Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual

September 2013
Third Edition
The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense leadership.

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international security decision makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint and interagency environment.

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where effort centers upon the USSOCOM and United States SOF missions:

**USSOCOM mission.** Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces to defend the United States and its interests. Synchronize planning of global operations against terrorist networks.

**USSOF mission.** USSOF conduct special operations to prepare the operational environment, prevent crisis, and respond with speed, precision, and lethality to achieve tactical through strategic effect.

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, interagency, and United States military communities.

The JSOU public Web page is located at https://jsou.socom.mil.

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On the cover. The cover image includes a representative sample of U.S. Government department seals for those routinely involved in interagency counterterrorism activities with Special Operations Forces. USSOCOM is one organization within the Department of Defense and among other federal agencies who work through the interagency process to achieve synchronized results. The graphic suggests networked relationships among federal agencies to highlight the concept that any one agency may be working with multiple and different partners at any point in time.

The content of this manual represents an ongoing, dynamic project to capture existing interagency counterterrorism structures, organizations, responsibilities, and work flow. Changes driven by new presidential administrations, fresh policy and current events inevitably alter the interagency landscape. All information comes from open sources to include official fact sheets and background obtained from various official Web sites. The cutoff date for input to this Third Edition was 30 June 2013. Any omissions are completely unintentional.

This reference manual is intended for classroom use and does not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.
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Foreword

This third Edition of the SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual is designed to support the Joint Special Operations University’s (JSOU) mission and, in particular, its Interagency Education Program. This program includes six educational activities:

a. Combating Terrorism Executive Interagency Seminar
b. Special Operations Support Team Orientation Course
c. Combating Terrorist Networks Seminar
d. SOF-Interagency Collaboration Course
e. SOF Orientation for Interagency Partners
f. Interagency Education Outreach

Mr. Charles Ricks, a JSOU Senior Fellow, compiled this manual and continues to update it to provide a valuable reference work for JSOU students, SOF staff officers, and partners within the interagency process. While not all inclusive, it provides an outline of organizations, missions, programs and relationships that comprise the interagency process. The manual provides insight and information regarding various counterterrorism (CT) organizations in the U.S. Government national security apparatus. This project began as a discussion of CT overseas. Because of the changing international security environment and policies set by the National Security Council (NSC), the scope has expanded a bit to include representation from some aspects of the domestic CT mission. New information contained in this edition addresses the continued evolution of NSC thinking that narrows the distinction between overseas and domestic CT efforts. Additionally, the increasing emphasis on transnational criminal organizations and the consequences of their activities for CT practitioners has provided fresh impetus to interagency CT initiatives. Perhaps most significant is the inclusion of expanded concepts of civilian power and their implications for Diplomacy and Development that emerged from the publication of the First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review in 2010. Expanded sections on countering terrorist finance operations, interagency responses to cyber threats, and strategic communication reflect general acknowledgement of the importance of these capabilities. As before, updated collections of definitions, organizations, programs and acronyms are included to provide the special operations warrior with an improved, practical, quick-reference guide to the interagency community.

The interagency process is a fluid interaction involving U.S. Government organizations and processes that changes the way the government is organized and adjusts its priorities to meet real-world challenges. Consequently, as before, JSOU expects to continue updating the document; treating it as an iterative product will keep it current and relevant. Updates are planned on a two-year cycle. If you have suggestions for improvements or changes to the manual, please contact the JSOU Research Director at jsou_research@socom.mil.

Kenneth Poole, Ed.D.
Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
Introduction

I am pleased to introduce the Third Edition of the SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual. The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) has for several years taken the lead in educating those throughout the United States government who are involved with the demanding challenges of countering terrorism threats both domestically and internationally. This manual has proven to be both a useful companion guide for those attending JSOU programs as well as a quick reference document for counterterrorism professionals throughout the interagency structure.

This Third Edition builds upon the success of the earlier versions and continues to incorporate the evolving policy guidance and strategic vision that guide ongoing interagency counterterrorism efforts. I would call your attention particularly to the concept of “Civilian Power” that emerged from The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) that was published by the Department of State in 2010. In its efforts to build Diplomatic and Development capacity, the QDDR acknowledges the importance of Defense as the third pillar of national security. By doing so, the QDDR also establishes a supportive context for SOF Warriors who possess critical skill sets in all three of the “Pillars of National Security and Foreign Policy” (Defense, Diplomacy and Development) and who play unique strategic roles in projecting critical elements of national power into the most challenging environments.

USSOCOM conducts a robust engagement campaign by working with interagency components from throughout the U.S. Government. As part of that effort, it maintains a very active liaison program with the various agencies engaged in the current fight. Such relationship building and sustainment ensure that USSOCOM and its interagency partners are in the best position both to take the initiative and to respond to a wide variety of terrorism challenges.

This manual serves as an essential component of JSOU’s successful education curriculum that is focused on the interagency process. JSOU’s Interagency Education Program and this manual make an important contribution to the knowledge base and professional development of the SOF and interagency communities.

