the past 18 months. He had met Aris and Zervas and had secured their cooperation, including a combined force of about 150 guerrillas. Furthermore, reconnaissance had shown that, although most of the piers of the Gorgopotamos were masonry and “therefore unsuitable for rapid demolition,” two of them were of steel and vulnerable to sabotage attack. The demolitions were to be shaped and prepared prior to the start of the attack.

The mechanics of the attack were fairly complex, since the bridge was well defended, with Italian guard posts at both ends. About 80 Italian troops were billeted near the bridge for its defense. Other enemy troops who were garrisoned in nearby towns could be brought up quickly by road or rail. No one was allowed to come within a mile of the railway after dusk.

Because the Gorgopotamos bridge, almost 200 yards long, spanned a gorge so deep that the groups attacking the garrisons at the north and south ends would be entirely separated during the whole operation, Colonel Myers planned to divide the forces at his disposal into seven groups. The enemy garrisons defending the bridge were to be isolated by two guerrilla groups who were to cut all telephone and telegraph communications at some distance beyond the guard posts, and prepare to destroy the railway line leading to the bridge, immediately if a train should pass, otherwise at the end of the operation. Two other groups of guerrilla fighters were to destroy the guard garrisons...
at either end of the bridge. When these four groups had done their work, a fifth party of British engineer officers was to begin demolition of the bridge itself. Meanwhile, a sixth guerrilla group, stationed on the road between a nearby town and the bridge, was to delay any enemy reinforcements. Finally, a headquarters company would install itself up the valley, facing the center of the bridge, where it might also give some local protection to the demolition group.

Colonel Myers, of course, expected to command the operation himself. He was therefore a little surprised when Zervas suggested that it would be “tactful” to ask Aris to join the two of them in a joint command. “I was at a loss,” wrote Myers, “to see how three people could command the same operation, but Zervas reassured me. ‘I will command it,’ he said, ‘but the three of us will agree on all major decisions and plans beforehand.’” Actually, Myers found it expedient to go along with this advice, and the command was nominally joint. To succeed in the endeavor, Myers used cajolery and persuasion, not commands, with both Axis and Zervas. Naturally, he could depend on his own men to give instant obedience.

The final approach to the bridge was started around 1800 hours on 25 November 1942. This allowed the group going farthest, a distance of about 3 miles, 4 hours to get into position. They left first, a band of 15 ELAS guerrillas with 2 British officers, to cut the railway and telephone lines south of the bridge. Another band of 15 ELAS men under a British officer and a guerrilla engineer officer went to do a similar job on the lines north of the bridge. Then the attack guerrillas marched out in two groups of about 30 to 40 men, one party of EDES men and one of both ELAS and EDES men, both groups under EDES officers.

Next came the Joint Headquarters, in which Aris and Zervas now combined to outvote Myers: they stationed themselves on the near, instead of the far, side of the bridge valley, with the result that they could offer no support to the demolitions group. A further change in Myers’ plan appears to have been that the road ambush party was converted into a reserve group under the direct control of the Headquarters, a most fortunate provision, as it turned out. Finally, the demolitions party, now responsible for its own local defense, left last, some 3 hours after the first group.
H-hour, which was, according to Myers, at 2300 hours, was to mark the simultaneous assault on the bridge garrisons at either end of the Gorgopotamos. Colonel Myers, most tense by now, had to wait almost 15 more minutes, however, before the operation actually started. Within a few minutes after the first firing, he received a message that, while cutting their way through the barbed wire around the guard post, the guerrillas at the northern end of the bridge had been spotted, fired upon, and had retreated in disorder. The Joint Headquarters decided immediately to throw in the whole of the reserve, under the leadership of Zervas’ second in command, Komninos Pyromaglou, to get a fresh attack underway. The guerrillas at the southern end of the bridge, also under a Zervas officer, had a vigorous attack going. After 20 minutes of fighting, however, Zervas himself began to worry about ammunition shortages and wanted to give the withdrawal signal if the attack were not successful within 10 more minutes. Luckily, it was discovered at this

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On this minor point Myers is at variance with another officer participant, who set H-hour at 2400 hours. The time of H-hour, whichever it may have been, had no effect on the subsequent action.
point that the Headquarters was without a Very pistol; Myers took the opportunity to order Woodhouse to fetch the pistol and allow no one else to handle it.

The leadership of the two Zervas officers in the attacks going at either end of the bridge appears to have been good. In addition, the guerrillas were spurred on by the mixture of Communist and non-Communist elements in one of the attack parties: during the fight each accused the other of cowardice and, thus annoyed, each went on to greater endeavor. After an hour of fighting, Colonel Myers heard that Pyromaglou at the north end of the bridge expected to win and that the south end was already in possession of the guerrillas.

At this point, Colonel Myers, worried about the duration of the operation and the chance of enemy reinforcements arriving, ordered in the demolition party. Consisting of four British officers, the three escaped colonial personnel, and about six Greek guerrillas to carry explosives and to act as guards, the demolitions party shoved down the steep slope, “mostly on our behinds, and greatly to the detriment of our boots and trousers.” The Greek guards tended to see Italian soldiers
in every bush and began to fire wildly. After several shots that came close to British ears, the officers insisted that the firing cease.

Without bothering about mines, the British officer leading the party cut the wire surrounding the base of the pier and the group now took a close look at their target. “The four great steel feet of it were sunk into an unshakable base of deep concrete. A hundred men could have stood inside the square those feet formed. It seemed to me a miniature Eiffel tower,” wrote one of the officers. Far more serious, the group now realized that their reconnaissance had proved erroneous in one important respect. The girders, instead of being right-angled as they had thought, were U-shaped; so their carefully prepared charges and pieces of timber could not be used. The demolitions all had to be reassembled, a job that was likely to take an hour or more.

There was no time to lose. The three engineer officers, with their assistants, went to their assigned girders, each with two charges to place. The Greek carriers were positioned as guards; the one British commando officer was assigned to supervise the guards and keep a general lookout, as well as to lend a hand where needed.

With the fighting still continuing on the north end of the bridge, the demolition party felt, with some reason, as though it were directly in the line of fire. Some Italians who early in the fighting had gone farther down the gorge actually “zeroed in” on the party with a mortar; the shells, in fact, dropped so close to the saboteurs that the Italians may have thought they had knocked them out, because after two shots they stopped firing. The party itself thought that the Greeks on the bridge were grenade-happy and addressed them in especially non-endearing terms. Meanwhile Colonel Myers, back at Headquarters, was placating Zervas. Now convinced that they were running out of ammunition, Zervas wanted to withdraw immediately. To break his tension, Myers went to see the fighting at the north end of the bridge. He found the battle there almost at a standstill. Within seconds, he heard the demolition party’s signal to take cover. All firing ceased, the explosion occurred.

A first look at the bridge reassured both British and Greeks. The pier’s four legs had been cut clean through; two of them had lost about eight feet, with the result that the pier had a tremendous lean. Two complete spans of the bridge had dropped into the gorge. Nevertheless, the British officer in charge of the demolition party wanted to do a little more work—to twist the railway spans and cut a log of the next pier. Myers agreed and returned to headquarters to keep Zervas from withdrawing for the 40 more minutes it was estimated the work would require.

Meanwhile, an enemy train from the north had managed to ride through and then back up from the explosion that the northern
communications party had laid. Somehow the Greek guerrillas failed to attack the troops in the train before they came out and engaged the guerrillas. Hearing the fresh fighting, the demolition party worked feverishly against time. In another 10 minutes they decided they had done all they could, for firing in the north had ceased and they suspected that the guerrillas were giving way. They lit the fuses for 90 seconds and retired. This second explosion twisted the already broken spans, but failed to bring down the pier.

As the second explosion died down, three green Very shots gave the signal for a general withdrawal. Every man now began to follow instructions to make his own shortest way back up Mount Oiti. Rendezvousing along the mountainside, the guerrillas left a small liaison party to direct stragglers and moved off immediately for their base, the sawmill huts where they had had their last rest some hours previously and where they expected to find food and rest again.

On the way back to the sawmill, the effects of fatigue, hunger, and the letup of tension began to make themselves felt. Commando-trained British climbed the 4,000-foot Mount Oiti and went on to the sawmill in 4 hours, but claimed to have done it mostly in their sleep. Colonel Myers, not in this fit condition, had to ride part of the way on a mule and still took 8 hours to reach the huts. All along the way, men who were still on their feet kicked and prodded awake both the Greeks and British who dropped and fell asleep in the snow. But back at the huts they all found fires, hot food, and sleep.

The operation was almost a complete success. None of the 12 British had even been hurt. Although 20 to 30 Italians were reported killed in the fighting, no guerrillas had been killed. A few had been injured or wounded. The next day, however, the Italians shot 14 Greeks in reprisal. The bridge, of course, was ruined; and it was 6 weeks before the enemy was able to repair it and to resume using the important railway. “Communications between Salonika and Athens were disrupted,” wrote German General Lanz, “and this lifeline had now to be maintained by means of a tedious reloading process.” The demolition of the Gorgopotamos provided the Allies with a major strategic success; it gave to Myers’ British party and the Greek guerrillas a major tactical victory.

**Tactics of the Asopos Bridge Demolition**

Whereas the Gorgopotamos operation involved both uniformed British and non-uniformed Greek guerrillas, the destruction of the
Asopos, sister bridge to the Gorgopotamos, was actually performed by a total of six British soldiers in uniform. They made the attack unassisted after ELAS, as already noted, had turned down the opportunity to participate. Because there could be no direct attack on the guard posts, the entire operation depended upon secrecy and surprise for the time required, not only to do the work, but to get away.

The Asopos had a guard detail of about 40 German soldiers, with 6 heavy machineguns and more light automatics. The bridge was regularly patrolled, and searchlights played upon it periodically during the night. Its two regular approaches were through tunnels, through which it was impossible for the small British sabotage party to go. German defenses of the bridge were laid out in all directions except through an extraordinarily deep and narrow gorge which both Greeks and Germans regarded as impossible to negotiate. The party nevertheless undertook to go down through this very gorge, with its long drops and deep, freezing-cold pools and waterfalls, some 40 feet high. They carried explosives but no arms.

In May 1943 the British party made a favorable reconnaissance and the demolitions charges were preshaped and prepared. On 23 May, the explosives were wrapped in five bundles with waterproof covering, and taken part way down the gorge by a party of eight men. In two days’ time, the men had descended two-thirds of the way but were stopped by a particularly difficult waterfall, for which they needed extra rope ladders. They had used up their 340 feet of rope; they needed packs they could carry on their heads; and the moon was becoming too low for the operation. Leaving their explosives hidden in the gorge, the men returned to the top. Some of them had badly torn hands and knees and the entire party was exhausted. The assault was postponed to the next moon period.

On 16 June the final attempt was made by six men: two commando officers, two Royal Engineer officers, a British escaped prisoner of war who had joined the party, and a Palestinian Arab sergeant in the British Army who had participated with distinction at Gorgopotamos. Four of these men had been on the previous reconnaissance attempt: Using additional rope, three men started down the gorge in daylight, they reached a point about a hundred yards from the bridge, where they could see that workmen were busy on the bridge and that there was scaffolding leading up to it. Already confident of success, the two

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In order, Maj. Geoffrey Gordon-Creed, Capt. Donald Stott, Maj. R. Scott, Capt. Henry McIntyre. Lance-Corporal Charlie Mutch, and Sgt. Michael Khuri. For this adventure the first two received the D.S.O.; the second two, the M.C.; and the two enlisted men, the M.M.
officers sent a message to British Mission headquarters: “The job’s in the bag. . .”\(^{18}\)

On 19 June the other three men reached the top of the gorge and the next day started down. The two groups met at the place where the explosives had been hidden earlier and spent the day repairing and changing them. At this time, the two commando officers made a final reconnaissance and discovered that there was a path leading directly to the bridge scaffolding. All was ready for the final attack.

At 1830 hours on 20 June 1943, all six men began the trek down the last part of the gorge; at 2000 hours they reached the foot of the path leading to the bridge. As they went on, they found neat gaps in the barbed wire and a ladder leading through the scaffolding to a platform about 30 feet up. From here they were able to reach the bridge’s main girders. The two enlisted men were now sent back to the camp site in the gorge to prepare hot food and get everything ready to leave. The four officers hauled up the explosives; then the two engineers set to work, while the two commandos remained on the ground as guards.

During the placement of the explosives, a German guard came down the path. A commando officer, hidden behind a bush, jumped him as he passed, knocked him out with his rubber cosh, and toppled him over the cliff. His fall was silenced by the noise of the raging river. As the saboteurs worked, loose bolts were kicked off the platform and clanged onto the metal girders below. The men fell over themselves and dropped things. At times they had to stop working because the moon was too bright or the searchlight was played on the bridge. Although the British were understandably shaken by the noise they were making, the German guards pacing up and down the bridge appeared to hear nothing. “The enemy,” the British later wrote, “was apparently unsuspicous.”

After about an hour and a half, the engineers had finished their task. They fixed fuses for 90 minutes’ delay and the party left. At this moment the searchlight played right upon them, but still none of the guards noticed. Now that saboteurs began worrying about the explosives, which had been dragged through water on the final approach. At 0215 hours, however, as they were halfway back up the gorge, they heard the explosion. The main arch of the bridge was cut and the whole central span collapsed into the ravine, bringing down both the cantilevered spans attached to the main one. In 24 hours the whole British party was back in Anatoli, all hands safe.
Figure 23. The Asopos Railway Bridge.
Figure 24. The Asopos Diagram Used by the British.

Not so the German bridge garrison. The German high command was so convinced that the bridge could have been blown up only through treachery that they judged the entire defense garrison of about 40 men guilty of gross neglect of duty and shot the officer in charge and several men. Two months later the bridge was reopened for traffic. But as the first engine started across, a pier collapsed, hurling the engine and part of the bridge into the gorge. Either the repair work had been faulty or it had been deliberately sabotaged by Polish and Greek crews. It took another 2 months to complete the second repair, so that, according
to Myers, the Salonika-Athens railway was not functioning for fully 4 months during the summer of 1943.\textsuperscript{d}

Asopos was truly an amazing feat. “For sheer endurance, determination to succeed and pluck,” wrote Brigadier Myers, “there was probably no more gallant achievement of its type.”\textsuperscript{19} It should not be forgotten, however, that many Greeks knew it was going to take place and no one gave it away. Without this curtain of silence it could never have been successful.

Other Bridge Operations

Two other operations on bridges, far less famous than the attacks on Gorgopotamos and Asopos but far more typical of the usual work of guerrillas, are described below.

In the first instance a British liaison officer and an enlisted man of the local mission, with a small detachment of ELAS guerrillas under an ELAS commanding officer, set out to destroy a road bridge at Mavroneri.\textsuperscript{20} The main purpose of the action was to keep the Germans from bringing up armored cars, small cannon, and infantry trucks for antiguerilla operations.

The operation was planned by the British. On the day of the operation the guerrillas were told the details of the plan, and they made a reconnaissance during the evening hours. About 2200 hours, the guerrilla scouts reported that the bridge was free of patrols, absolutely deserted in fact. At this point the two British and the rest of the guerrilla group joined the scouts to complete the operation. Stopping in a nearby woods, the two British prepared their charges. They were using “beehive” devices which made holes in the bridge, into which explosives to cause greater damage could be tamped. Since the bridge was still deserted, the two liaison officers climbed onto it and attached the “leeches of explosive.” The guerrillas stood by in case of trouble, but none came. The only untoward happening was that the mules were brought too close and were difficult to control when the explosion occurred. The bridge was wrecked, and all hands were back at mission headquarters before morning. It was as simple as that.

Not all operations went as well as those at Gorgopotamos, Asopos, and Mavroneri. The last bridge operation to be described,\textsuperscript{21} one performed in the late summer of 1944 as part of Operation NOAH’S ARK, failed completely. Nevertheless, it was a remarkable try.

\textsuperscript{d} In another account the time is given as two and a half months (McGlynn, \textit{Special Service in Greece}, p. 29.)
The target was a railway bridge at Choiropotamos. It was heavily guarded by German troops in concrete pillboxes. These were protected by a minefield, which was in its turn surrounded by barbed wire fences. The German guard had machineguns and mortars and had evidently planned its field of fire carefully.

The attacking group was composed of a full ELAS company, an American Operational Group of some 20 men, and a British liaison officer more or less leading the joint group. Intelligence concerning the enemy posts and patrols had been acquired from a captured German prisoner, “an old Bavarian soldier named Hans.” The plan of attack was to blow up the barbed wire and then to set off the minefield to clear the approach and to demolish the bridge. The guerrillas also planned to use Hans for psychological warfare—“a 'Lord Haw Haw' in reverse.”

From the very start the attack got nowhere. The guerrillas apparently were ambushed before it even fully started. One line of guerrillas walked straight into a mortar burst, and the entire attack party was pinned down for half an hour.

At this point the liaison officer called on Hans to perform. He was supposed to get the results that force of arms had failed to achieve. He called to his German comrades to surrender to the British and American troops instead of the guerrillas and promised them good treatment “until the war ended in a short time.” The Germans’ answer was in the form of mortar and machinegun fire.

For 2 hours the guerrilla group alternated psychological and military efforts. The military assault failed completely; the psychological effort resulted in one surrender, a middle-aged man “pale with fear.” Unwanted by the Americans, the deserter remained with the guerrillas.

Under the liaison officer’s direction, all hands retreated several miles from the bridge. At dawn, after breakfast and the posting of sentries, most of the men fell asleep. Two guerrillas were dead and several wounded.

A second attack several days later also ended in failure; the group partially compensated for this, however, by blowing up a train and shooting some of the troops it carried.

Train Ambush, Near Katerini, 3 August 1944

Along the Salonika-Athens railway in the east of Greece, a number of Allied missions and guerrilla groups operated in a fashion popularly known in 1944 as “train-busting.” One such group was
known as the Lapworth mission, which regularly operated in conjunction with the local ELAS 50th Guerrilla Regiment. One of its operations in the summer of 1944 may be cited as typical of such liaison officer-guerrilla activities.

Lapworth was commanded by British Major M. G. McAdam, a 25-year-old Scot, a chartered accountant by profession. Also attached to the mission were two radio operators, an Italian cook, an interpreter, an English lieutenant with a Greek name, a corporal of the regular Greek Army, and a Greek private in the British Army. The last three men were operational and constituted, with himself, Major McAdam’s own combat group.23

Major McAdam could also count on support from elements of the ELAS 50th Guerrilla Regiment. The group of guerrillas it usually provided for operations was well commanded by a Capt. Andreas Arnaoutoglou, who was a teacher by profession and had fought in the Greek Army in 1941. McAdam regarded him as a friend “and a good and reliable officer in an operation.” It was probably to such men that McAdam referred when he later said there were ELAS subalterns capable of fanatical bravery.24

McAdam also knew that the civilian population in his area was trustworthy. Not only did no one pass information to the Germans against the “trainbusters,” but they supplied the guerrillas with much information about German moves of all sorts.

This particular operation was conceived by Major McAdam. He cleared it with his regional Allied Mission headquarters and received permission to carry it out. He also got in touch with the guerrillas, received their approval and support, and arranged a rendezvous with them. He informed his own Lapworth group of the operation only as they started out for the rendezvous.

After a couple of hours the Allied liaison group stopped to rest and the commanding officer and his lieutenant prepared their plan of assault. They studied detailed maps of the areas supplied by Allied air drops. The attack was to be that night, 3 August 1944. There were two major problems: the exact place where the demolition charges should be laid and the exact train they wanted to derail.

They decided to attack at a point southeast of Katerini and slightly north of Dhion, where the rail line lay within sight of the Aegean Sea. At Dhion there was a small German garrison; this station and the one above the point of attack, Korinos, were armed with field guns and heavy mortars. Furthermore, there were many German posts nearby. These considerations were outweighed by the advantages of the selected location. The terrain was ideal. At this point the rails curved and the train could be easily derailed by even a small explosion. There was,
Furthermore, plenty of natural cover providing hiding places and camouflage nearby. Dried-up stream beds were readymade trenches. No attack had been previously tried at this point.

The choice of a train to attack was a more difficult matter. The major consideration was to avoid hitting one carrying Greek civilians. Intelligence on trains came from Greeks working for the Germans as personnel on the railway or doing repair work. These people gave information to a guerrilla contact, who informed guerrilla headquarters at either local or area level, which in turn sent the information on to Allied liaison officers. Often, however, conflicting information would be received. On the night of an operation the guerrillas provided a relay of runners to inform the raiding party of last-minute details as to the composition of the train and when it was expected to leave the station. At the morning parley between the commander of Lapworth and his lieutenant, however, these last-minute details were not available. Their information led them to believe the target would be a supply train.

After an hour spent in resting and consultation, Major McAdam’s group continued on its way, observing a certain care in proceeding. They trusted the Greek people not to give them away, but they were near German posts. There was not only the danger of accidentally running into a patrol, but the Germans were known to send out patrols or armored cars at night which remained camouflaged and “doggo” during the day in order to ambush guerrilla parties. In this way, the terrain also worked against the guerrillas. Care was always taken in crossing roads; a guide was sent on ahead to see if the road was clear and the party crossed individually.

Another stop was necessary in the afternoon, not only to rest and eat, but to prepare the demolitions charges. It was routine with this group to ready the explosives as close to the target as possible. They were easier to carry in bulk, were more likely to remain reliable, and also would not be wasted if the operation should be cancelled during the early part of the approach to the target area. After the charges were prepared—with the usual headaches to all—the liaison group reloaded its mules and went off to meet the guerrillas.

The rendezvous was a group of shepherds’ huts outside a small village. The guerrillas were already there, and their leader, Captain Arnaoutoglou, and the two British officers, speaking through an interpreter, held their final council of war as the sun was setting.

The plan was to lay charges so as to blow up the engine. The guerrillas would then attack the derailed cars. Since it was presumed to be a supply train, much booty was hoped for. Moreover, in order to prevent help from reaching the attacked train, two men were sent north to blow
the line where it crossed a small ravine as soon as they heard the first explosion. As soon as the last runner arrived, bearing news that the rail line itself was clear of patrols, the guerrilla captain briefed his men. The British commander gave his orders to his Lapworth group, who were to handle all the demolitions work.

The entire group moved off in the dark to a point about a quarter mile from the rail line. Here they sorted themselves out. The two men from Lapworth who were to go to the north took their explosives and left. The other Lapworth men then carefully approached the rail line. It was imperative now not to alert the Germans lest all trains be stopped and patrols sent out.

Holes were dug under the rails and the explosive charges placed at 10-yard intervals, with primer cord connecting each bundle of charges. The detonator was not attached immediately in case the wrong train came along first. Major McAdam then sent word back to the guerrilla captain to deploy his men. McAdam and his assistant meanwhile waited, lying down by the track, to fix the detonator device at the last minute.

First came the armored car, with flanged wheels, used to patrol the line ahead of trains and to come back to their rescue if they were attacked. Its searchlight did not pick up the men lying by the track. As the car turned the next bend, they rushed up to the track and inserted the primer cord into the fog signal detonator. Then they rejoined the guerrillas in the bushes.

The explosives worked as planned. In a tremendous fusion of noise, steam, and smoke, the carriages jumped the rails and piled up behind that engine. It was not a supply train after all, but a mixed train carrying supplies and troops. Some of the cars began to burn. Immediately the guerrilla attack began. Only a few shots were returned from the cars; then they stopped. There was no organized attempt to fight off the attack. The guerrillas approached closely and threw bakelite bombs into the cars; some few even went into the cars after individual German soldiers.

At this point the guerrillas were probably out of hand. They were firing wildly, running in and out of the carriages, going down the line. Even the young Greek member of Lapworth, who had had some training, showed the classic response of the inexperienced warrior. First he was paralyzed with inaction, “crying and shaking all over.” Then his “determination and confidence, even a sense of importance, returned in an instant” and he was in a mad delirium—“I was exhilarated. What to do next?” Unable to respond to his commanding officer’s order to come back, he too joined the guerrillas in their orgy of train hopping, wild firing, looting. Miraculously saved from death at least twice, this young man was brought back to his senses by the sudden sight of insane
guerrilla cruelty which made him physically sick and restored him to the cold rebuke of his superior officer.

Having recovered his errant boy, Major McAdam could now finish his work. He laid charges in the locomotive so that it could not be salvaged. Almost simultaneously he heard an explosion to the north; the armored car, returning to help the train, had backed into the northern party’s explosive charges. Meanwhile, German gun crews in the nearby railway station had found the range on the scene of the wreckage, restoring some sense to the guerrillas. It was time to retire.

Lighting the fuse of the charges in the engine, Major McAdam ordered the retreat. All hands left as fast as they could. Artillery and mortar fire followed them up the paths, where the Germans had accurately measured the field of fire. Nonetheless, they all got away. There were no guerrilla dead or injured.

German losses included a railroad engine, 20 cars, and an undetermined quantity of supplies. The armored car was in a ravine, damaged; and a small bridge over the river needed repair. It would take more than a day’s intensive work to clear the debris and repair the damage. In addition, an unknown number of troops being transferred to Russia never reached their destination.

Luck was with this operation. The explosives were well laid and exploded properly. The armored car was completely isolated from the train and was unable to help it. The train carriages were so piled up that the Germans were unable to get an organized defense going. Their usual procedure was to get the wounded out, take up positions, and return fire immediately. In this case, the Germans were too shaken up to respond in their usual fashion. Individual soldiers, however, took up positions within the carriages and fired at entering guerrillas. Nevertheless, the highly disorganized guerrillas suffered no casualties from their imbroglio.

This operation illustrates vividly the need for disciplined troops to lend trained support and greater fire power to such attacks. The opportunity to inflict heavy casualties among German troops was lost by the disorganized, inefficient, undisciplined behavior of the guerrillas. The Operational Groups were, on the whole, highly successful in augmenting the guerrillas on such operations, particularly when the trains were packed with soldiers being withdrawn from Greece. At such times, O.G. members were apt to speak in terms of “carnage.”

Throughout the occupation, the rail line in Greece was successfully attacked by guerrillas in conjunction with Allied liaison officers and, after mid-1944, sometimes with the aid of the Allied support groups.
Attacking Road Traffic

A glance at the map of Greece will show that its western half contains no railroads of importance. Here the occupiers had to rely upon the road system for transport of men and materiel, and here the guerrillas found their prime target. In the early days of the occupation, from 1941 to the fall of 1943, the western roads were the main Italian communication line. Zervas, in fact, originally chose Epirus as his place of operations for this reason.25

The important north-south road in western Greece, leading from Yannina, to Arta to Agrinion, ran through EDES territory. Apparently “depending upon the loyalty hinted at by the leader of EDES” in the summer of 1943, many German officers used this road, making the trip in individual cars. Nonetheless, this belief could be carried too far, as various officers found out.26

The road leading from Igoumenitsa on the western coast to Yannina, Metsovon, Trikkala, and thence to Larisa in the east, popularly known as the Metsovon Highway, was the only major east-west road in northern Greece. It was constantly fought over by guerrillas and occupiers. In October 1943, when the Germans took over major occupation duties from the Italians, they found that between Yannina and Trikkala this highway had been “blocked for nearly two years,” and it took “almost a whole regiment to open it.” Even after that, raids occurred. In July 1944 a major German mopping-up operation was required to stabilize the situation.27

All kinds of sabotage and ambush operations were used to harass traffic. In 1944 these guerrilla attacks were rendered more formidable by support from units of the O.S.S. Operational Groups and the British Raiding Support Regiment. Although all the following examples occurred in the western half of Greece, they illustrate tactics typical of road operations all over the country.

One of the simplest operations was to dynamite some of the road masonry. Bridges and retaining walls offered excellent subjects for blasting operations, and their destruction often interrupted traffic for 1 or 2 days. Sometimes charges were planted in drainage systems of bridges or walls during the summer dry season. “Good protection against such sabotage was never found,” wrote General Lanz, who was responsible for internal security in western Greece during the latter period of the occupation.28

More annoying than the blasting was the guerrillas’ ingenious use of mines. At first, because the mines had to be well laid and camouflaged in order to be effective—and this took time—it was possible for the Germans to curtail sabotage activity by patrolling the roads. Also, mine-locating details could be sent to inspect suspicious stretches.
Later, however, the guerrillas were supplied with devices called “rock mines,” because they resembled the stones or rocks normally found on Greek roads. When vehicles hit them, they detonated, usually destroying parts of the vehicle, particularly wheels. Often German occupants of the car were hurt. It was hard to protect against these mines because they were difficult to detect by visual inspection and they were not easily located by mine detectors. They contained little metal and were covered by concrete. Laying these mines was absurdly simple—they were merely placed on the road. The only solution the Germans found to this problem was to clear the roads of all rocks over a certain size, an occupation that “claimed a great many lives.”

Another device used to impede road traffic was a special nail, with an inch-long tip that automatically remained vertical. These also were simple devices, not so lethal to personnel as the rock mines but handsomely rewarding in wear and tear on the German motor pool.

Almost anyone in the mountains was an incipient saboteur, as General Lanz discovered. For example, once during a stopover for inspection, the front wheel of his car was so loosened that he barely missed having a bad accident. One did not have to be a guerrilla to strew tire puncture pins or rock mines or even to loosen front wheels.

What marked the guerrilla attack, as distinguished from this simple sabotage, was the combination of sabotage with antipersonnel assault: in short, the road ambush. An early EDES operation against an Italian supply column on the Yannina-Arta road provides an example of what a surprise guerrilla ambush can do to easy going and unready troops.

The guerrilla plan was to make the attack at a place where, after crossing the Louron Bridge, the column would have to pass through a deep, rocky defile along the river. Detouring would be impossible and deployment difficult. The supply column was to be allowed to pass the bridge. As its leading vehicle was stopped by road mines, the bridge behind it would be blown up, thus trapping, the column. Simultaneously, guerrillas hidden in the hills were to throw down hand grenades and rocks at the crews. Every available weapon was to be used to engage the enemy. After this, two groups of guerrillas were to assault the column and finish off any survivors. Meanwhile, roadblocks were to be set up to the south of the ambush point to stop any patrols from coming to the aid of the attacked column when it failed to reach its destination.

The guerrillas were warned not to have any papers or other identification on them, and they were ordered to avoid capture at any cost. It was expected that all the enemy would be killed; the booty was to be carried off on mules kept nearby. After the raid the guerrillas were to withdraw, except for a few scouts who were to remain to watch enemy reactions.
The night before the operation the minefield was laid on the road, ready to be hooked up with both pressure igniters and a cable. The bridge demolitions were also laid. The next day the guerrillas selected their positions on either side of the road and placed their weapons and ammunition—heavy rocks, hand grenades, cartridges, and two machineguns. Nearby telephone poles were sawed partway through, so that they could be quickly pulled down.

The target of this attack was an Italian supply column that every day covered the same distance, at the same time, and in the same formation. Two tanks, one at the head and the other to the rear, protected 20 trucks. Crews, including drivers and assistant drivers, numbered about 60 men. The column left Yannina, fully loaded, traveling south to Arta, at the same time each day.

On the day of the planned ambush the column leader was apparently alarmed by a number of tire punctures and rumors of guerrilla activity. At any rate, he decided to increase the escort. A truck with two manned machine guns and an assault detachment was placed after the lead tank. Then followed the leader’s vehicle and the 19 loaded trucks. Each had two guards with submachine guns. The final tank had two machine guns in a revolving turret. The column leader warned his men about the possibility of an attack. Delayed by these preparations, the column did not leave Yannina until 1600 hours.

Despite these precautions, all the guerrilla plans worked perfectly. The column passed the bridge and was trapped when the demolitions occurred. Its lead tank rolled down the embankment on one side of the road. The other vehicles closed up and stopped. Although the convoy leader tried to organize his men, they seemed unable to respond quickly. When he was felled by a bullet, no one offered any resistance except the crew of the rear tank. They were eventually knocked out by an explosive charge thrown under the tank chassis. At this point the guerrilla assault team rushed in and finished off the Italians who were still alive.

The guerrillas were now out of hand and began to loot the vehicles individually, but they were eventually brought under control by their leader. The mules were brought in and loaded; the Italian bodies were stripped of papers and valuables; vehicles were searched for documents, arms, and weapons; and the tanks were covered with gasoline and fired so they could not be salvaged. Guerrilla casualties were removed. The guards posted on the overhanging rocks were now called in and the guerrillas departed.

An Italian motorcycle platoon, sent out from Arta to investigate when the supply column failed to arrive and telephone communication with Yannina was found to be disrupted, met the road block and
received fire from the nearby hills. The platoon returned to base and no new patrols were sent out, since it was now getting dark. In the morning, a stronger detachment discovered the complete wreckage of the column in what came to be known as “Death Valley.”

“This,” wrote General Lanz, “was a tale told week after week” during the Italian phase of the occupation. After the Germans took over the major occupation duties in the fall of 1943, however, they put an end to road ambushes on such an ambitious scale. A strong guard was posted at the rebuilt Louron bridge and numerous strong points were set up along the road. German convoys travelled at varying intervals, their size and composition were frequently changed, and German troops invariably reacted with vigor and swiftness in meeting any assault.

During much of the period from the fall of 1943 to the spring of 1944, the roads were free of large-scale guerrilla activity. There were several reasons for the lull: the German measures, the instructions from the Allies to the guerrillas to lie low, and possibly also, in Epirus, the tacit agreement the Germans insisted they had with EDES. Some German sources indicate that local commanders supplied EDES with small arms to keep the Yannina-Arta road open. Elsewhere, guerrilla ambushes occurred, of course, but they were mostly small-scale attacks on vehicles traveling individually.

In such attacks roadblocks were set up, using telephone poles and wires. Guerrilla scouts gave the signal that the car was approaching; and snipers, hidden near the roadblock, got ready to fire. By such means the Germans lost a colonel commanding mountain infantry in September 1943.

Though the Germans hoped in the fall of 1943 that they had permanently ended guerrilla attacks on the roads, “it soon became evident that this was an error. All efforts to keep the bands away from these lifelines—extending from the north through Korca and from the east through Trikkala toward Yannina—ended in failure,” wrote General Lane. In the summer of 1944, two large-scale German attacks on EAM/ELAS guerrillas operating in southern Albania and northern Greece, code-named GEMSBOCK and STEINADLER, were necessary to ensure continued German use of these two roads.

Nevertheless, guerrilla attacks increased in the summer of 1944. EDES guerrillas also went into action. For example, they successfully attacked a German column of vehicles carrying medical supplies and displaying the Red Cross. In a maneuver similar to the one in the Louron Valley, they cut off the medical train, killed the doctors and
medical personnel, and ransacked and burned the vehicles. For one period they almost succeeded in closing the Yannina-Arta road.

“During the entire period of the occupation,” wrote General Lanz of western Greece, “hardly a night and, from the summer of 1944, not a single day passed without a surprise attack, a mine explosion, or another act of sabotage occurring on one of the supply roads. Valuable materiel was consequently lost every time, frequently heavy casualties occurred, and only in a few cases did one succeed in locating and inflicting damage upon an enemy adept in clever operations.”

**Attacks on Enemy Troops**

Attacks on enemy troops netted some results of value to guerrilla operations. While the Italians were still on duty, the guerrillas proved masters at harassment. EAM/ELAS alone claimed to have inflicted numerous Italian casualties during the spring of 1943. At the “Battle of Bougazi,” near Siatista, they claimed to have captured an entire battalion of 18 officers, 700 men, and all arms and equipment. In other encounters the Italians suffered heavy losses. Italian reports given to the Germans when the latter took over occupation duties supported these guerrilla claims. The success of guerrilla attacks against Italian columns encouraged further attacks on Italian garrisons in the smaller towns, with the result that the latter began to withdraw to their main bases. This made the great expansion of the guerrilla movement in Greece in early 1943 much easier.

The guerrillas were so sure of themselves in the summer of 1943 that ELAS forces of the Grammos Mountains area undertook to attack the formidable German 1st Mountain Division as it moved from Albania into Greece. Slipping over the border, the guerrillas invested the Albanian town of Leskovic, whose 1,800 inhabitants are of Greek descent and speak Greek. Old men, women, and children were evacuated to the safety of the mountains.

The plan was to ambush elements of the German division as it passed along the main road of the town. Scouts outside the village were to signal the approach of the troops. The advance guard was to be allowed to pass through unmolested and, while the main body of the marching troops was inside the village, the attack was to be made. Every house was thus to be a fortified position. If resistance proved stronger than expected, the guerrillas were to escape into the mountains.

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1 An action contrary to the laws of war and to the code governing guerrilla behavior as stipulated in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. EAM/ELAS was also guilty of such acts.
The alarm signal was given as the German troops approached. However, instead of marching through the town, they first enveloped it from both sides. This precaution, customary with the well-trained and guerrilla-accustomed 1st Mountain Division, cut off the guerrillas’ retreat. The maneuver surprised and alarmed the guerrillas; lack of discipline added to their problem. Instead of waiting until the first troops had passed through the town, guerrilla hotheads at the edge of the village fired on the Germans as they entered. The plan was thus entirely upset.

The ambush was reversed, and the guerrillas now had to fight a defensive battle. While the Germans methodically surrounded the village and brought up heavy weapons to break through the house walls, the guerrillas fought stubbornly on. (Some few escaped by posing as civilians before the Germans became alert to this maneuver.) After 2 hours of fighting, most of the town’s houses had been destroyed and many guerrillas lay dead and buried beneath the rubble. A number of prisoners were taken. The German division’s losses were also “considerable,” and, according to their own account, they acquired “a deep mistrust of the Greek population” from this encounter.

Other attacks on a small scale were not so unrewarding. Especially in the summer of 1944, guerrillas made a number of attacks on German installations. In May, Generalleutnant (Major General) Krech, commander of the 41st Fortress Division, was killed in a raid on his headquarters in the Peloponneseus. Small groups of Germans in outlying posts such as blockhouses or those working as foresters in wooded terrain were constantly prey to guerrilla attack. Early in July 1944 ELAS was active in two small actions against German garrisons at Amfissa and Amfilokhia. Both operations were undertaken mainly to get supplies, although the latter was also to divert German attention in the north.42

In the first case, EAM/ELAS broke into the town of Amfissa and succeeded in pinning the Germans in one quarter of the town. The guerrillas could not neutralize the garrison; they therefore collected what equipment and food supplies they could and destroyed whatever they could not carry away. After 8 hours they pulled out. From their own point of view the operation was unsuccessful. Many ELAS had been killed and the guerrillas had not obtained “the large quantities of ammunition we so badly needed.”43

The second operation was more successful from ELAS’ point of view. A guerrilla regiment was placed on the Arta-Amfilokhia road to intercept reinforcements, then two other guerrilla regiments invested both Amfilokhia and the surrounding area. According to ELAS claims, they succeeded in wiping out the German garrisons of some 400 troops.
A German officer of the XXII Mountain Corps testified that he saw 60 dead at Amfilokhia. The Greek security forces working for the Germans knew the fate they might expect at guerrilla hands and fought with extreme ferocity in house-to-house combat. For 24 hours the town was in guerrilla hands; in that time ELAS took “all the German equipment, ammunition, arms, horses, medical supplies, food and clothing.” Even a ship loaded with German land mines was captured. After this, bragged Saraphis, the Germans moved only in large columns. “The . . . district had become a nightmare to them.”

But at this moment, the Germans were driving thousands of EAM/ELAS troops into an encirclement. Although the Germans could not completely stop guerrilla attacks, the Greek guerrillas, even at the height of their strength, were often unable to fight their way out of German traps.

**What Military Value?**

What was the military value of these guerrilla operations? How was it estimated? The British, the Germans, and the guerrillas have all made estimates. In general, the major indices have been (1) tiedown of enemy troops that could otherwise have been used elsewhere; (2) infliction of enemy troop losses; (3) interdiction of enemy lines of communications; (4) infliction of enemy supply and equipment losses; and (5) miscellaneous services to the Allies.

Tiedown of troops was a major aim of Operation ANIMALS in the summer of 1943. The British have claimed that the successful completion of this operation helped to deceive the Germans as to Allied intent and compelled them to reinforce the unreliable Italian troops in Greece with two German divisions and extra air support. As a result, these divisions were not available for use in Sicily at the time of the successful Allied assault on that island. Colonel Woodhouse, who at times belittled the military value of Greek guerrilla activities, has stated that at least one German armored division was held in Greece as a result of ANIMALS.

For the period from September 1943 through September 1944, it is difficult to know exactly what proportion of German troop strength in Greece was due to German belief in the possibility of an Allied landing in Greece and what proportion was due to the need to keep the guerrillas under enough control to maintain an occupation and secure German lines of communication.

Saraphis has estimated that in 1944 there were approximately 180,000 Axis troops in Greece—40,000 Bulgarian troops, 40,000 miscellaneous foreign troops, and the main body of about 100,000 German
Comparison of these figures with the troop strength of the German divisions given in the _Kriegsgliederungen_ (Order of Battle) for 1943–44 indicates that this figure must be very close to reality and might even be low.\textsuperscript{48} If these figures are even approximately correct, they show that there were only three times as many troops of all categories as guerrillas in Greece.

The mission of the German forces was dual: to secure the coastline against an Allied assault and to secure the interior against the guerrillas. Since there was no Allied landing in Greece during the occupational period, the major operation was against the guerrillas. Saraphis claimed that four or five enemy divisions were “occupied exclusively with ELAS.”\textsuperscript{49} Since EDES was lying low during most of the period, it is true enough that German forces were primarily directed against EAM/ELAS. These facts, nevertheless, do not confirm Saraphis’ claim, nor do they establish with any definiteness what Axis troops were held in Greece solely because of guerrilla operations could otherwise have been used elsewhere—in other words, the tiedown value of the guerrillas over and above the threat of invasion. Though no tiedown figure can be assigned with accuracy, it must be conceded that, if there had been no guerrilla operations, some proportion of German troop strength in Greece could have been used elsewhere.

Neither can figures be accurately given for personnel losses inflicted on the enemy by guerrilla activity. For July and August 1944, the two months just before NOAH’S ARK, German figures indicate troop losses of 936 dead, 1,235 wounded, and 275 missing.\textsuperscript{50} During NOAH’S ARK (fall 1944), Allied reports stated that 5,000 enemy troops had been killed and another 5,000 wounded and captured by ground action alone.\textsuperscript{51} This would include help from O.G. and R.S.R. activity. In addition, more German troops, jammed on the roads because of guerrilla operations, have been claimed as victims of Allied air bombing. These figures, Woodhouse has since said, are “absurdly inflated, like most claims made in the heat of battle.”\textsuperscript{52}

The same charge of inflation would surely be applied to Saraphis’ claims for ELAS victories over Axis troops for the period of May 1943 through October 1944:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Prisoner</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>16,062</td>
<td>6,504</td>
<td>1,878</td>
<td>24,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian*</td>
<td>1,305</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>2,230</td>
<td>4,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>1,988</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>1,073</td>
<td>3,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>19,355</td>
<td>8,294</td>
<td>5,181</td>
<td>32,830</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not including the Pinerolo Division, which surrendered to the guerrillas in the fall of 1943.
These figures, if accepted, would mean that a total of almost 25,000 Germans fell victim to ELAS guerrillas (excluding operations in Athens, on the Peloponnesus, and in Thrace), or that on the basis of Saraphis’ own estimate of German troop strength, one out of every four Germans in Greece was a casualty. Based on German records for their Southeast Theater, which also included Yugoslavia, where guerrilla fighting was far more intensive, an estimate has been made that one out of every seven troops in German uniform became a casualty. For Greece, even this figure seems high.

The prisoner total would be surprising under any circumstances. Unless these prisoners were taken in the last phase of operations when they could have been handed over to the incoming British forces, there would have been no facilities for a guerrilla army to keep them safely. Furthermore, it was stated ELAS policy to treat prisoners “according to the way in which the Germans treated our men,” and this meant death. Although some exceptions were apparently made, much more would need to be known concerning prisoner handling for credence to be accorded these claims.

The figures for enemy troops killed and wounded are indubitably high also. Nonetheless, guerrilla action did exact a heavy toll. When troop trains were derailed, troop losses did occur. In one operation in February 1944, derailment of a troop train caused the death of over 500 Germans, including a general and his staff. Reports from American sources in Greece indicate the high cost to the Germans of guerrilla attacks. Casualties inflicted during the summer of 1944 in joint O.G.-guerrilla operations—which the guerrillas would naturally claim as part of their own successes—are estimated at several thousand. It would seem to be safe to put guerrilla-inflicted enemy casualties for the entire period, by all guerrillas, at some figure between 5,000 and 15,000.

The interdiction value of guerrilla operations was equally nebulous. The Germans had to fight to keep the major roads open, but they did keep them open most of the time. To do so, however, cost them time and effort and added to the tiedown value of guerrilla operations. Furthermore, guerrilla mines and ambushes increased enemy troop casualties. Blown-up road bridges closed roads for a day or more at a time. An Italian officer, for example, testified that his unit took 11 days during ANIMALS to make a journey that would ordinarily have taken 3 days. EDES made the Germans fight hard to keep the Yannina-Arta road open in September 1944.

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8 This latter figure is derived as being roughly one-seventh of 100,000.
The Greek railways were interdicted for fairly long periods as a result of combined guerrilla and Allied party activity. The operation against the Gorgopotamos bridge in November 1942 closed through traffic on the Athens-Salonika railway for 6 weeks. This was of undoubted military importance, since the railway was carrying supplies for Rommel’s troops in Africa. The demolition of the Asopos in June 1943 closed the same line for about 16 weeks. ELAS units kept the Germans from using long stretches of railway line near Salonika for various periods in September 1944. Demolitions and “trainbusting” attacks by combined guerrilla-Allied parties resulted in a great many additional, if lesser, delays in the enemy’s use of the Greek railroads throughout the latter part of the occupation.58

The enemy also lost a good deal of equipment and supplies. Saraphis claimed that ELAS destroyed 85 railway engines, 957 coaches, and 1,007 motor vehicles. In addition, it captured and used German food supplies, pack animals, wireless sets, mines, and arms.59 However, these losses, while bothersome, were never critical, and much of the materiel was of Greek origin.

The guerrillas rendered many miscellaneous services to the British and the Allies. During one period EAM/ELAS guerrillas almost stopped production of the Greek chrome mines, a major source of Germany’s chromium. EDES guerrillas provided a safe area for British and American landing parties on the western coast at Parga. ELAS helped to build the first Allied landing field in occupied Greece. Guerrillas of both sides provided guides and safe areas for Allied airmen or escaped prisoners of war attempting to get out of Greece. ELAS saved Colonel Woodhouse’s life at least once. It also attempted to help the Greek Jews, who were persecuted by the Germans. The clandestine resistance on Crete fulfilled admirably an intelligence role; in 1942, information passed on by the British liaison officers there resulted in the RAF’s shooting down German planes bound for Rommel’s Afrika Korps and loaded with “troops, fresh water, and even cooked meals.” On the mainland, Greek guerrillas augmented the efforts of clandestine intelligence agents in providing intelligence of value for the Allies. The Germans, for example, found it difficult to maintain the security of ship movements in either the Aegean or Ionian Seas. The sinking of at least one Crete-bound vessel carrying German arms and ammunition has been directly attributed to guerrilla intelligence efforts. In April 1944, Generalmajor (Brigadier General) Karl Kreipe was kidnapped on Crete by a party of British Commandos, a British liaison officer, and nationalist Cretan patriots, despite the objections of the local EAM/ELAS organization. During the last phases of the occupation, guerrillas succeeded in preventing some German damage to installations.60
The mere fact that there was in Greece a guerrilla army, a guerrilla government, and a guerrilla connection with the Allies provided a challenge to the Germans. It was, in one sense, a major psychological operation. Greece had become one more area where the Germans were, to put it mildly, unwanted. It was one more area where the German just returned from hard fighting in Russia found, not rest, but bitter and strenuous mountain duty. It was one more place where the German might find injury or death. It was, above all, a place of colossal insult: for the Greeks’ classical heritage, Hitler himself had shown respect; for the Germans’ Third Reich, most Greeks seemed to prefer war to the death. “The Greek guerrillas,” wrote Colonel Woodhouse, “were supposed to be organized to fight the enemy occupation; the fog of political controversy has obscured the fact that they actually did so.”

In spite of all this activity, however, it should never be thought that the guerrilla operations were in any sense a decisive factor. At any time during the occupation, German troop divisions could be mustered to go into any area of Greece. But if they did not go in sufficient strength—then it was a different story. The lone supply convoy, the straggling car, the unescorted train, the small troop unit—these were in danger. For them the Greek mountains were a highly dangerous place.
What Cost?

If guerrilla operations were bothersome and costly to both the Italians and later to the Germans, they were also expensive in Allied terms. The cost, however, varied in ascending order for the Allies, the guerrillas, and the population that lived on the guerrilla battlefields.