Bradley A. Heithold, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force
Vice Commander
United States Special Operations Command
Chapter 1. Interagency Counterterrorism Components

The line of departure for any discussion of the interagency process is a shared awareness that no single department, agency, or organization of the United States Government (USG) can, by itself, effectively locate and defeat terrorist networks, groups, and individuals. Similarly, it has become increasingly evident that it is not possible for individual countries, coalitions, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to “go it alone” against the threats posed by terrorists and their networks.

Appendix A (List of Organizations and Programs) of this manual provides a substantial but not complete listing of the many participants invested in the interagency process. The USG and these various international players must seek ways to work collectively to create environments that discourage the conditions that breed terrorism in the first place, defeat terrorist threats where and when they emerge, and prevent the recurrence of terrorism once defeated. This manual addresses the complex mix of players and structures within both the USG interagency and, to a lesser extent, the wider international community.

It is often the case that the special operations warrior first encounters the interagency and the other players during a chance encounter or planned gathering within the area of operations (AO). Thus this manual seeks to answer three basic questions:

a. Who are these people?
b. For whom do they work?
c. Why are they here?

Chapter 1 focuses on the USG interagency structures and processes in four sections:

a. The first section—The 3Ds (defense, diplomacy, and development): Civilian Power & SOF—offers a brief overview of the international security environment, the USG interagency process, and the role of Special Operations Forces (SOF) within that process. Perhaps most importantly, it includes an overview of the concept of Civilian Power as discussed in the First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)—6 (Global Development Policy), various supporting documents, and public comments by the Secretary of State and others. While this section is by no means exhaustive in its scope, the discussion provides basic information for the special operations warrior about the interagency concept, its historical context, and current thinking about the way ahead.

b. The second section—Counterterrorism Roles, Missions, and Responsibilities—identifies the various department, organization, and agency components within the USG that address CT issues. It is important to know where specific CT expertise and resources reside, but also to understand that they frequently function separately from their parent leadership in various interagency relationships.

c. The third section—Functioning of the Interagency Counterterrorism Components—describes how these various components are linked together into functional work clusters centered around a lead agency responsible for carrying out specific CT activities. For instance, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is the focal point for all USG intelligence activities and coordinates the activities of the 16 other members of the Intelligence Community (IC) and other supporting bodies that originate from throughout the USG.

d. The fourth section—Interagency Organizations and Initiatives—presents specific examples of
interagency cooperation within the USG with a particular emphasis on engagement initiatives in which U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) plays significant roles.

A note about using this manual: Because of the rapidly changing nature of the USG interagency structure and functioning, organizations and programs are constantly being created, eliminated, and merged to develop necessary capabilities, clarify lines of responsibility, and increase operational efficiencies. Thus information that is accurate at the time of publication may not be subsequently during the life cycle of any version of the manual. However, to the extent possible, the URLs for organizations and programs, along with listings of organizations, programs, and acronyms; a section of definitions; and a bibliography are included to guide a user of the manual to track changes as they evolve. Experience with the first two versions of this manual teaches that the members of the USG CT Interagency—and the other organizations included—are quite effective in maintaining websites that are updated for structure and content. So while the publication date of the current version of the manual serves as a baseline for information, tools are included to lead the user to new and updated information, thus sustaining the manual’s utility over time.

3-Ds (Defense, Diplomacy, and Development): Civilian Power and SOF

The traditional role of SOF has been to transcend the narrow military component of the elements of national power. This reality is acknowledged within the evolving concept of the Special Operations Warrior, an individual with the skill sets and experiences to work within the interagency structure to produce diplomatic, defense, and development effects as required within any AO.

DIME-FIL Model

USSOCOM conducts what it calls a Global Synthesis that seeks to come to an understanding of the current and future international security environment. The Global Synthesis assists in driving SOF strategic thinking and brings together the mosaic of variables that contribute to international instability and generate threats to national sovereignty.

The general conclusion of that synthesis is that traditional nation-state tensions are fading and strategic thinking must focus on a new reality. That new reality is that the international security environment is irregular in nature and will require SOF that are prepared, positioned, led, and able to lead others within the Department of Defense (DOD) and to coordinate with the wider USG and, as appropriate, elements of the international community to meet these emerging threats.

The synthesis has identified crime, migration, violent extremism, and “open source” networks as recurring general concerns around the globe. Various studies, to include those contained in the synthesis, have identified more specific threats. Among these are:

- Sovereignty issues
- Failing and failed states
- Ethnic conflict
- Global economic crisis
- Energy dependence
- Cyber crime
- Pandemics
- Natural disasters
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Trafficking of drugs, weapons, and human beings
- Piracy
- Regional instability
- Resource competition (energy, food, and water)
- Globalization
- Climate change
- Demographic polarization
- Illiteracy
- Ideology and religion
- Wealth disparity
- Parallel social, economic, judicial, and cultural systems
- Corruption

Over the decades, the concept of the interagency approach — also called the whole-of-government (WOG) — has emerged as the process that harnesses
the traditional diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) elements of national power to address a broad spectrum of security threats and to ensure the safety of the United States and the American people. A strategic reassessment, based on the experiences and insights of the past decade, has expanded the notion of the elements of power to include financial, intelligence and law enforcement components, resulting in a more comprehensive spectrum of capabilities (DIME-FIL).