For the Allies the cost was moderate. On the basis of figures available from the sources used, no definite costs can be given, but a very clear idea of their magnitude may be obtained. For example, less than one-sixth the supply tonnage for Yugoslavia went to Greece. On the basis of 2,514 tons of supplies air carried to Greece, air transportation costs have been estimated to range around $1,000 a ton or a total of approximately $2,500,000. It may be assumed that the cost of the supplies themselves would not exceed the cost of their air transportation. It is also estimated that the tonnage and transportation costs of supplies sent to Greece by clandestine naval craft would be far lower than those for air delivered supplies.

In addition to supplies, there were the gold sovereigns given to the organizations to help support their men and the destitute population. It is impossible to place this cost definitely. At first, the British supported the guerrillas at the base rate of one gold sovereign per man per month. Later the rate was raised to two gold sovereigns per month for a given level of strength. If EDES guerrillas were supported at a strength level of 10,000 to 12,000 men and EAM/ELAS on the limited basis of 10,000 men from mid-1943 on—although neither case is certain from the evidence—the total cost would have been between approximately 22,000 and 44,000 gold sovereigns per month for a period extending to the liberation of Greece. During part of this time, of course, both supplies and sovereigns were cut off from EAM/ELAS for bad behavior. Although the sovereign was not issued in Great Britain at the time and had a fluctuating value on the free market, it has been estimated at roughly the same worth as the pound in U.S. dollars. Calculating its worth at $4.03, it is therefore estimated that the cost of supplying the guerrilla organizations with gold sovereigns for about 18 months was in the range of $1,600,000 to $3,200,000. While this aid may have been expensive, it was hardly so in relation to other war costs.

The number of Allied troops in Greece—under 400 in all in mid-1944 and far fewer before then—makes the Allied investment in manpower up to the period of liberation extremely small. Many observers, including Colonel Woodhouse, have noted that the casualty rate among Allied personnel, particularly liaison officers, was low. In the course of this study, total Allied casualties of 8 dead and 14 wounded have been noted, including the 2 parachute casualties. These figures, of course,
are not complete. Also, many more men became disabled through sickness, particularly malaria. Under any circumstances, the commitment of Allied men was small.

For the Greek guerrillas, on the other hand, the cost in lives was considerable, although it is as difficult to reach a figure for guerrilla casualties as for German. The Germans claimed to have eliminated 4,043 ELAS guerrillas, dead or captured, in only two mopping-up operations undertaken in June and July of 1944. In the 2-month period of July–August 1944,\(^h\), in which German casualties came to almost 2,500 dead, wounded, and missing, the Germans claimed to have killed 5,394 guerrillas and captured 768.\(^6\) Saraphis has placed total ELAS losses at 4,500 dead and 6,000 wounded, of which 2,000 were permanently disabled.\(^6\) Using his own figures, it could be said that one out of every four ELAS guerrillas was a casualty.\(^i\)

Although there may be good reason to believe that German figures for guerrilla casualties were high—since the Germans by their own admission had trouble in discerning which Greeks were guerrillas and which simply inhabitants—there is no reason to question that their figures represented Greek casualties, whether combatants or not. In addition to so-called combatant casualties, there were additional large numbers of Greeks who were shot as “Communist suspects,” because they were Jews or gypsies, or in measured retaliation for German losses.\(^6\) Looking over his village, half of whose dwellings had been burned by German reprisals, one Greek told a liaison officer that his village had lost no citizens through reprisals: “It was more than we had dared hope for,”\(^6\) he said. A Greek source has estimated that 21,000 reprisal victims were executed by the Germans, 9,000 by the Italians, and 40,000 by the Bulgarians.\(^j\) These 70,000 victims of execution compare with a total of 72,000 casualties suffered in combat or by bombing in 1940 and 1941. Another 45,000 Greeks, including many Jews from Salonika, were transported to Germany, and presumably executed. Over and above all these figures, about 260,000 Greeks\(^k\) are reported to have died from the effects of starvation between 1941 and the end of 1944.\(^6\) In all, 447,000 Greeks were apparently the direct and indirect victims of the war and occupation; beside this figure, the 10,000 ELAS casualties and the additional casualties of EDES must seem small indeed.

\(^h\) Note that these two periods overlap and casualties may therefore not be added.
\(^i\) Figures for EDES losses are not available.
\(^j\) Because of the complex situation in Bulgarian-occupied Greece, with the Bulgarians attempting to annex part of Greece, these last executions may not be wholly connected with resistance activity.
\(^k\) Estimated at 300,000 at the Nuremberg Trials. (Trials of War Criminals, XI, 828.)
In addition to losses of men, the Greek community suffered disastrously during the occupation and the guerrilla warfare. By the end of the war, well over a thousand villages\(^1\) had been burned and destroyed by Axis forces. Over a million peasants were estimated to be homeless, destitute, and unable to farm. Greek industry, such as it was, was ravaged. Of 1,700 miles of railway in Greece at the beginning of World War II, only 415 miles of track remained usable in October 1944. At that time, over 1,300 bridges had been destroyed or damaged. The road system was in extremely poor shape, and the telephone and telegraph systems were also severely damaged. The state of the economy was reflected in the fact that, whereas aggregate corporate value of about 1,300 Greek corporations was estimated at 12 billion drachmae in 1941, it took 170 trillion drachmae to purchase one gold sovereign in November 1944.\(^6\)

War in Europe and the disruption of the economic process would have caused trouble in Greece, even if it had been able to remain neutral. Involvement in the war of 1940–41 with Italy and Germany exacted some 72,000 Greek combat and bombing casualties, as well as economic losses. But the degree of devastation and destitution rampant in Greece at the time of liberation in November 1944 must be laid to the disasters of the occupation, the guerrilla war, and German counterguerrilla measures.

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\(^1\) The Paris Reparations Conference estimated that 2,000 villages and one quarter of all Greek buildings had been destroyed. (Forster, *A Short History*, p. 227.)
CHAPTER VI.
ANTIGUERRILLA WARFARE

END OF THE ITALIAN OCCUPATION
GERMAN ORGANIZATION FOR CONTROL
FINDING SUFFICIENT TROOPS
SECURING THE TRANSPORTATION NETWORK
MINOR OPERATIONS
MAJOR OPERATIONS
THE MISSING KEY TO SUCCESS
ANTIGUERRILLA WARFARE

Although Hitler’s original plans for the occupation of Greece had provided for a minimal commitment of German troops, by the summer of 1943, Greece had become an area of large-scale German intervention. At that time, three major problems in the Balkan area triggered German reactions. The most pressing was the obviously imminent defection from the Axis of Italy, whose troops formed the backbone of the occupation forces in the Balkans, including Greece. The second was the belief that an Allied landing or landings in the Mediterranean area was imminent and that Greece seemed a most likely area for such a landing. ¹ The concomitance of the first two problems magnified the third. Guerrilla warfare, endemic throughout the Balkans, had assumed proportions sufficient to require direct action before an Allied landing in Greece offered the opportunity for critical rear-area damage by guerrilla forces. First, however, the Italian problem had to be disposed of.

End of the Italian Occupation

Italian troops on occupation duty in the Balkans in 1943 totaled about 500,000. Of these, about 270,000 were, in late summer 1943, under the Italian Eleventh Army, commanded by General Vecchiarelli, who was responsible for most of mainland Greece, the Peloponnesus, Crete, and the Ionian Islands. ² Eight Italian divisions under Eleventh Army were stationed in this area. Except for 20,000 troops on Crete, the main forces of the Eleventh Army were on the Greek mainland.

If Italy were to make a separate peace with the Allies, obviously the Germans would have to act to prevent Italian forces in the Balkans from surrendering to either Allied forces or guerrillas. Beginning in early 1943, the Germans began to prepare for this possibility. Plans were made for Operation ACHSE, which was to effect the surrender of the Italians in the event of their withdrawal from the war. The two German divisions in Greece (one on the mainland and one on Crete) were augmented in the spring and summer of 1943, and the German commands in the Balkans were reorganized. By 1 August 1943 there was a German division and brigade, as well as an Italian division, on Crete. On the mainland, three German divisions and one Bulgarian division were directly under German control; and two German and seven Italian divisions were tactically controlled by General Vecchiarelli’s

¹ The Greek islands of Samos, Rhodes, and the smaller Aegean Islands came under Italian Army Egeo. There were in addition a few areas on mainland Greece under German or Bulgarian control.
Eleventh Army. Every German division commander knew what to do when ACHSE was ordered. Moreover, Fuehrer Directive No. 48, issued on 26 July 1943, placed German theater control in the Balkans over Eleventh Army. General Vecchiarelli, regarded as a “good Prussian,” had already accepted a German chief of staff, a German supply officer, and a German administrative officer on his own Eleventh Army staff. The Germans expected no particular difficulty in Greece during Operation ACHSE.3

When the Italians withdrew from the war on 8 September 1943, the Germans put ACHSE into immediate effect. In Greece, they demanded the complete surrender and disarming of troops of the Italian Eleventh Army. Although protesting the dishonor, Vecchiarelli agreed both to the surrender and to immediate transfer of heavy divisional weapons to the Germans on condition that the Italians be allowed to retain their light arms and thus avoid “external dishonor.” In particular, Vecchiarelli ordered that Italian troops “will not, I repeat, will not make common cause with the Partisans . . . .”4

Almost 120,000 Italian troops of Eleventh Army escaped from Greece in one way or another;5 however, the Germans encountered little trouble in effecting the surrender of those who remained on the mainland. On the islands, however, there was actual combat between Germans and Italians. On Cephalonia and Corfu off the western coast of Greece, Italian troops fought, but German strength prevailed by the end of September. General Gandin with his staff on Cephalonia and the Commandant of Corfu were summarily court-martialed and shot. On Crete there was also some difficulty, but the Germans quickly brought it under control.b On the Greek mainland, only elements of the Pinerolo Division under General Infante and the Aosta Cavalry Regiment under Colonel Berti (numbering approximately “twelve thousand well-equipped Italians”) surrendered to Colonel Woodhouse and the guerrillas.6

Although the Italians were to remain something of a problem to the Germans even after the surrender of Eleventh Army in September 1943, the degree of the problem was quite different before and after that date. At the beginning of September, the Italian Army was of considerable size and armament, in formed units, under its own leadership. Had General Vecchiarelli fought, the Germans in Greece would have been considerably outnumbered. The fact was that he did not. By the end of September, the Germans had obtained the surrender of most Italian troops in Greece.

b On the Greek islands of Rhodes and Samos, fighting by Italian forces continued somewhat longer. In 48 hours of intensive fighting on Rhodes, however, approximately 7,800 German troops enforced the surrender of about 40,000 Italians.
The Germans now had to undertake the role of the major occupation force. They found the country in considerable disorder. Coastal defenses needed to be strengthened against an invasion threat, and strong measures needed to be taken internally to secure the country against the guerrillas of EAM/ELAS and EDES.

The Italians had never really faced the guerrilla problem in Greece. Their supply convoys had been successfully ambushed and their outlying troops successfully attacked. Their reaction had been ineffective: their combat units had gone into the mountains and, though rarely engaging the guerrillas, had halfheartedly burned down village houses.
and hanged villagers in retaliation for guerrilla raids. These activities, regarded by German General Wilhelm Speidel as “at times most irresolute and at times brutal,” had neither deterred the guerrillas nor secured the cooperation of the villagers. As guerrilla operations had continued and become more intensive during Operation ANIMALS in the summer of 1943, the Italians had withdrawn their garrisons from the outlying villages into the larger towns. In the period of flux following the Italian surrender, many Italian units withdrew from their posts before the Germans came, thus allowing guerrillas to infiltrate additional territory. Some Italian soldiers even sold their arms to the guerrillas. EAM/ELAS, it will be remembered, was immeasurably strengthened by the arms and equipment surrendered by the Pinerolo Division.7

As a result, the Germans found, on taking over their occupation posts, that the major part of Greece, variously estimated at from 67 to 80 percent, was in the hands of the guerrillas. Italian data on the guerrillas were, according to the Germans, vague, outdated, inaccurate, and exaggerated and therefore of little value in estimating or meeting the problem. Not only had the Italians lost control of the countryside but they had lost control of vital supply roads. The Metsovon Highway, the only major east-west road in northern Greece, had been intermittently blocked for nearly 2 years. The Germans found it completely closed and supplies being detoured in the fall of 1943. The internal situation in Greece was intolerable to the Germans, and they meant to do something about it.8 But first they had to consolidate the organization of their occupation forces.

German Organization for Control

Throughout the occupation of Greece by the Germans, their forces were organized in a highly complex fashion, with a number of parallel commands and overlapping responsibilities.

In the fall of 1943 Greece was under the operational control of the German Southeastern Theater, which had recently been administratively revised. As Supreme Commander Southeast, Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs had overall command of the Balkan theater. His headquarters were in Belgrade, Yugoslavia; he reported directly to the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW). He was responsible for defense against an Allied landing attempt and for internal security against guerrilla warfare in the Balkans, including Greece. This responsibility was assigned to Army Group F, of which von Weichs was simultaneously commander, for the Balkans except Greece; and to Army Group E, for Greece.9
Army Group E was commanded by Generaloberst (Gen.) Alexander Loehr, who reported directly to the theater commander, von Weichs. Army Group E had no armies under it. By October 1943 it had two German corps, the LXVIII and the XXII Mountain Corps, both available for coastal defense and for tactical operations against guerrillas. The first was assigned the defense and security of the area of eastern Greece and the Peloponnesus; the latter held the same responsibility for the Epirus region of southern Albania and western Greece down to the Gulf of Patras.\footnote{10}

Figure 27. Field Marshal von Weichs, Supreme Commander Southeast and Commander of Army Group F.

By the beginning of 1944 and after some further reorganization, Army Group E had brought into corps status three additional commands: Fortress Crete, on the island; the Administrative Area
Salonika-Aegean with headquarters in Salonika; and a Bulgarian Corps, which had its own occupation sector in Thrace and eastern Macedonia and whose two divisions came under General Loehr only in the event of an Allied landing attempt. The mainstay of Army Group E’s tactical troop strength remained the LXVIII Corps under General der Flieger (Lt. Gen., AF) Helmuth Felmy and the XXII Mountain Corps under General der Gebirgstruppen (Lt Gen, Mtn Troops) Hubert Lanz. At the end of 1943 these two corps had a total of three divisions regularly assigned.\(^{11}\)

\(^{c}\) In its tactical role, the administrative area came under Army Group E; as a military government area headquarters, the administrative area came under General Speidel, Military Commander in Greece (see page 229).

\(^{d}\) This same principle applied to the independent German naval and air units in Greece which were to come under the Army Group Commander only in the event of an Allied assault. Excluded from this rule were the Air Force field divisions that were regularly assigned Army Group E.
General Loehr’s position as commander of Army Group E was difficult because of the complexity of the German organization for occupied territories. In addition to the tactical organization of Army Group E, there was a German administrative command, really a military government, for occupied Greece, which was mainly independent of the Army Group Commander. This military government headquarters, called Military Command Greece, was situated in Athens. The Military Commander of Greece was General der Flieger (Lt. Gen., AF) Wilhelm Speidel. He reported, not to von Weichs, but to Military Commander Southeast, whose military government headquarters was in Belgrade, and who was simultaneously Military Commander (Governor) and Combat Commander in Serbia. Military Commander Southeast in turn came under theater authority. Because of his combat function in Serbia, Military Commander Southeast had little interest in Greece. Under Speidel, military government administration divided Greece into administrative areas quite separate from the operational areas.12

Between the two German commanders in Greece, General Loehr and Lieutenant General Speidel, there was friction. Speidel, who had previously been Military Commander of Southern Greece, with some tactical forces under him, had lost these to the Army Group Commander in the reorganization of German commands in Greece during the summer of 1943. Presumably General Speidel had executive power and “territorial authority,” while General Loehr had tactical and strategic military control. As the guerrilla war continued, however, the country was brought more and more under combat command. Using his power, when the tactical situation demanded it, to give instructions to military (government) commanders not subordinate to him, General Loehr began exercising authority over General Speidel’s command. “From then on,” wrote General Speidel, “every requirement of Army Group of an economic, financial or administrative nature was a ‘tactical necessity.’ It was inadverible [unavoidable] that these two so widely differing conceptions should lead to severe controversies.”13 At the same time, although Speidel had no voice in combat against the guerrillas, he was vitally affected by its existence. “Partisan warfare,” he wrote “paralyzed the territorial organizations of Military Commander [Speidel]. It is impossible to conduct warfare in a country and at the same time to maintain a pretense of peaceful occupation . . . .”14

The German command structure in Greece, already complicated by the overlapping of function between Generals Loehr and Speidel, was further entangled when, in September 1943, the post of Senior SS and Police Leader for Greece was created. The occupant of this post, a General Schimana, played an anomalous role. Presumably, he was subordinate to General Speidel, who was responsible for territorial control,
but Schimana had sole responsibility in all police matters and reported on these matters only to the Reichs Leader SS and thus directly to Hitler. Schimana also received direct policy guidance and directives from the Reichs Leader SS. Furthermore, by OKW directive of 7 September 1943, General Speidel was ordered to assign definite combat areas to Schimana so that the SS and police units under him (excluding the Waffen SS units assigned to Army Group E) could carry out combat against guerrilla bands and sabotage in Greece. At this same time, overall responsibility for guerrilla combat belonged to Army Group E. Speidel reported that Army Group E assigned Schimana the province of Boeotia; and that later Schimana shifted his combat activities to the Peloponnesus, “presumably with the approval of Army Group E.” Because Schimana was nominally under the military government headquarters but operated in the field as combat commander against the guerrillas, his functions in Greece overlapped those of both Speidel and Loehr. At the same time Schimana partially bypassed both of these commanders, since he received guidance, directives, and even tactical orders directly from the Reichs Leader SS.15

In addition to the overlapping functions and interests of General Loehr as Army Group Commander, General Schimana as Senior SS and Police Leader in Greece, and General Speidel as Military Commander (Governor), there was a representative of German political affairs in Greece who had an interest in the functions of all three military commanders. The Special Plenipotentiary, Ambassador Hermann Neubacher, represented both the German Foreign Office and the Reichs Minister for Economics. On occasion he was directly involved in the measures taken in the antiguerrilla campaign, particularly with regard to the political effects of retaliatory measures.16

The German organization in Greece, as in other occupied nations, reflected a very delicate balance of power between the various governmental agencies of the home country. The result was a certain internal inconsistency in applying a basic German policy of pacification. Prime responsibility for operations against Greek guerrillas, however, remained mainly in the hands of General Loehr, the commander of Army Group E. And since no Allied landing attempt was made in Greece, control of and combat against the guerrillas became General Loehr's major objective.17

**Finding Sufficient Troops**

No matter how passive the Greek population might have been, General Loehr would have felt hard pressed for troops to man the coastal defenses of Greece and to repulse any Allied landing attempts. Since the country was not passive, the problem was the more serious.
Figure 29. German Organization after September 1943.
Whatever his need, General Loehr could not count on any major additions to his strength unless a landing took place. As a matter of fact, the Germans faced a growing troop shortage everywhere. In 1941, 139 of 186 German divisions had been committed in Russia; in 1944 they were still “bleeding to death” in that country, and the Western Front was about to open.18 Strategically, the Southeastern Theater in the Balkans represented the southern flank of the German fight in Russia, but it was a flank that had to be held by the smallest possible number of troops.

After the Italians defected in 1943, the Germans had 14 divisions and about 600,000 military personnel in the Balkans. At the end of the year, the commitment had risen to 20 German divisions and about 700,000 men. It has been estimated that by July 1944 German strength had declined to about 500,000 men in the Southeastern Theater.19

Of the 20 German divisions in the Balkans at the end of 1943, five were assigned to Army Group E; of these, four divisions and a number of separate regiments were on the mainland. Using this ratio of strength as a basis, it has been estimated that at its height the German manpower commitment in Greece was approximately one-fifth of their total troop strength in the Balkans; that is, approximately 140,000 men on mainland Greece. By the same process, it may be estimated that, in the summer of 1944, German troop strength was down to about 100,000. These figures roughly agree with estimates based on the German Order of Battle and with those made by General Saraphis of EAM/ELAS.20

Some German troops in Greece were first-rate fighting soldiers. For example, the 1st Mountain Division under Army Group E was a first-class unit, mountain-trained and combat-ready. As the guerrilla war wore on, antiguerrilla combat schools were organized and increased the available number of trained troops.21

One particularly effective technique was the formation of special guerrilla-hunting details. These were detachments of young, battle-hardened soldiers, organized into small units and trained and equipped to fight guerrillas. First used in Russia, they were also effective in Greece. When possible, natives who knew guerrilla methods were also enlisted in these details. The details were trained and armed for close-in, hand-to-hand fighting in forested, mountainous terrain; and, though expert in the use of rifles, machine guns, pistols, and grenades, they were equally ready and able to inflict death by knife, spade, or bare hands. These guerrilla hunters dressed like the local population, sometimes even wearing pieces of native uniform. They accepted their illegal status, feeling that capture would mean sure death whether or not they were in uniform. These sub rosa troops were effective both
in stalking and annihilating small bands on their own and as a combat adjunct in larger operations.\textsuperscript{22}

The unfortunate fact of the matter, however, from the German standpoint, was that they had too few first-class troops. Many men were over age or post-convalescent. In addition, there were several fortress regiments which were composed mainly of former general military prisoners. Army Group E also had some “Eastern” battalions, consisting of men of Slavic or Tatar derivation who were willing to fight on the German side. These men, useful for certain operations when carefully handled, were not completely reliable. In 1944 some of these groups had to be disarmed.\textsuperscript{23}

The Germans tried in late 1943 and 1944 to salvage some of the surrendering Italian troops for duty in Greece. Basic German policy was to treat as prisoners of war all those Italians unwilling to assist the Germans, but to allow those willing to help to do so, either in non-combat labor or armed guard and security duties. Although many Italians soon tired of prison camps and elected to help, few chose active duty. Even those who did were not completely dependable from the German point of view. The Germans therefore required that each man take a personal oath of allegiance. Thirty percent of the Italians refused to do so. Those who did take the oath apparently feared that they would be transferred immediately to frontline service and that if they ever returned to Italy they would be imprisoned. Despite the oath of allegiance, lowered morale made the Italian volunteers unreliable. The Germans therefore kept them dispersed throughout their own units at the rate of one company of 40 Italians per German security battalion. Italian disaffection continued to increase as time went on. Army Group E never placed complete confidence in the Italian troops within its ranks.\textsuperscript{24}

The Bulgarians, who shared the German occupation of Greece, had an estimated 40,000 troops there. In addition to two Bulgarian divisions under their own corps commander and not subject to General Loehr except in the emergency of an Allied landing, a third Bulgarian division was under the German Salonika-Aegean command. Although the Germans considered the Bulgarian troops good soldiers they created problems for General Loehr. The Bulgarians wished to divert their independent corps from defense of the Thracian coastline to the construction of a defensive line within their own country and to the security of the interior of Thrace. In early 1944, despite the protests of Loehr, they assigned a quarter of their troops to this latter task, leaving a large exposed sea front. Also, when Bulgarian units went on antiguerrilla operations in German territory, they tended to remain until “ordered to return to their own zone.” They in turn were irked by German demands that they turn over captured weapons and booty.
Bulgarian-Greek friction in the Bulgarian zone added to anti-German sentiment throughout Greece, since the Greeks blamed the Germans for inflicting the Bulgarians on them. By mid-1944 some Bulgarians serving in German units had to be disarmed, a symptom of the coming Bulgarian withdrawal from the Axis, which was to take place late that summer.25 It might be said that Bulgarian troops supported Army Group E quite well in tactical operations against the Greek guerrillas while at the same time they proved to be strategically unreliable.

The major success of the Germans in augmenting their troop strength came with the creation of Greek complements—the Security Battalions, whose main duty was to aid the Germans in the suppression of the guerrilla bands.

The Security Battalions had been started in the summer of 1943 even before the Germans took over major occupation duties from the Italians. With the encouragement of the Germans, John Rallis, third premier of the Greek puppet government, took the lead in forming these battalions. Behind the scenes were Gen. Theodore Pangalos, who had been active for years in Athenian politics and briefly dictator of Greece in the mid-1920’s, and Stylianos Gonatas, who somewhat earlier had been prominent in the Athens EDES. He is reported to have advised young Greek Army officers to join these Security Battalions.26 Woodhouse believed that Rallis saw the Security Battalions as a “bridge” over the period of chaos that would occur during the changeover from
German occupation to Allied liberation and that he counted on Allied gratitude for preserving order in Greece. “He intended to enjoy,” wrote Colonel Woodhouse, “the fruits of collaboration with both sides.” The Germans, at least, profited much from this collaboration.

The Security Battalions were first organized on a purely voluntary basis, although Rallis’ government later attempted conscription. Since most men were able, if they wanted, to hide out from the puppet government, by joining the guerrillas if necessary, most of the members of the battalions were volunteers. What motives led these Greeks to aid the occupiers and fight against their fellow citizens?

For the leaders of the Security Battalions and others whose motives were knowingly political, the situation and the reasons were complex. It was true that for some Greeks the fear of communism was greater than the fear of the Germans: The Germans would inevitably leave Greece, but the Communists might stay forever. Many Greeks felt, like Rallis, that the British would not be against the Security Battalions and might even be for them. If so, they could save Greece from communism, avoid German reprisals, at least against themselves, and gain British favor simultaneously. Saraphis has written that “Rallis himself frequently gave out that he had created the Security Battalions by agreement with and at the suggestion of Great Britain and of the King of Greece.” Some recruiters for the battalions, like those for EDES and EAM/ELAS, gave volunteers the clear impression that Great Britain looked with at least implicit favor on the organization. As the news got around Greece that the British were becoming anti-EAM/ELAS, Woodhouse noted that the Security Battalions began to expect Allied favor.

For the rank and file of the Security Battalions, like the rank and file of EDES or EAM/ELAS or any other organization in Greece, joining the Security Battalions was probably a matter of accident. One of the reasons for joining them—as it was for joining the guerrillas—was economic necessity. But the average Greek, according to Colonel Woodhouse, had no real basis for decision as to whether to join the guerrillas or the security battalions. “If he lived in one part of the mountains, he was more likely to be in contact with the Communist influence first; if in another, with the non-Communist resistance; if in the plains, with the Security Battalions and the collaborating authorities; and so on. But in any case his destiny was decided for him by chance...” It should not be thought however, that the average Greeks felt no emotion; they were filled with emotions; they were ridden by them. Their politics were reflections of these emotions, not of professional political calculations. “There was indeed nothing to decide them,” wrote the Colonel, “except the first glib tongue that reached their ears.”
EAM/ELAS excesses also pushed some men into the Security Battalions. The issue of communism in EAM/ELAS and its activities in fighting other guerrillas alienated some Greeks from the guerrilla movement and made employment in the Security Battalions acceptable. The men from bands eliminated by EAM/ELAS had little choice except to join that organization or the Germans. They often chose the latter. Most of the members of the Security Battalions, in fact, started as members of small bands. The remnants of EKKA, for example, who escaped capture by EAM/ELAS joined the Security Battalions. These owed their popularity, Woodhouse wrote, “to the excesses of EAM/ELAS . . .”

The Security Battalions were strongest in the Peloponnesus, where all elements combined to bring about this development. The Germans regarded this region, after the loss of Africa, as practically a frontline and maintained proportionately more troops there than on the mainland. Their headquarters were centrally located, and they constantly policed the area. By early 1944, the Germans had declared martial law in the Peloponnesus. They were aided in control by two factors—geography and EAM/ELAS. Since the road network through the mountains on the Peloponnesus was relatively well developed, it was easier for the Germans to maintain control and harder for the guerrillas to find safe areas. On the Peloponnesus, as on the mainland, EAM/ELAS waged a battle against its local affiliated rivals, EOA, the National Organization of Officers, and ES, an organization whose initials stood for the Greek Army and which had royalist allegiance and loose connections with EDES and EKKA. By the end of October 1943 ELAS had eliminated these rivals, with the result that several of their commanders had joined ELAS and several had gone over to the Security Battalions. After EAM/ELAS obtained control of the guerrilla groups on the Peloponnesus, they took reprisals against local villagers whom they suspected of helping the Germans. The naturally conservative southern peasants, already alienated by the men in EAM/ELAS and the fact that they were not native to the Peloponnesus, were further antagonized by the internecine fighting and by the reprisals. Those villagers who did not want to join EAM/ELAS found no other guerrilla organizations to join and ended up with the Security Battalions. Thus events aided the Germans.

Enrollment in the Security Battalions has been variously estimated at from 5,000 to 15,000. The latter figure is that of Saraphis, who put the strength of the battalions at 9,000 in the Peloponnesus, 3,000 in Athens, and 3,000 in Central Greece. These figures seem high; a German estimate is 5,000 men recruited in the Peloponnesus. The battalions had Greek military leaders—Colonel Plitzanopoulos on the
mainland and Colonel Papadhongonas on the Peloponnesus—but they were described by Woodhouse as “unimportant.” Although commanded by regular Greek Army officers, each unit of the Security Battalions had a German liaison officer serving with it. In practice, it was the German officer who acted as battalion commander, just as the Allied liaison officer often led the guerrillas. In action against their fellow Greeks, the Security Battalions showed themselves merciless, even taking reprisal against the helpless villagers. In the story of antiguerilla warfare, they must be chalked up as a major German success, both tactically and psychologically. But even with this augmentation of his troop strength, General Loehr had difficulty in maintaining the internal security of Greece.

Securing the Transportation Network

Lacking sufficient troops to occupy all of Greece at once, the Germans in 1943 set out to secure from guerrilla attack their lines of communications and the towns and villages strategically located along those lines. The basis of the German defense of the supply roads and railways was a system of strong points. These were used particularly to protect important bridges or tunnels and places where high passes or serpentine roads favored guerrilla tactics. They were carefully sited in a dominating position where the terrain could be surveyed for some distance. However, blockhouses along the important western roads were often 6 or more miles apart, owing mainly to lack of enough troops to man more of them.

Strong points were laid out to allow all-round defense of the position. They were supposed to have bulletproof, or at least splinterproof, shelters, and the approaches were defended by mine fields and barbed wire obstacles. Reliable communications with other strong points and with sector headquarters were extremely important, the Germans found, to prevent troops from feeling isolated and depressed and to enable them to summon aid in case of attack. Since wire communication were extremely vulnerable to guerrilla attack, radio was a necessity.
The size of the forces defending the strong points varied according to the location, importance, and vulnerability of the target that was being defended, and the tactical mission of the troops. The Germans found, however, that they had a basic problem: if they tried to set up a large number of strong points, these could not be made strong enough to fight off guerrilla attacks; if they concentrated larger forces in fewer places, they left gaps too great to be adequately patrolled. Often in an effort to stretch manpower, they placed one squad of eight men under a noncommissioned officer in charge of such a defensive post. General Lanz discovered that this over-burdened his troops with guard and reconnaissance duty and invited guerrilla attacks, often quite successful. In turn, the morale of other squads in similar situations dropped, since they felt insecure. As a consequence, Lanz recommended that strong points never be staffed by less than a platoon of 40 men led by a carefully selected officer, even if this meant establishing fewer strong points: “For he who attempts to secure too much with inadequate forces, succeeds in securing nothing.”

Nonetheless, he could not always follow his own good advice. “Sometimes,” wrote the General, “guerrilla activity became so pronounced between the two points that a middle one had to be set up.” This often meant that the geographic location of the new strong point was far from ideal. Furthermore, troops had to be withdrawn from other points in order to man the new one. A better practice, General Lanz felt, would have been to have established more strong points at the outset than
were needed, leaving them unmanned until an emergency occurred. They could then be suddenly occupied “in a surprise move” to upset guerrilla plans.

The intervals between strong points were thus areas of great vulnerability. To guard these intervals, the Germans employed two types of road patrols—men sent out from the blockhouse staff and divisional motorized road-control detachments.

Each strong point was responsible for a given security sector of the road and sent out patrols—often three men and a leader—to walk along and guard the road. The patrols operated at varying intervals, were occasionally reinforced, and were sometimes assigned a mine-locating detail. This duty was not particularly easy or reassuring for four men operating alone, often at night, in guerrilla-infested territory.

The roving motorized road-control detachments assigned by divisional headquarters to supplement the road-patrol system of the strong points operated on staggered schedules, but on a 24-hour basis. They were particularly active during darkness or in weather of poor visibility. Their duties were to check Greek civilians using the roads, to test the combat readiness of strong points, to oversee the condition of the roads, and to come to the assistance of any strong point, walking patrol, or supply column that might be under attack. Operating at platoon strength with an officer in command, the detachments were mounted on armored reconnaissance cars and trucks, with machine guns, searchlights, and 20-mm antiaircraft artillery. They had radios and could report to headquarters instantly if they found any trouble; they could also be directed to trouble spots. The motorized road control detachments were extremely effective. It was unfortunate, from the German point of view, that their use was limited to the availability of motor vehicles and fuel.

Another measure that proved very helpful in securing lines of communication was the establishment of barrier zones. In critical areas, all civilian traffic on a given road or in the area immediately adjacent to it would be forbidden. Sometimes entry to the zone was prohibited after dark; sometimes it was completely forbidden. At any rate, anyone other

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*e* There is some question as to how General Lanz would have prevented guerrillas from taking over and manning unoccupied strong points and turning their defensive capabilities against the Germans for at least a short time.

*f* General Lanz would also have liked to make extensive use of suitable aircraft to patrol the roads, but these were not generally available. Pilots could have instantly alerted strong points, motorized road control detachments, or headquarters of suspicious moves. Low-flying fighter bombers or helicopters could have carried emergency packages of food, arms, and medical equipment for beleaguered German soldiers or convoys. The motorized road control detachments with their radio equipment could easily have called for instant air strikes.
than a member of the occupation force found in the zone at a forbidden time might be fired upon on sight.

Defense implied more than prevention of any incident along the roads; it also involved the quick cleanup of any trouble areas, so that the guerrillas’ opportunities for further attack were limited. The Germans used labor details to clear the roads of mines. If there was no time for this, a vehicle loaded with sand, gravel, or dirt, and reinforced with armored bottom plates beneath the driver’s seat was sent on ahead. Particularly in the mountains, where the breakdown of one car might trap all others using the road, motorized repair crews were kept constantly ready.

Road security also involved the vehicles that traveled the roads. General Lanz found it “inadvisable” to use Greek laborers in any of the workshops or depots, “no matter how dependable they may appear to be,” but he could not always avoid their use. Furthermore, vehicles left unguarded even for a moment were in danger. Single vehicles were always possible targets for guerrilla action. The Germans therefore ordered that all road traffic should be handled by convoys, and these were always sent out on irregular schedules. Furthermore, the position of defense vehicles in the convoy was frequently switched. Insignia, markings, and command flags were eliminated. Everything possible was done to avoid setting a pattern upon which guerrillas could plan attacks. The Germans also found it useful to camouflage or screen from view important facilities along the road or even sections of the road.

The security of rail lines was established in much the same way, measures being adapted to the peculiar qualities of the roadbed. The area on either side of the tracks was declared a restricted zone approximately 3 miles wide in rural areas and about 220 yards in urban areas. Strong points were established along the line, sometimes by fortifying the station houses. (Increased emphasis was put on anti-aircraft batteries in 1944 when the rail line was vulnerable not only to guerrillas but to Allied air attack.) The Germans used armored cars with flanged wheels and searchlights to patrol the railway and to search for guerrilla saboteurs. These armored cars “felt out” the way for trains and reversed to come to their aid in case of attack. The trains themselves were almost always manned by Greek civilian engineers who were bound to be injured or killed in any attack. When they also carried Greek civilians, these became in effect hostages against guerrilla attack. Sometimes the Germans, particularly when moving their own troops, deliberately carried civilians as hostage prisoners in cages pushed ahead of the

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8 See description of the guerrilla attack near Katerini on 3 August 1944. Chapter V.
locomotive.\(^h\) As a defensive measure, this last practice was moderately effective. Sometimes it stopped the attack; whenever possible the guerrillas released these unfortunate people from their cages as soon as possible after the demolition.

Figure 32. Hostage Cages. The Germans filled such cages with Greek hostages and pushed them ahead of trains, in order to deter guerrilla sabotage.

Responsibility for defense of urban areas belonged to the assigned Army post or station commander. “Outer security” for towns and villages was attempted simply by closing the roads, paths, railways, or streams leading out of the town—either by barbed wire obstacles or patrols. When the tactical situation was dubious, the population hostile, and German forces weak, the station commander sometimes built trenches, obstacles, observation posts, and combat installations to help withstand any guerrilla attacks. Incoming traffic was carefully checked. These German measures were not particularly effective; it was usually

\(^h\) Forty such hapless persons carried as hostages in the first coach lost their lives in the EAM/ELAS attack on the Kournovon tunnel in the summer of 1943. (See Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, pp. 194–95.)
not difficult to enter or leave the towns after darkness and guerrillas and Allied liaison officers often did so.

The German manpower shortage precluded the use, in the larger towns, of all-round defenses—the only kind they regarded as adequate for outer security. In the area of the XXII Mountain Corps, only one large town received such defensive installation—Yannina, corps headquarters, strategically located at the junction of the east-west Metsovon Highway and the north-south Yannina-Arta road. It did not receive this protection until September 1944, “as the threat to this city from guerrillas [during NOAH’S ARK] became more and more apparent” to the corps commander. The defenses were never actually tested, however, since the Germans pulled out of Greece a month later.

Within the towns there were areas peculiarly vulnerable to guerrilla attack which the Germans protected to obtain “inner security.” All military installations—command posts, troop billets, motor pools, repair shops, ammunition supply points, etc.—required special protective measures. Rooms or areas were enclosed and their entrances guarded. Only checked individuals could enter or leave. Finding it unsafe to quarter troops in private homes, the XXII Mountain Corps Commander, wherever possible, set up barracks and surrounded them with barbed wire, barriers, and sentries. He was never able, however, to do away entirely with private quartering, a condition he deplored since it led to overdose contact between the population and German troops and to frequent intelligence leaks.

These German defensive measures, with their numerous weak spots did not preclude guerrilla attacks. Weakness, particularly in the isolated blockhouses, invited guerrilla action. A second point in the German system of security was, therefore, to react immediately to every contact with the guerrillas. This, in turn, led to a constant series of minor operations.37

**Minor Operations**

A cardinal rule of the Germans in Greece was to react swiftly and in force against any guerrilla activity. Since such incidents occurred daily, German troops were more or less constantly engaged in minor operations. Such operations were generally characterized by three conditions: they were carried out immediately following contact, they were performed independently by troop units below divisional level, and their mission was to destroy the guerrillas.

Most minor operations took place in response to contact with guerrillas—either German troops made contact themselves or were in the immediate neighborhood of a guerrilla attack or act of sabotage. Under
these conditions, immediate response was regarded as necessary, since a delay of even a few hours usually meant that the guerrillas could not be found. As soon as word was received of a guerrilla operation, all available troops would be rushed to the scene.

Once on the spot, the troops, if strong enough, would begin an encirclement. While they were doing this, heavy weapons were brought up and surveyed in on the forming pocket. Everyone seen in the pocket was more than likely to be treated as a guerrilla. General Lanz has written that “the rural population, which accidentally or intention-ally was caught in the pocket, could easily be taken for enemies and fired upon.”

Naturally, all the guerrillas and most male civilians about to be caught in such a pocket would attempt to escape. Sometimes the guerrillas would take advantage of any momentary weakness to slip through or to break out by force; at other times they would separate and go in as many directions as possible, so that at least some of them would elude the pocket before it was fully formed. In these latter cases, German troop commanders were called upon to make wise and immediate decisions. They were supposed to avoid splitting their forces and to make the encirclement at the point where they thought the major body of the guerrillas would be. At that moment, “the tactically trained eye of the troop commander [was] of decisive importance.”

Once the Germans had formed the pocket, they still had to find the guerrillas inside it. A favorite guerrilla trick was to hide and hope the encircling troops would pass by, leaving the guerrilla on the outside of the ring. This often happened. Even when the ground was being searched, guerrillas were missed. “Arthur Reade, Yanni, and I hid in a thick cypress tree,” wrote one British liaison officer on Crete, “and over a hundred Germans passed underneath.” They were not captured. Luck played on both sides in these operations. One important guerrilla leader was captured when a German soldier accidentally stepped on his hand. The Germans appreciated the ability of the Greeks to make use of every bit of natural terrain to hide, every fleeting cloud of fog to disappear, magically as it were, from the face of the earth. Troop commanders were supposed to see that searches were thorough—tedious and dangerous work when a cornered guerrilla had a gun. The troops themselves avoided these combing operations whenever possible. Commanders were instructed, however, to do their duty “even if it meant repeating the maneuver.”

Troops on minor operations were often unable to effect an encirclement. Their only possible action at these times was to comb the terrain. Success in this, however, was even more dubious. Most of the time the
guerrillas—familiar with the terrain and its many hiding places—were able to elude the troops and get away.

When guerrillas undertook to defend themselves in mountain houses or small villages, the Germans usually felt that they had the upper hand. “Good results were obtained,” wrote General Lanz, “by surrounding the village and preparing for an attack employing heavy weapons, antitank guns, and mortars.” By the time the Germans had overpowered the village, however, many of the guerrillas had usually managed to slip away.42

Sometimes small-scale mop-ups were planned rather than impromptu. Even with planning, however, German commanders regarded small-scale sweeps as unsatisfactory. By the time such an attack was mounted, several hours would have passed and the guerrillas would have been alerted and scattered far afield. Also, the number of troops involved in minor operations was not sufficient to encircle an area large enough to trap the guerrillas. Consequently, the guerrillas would slip away and the attack deteriorates into a reprisal operation. Such was the case in the LXVIII Corps area in Operation KALAVRITA, for example, where the tactical lesson was recorded in the corps diary: “It again has been demonstrated that an insufficiently mobile light regiment in the mountains is insufficient for . . . encirclement of bands.”43

In the experience of the XXII Corps Commander also, minor operations were “not fully satisfactory.” Since the area to be encircled was small, most of the guerrillas could get out of it too quickly to be caught. And it was usually impossible to deceive the Greeks about what was going to happen. The Germans could not bring up troops “quietly or quickly enough to prevent the enemy from escaping.” In short, secrecy, surprise, and a sufficiently large area in which to operate were lacking in minor operations.44

**Major Operations**

Whereas minor operations were generally ineffective, the Germans felt that major mop-ups achieved considerable success. From their experiences in Russia and Yugoslavia, they had by 1943 a broad background in antiguerrilla operations. The tactical maneuver of the major operation was invariably encirclement. The German had learned how to enclose a wide area and thus trap large numbers of guerrillas. From a wide outer encirclement, thinly manned, the ring would be compressed successively until an inner encirclement line was reached. From this point, a final attack against the guerrilla stronghold would be launched and the individuals within it destroyed. Provided they had
the needed number of alert, trained troops, the Germans were able to score significant successes in major mop-ups against the guerrillas.

Though minor operations were undertaken spontaneously on contact, major operations were always carefully planned and plans were based on intelligence information. Major operations were undertaken only against strong, identified guerrilla groups. Obtaining information regarding such groups, however, was a problem in itself.

**Combat Intelligence**

The data on guerrillas in Italian files having proved in 1943 so “inaccurate and exaggerated” that no credence could be put in the estimates of guerrilla strength, the Germans set out to collect accurate information. Their intelligence organization, however, was dogged by the same multiplicity of command chains that worried tactical commanders in Greece. “Two or three intelligence organizations overlapped one another and thus interfered with each other’s work,” wrote General Lanz. “Himmler’s Security Service needlessly operated in opposition to the Wehrmacht, so that our staffs and troops were not only watched and spied upon by the partisans but also by the agents of the Security Service.”

When they were not compiling information about their fellow Germans, the intelligence nets set about covering Greece with their agents. Apparently many of their contacts involved the same Greeks with whom Allied intelligence was working. As a result the communications links between Greece and the Allies were threatened a number of times. It will be remembered that the link from Athens to Cairo was compromised and captured at the time of Woodhouse’s visit to Athens in early 1943. Other links were discovered and captured later in the war, at Yannina for example.

Spies were also sent into the mountains to obtain information about the guerrillas, but these poor creatures were often captured. One “wretched man” whose cover story was that he was an Australian, an escaped prisoner of war named Captain Benson, went to the mountains to seek Brigadier Myers. Brought to Myers by EAM/ELAS, he was exposed within the hour. “Benson was a dupe of the Gestapo,” wrote Myers, “and a pretty low-grade one at that. . . . It was an incredibly poor piece of work.” Benson paid the penalty. Another German spy with the cover story of being an escaped Frenchman from a labor corps in Athens had the bad luck to join a guerrilla group whose British liaison officer was bilingual in English and French. Unfortunately for the spy, his command of French was mediocre. “In point of fact,” wrote the British officer, “he was the first of many spies whom we were to catch
posing as deserters. . . . They never did us much harm, and, as in the case of our young ‘Frenchman,’ they got short shrift.”

Fortunately for German troop commanders they did not rely entirely on the intelligence organizations for combat intelligence, but had their own methods of acquiring information, particularly tactical data. These included troop ground and air reconnaissance, troop radio and telephone monitoring, and cooperative sharing of information with equal or higher commands.

Ground and air reconnaissance was routine, but because of the cooperation of the population with the guerrillas, it could rarely be done in secrecy. Active reconnaissance alerted the wary guerrillas and led to frequent shifting of their base of operations. In an effort to avoid detection, the Germans established camouflaged observation posts from which they could observe guerrilla areas over a long period of time. They assembled this information centrally to attempt to build up a big picture. On a local level, they sometimes sent out armored cars or tanks at night to possible places of guerrilla effort, camouflaged them, and from these vantage points carefully observed any activity in the vicinity the next day. Spotting of drop points also helped to locate guerrilla hideouts; the Germans wanted most, of course, to capture the drop points and achieve a “playback” operation, thus soaking up any agents or supplies they could. No instance has been found of this being successfully done in Greece.

During periods of active operations, tactical air reconnaissance proved invaluable. It was of much less use when contact with the enemy had not been made; guerrilla shelters were either invisible from the air or were in fact civilian buildings, and the guerrillas themselves were, unless carrying weapons openly, indistinguishable from the population.

Monitoring of guerrilla communications, however, provided useful information. Guerrilla radio transmitters were located by means of direction-finding devices and then not disturbed. The monitoring service took over the job of keeping track of all guerrilla messages, breaking codes when possible, and translating message content. A captured code at one point helped the Germans considerably. Such information was of great use in planning tactical operations and in preparing propaganda appeals. On the other hand, it was difficult, during active operations, to decode and translate messages in time for use. Unfortunately for the guerrillas, they sometimes spoke in the clear.

Telephone communication offered another source of intelligence for the Germans. Telephone wire was so scarce in the Greek mountains that when cable was found strewn along the ground, looped over bushes in guerrilla fashion, the Germans knew it was in use. They therefore let it alone and tapped the wires. Although guerrillas usually
held conversations in the clear, the Germans lacked the “trained and dependable military interpreters” necessary to exploit this source fully.\textsuperscript{51}

Other major sources of combat intelligence were the evaluation of captured documents and the interrogation of prisoners, both handled at corps headquarters. From here also, divisions could obtain the details of reconnaissance by neighboring divisions and intelligence evaluations. In interrogating prisoners, the Germans rediscovered the value of sugar over vinegar. Greeks being interrogated “should be treated well,” wrote the commander of the XXII Mountain Corps. “Since these are for the most part a primitive people, a clever treatment and method of interrogating will frequently serve to obtain important statements.” The Germans often used a political line of questioning to arouse passion and to elicit information from EDES guerrillas about ELAS and vice versa. Also, persons who had been ill-treated by guerrillas were usually willing to talk. Such individuals, however, seldom had information of major value.\textsuperscript{52}

\textit{Planning and Preparing for Major Operations}

With sufficient information at hand on guerrilla strength, bases, and habits to make a major operation worthwhile, planning was begun. To avoid security leaks, the Germans used a small planning staff of two or three officers, usually at corps level. The plan included an assessment of the guerrilla strength, a study of their habits, and an outline of the possibilities inherent in their location for entrenchment or escape. The plan detailed the tactical approach for destroying the guerrilla units. It also considered where and when to assemble the German troops so that the operation would not be compromised before encirclement had been achieved.\textsuperscript{53}

When the plan was finished, division commanders were brought in and briefed, and the operation was rehearsed in a map exercise. At this point, questions concerning the tactics were considered, and the plan was changed when necessary. Following the map exercises, divisional commanders and independent unit commanders, but no others were told of the impending operation.

On the basis of directives included with the operational order, measures were taken to perform secret air reconnaissance of the area, to prepare command posts and communications facilities, to organize traffic control, to complete supply plans for the operation, and to organize security protection. This last aspect was regarded as especially important. The Germans tried to fool their own troops as to their intentions by starting rumors of alternate operations; sometimes they even assembled motor vehicles and replenished supplies to support
their cover operation. They also tried to throw the guerrillas off by sending false radio messages and by spreading rumors among the population—often accomplished most easily through the false leads given German troops.54

One of the planning difficulties was to find enough troops for major encirclement operations. Sometimes troop strength was so low that the outermost encirclement line could not be adequately manned. As the line was compressed, however, the troop strength problem lessened. After the first day of operations, planners counted on having both command and tactical reserves available. Command reserves were composed of “highly mobile units with strong fire power” placed either under corps headquarters or at the point of main divisional effort. Tactical reserves were spread all along the ring, at an initial rate of about one company for each regiment. As the ring was tightened and more severe fighting was to be expected, the Germans preferred to increase local reserves to one company for each battalion.55

Mountain operations required more than mere numbers of men; their combat condition was all-important. Since trained troops were always at a premium, however, the Germans also had to use soldiers untrained in mountain and forest ways. These were employed for blocking operations, saving their trained men for assault troops. Thus all men were utilized to best advantage; under the circumstances, this economy of force was an imperative.56

The Germans regarded light automatic weapons, machine guns, 20-mm guns, mortars, and mountain artillery as ideal for mountain operations. Hand grenades were especially useful for flushing out guerrillas from hiding places. Tanks were used where terrain allowed. Combat aircraft were apparently seldom available for such operations, although liaison planes were available and valuable.57

Since major encirclement operations involved the expenditure of troops and materiel—both in short supply—the Germans were meticulous in the planning and preparation phases of such operations. And they felt that any later operational success was due in large part to this previous care and attention to every detail.

The Outer Encirclement Ring

Troop movements began as soon as the operational code word was passed. The men were supposed to get to the jump-off point without alerting either the population or the guerrillas; however, this was much easier said than done. The Germans found their every move watched and reported. Even when the prepared cover plans fooled the villagers, the guerrillas often discovered that something was afoot as soon as the troops moved. While it was always the German intent to assemble
troops inconspicuously, the ubiquitous Greek herdsman was almost invariably an informer on troop movements. One of the advantages of the major mop-up, of course, was the fact that so large an area was involved that specific intent could not always be deduced, even when guerrilla intelligence on troop movements was fast and accurate.

When the Germans reached their jump-off point, they moved immediately to assigned areas; sent out security and reconnaissance patrols, including aircraft; and prepared to reach an outer encircling line.58

By the end of the first day of a typical major operation, the Germans expected to have established an outer encirclement. From this perimeter, advance troops were to dig in and be ready to repulse any guerrilla attempt to break out. The various staffs were to be functioning. Radio and telephone communications were to be in operation. Not only was artillery to have been brought up, but troops were supposed to have obtained firing data and to have important targets in range. Radio monitoring of the guerrilla networks was to be constant, and immediate translations were to be supplied: The entire outer ring was to be occupied by groups of soldiers, so that no guerrillas should escape during the night. But the Germans could not yet be sure just how the guerrillas would move.59

At this point, as combat operations were about to begin, the Germans looked to their troop leaders as a major factor in the successful conclusion of the encirclement. In general, their leaders responded to the need by aggressive action. In order to maintain personal direction of the campaign, corps commanders would select forward headquarters, and division commanders sometimes directed operations over their front from a Storch aircraft. To take advantage of local situations, lower ranking troop commanders would be allowed some leeway in interpreting orders. Both officers and men were usually eager now to get started with the work of destroying the guerrilla enemy.60

**Compressing the Ring**61

By the following morning, German troops were ready to undertake the main work of compressing the ring and destroying any pockets of resistance that might show up. This work continued day after day until an inner encirclement was reached and the final battle occurred. Nights saw no end to operations, for it was then that the guerrillas moved and attempted most actively to break out.

A typical operational day started off with air reconnaissance by the troop commander or one of his aides and with reports to corps headquarters from lower echelons of conditions along the ring. With this operational data assembled, the commander faced the problem
of deciding whether his troops should advance to tighten the ring or stay put for a time and reorganize to close up any gaps. General Lanz, XXII Mountain Corps Commander, has indicated that once an operation was started, time was no factor. It was always better, he felt, to strengthen the ring than to attack prematurely. Attack would only force the guerrillas to launch breakout attempts, which would probably be successful if the line were not strong enough.\(^{62}\)

When an advance began, it was usually by battalions. Three companies of each battalion would move, while the fourth remained in reserve. Machine gun platoons of the fifth company went with the forward companies, while the mortars and infantry guns remained at the disposal of the battalion commander. In addition to these weapons, each battalion commander was able to draw upon regimental artillery support, through an artillery liaison team attached to his headquarters. If the forward companies met with sudden resistance they could, by radio and telephone contact, call direct fire on target through the battalion liaison teams.\(^{63}\)

The assault companies moved forward as quickly as the terrain permitted. In the woods they deployed in depth, advancing in squad columns, combat-patrol style. Forests presented so many difficulties, however, that squads moved behind sweeping machine gun fire and the area was combed for hidden guerrillas as the assault troops passed on. Where there were no roads and thicket was dense, the troops were apt to get lost. In such terrain, especially at night, German troops sometimes did not know where they were and got in each other’s way. Forests also cut down on good radio reception and made communication difficult. In open country, German troops formed a skirmish line, sending scouts two to three hundred yards ahead, so that the assault troops would not be flanked. Following the assault troops, outside the range of small arms fire, came the battalion staff, reserve company, and heavy artillery.\(^{64}\)

Not only terrain but weather affected the German advance. Troops found that fog, dense snowfall, and bad weather in general impeded all their operations, while they helped the guerrillas. Snow, however, sometimes helped antiguerilla operations: the guerrillas could move only at the risk of disclosing their positions and movements. The most desirable conditions, however, were “clear weather, long days, and bright nights” to facilitate observation, movement, and operations.\(^{65}\)

During this period of forward movement, communication between units became extremely important. Companies, squads, and platoons maintained contact by messenger, hand signals, or visual observation. Companies communicated with battalions by telephone and portable radio. Battalions and regiments used motorcyclists, mounted
messengers, portable and voice radios, and telephones. Division to regiment and corps to division contact was by motor messengers, radio, and the ring-circuit telephone. In addition, attached to each division was a corps liaison officer with his own radio. Corps also used liaison aircraft. Contact between the corps command post and its permanent headquarters was often by carrier pigeon, but messages could usually not be relayed back by this means, since the command post was frequently moved. Tracer signals were generally used for special signals. For security, code names and call and frequency signs for radio and telephone contact were changed during the operation.66

As German troops moved forward over the plains and mountains they sometimes came upon villages or towns in the battle area. They approached such places carefully. The citizens had already been ordered by bulletin, leaflet, or loudspeaker to remain within the town, to stay inside their homes after dark, and warned that “any sort of association” with the guerrillas was punishable by death. Anyone who left the town was subject to being fired upon without warning. Despite the fact that the townspeople were imperiled by contact, guerrillas sometimes did invest the towns. When this happened, the townspeople might just as well collaborate with them as not—in German eyes the mere presence of guerrillas in a village was positive proof of collaboration.

Before German troops approached a town, their scouts reported whether it contained ELAS or EDES guerrillas. If there were no guerrillas, the troops marched through. If guerrillas occupied the town, the troops tried to envelop it to prevent anyone’s escaping. Heavy artillery was then brought up and the village shelled. While the artillery attack continued, troops prepared to assault the town. As soon as resistance began to slacken, artillery fire was stopped, and the assault troops rushed the town and cleaned up any remaining snipers. “Those civilians who participated in the fighting were dealt with mercilessly,” wrote General Lanz.

As soon as the towns were in German hands, either with or without fighting, the houses were searched for weapons, ammunition, or other prohibited items. Inhabitants who had not resisted were collected and sent to security camps outside the ring circuit until after the operation. In addition, a small detachment of troops was left in the town until the close of operations, to avoid reinfiltration. These forces were sometimes so, weak, however, that they invited guerrilla counterattack and were later overrun by the guerrillas. Sometimes the Germans simply burned the villages, particularly when they felt the villagers had collaborated. Even burned-out villages, however, offered later defensive possibilities.67
As German troops advanced through the forests, over the mountains, past the town—always compressing the ring—they were bound to come upon pockets of strong guerrilla resistance. For dealing with such situations, the Germans worked out what was practically a standard tactical method. To prevent the guerrillas from withdrawing immediately, the troops engaged them in a frontal assault. Meanwhile, an envelopment was begun from both sides. German troops, observing complete silence, using every cover, and moving almost in Indian fashion, sneaked quietly in from either side and obtained data to fix an enveloping artillery fire. Nevertheless, guerrillas were usually able to extricate themselves before this small subsidiary envelopment was completed. “But, when caught in a trap,” wrote one German commander, “they fought with impassioned fanaticism until the end.” Even if the guerrillas escaped from this little trap, however, they were still in the larger ring and had not yet eluded the German forces.

The Germans used every means to decrease guerrilla resistance, including psychological warfare. This was particularly feasible when they found themselves fighting both EDES and ELAS guerrillas. Using their knowledge of the ideological split between the two groups and knowing that armed clashes had already occurred between them, the Germans, in one operation in October 1943, dropped leaflets. These told EDES men that the Germans had no quarrel with them and that they should signal their allegiance to EDES so that the Germans would not attack them. Whether by mistake or design, these leaflets were air-dropped over ELAS guerrillas. In either event, it was an inspired act of psychological warfare: ELAS took the leaflets as proof of EDES collaboration and general untrustworthiness. The guerrilla front was split.

Even though the Germans took the offensive in these encirclements, the situation might be quickly reversed at places within or along the perimeter of the ring. Literally caught in a death trap as the ring tightened, the guerrillas made intense efforts to get away. Every weakness in the line was a vulnerability that was quickly exploited. The Germans were amazed, also, that the guerrillas could get an attack going so quickly. “Considering the speed of enemy attacks,” wrote General Lanz, “only those defensive forces can be effective that are immediately available and on the spot.” The guerrillas also sought to turn German tactics against them; in a number of situations, they strove to envelop the enveloping Germans. Such efforts enjoyed some success. In one battle occurring at nightfall, German troops were so hard pressed that “battalion commanders lost control and the lower echelons fought on their own and got into each other’s way.” By means of these lightning attacks launched against German troops who were momentarily in a weak position, numbers of guerrillas escaped the encirclement.
German defenses were particularly vulnerable at night, when such attacks were most apt to occur and when troops were most weary. In an effort to prevent breakouts, troop commanders were instructed to reach the day’s objective before nightfall, so that there would be plenty of time to coordinate the assault troops’ position with that of the blocking units and take strong defensive measures. Encircling lines were laid out in such a way that they resembled the system of strong points used to secure the roads. Groups of soldiers were stationed along the perimeter of the ring, maintaining contact by sentries and patrols. Fire patterns were laid to cover the outpost areas. By this means a continuous security line was achieved during the night hours. In addition the Germans found they needed to patrol all roads during the night and to inspect them before use in the morning; otherwise they were apt to suffer losses from guerrilla mines laid during the night.72

The Final Battle

After several days and nights of this type of fighting, German forces would find themselves near the so-called inner encirclement line, the last compression of the circle. This would form the line of departure for the final assault. The Germans now began to see the end of their long manhunt and took additional steps to preclude any escapes. Battalions were ordered to stop as they reached interim points, and to close ranks and wait for artillery and regiments to come up before they took off for the next point. In this way gaps were prevented and the attack front was coordinated. Troop fatigue was by now a problem too, and German commanders were becoming careful not to exhaust their men by enforcing too rigorous time schedules before the last hand-to-hand fight.73

Extreme precautions were taken at night after the inner ring was reached. A reconnaissance battalion combed the territory passed over during the day. Every available man was assigned to a position, fire was adjusted and communication tested. Tripwire mine fields were laid to avoid surprise. Also, Very signals were used to light the outpost patrol areas. Patrols were intensified, and advance listening posts set up. Irregular machine gun and mortar bursts periodically covered the interior of the ring. A defense in depth was set up; at some points there was, in effect, a double encirclement.74

Despite these measures, guerrilla attacks could be expected. Seizing upon any weak point, the guerrillas would strike out. At times some forces actually broke through the line, but it appears that on the whole the guerrillas’ communication was poor and that gaps were not effectively exploited. Instead of bringing up additional guerrillas to hold the breach open, some of the attack party would slip through the lines,
thus weakening the attack. German reserves brought up to the line would shortly restore the situation against the remaining guerrillas.\textsuperscript{75}

The final attack on the guerrilla stronghold from the inner encirclement was made only after the most careful preparations, sometimes requiring a day or more. Ground, air, and radio reconnaissance of the guerrilla redoubt was made. Ammunition supplies were brought forward, and firing data were obtained to fix artillery positions. Observation posts were established and communications facilities double checked. The encirclement perimeter, although possibly 60 miles in circumference, was so comparatively small that the Germans usually possessed sufficient reserves to double their ring in all places vulnerable to breakout attempts.\textsuperscript{76}

Figure 33. Lieutenant General Felmy, Commander of LXVIII Corps.
Starting early in order to take advantage of every daylight hour, German troops began the final assault. This was sometimes a matter of as much as 9 miles. Last-ditch defenses and hand-to-hand combat were the order of the day. Guerrilla attacks now, however, were apt to be wild, and German care and preparedness began to pay off well. Using artillery to presoften the massed guerrillas, the Germans prepared for the knockout blow while air-dropped leaflets and loudspeakers delivered an ultimatum for surrender. If this ultimatum was not met, hard fighting resulted; but the end was usually foreordained. Numbers of guerrillas died and many surrendered.

As the Germans finally learned, however, many more guerrillas were, even at this time, still hiding. Using guerrilla prisoners to serve as guides, German troops therefore continued to comb the mountain battlefield and surrounding terrain. The search sometimes lasted many hours, even days and nights. Finally, at the conclusion of the operation, the prisoners were taken away and those civilians who were considered non-collaborators allowed to return home.77
Lessons of Major Operations

German commanders not only made the most of experience they had gained in other areas of guerrilla activity, but they carefully reviewed every major antiguerilla operation in Greece for the lessons to be drawn. There were daily tactical reviews while an operation was under way, and later a comprehensive post-mortem review of the operation as a whole.

The Germans, of course, had already learned many of the principles of antiguerilla warfare that were retested in Greece. The lessons given below were particularly stressed by General Lanz.

Operating Information. No major operations were started without knowledge of the strength, position, habits, and escape avenues of specifically identified guerrilla groups. At first the Germans underestimated the guerrilla adversary, but they learned from experience to take into account the guerrillas’ strengths and weaknesses. Major operations were undertaken only against “strong, established guerrilla forces.”

Careful Planning. Operations were prepared carefully and pretested with map exercises. Every detail of early troop movement, supply, etc., was worked out with precision before the operation was started. This attention to detail paid off.

Secrecy. Guerrilla intelligence in Greece was so good that the Germans had to take exceptional measures to maintain the security of their counterguerrilla operational plans. Only a few German commanders knew of the plans before the start of operations; false rumors, deceptive movements of supplies and troops, etc., were used to mislead German troops themselves as to what was about to take place.

Tactics. The German aim in counterguerrilla operations was not to take territory but to destroy guerrilla forces. They found, from experience, that encirclement on a large scale was the optimum tactic. Neither frontal attacks nor flanking movements offered an equivalent degree of success.

Area. German planners learned to allow a large enough area for a major operation so that, even though the guerrillas might realize at once that an encirclement was being attempted, they would still be contained within its area despite their efforts to slip out. General Lanz stressed this point particularly.

Troops. Highly trained combat troops in adequate number were needed for major operations. The Germans—never having enough qualified antiguerilla troops—used their second-class troops for stationary, blocking operations and saved their first-class troops for the assault echelons.
**Flexibility.** During the operation, plans were changed to take into account local situations and troop conditions. Subordinate commanders were allowed some latitude in exploiting unforeseen opportunities. 84

**Time versus Accuracy.** Time was of the essence at the start of an encirclement operation, in order to establish the cordon before the guerrillas could escape. Once the outer encirclement line was closed, General Lanz emphasized that the prime requisite for success was a slow, steady, uniform compression of the line—at whatever rate was necessary to preclude any soft spots in the ring and to avoid troop fatigue. Objectives for a day, wrote General Lanz, should be limited to troop ability. The important thing was to keep the guerrillas within the ring and to destroy them, not to finish the operation in a hurry. In short, time was not important; accuracy was. 85

**Gaps in Line.** Germans commanders made every effort to avoid gaps or soft spots by coordinating and strengthening their encircling lines—even, as has been seen, at the expense of taking time. No assault was to be started until a closed front had been achieved; experience proved the folly of striking before the troops were completely ready. No unit was to be allowed to advance at a pace faster than its companion units could sustain otherwise the forward unit, the Germans found, might be enveloped by the guerrillas and overwhelmed, creating a major gap. 86

**Reserves.** General Lanz found that, owing to the rapidity with which guerrillas were able to mount an attack—something that appears to have surprised him—he needed to keep his reserves available for instant use. He found it wise to have his assault troops immediately followed by reserves, so that any small, local breakthroughs would be intercepted. Reserves kept back under corps headquarters could not be brought up quickly enough to prevent local breakthroughs. 87

**Breakout Routes.** The Germans found that it paid off to double-protect possible escape routes with “machine gun crews echeloned in depth” before an assault began. 88

**Combat Force.** The battalion proved to be the unit best adapted for counterguerrilla sweeps. It was the largest unit that could be personally led and controlled during operations in difficult terrain. 89

**Combat Communication.** It was very difficult to maintain communication between units during fighting in mountain terrain. This was a major reason for going slowly and maintaining visual contact whenever possible.

**Combat Intelligence.** In the initial stages of major operations, the Germans found that, because the guerrillas possessed the highest ground, they had an intelligence advantage. As the Germans moved to
higher ground they were better able to observe the battlefield and to fix artillery fire. Aircraft and helicopters in sufficient numbers would, of course, have obviated the guerrillas’ initial advantage. The Germans monitored guerrilla radio messages—often in the clear—to good advantage. Careful interrogation of prisoners also paid off.  

**Unit Boundaries.** Even highly trained German troops got in each other’s way during combat in difficult terrain. General Lanz therefore emphasized the obvious—that the use of natural terrain features, easily observed by the troops, as unit boundaries was highly desirable.  

**Combing Passed-Over Terrain.** Since a favorite guerrilla tactic was to hide and let German assault troops go past, the Germans instituted a second line of troops whose duty it was to carefully search the ground over which the assault troops had just passed. Through this technique the Germans found many guerrillas who would otherwise have escaped. Even after the final battle of the encirclement had been fought, the Germans learned it was still necessary to search trees, bushes, caves, rocks, etc., to find the surprisingly large numbers of guerrillas who had gone into hiding as a last resort. Prisoners were used to telling advantage in this work.  

**Flank Attacks.** The vulnerability of guerrilla units to such attacks suggested to General Lanz that they could be used to drive guerrillas along desired directions in the early stages of the encirclement.  

**Alarm Devices.** Under combat conditions the Germans found that even simple alarm devices—such as cans strung on tripwires—were effective in alerting troops to night breakout attempts.  

**Artillery.** German artillery was extremely effective against guerrilla strongholds. Enveloping fire combined with a frontal assault put murderous pressure on local redoubts. In order to achieve accuracy in mountainous and forested terrain, the Germans found it necessary to have their men carefully trained in the use of the compass.  

**Psychological Warfare.** Although General Lanz did not stress or apparently attach much importance to psychological warfare, it was apparent that the Germans were at times able to exploit effectively the schism between EDES and EAM/ELAS guerrillas.  

**Civilians.** “Collaboration of the population with the partisans [guerrillas] must be eliminated at the beginning of the operation,” wrote General Lanz. The Germans tried to put this policy into effect during encirclement operations by ordering the inhabitants to remain in their villages until German forces entered and by temporarily removing the inhabitants from the battle zone once the encirclement had reached the town. Civilians caught in the open were treated as guerrillas. These measures were effective for the period of the operation. The general
support that civilians provided for the guerrillas—for example, the ability of the guerrillas to replace their casualties with new recruits—tended, however, to negate, from the German point of view, the hard-won successes of the major encirclement operations.96

**Results of Major Operations**

With local variations, these tactics were typical of many major counterguerrilla sweeps in the Greek mountains. In Operation PANTHER, in the latter part of 1943, the Germans undertook to clear ELAS and EDES guerrillas from areas along the north-south Yannina-Arta Road, the east-west Yannina-Trikka Road, and Mount Olympus. In several weeks of fighting, employing upwards of two divisions, the Germans claimed that they inflicted guerrilla losses of 1,400 men and captured three field guns and a large stock of small arms. EAM/ELAS admitted to having suffered over 500 guerrilla casualties and having abandoned two guns when they ran out of ammunition. This was the operation in which German psychological warfare, already described, was so successful. Several towns were burned. ELAS also claimed, however, that it inflicted over a thousand German casualties. The discrepancies are interesting. One may disregard the inflated guerrilla claim of German casualties. ELAS casualties of 500 men, however, may be rather close to the mark, considering that to these would be added some EDES casualties and that unknown number of civilians killed by the Germans as guerrillas.97

In early 1944, German sweeps in northeastern Greece were frequent; here both German and Bulgarian troops were involved. Two operations, code-named WOLF and HORRIDO, resulted respectively in guerrilla casualties of 254 dead and 400 captured, and 310 dead and 15 captured. German casualties, meanwhile, were extremely low, being listed for HORRIDO as 18 dead, wounded, and missing. In Operation RENNTIER the Germans claimed guerrilla casualties of 96 dead and 100 prisoners while suffering only 2 German and 7 Bulgarian casualties. Operation ILTIS resulted in only 15 guerrilla casualties.98

In the spring of 1944 the large-scale operations against EAM/ELAS began with a vengeance. Operation MAIGEWITTER was an attempt to destroy ELAS guerrillas in northern Greece. German records indicate guerrilla losses of 339 dead and 75 captured, with 200 suspects arrested. GEMSBOCK, undertaken by three German divisions under the XXII Mountain Corps, was directed against 9,000 ELAS and other Communist forces on the Albanian-Greek border. The operation lasted from 6 to 14 June 1944 and netted 2,500 guerrilla dead and prisoners, with German losses of only 120 dead and 300 wounded. The success of
the operation was the more remarkable in that gas shortages delayed troop arrival at assembly areas and that, at the first encirclement line, each man had to cover 100 yards.99

Following on the heels of GEMSBOCK, Operation STEINADLER began on 4 July 1944 and was aimed at the elimination of 6,000 to 8,000 ELAS forces in the Korca-Yannina and Yannina-Trikkala triangle of north central Greece. The savagery of the fighting was shown by guerrilla murder and mutilation of 80 wounded Germans in an overrun battalion aid station. German forces comprised two divisions and some additional security troops under the XXII Mountain Corps, and were estimated by General Saraphis to number about 18,000 men. Compressing the guerrillas into an inner ring around Pendalofon, German forces killed 567 guerrillas and took as prisoners 976 guerrillas, 341 Italians, and 7 British officers.1 Booty included 10 tons of explosives and 10,000 livestock. Despite these losses, the German corps commander noted that “strong partisan groups reappeared a few weeks later in this area.”100

With the renewal of activities by EDES guerrillas in the summer of 1944, the Army Group E Commander, General Loehr, decided after German conversations with representatives of EDES that he would have to act against Zervas. Operation KREUZOTTER, begun on 5 August by two task forces comprised of elements of the XXII Mountain Corps, the LXVIII Corps, and SS troops, was therefore divided into three phases. The first two phases were to be directed against strong ELAS forces in southwestern Greece and in the province of Boeotia; the third, against EDES in Epirus. The first two phases of KREUZOTTER were carried out; but the third one, against EDES, was apparently cancelled by the Germans because of the deteriorating situation with regard to the Hungarians and Bulgarians. Although some local actions against EDES may have developed during the operation, no large-scale action was undertaken. In a final report on KREUZOTTER, the Germans noted guerrilla casualties of 298 dead and 260 captured against German casualties of 20 dead, 112 captured, and 1 missing. At the same time, an ELAS diversionary attack at Amfissa, outside of the operational boundary of KREUZOTTER, had resulted, by German account, in several hundred Germans killed and almost as many wounded.101

The figures assembled for these encirclement operations indicate that, in every case, German forces maintained supremacy of force, in numbers as well as in training, for the duration of the operation. In GEMSBOCK, three German divisions were involved, including the well-trained, hard-pressing 1st Mountain Division, against 9,000 ELAS and

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1 Their fate is unknown; no mention is made of their mistreatment in the account of the Nuernberg trials, however.
other Communist guerrillas. In STEINADLER, German forces estimated to number 18,000 men were used against 6,000 to 8,000 ELAS. The strengths of the forces opposing each other in KREUZOTTER are unfortunately unknown.

Despite the numerical superiority of the German forces, the German sweeps were never able to annihilate all the guerrillas who were initially surrounded. In GEMSBOCK for example, ELAS apparently extricated about 72 percent of its forces, while in STEINADLER it got out somewhere from 75 to 81 percent (depending upon the number committed). Although guerrilla casualties in KREUZOTTER were considerable, Army Group E noted that ELAS guerrillas immediately infiltrated searched areas as soon as German forces withdrew.

On the basis of comparative casualties for guerrillas and Germans, the guerrillas appear less battleworthy. In HORRIDO, the Germans claimed to have inflicted casualties at a ratio of 19 guerrillas to every German; in RENNTIER, the ratio was 22 to 1. Man for man, the guerrillas suffered six casualties for every German killed or wounded during GEMSBOCK; in STEINADLER, German casualty figures are unknown, but the operation was generally regarded by others as less successful. During the first two phases of KREUZOTTER, the ELAS guerrilla-German troop casualty ratio dropped almost to 4 to 1. If the ELAS action at Amfissa were counted, however, the casualty ratio for this one operation would have approached 1 to 1. A better view of the ratios may be gotten from a wider sampling of casualties throughout Greece. For the period of 5–18 August 1944, Army Group E reported guerrilla casualties of 1568 dead and 337 prisoners against German casualties of 327 dead, 304 wounded, 69 missing, and 8 deserting during antiguerrilla operations. The ratio for this period would be slightly under 5 guerrilla deaths for 1 German death or, on the basis of total casualties, slightly less than 3 to 1. It should also be remembered in regard to these ratios that a number of the guerrilla casualties may well have been civilians who were caught and treated as guerrillas. According to General Lanz, “Whenever the population was caught in the line of fire, severe losses were unintentionally inflicted upon them . . . . The troops . . . were unable to make the distinction between the civilians and partisans.”

Whatever the statistical success of major operations, they did not end the Germans’ problems with guerrillas. After a major mop-up, the guerrillas were almost always able to re-form and be back in operation immediately. The Germans attributed this amazing recovery to the support of the local population. No definitive control of the guerrillas could be obtained, according to General Lanz, until the guerrillas and the people were totally separated. Since it was impossible for the
Germans to effect this separation by completely destroying the guerrillas, they attempted to enforce it by applying restrictive measures to the population.¹⁰³

The Missing Key to Success

When the Germans began their occupation of Greece in 1941, they had wanted to maintain a liberal policy toward the inhabitants. In contrast to Russia, where Hitler welcomed the start of guerrilla warfare as an excuse for retaliatory measures aimed at the decimation of the Slavic race, the Germans in Greece had no such intentions, since they respected the Greeks’ untainted racial heritage. Although the Germans used the guerrilla warfare in Greece as an excuse to get at Greek Communists, these formed so small a minority of the population that a liberal policy toward the inhabitants was still possible. In return for liberality, it was expected that the Greeks would accept their status as an occupied people without reproach: they were to take short rations without complaint; they were to submit to exploitation as labor, either in Greece or in Germany; they were to maintain loyal and cordial relations with the Germans in Greece; and they were to aid the Germans in exterminating any guerrilla bands, particularly any Communist ones, that might spring up.

By the autumn of 1943, however, the Greeks had shown their disinclination to live up to these expectations. They had struck for more food. They had not responded to the call for labor with any enthusiasm, and, in collusion with EAM/EEAM, had frustrated German attempts to draft a labor force. “A few contingents of workers were dispatched to Germany by press-gang methods up to November 1943; but it was already obvious, four months earlier,” wrote Woodhouse, “that orderly conscription had failed.”¹⁰⁴ Greeks might be cordial, but the Germans had little reason to trust their loyalty: “Troops whenever billeted in private quarters, were exposed to espionage,” wrote General Lanz.¹⁰⁵ And German troops in Greece had already learned, in the summer of 1943 while they were still under the tactical control of the Italians, not to trust the population in the fight against guerrillas.

The German tactical command in western Greece felt that the only way it could definitely settle the problem was to separate the guerrillas and the population by moving the population in guerrilla territory to other areas. The German High Command, however, felt that this solution was not feasible.¹⁰⁶

¹ Untainted, by Nazi standards, i.e., non-Slavic and non-Jewish.

¹ See Chapter I, section on “Major Resistance Parties.”
The key to the situation, in the official German view, was firmness. To control the population the Germans intended to show, from the first, that they would brook no nonsense. Every act against the occupier would bring reprisals. Before the fall of 1943, reprisal measures were taken in the German sector of Greece both by their military government forces and by their tactical troops. The “Ten Commandments” printed into the paybook of every German soldier stated that commanders at divisional level or above were empowered to order reprisals. But the reprisals in Greece had not reached the 50 to 1 or 100 to 1 ratios being applied in the Slavic countries. The theater commander had specified no reprisal ratio for Greece, since it was felt at theater headquarters that each reprisal should be individually suited to the act being punished. In general, the ratio in Greece was 10 to 1. Hostages were selected from the population and held in collection camps. Presumably they were selected for shooting or hanging on the basis of their political attachment to the group held responsible for the act for which they were paying.107

From the autumn of 1943, however, German reprisal measures grew in severity. With the start of active counterguerrilla operations in mid-October, German tactical troops began to make many on-the-spot reprisals. The policy was to hold local inhabitants responsible for what occurred in their area. If guerrillas blew up a train or attacked a supply column, the villagers nearest the place of attack were held guilty of
complicity. If guerrillas ran into a town at night and demanded shelter, even at the point of a gun, the villagers were held guilty of aiding them. The policy was apparently aimed at convincing the Greeks that they would be punished more severely by the Germans for aiding the guerrillas than they could possibly be hurt by the guerrillas for not aiding them. In this way, the Greeks would learn to fear the Germans more than the guerrillas. And since the guerrillas were the ones who brought this punishment on the population, it would be alienated from them.

In October 1943, the ratio of 10 to 1 was dropped and more severe measures were applied, except in retaliation for attacks on pro-German Greeks. Retaliation ratios varied at different times and in different places. In active operations against the guerrillas, the XXII Mountain Corps of General Lanz applied a ratio of 50 to 1. In the area of the Corps’ 1st Mountain Division, General Stettner, division commander, ordered that the 50 to 1 ratio for reprisals be applied even for German combat losses during guerrilla mopping-up operations. Throughout the winter, reports of reprisal shootings continued. On 29 November the Germans reported that 100 hostages had been shot at the scene of a band attack on the Tripolis-Sparta road in the Peloponnesus. For one German soldier killed in Tripolis, 30 Communists were reported shot on 1 December. For a band attack southeast of Gytheion in the Peloponnesus, 25 hostages were shot on 3 December. Sometimes these reprisals were exacted against persons who had already been interned as hostages in German collection camps; sometimes the individuals were simply picked up at random.\textsuperscript{108}

\vspace{1cm}

Figure 36. Burning Village.
Reprisals reached a highwater mark during Operation KALAVRITA in the Peloponnesus. This began as a small-scale mopping-up operation by elements of General Felmy’s LXVIII Corps, initiated on 8 December 1943, in retaliation for the killing of 78 German soldiers. These troops of the 5th Company of the 749th Light Regiment had been captured by ELAS guerrillas on 19 October and had been subsequently shot on 7 December in the mountains of Kalavrita. For the first 2 days of the operation, German troops of the 117th Division under General von Le Suire did not make contact with the guerrillas. On 10 December, however, they exchanged fire, with German losses of 10 dead and 11 wounded. By the 12th, Operation KALAVRITA was concluded “without,” according to the corps’ war diary, “any notable success except for the continuation of reprisal measures.” These lasted until 14 December, by which time 24 villages and 3 monasteries had been destroyed and some 696 male Greeks, 511 from Kalavrita alone, had been shot to death.  

Not all Germans were pleased with the results. Concerned about the boomerang effect of this reprisal policy, not only in Greece but throughout the Southeast Theater, Ambassador Neubacher brought up the matter at theater level. As a result, the Theater Commander orally reprimanded General von Le Suire—he was later given a higher post—and on 22 December 1943 ordered that military commanders must take account of political considerations when ordering reprisals. The new policy was “to seize the perpetrator himself and take reprisal measures only as a second course, if through reprisal measures the prevention of future attacks is to be expected.” Nonetheless, reprisals were still allowed. “If such people as are guilty cannot be found,” continued the Theater Commander, “those persons must be resorted to who, without being connected with the actual deed, nevertheless are to be regarded as coresponsible.” 

Reprisal policy was now altered so that reprisals might be ordered only by a German commander equal in authority to a division commander with the accord of the competent administrative territorial commander under the military governor, General Speidel. If these could not agree, the territorial commander was to decide. For losses in the German air, naval, police, and labor organizations in Greece, the territorial commander was to be the principal initiator of reprisals. Thus General Speidel came into play in the tactical operations of the Army Group E. General Speidel, however, claimed that this “territorial agencies practically ceased to function” in combat zones. Furthermore, his policy was often actually carried out by, or under the direction of, General Schimana, the Higher SS and Police Leader, over whom the military governor had little or no authority. When Neubacher complained
about excesses, he went to theater headquarters. Final responsibility for reprisals appears to have been so diffused throughout the command organizations that it was, in fact, more often than not the commander on the spot who made the decision.\footnote{111}

Figure 37. Map of Burned Villages. Greek Government sources state that 1,770 villages lay in ashes at the end of the occupation in 1944.

Whatever the change in policy, reprisals continued. On 23 February 1944 the Germans shot 50 hostages from a hostage camp for the murder of an interpreter. In March they reported 45 hostages shot in Corinth, 52 in Tripolis, and 44 in Sparta. A train on the Athens-Sparta
line hit mines, killing 1 and wounding 14. Seventy Greeks were executed on the site of the incident. And so on.112

In the countryside, the combined burning-killing reprisals continued. The fame of Kalavrita in the Peloponnesus was echoed at Klisoura in Macedonia. On 4 April 1944, two German motorcyclists were killed about a mile and a half from Klisoura, and the motorcycles were taken to the village. Guerrillas came into the village and allowed no one to leave. When they left the next day at about 2 p.m., all the village men except the aged left too, fearing German reprisals. About 4 p.m. of that April 5, troops of the 7th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, including some subordinate Bulgarians, all under tactical command of Felmy’s LXVIII Corps, surrounded the village, searched the houses for arms without success, and rounded up and immediately shot 223 old men, women, and children who had been left behind. Seven of these people were over 80; 50 of the children were under 10 years, 38 under 5, and 9 under 1. Then the Germans burned down the village.

It was a blow to Ambassador Neubacher. He had the German consulate general report from the scene and demanded an investigation by the Theater Commander of what he termed the “Blood Bath of Klisoura.” “It is much more comfortable,” he wrote the Theater Commander with some irony, “to shoot to death entirely harmless women, children, and old men than to pursue an armed band . . . . The use of such methods must necessarily lead to the demoralization of a genuine combat morale.” Even worse, such methods interfered with Neubacher’s mission to pacify the Greek population and to implement the general German political fight against Communism. “It is utter insanity to murder babies . . . . because heavily armed Red bandits billeted themselves overnight, by force, in their houses, and because they killed two German soldiers near the village. The political effect of this senseless blood bath doubtlessly by far exceeds the effect of all propaganda efforts in our fight against Communism.” The Commander replied that Neubacher’s Greek sources could not be believed, that the village had been stormed, and that the inhabitants had been killed by artillery fire. “There was no retaliation action,” he reported.113

Two months later, on 10 June 1944, the same 7th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment was involved in a reprisal raid at Dhistomon, in which 270 inhabitants were killed. A German Secret Field Police member in Dhistomon at the time reported that people were not rounded up, but were shot wherever they happened to be standing. “As far as I could see,” he added in an interesting comment, “all were shot dead. I did not see any inhabitants being killed in any other way, i.e., beaten to death by rifle butt or by pouring gasoline over them and setting them on fire.” This time the reprisal had been initiated on the spot by a company
commander. To protect him, his regimental commander apparently falsified his report and asked that he be allowed to handle the matter with disciplinary proceedings only. The company commander had, after all, saved the necessity of “sending at a later time a strong mission with corresponding high fuel consumption.” The case was closed.\textsuperscript{114}

Whatever the purpose of the German policy of reprisals, it did little to pacify Greece, fight Communism, or control the population. In general, the result was just the opposite. Burning villages left many male inhabitants with little place to turn except to the guerrilla bands. Killing women, children, and old men fed the growing hatred of the Germans and the desire for vengeance. The wanton nature of the retaliation—the picking of victims at random—meant that pro-German Greeks or their relatives suffered as much as anti-German Greeks. Under these circumstances there was little advantage in being a collaborator. As the reprisals continued they tended to give credence and prestige to the guerrillas, and especially to EAM/ELAS, as the most widespread most articulate, and most active guerrilla organization. As the numbers of homeless and dead grew, the Greek population became simultaneously more terror-stricken and more anti-German. Month by month, the guerrilla base became more secure and the fight against the guerrillas more difficult for the Germans.\textsuperscript{115}
APPENDIX A.
THE “NATIONAL BANDS” AGREEMENTS

1. All guerrilla bands will be known for military purposes as the National Guerrilla Bands of Greece, which title will be the only one used by Middle East. It is, of course, understood that each organisation may use its own names within Greece and its own system of command.

2. Greece shall be divided into military areas appointed as independent territorial districts. In an area where there are bands of only one organisation, all military decisions will be taken by its HQ in accordance with the orders of the Joint GHQ. In an area where there is more than one organisation, the different bands will co-operate fully in all military actions, either under the Joint HQ of the area appointed by the co-operating bands, or under a commander appointed by the Joint GHQ after consultation with the respective commanders and the British Liaison Officer of the area concerned. In special circumstances the Joint GHQ may itself appoint a commander to execute an operation ordered by the Middle East.

3. The bands of one area will not enter another area except in cases of emergency, or as a result of mutual agreement of the respective directing authorities, or as a result of an order issued by Joint GHQ in accordance with the military requirements of Middle East. This clause aims at the insurance of the proper distribution of forces with regard to the local military requirements.

4. All guerrillas of one organization recognize the guerrillas of another organization. Every guerrilla is free to voice his opinion on any matter in public, provided he does not denounce or say anything against other guerrilla bands, their principles or ideals, or against any member of another guerrilla organization.

5. Any organizations or persons are free to raise guerrilla bands in any area so long as they accept the conditions of the agreement and come under the orders of the Joint GHQ. All guerrillas within the same area have equal rights. Any disputes will be settled by common agreement of HQs of the respective bands or, if necessary, by the Joint GHQ.

6. All guerrilla bands in the plains will help guerrilla bands and the civil population in the mountains in the supply of food. The Joint GHQ reserves the right to arrange by mutual agreement between the different organisations the distribution of food supplies in cases of shortages.

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As given in C. M. Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, pp. 299–300. This agreement was signed by representatives of EAM/ELAS, EDES, EKKA and the British Military Mission on various dates during July 1943.
7. The bands of different areas will give maximum assistance to each other in cases of military action against the enemy, either when asked by the commander concerned, or of their own accord when the situation demands it. In cases of general action, orders from Joint GHQ should state the extent of help to be given.

8. There must be no barbarism against anyone by any member of any guerrilla band. No one must be kept under permanent arrest or be executed without fair trial and complete proof of the facts.

9. Any Greek guerrilla who in the past or up to the date of the signing of this agreement has transferred his allegiance to another organisation will be given complete amnesty. All Greeks enlisting as guerrillas have been and will be free to join any organisation they wish.

10. All military stores now being sent to Greece should be accepted as a gesture of the United Nations’ appreciation of the great and gallant effort being made by their Greek allies to resist and overthrow the Axis. The distribution of stores will be undertaken by Joint GHQ. Any area contravening these conditions will have supplies stopped.

11. For the better direction of the struggle, and for the co-ordination of all military actions, a Joint GHQ will be formed, composed of representatives of all guerrilla bands recognised throughout Greece or occupying large areas, as well as a representative of Middle East. Similar Joint HQs may be formed for areas and smaller districts, according to the strength of the different bands. All smaller independent bands may be represented on the Joint GHQ by liaison officers.

12. The role of the British officers attached to Joint HQ’s shall be that of liaison officers to Middle East. In cases of disputes between co-operating bands affecting the requirements of Middle East, the nearest British Liaison Officer will be immediately informed.

NOTE—These terms are to be published in the Press, read to all guerrillas, and will be broadcast on the Cairo and London radio stations.
APPENDIX B.
THE ITALIAN ARMISTICE

On this day, the 11th of September, 1943, after the armistice signed between the United Nations and the Italian Government and after the order issued by the C-in-C Mideast, General Sir Henry Maitland WILSON, concerning co-operation with the Italian Forces desiring to undertake the struggle with us against Germany, the JGHQ of the Greek Forces and the General commanding the PINEROLO Division, decided the following:

1. All Italian forces of the above-mentioned division will withdraw from their stations and will concentrate in places indicated to them by the Greek forces of the THESSALY area, under the cover of Greek forces.

2. The Italian units, as soon as they concentrate, will undertake, in small units of companies with their HQs, the task of securing the area, incorporated in Greek formations. Italian HQs superior to companies will keep their commanding authority, co-operating with their equivalent in the Greek forces. All officers and men desirous to undertake the struggle against the Germans will keep their arms.

3. All equipment which is not carried by the Italians must be transported immediately out of the garrisons to a place of security: the surplus to be used by the Greek units.

4. Those of the Italians not desirous of undertaking the struggle will surrender their arms and equipment (saddles, etc.) excluding their clothing and boots which they will keep for their own use. The above-mentioned equipment will be used by the Greek forces.

5. The British Military Mission undertakes to finance the feeding of the Italians on the same basis as that of the Greek rebels. The services concerned will fix details.

6. The JGHQ undertakes the obligation to send to Italy those of the officers and men so desiring when the military situation allows it.

7. When the military situation permits and the Italian units adapt themselves to the special type of warfare carried out in Greece, a separate sector of action can be entrusted to units of the Italian forces.

Signed: P. RAVTOPOULOS
COL. CHRIS
S. SARAPHIS
A. INFANTE

Joint GHQ,
Greek Forces.
12th September, 1943

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a As given in Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, p. 301.
b Woodhouse’s pseudonym.
c Woodhouse has stated that the armistice between General Infante, GOC Pinerolo Division and members of the Joint General Headquarters was actually signed on 11 September 1943.
APPENDIX C.
DENUNCIATION OF THE SECURITY BATTALIONS

The undersigned organisations, EAM/ELAS, EDES and EKKA, the Greek High Command of Egypt and the AMM in Greece, through their authorised representatives, declare and announce:

1. That they regard the Government of Rallis and all its appendages as instruments serving the purposes of the Occupation of Greece, supporting it in every kind of tyranny and destruction against the Greek people, and in the suppression of the national struggle for liberation as well as the struggle of the Allied Nations. As such they regard it as the enemy of Greece.

2. That they regard all who have enlisted in the units organised by the Government of Rallis and armed and directed by the Occupation, namely the corps of Special Security, the Battalions of the Evzones, the Gendarmes and any similar creation of the Occupation or Rallis, as enemies of the nation, war criminals, responsible to the nation for acts of treason.

3. That they call upon those who belong to the above-named bodies to desert them immediately. No justification of any kind will exist for them after this proclamation.

S. SARAPHIS K. PYROMAGLOU D. PSAROS
NIKOLAS P. NIKOLOPOULOS G. KARTALIS

(=Petros Roussos)
for ELAS for EDES for EKKA

CHRIS (for Greek High Command and AMM)
G. K. WINES (for AMM, United States component)

19th February, 1944.
APPENDIX D.
THE PLAKA ARMISTICE\(^a\)

In the interests of the total and undivided conduct of the national struggle against the occupation and its instruments, and of the success of the Allied struggle, the liberation of Greece and the consolidation of democratic freedom, and finally of the creation of conditions conducive to the unification of the guerrilla army of Greece, the undersigned representatives, authorized to undertake negotiations for the unity of Greece, have resolved:

1. They accept the proposal of EAM/ELAS for the final cessation of hostilities between ELAS and EDES.

2. The units of EAM/ELAS and EDES will maintain the positions which they occupy to-day.

3. The organisations of EAM/ELAS and EDES undertake the obligation of fighting the Occupation and its collaborators with all their forces, either independently in their respective areas or in common by prearranged agreement.

4. To ensure better opposition against the Occupation, the high commands of both organisations (EAM and EDES) in Epirus will cooperate in drafting a common offensive and defensive plan, specifying the conduct of any necessary manoeuvres by either organisation under enemy pressure within the territory of the other, provided that military necessity requires it.

5. If units of either organisation withdraw from their positions under pressure from the Germans or their collaborators, they will return to them as soon as the enemy withdraw.

6. A Joint Military Committee, composed of representatives of ELAS, EDES and EKKA, will supervise the observation of these terms and resolve any disputes which may occur. This committee may function with only two members until the arrival of a representative of EKKA.

7. The AMM is asked to secure from GHQ Middle East the maximum possible supplies for the forces of all organisations in Greece, on the basis of their operations against the Germans and in proportion to the real requirements of the war.

8. The wish of all Greece is hereby expressed that those who have suffered either from German attacks or from the conflict of the organisations may receive the undivided assistance of all the organisations.

\(^a\) As given in Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, pp. 303–304.
The Allied Headquarters is especially asked to come to their immediate assistance.

9. From the signature of this agreement all those held by either side as prisoner, or hostages for political reasons will be released and assisted to go wherever they wish, with the exception of those charged with acts of treason or serious criminal offenses whose names will be notified to the organisation concerned, for trial by the established courts-martial, of which a representative of the organisation concerned will be a member. It is hoped that these cases will be completed as soon as possible. The release of hostages will take place at the latest within a fortnight.

10. This agreement takes effect forthwith.

S. SARAPHIS  G. KARTALIS  K. PYROMAGLOU
NIKOLAS  P. NIKOLOPOULOS
(= Petros Roussos)
for EAM/ELAS  for EKKA  for EDES

CHRIS (for Greek High Command and AMM)
G. K. WINES (for AMM, United States component)

SECRET CLAUSE

The organisations EAM/ELAS, EDES and EKKA will co-operate closely in the plans for “Noah’s Ark,” and will facilitate the plans of GHQ, Middle East Forces, including the infiltration of special British and American units designed to take part in the operations.

(Signatures)
APPENDIX E.
THE LEBANON CHARTER\textsuperscript{a}

1. The reorganisation and, re-establishment of discipline in the Greek armed forces in the Middle East under the Greek national flag must be carried out exclusively on a national and military basis, not on a political basis. The army will carry out the orders of the Government, and cannot possess political opinions.

2. All guerrilla bands in free Greece must be unified and disciplined under the orders of a single Government. The guerrilla principle of military organisation cannot be a permanent one; but no change should be made at the moment which will lead to a reduction of resistance. Consequently the present situation must be regarded as a transitional one, and the initiative in settling it can only be taken by the Government in consultation with GHQ, MEF.

3. The reign of terror in the Greek countryside must cease and the personal security and political liberty of the people must be firmly established when and where the invader has been driven out. Outbreaks of terrorism must also cease in the towns. Ministers of the Government will be in office in Greece to administer the armed forces and the liberated Greek population. As soon as the presence of the Government in Greece is possible, it must not lose a minute in proceeding there.

4. Adequate supplies of food and medicines must be sent to enslaved and mountain Greece.

5. Greece, when liberated, must be secured the state of order and liberty necessary to enable the people to decide, freely and without pressure, both on their constitution and their régime and Government:

   (a) The special task of the Government of National Unity will be to secure order and liberty.

   (b) The people must be enabled to make its decision as soon as possible.

   (c) On the question of the sovereign power, the political leaders who have joined the Government of National Unity are understood to retain such views as they have already expressed.

6. Severe punishment will be imposed on traitors and those who have exploited the misfortunes of the people. Since this problem concerns the post-liberation period, it is necessary to make clear that the

\textsuperscript{a} As given in Woodhouse, \textit{Apple of Discord}, p. 305. This is a summary of the Eight Points given in Papandhreou’s final speech 20 May 1944.
Government of National Unity will continue beyond the date of liberation for such period as the conscience of the nation and its own political judgment may decide.

7. Arrangements will be made in advance, in concert with the Allies, for the satisfaction of Greece’s material needs in the way of reconstruction, including such necessities as the provision of outlets for Greek products and freedom of emigration.

8. Full satisfaction of Greece’s national claims is called for by the past services and sacrifices of the Greek people. This must include the security of our new frontiers.
APPENDIX F.
THE CASERTA AGREEMENT

1. At a conference presided over by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, at AFHQ, at which the Greek President of the Council with other members of the Greek Government and the Greek guerrilla leaders, Generals Saraphis and Zervas, were present, the following decisions were recorded as having been accepted unanimously:

   (a) All guerrilla forces operating in Greece place themselves under the orders of the Greek Government of National Unity.

   (b) The Greek Government places these forces under the orders of General Scobie who has been nominated by the Supreme Allied Commander as GOC Forces in Greece.

   (c) In accordance with the proclamation issued by the Greek Government, the Greek guerrilla leaders declare that they will forbid any attempt by any units under their command to take the law into their own hands. Such action will be treated as a crime and will be punished accordingly.

   (d) As regards Athens no action is to be taken save under the direct orders of General Scobie, GOC Forces in Greece.

   (e) The Security Battalions are considered as instruments of the enemy. Unless they surrender according to orders issued by the GOC they will be treated as enemy formations.

   (f) All Greek guerrilla forces, in order to put an end to past rivalries, declare that they will form a national union in order to co-ordinate their activities in the best interests of the common struggle.

2. In implementation of these decisions, General Scobie has issued the following orders, with which the Greek representatives agree:

   (a) General Zervas will continue to operate within the territorial limits of the Plaka Agreement and to co-operate with General Saraphis in harassing the German withdrawal within territory between the northern Plaka boundary and Albania.

   (b) General Saraphis will continue to operate in the remainder of Greece with the following exceptions:

       (i) ATTICA PROVINCE. All troops in this province will be commanded by General Spiliotopoulos, acting in close co-operation with representatives of the Greek Government and assisted by a liaison office-[sic]

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nominated by General Sarafis. To be under Command Force 140.

(ii) PELOPONNESE. Troops in this area to be commanded by an officer recommended by General Saraphis in agreement with the Greek Government, assisted by a British Liaison Mission. To be under Command Force 140.

(iii) At a later stage Thrace (including Salonika) to be under command of an officer nominated by the Greek Government.

(c) The task of both commanders will be to harass the German withdrawal and to eliminate German garrisons.

(d) As territory is evacuated both commanders are personally responsible to Commander, Force 140, for:

(i) Maintenance of law and order in the territories where their forces are operating.

(ii) Prevention of civil war and killing of Greeks by Greeks.

(iii) Prevention of infliction of any penalty whatsoever and of unjustifiable arrest.

(iv) Assistance in the establishment of the legal civil authority and the distribution of relief.

A map showing the operational boundaries has been issued to both commanders.

Signed:

H. MAITLAND WILSON          G. PAPANDHREOU
General,                     Prime Minister of Greece
Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre       S. SARAPHIS

H. G. MACMILLAN              N. ZERVAS
British Resident Minister

AFHQ
APPENDIX G.
ESTIMATE OF AIR TRANSPORTATION COST

Only the roughest idea of the magnitude of this cost, in 1944 dollars, may he obtained. In this estimate three major items are considered—operating cost, operational attrition, and nonoperational attrition. Operating cost is defined as the cost, per attempted sortie, of the fuel and oil, the labor and material for base and depot maintenance, and the pay of the crew—multiplied by 750 miles\(^a\) and divided by the cruising speed of the aircraft. Operational attrition includes the fly-away costs of the lost aircraft, the training cost of the crews, and the insurance cost of the crews. All members of the crews, assumed to be five men, are considered lost if the plane is lost; and no attempt is made to place any valuation on a man’s life. No depreciation has been considered. Nonoperational attrition has been arbitrarily assigned an equality with operational attrition.

**Operating Cost**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bomber sorties attempted</td>
<td>$560,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>$429,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sorties</td>
<td>$990,850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operational Attrition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bomber fly-away cost</td>
<td>$290,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport fly-away cost</td>
<td>$121,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomber crew, training cost</td>
<td>$117,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport crew, training cost</td>
<td>$102,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance crew members</td>
<td>$150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$781,020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nonoperational Attrition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$2,551,890</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) No adjustment has been made for the fact that special operations aircraft were based in Italy in 1944, with reduction in this distance.

\(^b\) Cost figures derived from those provided by HQ USAF and adjusted to 1944 levels according to the *Wholesale Price Index for all Commodities*, HQ USAF DCS/Comptroller, Mgt Analysis, two ltrs to Operations Research Office [no subj], 4 Feb and 26 Apr 54. Unclassified. See ORO-T-269, pp. 52, 71.
Notes to Chapter I


2 Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, pp. 52–58.

3 Ibid., pp. 65–68.

4 Ibid., pp. 73–75.

5 Hamson, *We Fell Among Greeks*, p. 106.

6 Ibid., pp. 95, 102, 104.


23 Hubert Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” trans. (Ms. P-955a, EUCOM Historical Division, 1950), pp. 11, 55.


27 Chadbourne, “Greece and Her Ships,” p. 70; Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, pp. 187–191, and n. 23, p. 190; Spencer, War and Postwar Greece, p. 34; Xydis, The Economy and Finances of Greece under Occupation, pp. 11, 27, 35–38, 42–46; Symmachos, Greece Fights On, pp. 53–60.


30 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 55.

31 Symmachos, Greece Fights On, p. 91.

32 Ibid., pp. 90, 93–95; Lee, Special Duties, p. 92.

33 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 31, 86–93.

34 Ibid., pp. 31, 89–91.

35 Ibid., pp. 84–86.


38 Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity, pp. 66–68. In 1942 EAM published a pamphlet, “What is EAM and What Does It Want?” written by Demetrios Glenos, a Communist intellectual. This publication stressed the national character of the resistance.


40 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 32.

41 Ibid., pp. 32–33, 61, 64; Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity, pp. 69–72.

42 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 133; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 63; Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity, pp. 70–72.


Stavrianos, *Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity*, p. 74; Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, pp. 72, 101. Myers estimated that guerrilla groups affiliated with EAM had put in their “first appearance in the field in January, 1942 . . . .”


Notes to Chapter II


2 Wilson, *Eight Years Overseas*, p. 165; Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, p. 98; Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, pp. 14, 248–50. There is some question as to Myers’ original rank. Field Marshal Wilson refers to him as major, but he apparently held the rank of colonel at the time of the drop into Greece and was given the rank of brigadier when the mission was left in Greece instead of being evacuated.


4 Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 96.

5 Ibid., pp. 99–100.


7 Ibid., p. 108.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., pp. 114–115.

10 Ibid., p. 115.

11 Ibid., pp. 115–116.

12 Ibid., pp. 118–119.


16 Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 148.

17 Ibid., pp. 125, 151–52.


21 Ibid., p. 196.


23 Ibid., pp. 195–96; Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, pp. 64–69.


Ibid., p. 175; Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, pp. 56–58.

Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 185.

Ibid., p. 204.

Ibid., pp. 203, 208.

Ibid., pp. 204–205.


Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 204; Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, p. 87.

Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 200.

Ibid., pp. 207–208, 260. Woodhouse shared this opinion; see *Apple of Discord*, p. 142.


Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 216.

Ibid., pp. 224, 228.

Ibid., pp. 228–29.


Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 225.

Ibid., pp. 224–25.


Leeper, *When Greek Meets Greek*, p. 31.


Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, pp. 247, 250.


Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 247.


Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, pp. 248–49.

Ibid.


Notes

64 Ibid.; Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 257–58.
65 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 258–65.
66 Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp. 179–80.
67 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 156–57.
68 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 112.
69 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 163.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., pp. 158, 165; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 101, 113, 122–23.
73 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 165; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 113.
75 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 97–98.
77 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 101, 161–63, 301; Langer, Encyclopedia, p. 1141; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 108. Also see Ronald Seth, The Undaunted; The Story of Resistance in Western Europe (New York: Philosophical Library, [1956]), pp. 75–78, for an interesting account of General Infante’s activities in the summer of 1943 leading up to his surrender to the guerrillas and to Colonel Woodhouse, as related to the author by the General in an interview on 25 March 1955.
78 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 163 (for quotations), 166–67; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 111, 120; Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, pp. 174–79; Seth, The Undaunted, pp. 78–79.
81 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 267; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 125.
82 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 125–37.
83 Ibid., pp. 136–37.
84 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 175–76.
85 Ibid., pp. 168, 170; Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 267–68; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 138.
86 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 175; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 143.
87 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 176.
88 Ibid., Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 144.
89 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 179; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 144–46.
91 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 148–49; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 177.
92 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 156–57, 159; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 177–79, 302.
93 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 177–79; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 162, 164.
94 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 165–67; Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 179, 303–304; Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 268.
95 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 175.
96 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 161.
98 Ibid., pp. 183–84; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 169–71, 173, 191.
100 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, pp. 184–85.


Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, p. 188.


Ibid., pp. 216, 220–22.


Ibid., p. 205.

Ibid., pp. 208, 244–45.


Ibid., p. 204; Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, pp. 266–72.

Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord* p. 204.


Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, p. 299.


Major Matthew Vlissides, “Comments” [on this study] (Unpublished ms. in SORO), p. 3.


Notes to Chapter III


17 Ibid., p. 21.

18 Ibid., p. 12.

19 Ibid., pp. 222–23.


21 McGlynn, *Special Service*, p. 3; Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 22.


23 Ibid., pp. 14–17.


26 Hamson, *We Fell Among Greeks*, pp. 21–22.


Notes

33 Ibid., p. 4.
34 Ibid., p. 392.
37 Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 21.
40 Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, pp. 40, 42, 50, 86, 95.
42 Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, pp. 120, 151, 159–60.
43 Ibid., pp. 166, 199.
44 Ibid., p. 199; Wilson, *Eight Years Overseas*, p. 165.
48 Ibid., 28, 30.
54 Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 220.
58 Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, pp. 169–70, 213, 223, 278.
59 NAAF, SO (Air), MTO, Sec. II (Greece), pp. 30–31; (In FRC).
62 Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 222; Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, p. 27.
64 Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 220; Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, pp. 102, 109, 122–23, 137.
Notes to Chapter IV

1 Smothers, Report, pp. 5–8.
3 Trials of War Criminals, XI, 1051.
6 By his own account, quoted in Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 58.
10 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 198–99.
12 Ibid., p. 99.

Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 73.


Ibid., pp. 25–26, 28 ff, 33.

Ibid., p. 39.

Ibid., pp. 42–43.

Ibid., pp. 49–52, 127; Vlissides, “Comments,” p. 10.


Ibid., p. 89.


Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, pp. 120, 125, 132–33.

Ibid., pp. 132–34.

Ibid.


Ibid., p. 170.


Ibid.; Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, pp. 70, 102.

Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, pp. 20, 86.

Ibid., p. 69.

Ibid., p. 281.


Ibid., pp. 80, 82; Hamson, *We Fell Among Greeks*, pp. 95, 97; Saraphis. *Greek Resistance Army*, p. 193.


Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 227.


Ibid., pp. 72, 75–78, 83.

Ibid., p. 77.

Ibid., p. 78; Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, p. 119.


Ibid., p. 18.

Ibid., p. 99.


Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, pp. 208, 222.

Ibid., pp. 116, 140.


Notes


87 Ibid., 131–32.

88 Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, pp. 93–94.


90 Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 95.

91 Hamson, *We Fell Among Greeks*, p. 140.

92 Ibid., pp. 111, 137.

93 Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 95.

94 Ibid., pp. 96, 111.

95 Ibid., pp. 160–62.


97 Ibid., p. 196.

98 Ibid., pp. 215, 221.


100 Ibid., Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, caption under illus., p. 208.

101 Fielding, *Hide and Seek*, p. 78 and also p. 50.

102 Ibid., p. 159; Reid, *I Was in Noah’s Ark*, pp. 95–96; Jecchinis, *Beyond Olympus*, pp. 123–25, 141–44.


104 Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 111.


107 Ibid.; for instances of bad relations, see also Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, pp. 84, 136–37, 199, 225, 231, 260 ff.


109 Saraphis made quite a point of the essential likeness of the rank and file in the various guerrilla groups—e.g., see *Greek Resistance Army*, p. 163; Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, pp. 99, 199.


113 Ibid.


115 Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, p. 223.


Notes to Chapter V

1 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 535.
2 Ibid.
3 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 185.
4 Ibid., pp. 203–204.
6 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, p. 8; Encyclopedia Britannica (1958 ed.), X, 792.
7 Piske, “Logistical Problems,” pp. 6–7; Smothers, Report, p. 6; Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, pp. 75–76.
9 Ibid., p. 13.
10 Ibid., pp. 65–66.
11 Ibid., pp. 117–18; Moss, A War of Shadows, p. 125.
12 This account is derived mainly from three sources, the first two being accounts by participants: Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 69–87; Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, pp. 89–125; and McGlynn, Special Service in Greece, pp. 3–22.
13 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 70.
14 Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 110.
15 Ibid., p. 111.
17 The account of the Asopos bridge demolition is mainly based on Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 169–86; and McGlynn, Special Service in Greece, pp. 23–29.
18 McGlynn, Special Service in Greece, p. 27.
19 Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 185.
20 Jecchinis, Beyond Olympus, pp. 97, 100–101.
21 Ibid., pp. 162–68.
22 Ibid., pp. 80–96.
23 Ibid., pp. 68, 74, 76.
24 Capell, Simiomata, pp. 46–47, 61.
25 Also, because there were no EAM/ELAS bands there. Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” p. 14; Myers, Greek Entanglement, p. 112–13.
27 Ibid., pp. 4, 16, 68, 69.
28 Ibid., p. 115.
29 Ibid., p. 117.
30 Ibid., p. 67.
31 Ibid., pp. 135–36.
32 Ibid., pp. 41–53, 60.
33 Ibid., p. 53.
34 Kennedy, *German Antiguerrilla Operations*, p. 56.
36 Ibid., p. 106.
37 Ibid., pp. 64–65.
38 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
41 Ibid., pp. 56–58.
42 Kennedy, *German Antiguerrilla Operations*, p. 58.
48 German Army, Gen. Staff der Heere, Op. Abt. III, *Schematische Kriegsgliederungen*, dated 1, 12, and 23 Jan. 43; 16 Feb. 43; 4 Mar. 43; 18 Apr. 43; 1 May 43; 21 June 43; 7 and 25 July 43; 5, 14, 21, and 27 Aug. 43; 26 Dec. 43; 15 July 44; 13 Oct. 44. (Photostats of captured German records in OCMH.)
50 Kennedy, *German Antiguerrilla Operations*, p. 62.
54 Kennedy, *German Antiguerrilla Operations*, p. 74.
55 Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, p. 144.
56 Wilson, *Eight Years Overseas*, p. 206; *Trials of War Criminals*, XI, 1051–53.
57 Kennedy, *German Antiguerrilla Operations*, p. 63.
58 Ibid.
59 Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, p. 278.
61 Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, p. 139.
64 Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, p. 278.
65 *Trials of War Criminals*, XI, 830–34, 1308.
Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II


Notes on Chapter VI

1 Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 173.

2 USDA, OCMH, Operation ACHSE, A Documented Narrative (Unpublished ms. R–2; OCMH), pp. 11–12; this source cites German Army Group E, Kriegstagebuch, entries of 11 and 18 Sep. 43; USDA, OCMH, Work Notes for Dissolution of the Italian Army in the Balkans, Sep.—Dec. 43 (Unpublished ms. R–1; OCMH) citing S.M.R.E. Situazioni Compressiva Sommaria Della Unità data del 1.IX.43.

3 Kennedy, German Antiguerilla Operations, pp. 30, 42; OCMH, Operation ACHSE, pp. 5–9, 23–24; Churchill, Closing the Ring, App. F. pp. 674–75.

4 OCMH, Operation ACHSE, pp. 23–24.


17 Ibid., pp. 9–11, 13–14; OCMH, Operation ACHSE, p. 59.

18 Axis forces in Russia lost over 500,000 men killed and captured in three months fighting, winter 1942–43; Langer, Encyclopedia, p. 1153.

19 Kennedy, German Antiguerilla Operations, pp. 49–50; Charles von Leuttichau, The Ardennes Offensive: Germany’s Situation in the Fall of 1944 (Unpublished ms. R-19, OCMH), pt. 3, pp. 94–95.


23 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, pp. 49–50, 54, 59.
25 Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, p. 277; Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, pp. 55, 57, 59, 60–62.
27 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 28.
30 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 59.
31 Ibid., p. 56.
32 Ibid., p. 184 for quotation; also pp. 96, 186, 191, 196; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, p. 59; Saraphis, Greek Resistance Army, pp. 178, 180.
35 Unless otherwise noted, material for this section was derived from Lanz, “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans,” pp. 81–86, 130–36, 141–42.
36 Kennedy, German Antiguerrilla Operations, p. 56.
38 Ibid., pp. 94–95.
39 Ibid., p. 96.
46 Myers, Greek Entanglement, pp. 142–44.
47 Hamson, We Fell Among Greeks, p. 157.
49 Ibid., pp. 90–91, 139, 146–47; Jecchinis, Beyond Olympus, p. 83.
52 Ibid., pp. 91–92, 139–40, 146.
54 Ibid., pp. 183–84.
55 Ibid., pp. 174–75.
56 Ibid., pp. 156–58, 175.
57 Ibid., p. 175.
58 Ibid., pp. 185–86.
This section is based on Lanz’s manuscript, mainly pp. 159–65 and 187–227.

Ibid., pp. 204–205.


Ibid., pp. 188–89, 194–96.

Ibid., pp. 177–78.

Ibid., pp. 188, 200, 208.


Saraphis, *Greek Resistance Army*, p. 126.


Ibid., pp. 195–96.


Ibid., pp. 212–13, 218–19, 221.

Ibid., pp. 217, 221–22, 229, 231–33.


Ibid., pp. 230–31, 236, 249, sketch map #9.

Ibid., pp. 234, 236–40.

Ibid., p. 176.

Ibid., p. 150.

Ibid., p. 161.

Ibid., p. 159.


Ibid., p. 175.

Ibid., p. 215.


Ibid., p. 205.

Ibid., pp. 174–75, 201–02, 207–08, 227.

Ibid., pp. 225, 227.

Ibid., p. 204.

Ibid., pp. 206–07, 227.

Ibid., p. 204.

Ibid., pp. 197, 227.

Ibid., pp. 214, 226.

Ibid., p. 227.

Ibid., p. 204.

Ibid., pp. 105, 120–21, 210–11.


Kennedy, *German Antiguerrilla Operations*, p. 60; [German] Army Group E, Extracts from War Diary, 16 July–25 August 1944, Doc. No. 65035/2, OCMH.


Ibid., pp. 120–21, 123–24.


Ibid., p. 126.

Chief OKW, order of 16 Sep. 41, subj.: Communist insurgent movement in the occupied territories, trans. and extracted in *Trials of War Criminals*, XI, 971–72; also see pp. 828–29, 1039, 1046–47.

*Trials of War Criminals*, XI, 826, 829, 830, 1031, 1310–11.


*Trials of War Criminals*, XI, 826–27.


*Trials of War Criminals*, XI, 830.


Ibid., pp. 832–34, 1309.

This case study is based upon a number of memoirs, histories, and documents, most of which have been published. Some, although unpublished, are available through the Department of the Army or the National Archives. None of these sources bears a security classification.

**Primary Sources**

Chandler, Geoffrey. *The Divided Land: An Anglo-Greek Tragedy*. London and New York: Macmillan, 1959. 214 pp. No index. Author entered Greece only in September 1944, by air, landing to a reception of British officers and Greek guerrillas on Corfu. He was attached to a British mission in the mountains, and was scheduled to remain after liberation as a member of the Anglo-Greek Information Service. Although he arrived late on the scene, Chandler qualifies as an on-the-spot reporter. He observed that the British liaison officers disliked the EAM/ELAS organization but were personally fond of the men as individuals. His comments on events of the December 1944 war, the false peace, and the second civil war are interesting and useful.

Churchill, Winston S. *Their Finest Hour, The Grand Alliance, Closing the Ring, and Triumph and Tragedy*, (The Second World War, vols. II, III, V, VI.). Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin [1949, 1950, 1951, 1953]. Maps, diagrams, apps., index. As Prime Minister of Great Britain during World War II, the author played a decisive role in the affairs of occupied Greece. *Their Finest Hour* gives interesting background information on the outbreak and course of Greek-Italian war through 1940. *The Grand Alliance* continues the story, with data on the British decision to aid Greece after the Germans showed intent to intervene in behalf of the Italians. The decision to defend Crete, the German attack, and forced evacuation of British forces are also covered. Chapter 13, pp. 532–52, of *Closing the Ring* briefly reviews events in the Greek resistance movement leading up to the crucial summer of 1943; there is a discussion of the evolution of British policy in relation to EAM/ELAS up through the spring of 1944 and the mutinies of the Greek forces in the Middle East. Chapters 18 and 19, pp. 283–325, of *Triumph and Tragedy* review the British liberation of Greece in the fall of 1944, the EAM/ELAS bid for power, and the December 1944 war. Churchill fully documents (p. 287) his determination to reach a military show-down with EAM/ELAS.

was on Crete from early 1942 to early 1944 and was responsible for organizing Cretan resistance on the western half of the island. Fielding gives an unusually frank account of his reactions to SOE Cairo, other British personnel, and the Greeks he dealt with.

Gosewisch, Walter. “Luftwaffe Communications (Greece and Crete).” Trans. Unpublished ms. B–644; USAREUR Historical Division. 42 pp. This account by Generalmajor a. D. (Brig. Gen.) Gosewisch deals largely with German administrative and technical communications problems between December 1941 and July 1942. Some indication of the Greek habit of “listening in” is given, but the period covered is too early to show any German difficulties owing to overt resistance. Of minimal value for this study.

G. B. Foreign Office. Documents Regarding the Situation in Greece, January 1945 (Greece No. 1 [1945], Cmd. No. 6592). London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1945. 14 pp. This collection of documents includes nine on ELAS brutality to hostages in Nov-Dec 1944 (Pt. I), and the EDES charter plus four disclaimers of ELAS policy made in Dec 1944 by various political parties (Pt. II).

Great Britain. House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates. 37th Parl., 10th Sess.; Fifth Series, vols. 406 and 407. London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1945. These volumes record the long and bitter debate in Parliament over British policy in Greece during and after the liberation in October 1944. The record shows that the British were in great internal discord on their Government’s policy in Greece, particularly over the matter of the conflict between British troops and EAM/ELAS.

Hamson, Denys. We Fell Among Greeks. London: Jonathan Cape, [1946]. 221 pp. Maps. The author, trained as a commando, parachuted into Greece as a member of Myers’ original party and reluctantly stayed on. He was sent to work with EAM/ELAS guerrillas and was in charge of constructing the first airfield built in its entirety behind enemy lines in that country. Hamson did not think highly of the guerrillas or of some of the liaison officers. His account is candid and interesting. It should be noted that he refers to a number of the British by names other than their own.

in 1944 and also offers insight into personal relations among the men in Greece.

Lanz, Hubert. “Partisan Warfare in the Balkans.” Trans. by Franke and Luetzkendorf. Unpublished ms., P-055a; Koenigstein: EUCOM Historical Div., 1950. 249 pp. Maps. General der Gebirgstruppen (Lt Gen) Lanz was (from late 1943 to 1945) commanding general of the German XXII Mountain Corps which was responsible for the security of western Greece. In this capacity, Lanz directed several major antiguerrilla operations. Later imprisoned under sentence by the U.S. Military Tribunal, Lanz was commissioned by the U.S. Army to write this study while in Landsberg Prison. This work, written entirely without reference to source materials, is still extremely valuable in view of the author’s experience in the field.

Leeper, Reginald. When Greek Meets Greek. London: Chatto and Windus, 1950. xxii, 244 pp. Illus., index. This memoir deals primarily with the political aspects of the Greek resistance, particularly as seen from the author’s vantage place as British ambassador to the Greek Government-in-exile in Cairo. One interesting point is that Leeper, while almost totally anti-EAM/ELAS, felt that “while the war [World War] was still in progress, the Soviet Government occupied itself very little with Greece.”

Lincoln, John. Achilles and the Tortoise: An Eastern Aegean Exploit. London, Melbourne, Toronto: Heinemann, [1958]. 256 pp. The author worked in the outlying Greek islands, his primary mission being subversion of Axis troops. His account gives information on SOE training, on rivalry between British organizations, and on the relations between various guerrilla bands on the islands. The Italian role in the islands is superbly re-created. Lincoln apparently became disillusioned with his life towards the end of the war, withdrew into himself, and took to drink.

Moss, W. Stanley. Ill Met By Moonlight. New York: Macmillan, 1950. 192 pp. Illus., maps, glossary. This book, partly in narrative and partly in diary form, is by one of the two men who were mainly responsible for carrying out the brilliant kidnapping of General Karl Kreipe from Crete. The part of the nationalist guerrillas in helping with this exploit is made clear.

______. A War of Shadows. New York: Macmillan, 1952. 239 pp. Illus., maps. In the first part of this memoir, Moss deals with his plan to kidnap General Kreipe’s successor on Crete—a plan blocked by EAM/ELAS. Later, Moss went to Macedonia in northern Greece, where his experience with the local ELAS group was equally frustrating. The book contains a good description of guerrilla-liaison officer operations undertaken as the Germans were withdrawing.
Mulgan, John. *Report on Experience*. London: Oxford University Press, 1947. 150 pp. The author, a New Zealander, served as a liaison officer with EAM/ELAS forces in northern Greece from 1943 to 1944. He held a low opinion of the military value of guerrilla operations and questioned the humanity of supporting a resistance movement because its every operation caused such severe reprisals against the civilian population. Mulgan died in an accident in Cairo in 1945; the book is a more or less unfinished product.

Myers, E. C. W. *Greek Entanglement*. London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1955. 289 pp. Illus., maps, index. Brigadier Myers, who parachuted into Greece in September 1942, commanded the British Military Mission to the Greek guerrillas from January 1943 until he was exfiltrated in August 1943 and replaced that autumn. Although he was anti-Communist, Myers believed he had no choice but to support EAM/ELAS in an effort to make the Greek resistance an effective military instrument. This memoir contains a great deal of information on Myers’ problems in control, his organization of the British mission headquarters and field establishment, and on guerrilla operations. His account, written in 1945 but, because of its controversial nature, only publishable 10 years later, is indispensable to this study.

National Liberation Front (EAM). *White Book, May 1944–March 1945*. Trans. New York: Greek-American Council, 1945. [ix], 137 pp. This volume gives the Communist side of the British-Greek controversy and war in the winter of 1944–45. This source should be used with caution; not only is this propaganda, but documents originally written in English have been retranslated from the Greek. Among other points, the EAM/ELAS claim is put forth that all other guerrilla groups did not number over 10,000 men (p. 28) and “proof” is offered (pp. 28–33) that EDES and the British cooperated with the Bulgarians.


The OSS Assessment Staff. *Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services*. New York: Rinehart, [1953]. xv, 541 pp. Illus., app., index. This valuable report, written by psychologists of the OSS assessment staff, gives the rationale behind their testing procedures, describes the testing situations, and evaluates the ways in which the staff attempted to assess the testing.

wrote his memoirs in the period 1943–1945 while he was held in German detention camps. The author extols Greek heroism during the active campaigns and criticizes the limited nature of the British effort to aid the Greeks.

Papandreou, Georgios. [The Liberation of Greece]. 3d ed.; Athens: Greek Publishing Co., 301 pp. In Greek. Author played a major role in the Greek government-in-exile in 1944–45. It was he who presided at the Lebanon Conference in May 1944. This work, parts of which were privately translated for use in this case study, consists of brief sections on events, followed by long passages giving Papandreou’s remarks or memoranda on various occasions.


Praun, Albert. “Signal Communications in the East: the Balkans and Finland: Supplement.” Trans. Unpublished ms. P–132 (Supplement). 68 pp. General der Nachrichtentruppen (Lt. Gen.) Praun noted that Balkan partisans caused losses of wire networks, but his comments are not particularly helpful for this study since he was not specific as to losses caused by Greek guerrillas.

Psychoundakis, George. The Cretan Runner. Trans. and intro. by Patrick Leigh Fermor and annotations by Leigh Fermor and Xan Fielding. London: John Murray, 1955. xi, 242 pp. Maps, illus., index. This book is, as Leigh Fermor noted when he read the manuscript, “Something unique in the literature of Resistance: a sort of primitive, Douanier-Rousseau war book.” Psychoundakis was a courier for Leigh Fermor and Fielding, both British liaison officers on Crete. His descriptions of resistance operations and his opinions of various British liaison officers and other members of the Greek resistance are valuable in themselves. Because these opinions may be contrasted with those of the British, who have also published their memoirs, they offered great insight into the interpersonal relations of liaison officers and indigenous resistance workers.

Reid, Francis. I Was in Noah’s Ark. London and Edinburgh: W. & R. Chambers Ltd., [1957]. 143 pp. Illus. Author was a member of one of the units of the British Raiding Support Regiment which went into Greece from the island of Vis by naval craft in May 1944. His unit worked with EAM/ELAS guerrillas, but this account is uninformative and almost useless.
Rendel, A. M. *Appointment in Crete: The Story of a British Agent.* London: Allan Wingate, 1953. 240 pp. Rendel was a British liaison officer on Crete from 1943 to the end of the war in May 1945, when General Benthak signed an unconditional surrender for the German forces left on that island. The author recounts his recruitment, his training, the naval infiltration technique, etc.; he also gives much useful information concerning life in the resistance on Crete.

Sarafis, Stefanos [Saraphis, Stephanos]. *Greek Resistance Army: The Story of ELAS.* Trans. and abridged by Marion Pascoe. London: Birch Books, 1951. xxvii, 324 pp. Glossary. Preface by Compton Mackenzie. Published in Greece in 1946, this English account has been called “a quite arbitrary abridgment, done along Leftist lines” by a student of Greek literature. Saraphis’ role as military commander of ELAS, a command shared by two other men, both Communists, has been highly controversial; still he remained a figure of respect in Greece up until his death. Saraphis details his imprisonment by EAM/ELAS and conversion to their side, his Anglophobia, his efforts to re-create the hands of EAM/ELAS into the image of a regular army, and the problems that confronted him during the days of the resistance. If Myers and Woodhouse recount the story of their difficulties in controlling EAM/ELAS, Saraphis provides the same story—told from the opponent’s viewpoint. An extremely valuable source for this study.

Speidel, Wilhelm. “Report on Greece (1942–1944); My Mission in Greece.” Trans. by H. Heitmann. Unpublished ms. P–003; USA-REUR, 1948. 102 pp. General der Flieger (Lt. Gen.) Speidel headed the German military government organization in Greece. Written while the author was in Landsberg prison, this study contains a description of German organization in Greece and outlines the problems of German military government in an occupied country where German tactical forces and separate SS troops simultaneously operated. Author is clear and frank about interagency friction within German organization.

Stephanides, Theodore. *Climax in Crete.* London: Faber and Faber, 1946. 166 pp. Maps. Dr. Stephanides took part in the Greek campaign in 1941, was evacuated to Crete, and then rescued from Crete on 31 May 1941. Although its value for this study is limited, this book provides an eye-witness account of Cretan resistance to the German invaders.

Thomas, W. B. *Dare To Be Free.* London: Allan Wingate, 1951. 256 pp. The author describes his experiences in 1941 during his many attempts to escape from German POW camps in Greece. This work is useful to this study primarily as a first-hand account of public opinion in
Greece during 1941 and the nascent resistance to the occupier that was already evident. Thomas spells out German measures to make the Greeks stop helping British escapees.

U. S. Military Tribunal. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, Under Control Council Law No. 10. Nuernberg, October 1946–April 1949. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950. Vol. XI. 1332 pp. Case No. 7, officially known as United States of America vs. Wilhelm List et al., and also called the “Hostage Case,” had as defendants a number of German officers who had served in Greece, including General der Flieger (Lt. Gen.) Helmuth Felmy, commander of the LXVIII Corps, General der Gebirgstruppen (Lt. Gen.) Hubert Lanz, commander of the XXII Mountain Corps, and General der Flieger (Lt. Gen.) Speidel, military governor in Greece. This abridged version of the trial proceedings includes a number of translated German documents and some of the testimony by the defendants. A supplementary mimeo transcript for Case No. 7 is available to users at the National Archives.

Vlissides, Matthew J. “Greek Study Task.” Unpublished ms; Special Operations Research Office, 1 June 1961. 25 pp. Map. Major Vlissides, retired Greek Army officer, has written especially for this Office a first-hand narrative of his work with the underground in the Greek islands of the Aegean during World War II. This manuscript covers some of the political aspects of the resistance and details of the Underground Military Group of Naxos. Underground organizational matters, security measures, intelligence collection, and combined raiding operations are discussed.

Wilson, Henry Maitland. Eight Years Overseas. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1948. xiii, 285 pp. Maps, illus., index. Field-Marshal Lord Wilson was first Army Commander-in-Chief Middle East and then Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations during the period 1943–1944. He provides a great deal of interesting and high level information on SOE Cairo and on the Greek resistance. Wilson is very frank about inter-agency difficulties among the British in Cairo, and about his personal feelings with regard to Brigadier Myers and British treatment of EAM/ELAS. This account is useful and informative, supplementing or confirming much of the data obtained from the memoirs of British officers in Greece.

Wines, Jerry [Maj. Gerald K.] A Lesson in Greek. (Unpublished ms.; [Dallas, Texas: c. 1948].) iv, 259 pp. Foreword by Col. C. M. Woodhouse. Major Wines was head of the American contingent of the Allied Military Mission (AMM) in Greece during World War II and was second in command to Colonel Woodhouse, commander of the
AMM. Major Wines wrote this story of his experiences shortly after the end of the war and was kind enough to lend his copy to the Special Operations Research Office. Unfortunately, at the time the manuscript was received, this study was already edited and it was impossible to make as full use of Wines’ study as one would have liked. Its great value lies in the author’s vantage point at mission headquarters and his close personal contact with all the major actors on the Greek scene. The present case study has emphasized the political nature of the liaison officers’ duty; Major Wines reaffirms this point with great precision. In general, Wines’ manuscript has served to confirm the point of view of this study, while adding many interesting first-hand details. It is extremely unfortunate that no American publishing house has sought out this account of an American’s work with a guerrilla group.

Woodhouse, C[hris]topher M. *Apple of Discord; A Survey of Recent Greek Politics in Their International Setting*. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1948. viii, 320 pp. Apps., index. The author dropped into Greece with Myers’ group in September 1942 as second-in-command of the party; he remained as second-in-command of the mission until August 1943, when he became its acting commander. In December 1943 he became commander of the new Allied Military Mission and remained in Greece until June 1944. In this role, he and the men under him worked directly with the Greek guerrillas. Woodhouse’s book is not a memoir in the usual sense but a study of the political aspects of the resistance, the author making full use of his special experience and knowledge. Monarchist in sympathies, Woodhouse was forced by his job to deal on a daily basis with the Communist-dominated EAM/ELAS. Unfortunately there is very little in this account on Greek guerrilla operations.


**Secondary Sources**

attempts to survey the entire European resistance and the political effects of resistance. Some information on Greece.

Borkenau, Franz. *European Communism*. New York: Harper, [1953]. 564 pp. Index. Author devotes chapter XVI, pp. 409–37, to Greece during World War II. Borkenau’s thesis is that Greek Communism followed the dictates of the Russians during this period down to the smallest details. In this belief, the author takes issue with a number of British on-the-spot observers. The only sources of information cited for this account are books by Woodhouse (see above) and McNeill (see below).

Byford-Jones, W. *The Greek Trilogy*. London, etc.: Hutchinson, [1946]. 270 pp. Appendix. The author served in Greece, going in with the forces of liberation in October 1944. It is sometimes difficult to tell whether Byford-Jones is speaking from experience or hearsay. He met a number of liaison officers and reports on what they have said.

Capell, Richard. *Simiomata, A Greek Notebook 1944–5*. London: Macdonald & Co., Ltd., [1946]. 224 pp. A newspaper correspondent, Capell reports in journal form the results of a series of interviews conducted in Greece as the Germans were withdrawing. This is an excellent source for the names and reported opinions of individual liaison officers. Capell, once called “more Tory than John Bull himself,” was very much against EAM/ELAS but was somewhat sympathetic to EDES.


De Guingand, Francis. *Operation Victory*. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947. xii, 488 pp. Maps, index. The author, who was chief of staff of the British Eighth Army in 1942–43, gives an extremely clear statement of the difficulties facing the British during the period of their intervention in Greek behalf in early 1941.


Gialistras, S.A. *The Greek Nation Once More Stems a Barbarian Onslaught*. Trans. by G. A. Trypanis. Athens: 1950. 89 pp. This is a Greek discussion of the losses sustained by Greece because of war, resistance, and the occupation from 1879–1949. There may be some exaggeration in the figures for World War II but non-Greek sources sustain the general thesis of overwhelming losses. The author, anti-EAM/ELAS and promonarchist in sympathies, gives little data on the resistance. He claims that the British supported only the Communist resistance and that Colonel Woodhouse was a “victim to communist fiendishness” (see pp. 43–44).

Goerlitz, Walter. “War Without Mercy, Partisan Warfare 1939–1945,” in *Der Zweite Weltkrieg*. Stuttgart: 1952. This excerpt from vol. II, pp. 57–171, was trans. by the Central Intelligence Agency. Pp. 113–120 of the FDD document concern guerrilla warfare in Greece. Goerlitz’s information on Greek and British organization and operations should be viewed with caution; his remarks concerning German actions and views appear far more reliable. Of the great German reprisals he remarks, “These stern collective measures certainly also affected the innocent; but the seed, which now bore such bloody fruit, was not sown by the German soldiers, not even by the SS, which now in some cases . . . employed particularly ruthless collective measures.”

[Greek-American Labor Committee.] *Greece Fights for Freedom*. New York: Privately printed, 1944. 29 pp. This is unadulterated propaganda for EAM/ELAS. Its author claims all operational achievements in Greece, including demolition of the Gorgopotamos and Asopos bridges, as EAM/ELAS victories. Demolition of the former, it will be recalled, was a combined British-EDES-EAM/ELAS operation; the Asopos was demolished by an all-British team.

“Greek Political Parties,” *The Economist*, 147 (December 23, 1944), 837–38. This short note, sympathetic to EAM/ELAS, attempts to place the civil war in Greece in context with recent Greek political history.

Hadsel, Winifred N. “American Policy Towards Greece,” *Foreign Policy Association Reports*, 23 (September 1, 1947), 146–60. One section of this article, subtitled “Sources of Communists’ Strength in Resistance,” offers an excellent résumé of the situation. The author shows how a previous dictatorship of the Right drove Greek Communists
underground, reinforcing their party organization and discipline. By the spring of 1942, author claims there were EAM cells “in nearly every village of Greece.” This article summarizes the main events in Greece during World War II.

[Kennedy, Robert M.] *German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941–1944).* (U. S. Department of the Army Pamphlet 20–243.) Washington: USDA, 1954. vi, 82 pp. Maps, charts. This study is based upon extensive use of captured German records, including the war diaries of the Commander in Chief and Armed Forces Commander Southeast, of Army Groups E and F, and of the territorial commanders. It also utilizes German manuscripts prepared for the U.S. Army. For a German view of the guerrilla war in the Balkans, including Greece, this pamphlet is very useful. Nonetheless, for information on British and Greek activities, other sources should be checked. One difficulty in using Kennedy’s work is that the focus is on the larger picture of the Balkans, with the result that the story of the guerrilla war in Greece is quite abbreviated and scattered in the text.

Kousoulas, Dimitrios G. *The Price of Freedom: Greece in World Affairs, 1939–1953.* Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1953. xi, 210 pp. This is a general account of the resistance and the civil wars, emphasizing political factors and containing little information on operations. On specific points, there are a number of errors, e.g., Saraphis’ first band was attacked by EAM/ELAS in early 1943, not 1942; Aris was capetan on the EAM/ELAS Headquarters, not political commissar—Andhreas Tzimas was the first and George Siantos the second political adviser on that triumvirate headquarters. Author claims that the Kremlin avoided open intervention in Greece (p. 87) and that “by the end of July [1944], the First Counselor of the Soviet Embassy [in Cairo] forwarded official instructions to the EAM representatives in Cairo, advising them to show less obstructionism and enter the Papandreou Government. . . .” (p. 113). For this latter fact, the present user of this work would have been grateful for some indication of the author’s source of information.

Lee, Arthur S. Gould. *The Royal House of Greece.* London and Melbourne: Ward Lock [1948]. x, 296 pp. Illus., index. This book is indispensable for the royalist version of events in Greece. A close-up of King George II is given on pp. 206–18; the account, pp. 182–83, of the meeting between the King and Churchill on the night of 29–30, December 1944—when the Prime Minister pressured the King into appointing a Regent for Greece—is quite interesting. The author recounts (p. 206) that Zervas once told him why he had been
anti-monarchist in 1941–42: because of an unfavorable impression of King Constantine which Zervas received as a cadet in 1912, he “turned violently” against the Greek monarchy as an institution.

Leighton, Richard M. “Overlord versus the Mediterranean at the Cairo-Tehran Conferences (1943),” in Command Decisions, Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959. Pp. 182–209. This article provides valuable background material on the question of the strategic value placed by the Allies on various proposals for major landings. By the end of 1943 and the conferences, the Mediterranean was no longer the main European theater and the planned landing in Northern France was primary in Allied considerations; furthermore the European theater held priority over the Pacific in Allied strategy.


McGlynn, M. B. Special Service in Greece: New Zealand in the Second World War. H. K. Kippenberger, ed. Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs, War Histories Branch, 1953. 32 pp. Illus., apps. This official account of the guerrilla war in Greece is mainly concerned with the role of the New Zealand officers and men who went into Greece to perform coup de main feats or to work as liaison officers with the Greek guerrillas. A manuscript by Lt. Col. Arthur Edmunds, who went into Greece with Brigadier Myers in 1942 and stayed on to take over after Woodhouse left in June 1944, was used for the account of the Gorgopotamos and Asopos operations. Other first-hand reports and personal interviews with participants were used by the author as a basis for his work.

McNeill, William Hardy. The Greek Dilemma: War and Aftermath. New York: J. B. Lippincott, [1947]. 291 pp. App., index. The author served as Assistant U. S. Military Attaché in Greece, 1944–46, and served in Athens with the United States Information Agency after the war. This work which, according to one student, “leans heavily on Allied military intelligence reports,” emphasizes political developments in the resistance. According to Col. Woodhouse, McNeill’s account
of the British-Greek war in the winter of 1944–45 is painstakingly impartial . . . but his version of earlier events . . . is misinformed." (Apple of Discord, p. 214, n. 1.) Under these circumstances, McNeill’s work has been heavily relied upon for the Nov 1944-Jan 1945 period in Chapter II of this case study.

Morrell, Sydney. Spheres of Influence. New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, [1946]. xii, 339 pp. Glossary. The author treats Greece on pp. 103–54. He states that there were more than 160 right-wing resistance organizations recorded in Greece during the period of the German occupation; his section on sub-agencies of the left-wing EAM organization gives a good idea of the complexity and depth of its underground apparatus. Morrell takes the highly controversial point of view that the British during the war years pursued a vigorously pro-EAM/ELAS attitude and thus permitted “Greek affairs to reach a stage where civil war was inevitable.”

Noel-Baker, Francis [Edward]. Greece: The Whole Story. London, etc.: Hutchinson & Co., [1946]. 64 pp. Maps, chronology. Brief, general account of the resistance, emphasizing political events. The author feels that the British should have encouraged non-Communists to join EAM and thus swing it to a more moderate and democratic position, instead of aiding its political opponents outside of EAM. This position was mildly echoed by Field-Marshal Wilson in Eight Years Overseas.

Playfair, I.S.O. The Early Successes Against Italy (to May 1941) and “The Germans Come to the Help of Their Ally” (1941). (The Mediterranean and the Middle East, vols. 1 and 2.) London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954 and 1956. Useful for broad background material on early part of the war.

Sacker, David. “The Background of the Greek Crisis,” Contemporary Review, 963 (March, 1946), 155–59. This article is a review of events from the liberation of Greece in October 1944 through the British-Greek war of December 1944 and up to the time of writing. Sacker presents his conclusions as to the root of Greek troubles and a four-point program for relief.

Seth, Ronald. The Undaunted: The Story of the Resistance in Western Europe. New York: Philosophical Library [1956]. 327 pp. Illus.; bibliog., index. There is a brief general account of the Greek resistance on pp. 65–85 of this work, in which the author attempts to assess its military significance. A major contribution to information on Greek affairs comes as a result of the author’s interview of 25 March 1955 with the Italian General Infante, commander of the Pinerolo Division in Greece. According to Seth, General Infante claimed that he was able to avoid taking a single reprisal while in Greece, The
General’s account of the hectic days of September 1943, when the Germans sought the surrender of the Pinerolo Division, confirms that about 12,000 of the Division’s 20,000 men eventually reached the mountains and the guerrillas. Other Italians joined them there until the Italian force reached a strength of 30,000 officers and men. Apparently the General did not explain to Seth how the EAM/ELAS guerrillas were able to effect the disarming of so large a group of trained soldiers on 14 October 1943.


Spencer, Floyd A. *War and Postwar Greece: An Analysis Based on Greek Writings*. Washington: Library of Congress, 1952. xv, 175 pp. This extremely valuable work takes the form of a series of bibliographic essays and is based very much on the use of Greek texts, although writings in other languages are also commented upon. This book gives comprehensive coverage of what is available only in the Greek language. Spencer frequently summarizes the authors’ major findings or theses.

Stavrianos, L. S. *Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity*. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952. ix, 246 pp. Index. Although Stavrianos addresses himself primarily to the question of a proper American policy in postwar Greece, almost half of his book is concerned with the resistance during World War II. On the whole he looks with disfavor on the “old order” in Greece and regards British policy there as unworkable. According to Spencer (see above) this is “the most complete [book] which we now have in any language on the recent background and current problems of Greece until the present. It is also the only work of its kind which makes use of Greek sources.” Despite this lavish praise, it may be wise to approach some parts of this work with caution: Stavrianos appears to see things in absolute terms and, just as the British policy was bad, EAM/ELAS is viewed as the lost hope of Greece.


Stavrianos, L. S. “The Greek National Liberation Front (EAM); A Study in Resistance Organization and Resistance,” *Journal of Modern History*, 24 (March, 1952), 42–55. The author considers that the Greek Communist Party set up EAM to organize the resistance and to use as a
tool for social revolution. Stavrianos deals with EAM’s organization and administration of local government and the financing of the guerrilla war; he develops useful information on the formal relations between the guerrillas and the population. It is sometimes difficult to tell, however, whether he is describing how things were supposed to be done or how things actually were done.


Sweet-Escott, Bickham. Greece: A Political and Economic Survey: 1939–1953. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, [1954]. vii, 206 pp. Maps, apps., biblio., abbrev., index. In part I of this volume, the author, brother-in-law of Brigadier Myers, undertakes a 76-page survey of the politics of the war and resistance period, the interval of postwar peace, and the guerrilla war of 1946–49. On the whole this is a balanced and sensible account, telescoping the main events to present an overall picture. The military side of the story is briefly indicated. There is another equally long section on Greek economic and financial problems.

“Symmachos” [pseud.] Greece Fights On. (Europe Under the Nazis.) London: L. Drummond, [1943?]. 143 pp. Illus., apps. One of the better books in this series, this concerns the war of 1941, German occupation policies, conditions in Greece, and the beginnings of resistance. Although a few events in early 1943 are described, this book deals mainly in local happenings through 1942. No evidence of British special forces is given, but the book is useful for the subjects noted above.


Voight, F. A. “Greece, the Empire, and the United States,” Nineteenth Century and After, 141, 842 (April, 1947), 186–90. A brief general article dealing with political aspects of the resistance.


Woodhouse, C[hris]topher M. “Five Weeks That Changed World History: A Comment,” *Nineteenth Century and After*, 143 (January 1948), 55–58. The author addresses himself to the argument that the German campaign in Yugoslavia upset their time table for invasion of Russia and thus caused the critical delay resulting in the final Russian success. Woodhouse, after demolishing this argument, advances the theory that any delay caused the Germans in 1941 was due to the Greek and British defense of Greece. This theory has in turn been questioned by German historians. Useful only for background purposes.

Xydis, Stephen G. *The Economy and Finances of Greece Under the Occupation*. New York: Greek Government Office of Information. [1945?]. 48 pp. Xydis’ report specifies the economic troubles Greece experienced during the occupation and shows how these problems were multiplied by occupational policies and guerrilla warfare. Although there may be some exaggeration in this work, neutral observers have confirmed the totality of economic devastation visited upon Greece.
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Although this study is primarily the responsibility of the author, a number of other persons in the Special Operations Research Office aided considerably in its completion. Mr. Seymour Shapiro did the initial research and wrote useful drafts giving information which was incorporated into Chapter I. Dr. Earl De Long and Dr. William Lybrand were very helpful in the work of formulating conclusions and implications.

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