Chapter 1: Interagency Counterterrorism Components

The primary focus of this updated manual remains on that slice of the larger USG interagency community that works through the coordinative and collaborative processes to address CT issues and activities overseas. However, it is essential for the SOF community to possess an awareness of the importance of all elements of national power in the CT effort because domestic and international interests overlap. Thus the discussion of the many different participants, capabilities, resources, and agendas leads to the occasional focus on broader CT and antiterrorism topics to include some homeland security concerns.

The three broad capacities of the Special Operations Warrior—defense, diplomatic, and development—absorb, not replace, the components of the DIME-FIL model.

Interagency and Civilian Power
One of the most important changes in the interagency process in recent years has been the clear articulation of the concept of civilian power in the first QDDR (2010). Its title, Leading Through Civilian Power, acknowledges the reality that merely clustering organizations on a chart doesn’t mean they share the same strategic vision or sense of an agreed unity of effort. Interagency leadership remains an essential element. Yet, as reflected within this manual, interagency leadership usually flows from coordinative rather than from directive relationships. Interagency initiatives typically feature “lead” agencies to organize, animate, and guide the process.

“The Department of Defense is uniquely positioned to stop violence, create conditions of security, and build the military capacity of foreign nations. The Department of Justice has essential skills and resources to improve foreign justice systems. The Department of Homeland Security can help countries develop their capacity to control their borders against smuggling and illicit trafficking while facilitating the free flow of legitimate commerce, and protect their ports, airports, online networks, and other infrastructure. The Department of Health and Human Services can help stop the spread of disease that all too often accompanies conflict and contribute to building sustainable health systems. The Department of Agriculture can help ensure food security and promote rural economic development. The Department of Energy can help establish the energy infrastructure necessary for recovery and economic growth. The Department of Treasury can improve financial systems and economic governance, and the Department of Commerce can expand business opportunities. Together, these capabilities support the civilian power indispensable for conflict and crisis response.” QDDR, 2010, pp. 138-140.

In the most general sense, the QDDR defines civilian power as “the combined force of civilians working together across the U.S. government to practice diplomacy, carry out development projects, and prevent and respond to crises … It is the power of diplomats in 271 missions around the world, development professionals in more than 100 countries, and experts from other U.S. government agencies working together to advance America’s core interests in the world.”

As established in PPD-6 and echoed in the QDDR and other documents, Diplomacy (Department of State—DOS), Development (U.S. Agency for International Development—USAID), and DOD form the three “core pillars” of our national security structure and U.S. foreign policy. Yet these three pillars neither stand alone nor merely in relationships with the other two. As discussed in this manual, many others play roles as defined by the traditional elements of national power (DIME) or the more comprehensive DIME-FIL.

Civilian power functions primarily within the domain of indirect action. However, it is not the intent to restrict military efforts—especially those undertaken by SOF—to the Defense “pillar” while retaining the Diplomatic and Development “pillars” only for civilians. In her speech to a Special Operations-hosted event on May 23, 2012, then Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton spoke extensively of the necessary partnerships among the “three Ds” to achieve “smart
power.” She said “… we need Special Operations Forces who are as comfortable drinking tea with tribal leaders as raiding a terrorist compound … We also need diplomats and development experts who understand modern warfare and are up to the job of being your [SOF] partners.”

One important aspect of the QDDR is the devotion of an entire chapter to “Preventing and Responding to Crisis, Conflict and Instability.” Chief among the components of this chapter is the designation of Conflict Prevention and Response within Fragile States as a “Core Civilian Mission.” This initiative, of course, signals a more extensive role for civilians in DOS, USAID, and other stakeholder agencies who will become increasingly involved with Phase 0 actions to “shape the environment.” As part of this expanded role for civilian power, the QDDR establishes the objective of “re-establishing USAID as the world’s premier development agency.”

The emphasis on civilian power brought about by the QDDR, PDD-6, and subsequent guidance will have significant impact on SOF activities. Increasing roles and missions for civilian power can engage interagency assets in greater numbers and with the necessary skill sets to balance both indirect and direct resources. These can then be applied to address issues of grievance and instability that tend to nurture conditions ripe for terrorist, criminal, and insurgent activities.

They are also likely to render any operational environment a more crowded place in which to operate.

**Interagency and SOF**

As defined in Joint Publication *Joint Operations* (August 2011), interagency coordination is that interaction “within the context of Department of Defense involvement, that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged USG agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective.”

Dealing with CT issues, however, involves more than just the departments, agencies, and organizations of the USG. The successful application of U.S. foreign policy and military power to achieve CT objectives also requires the inclusion and, if possible, commitment of host nation (HN) participants, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs. Because of this complexity, the special operations warrior frequently requires innovative mental flexibility to achieve assigned national security objectives. Essentially, SOF become a source of expertise, resources, and leadership for all three “pillars” of the CT effort.

“Our Vision is a globally networked force of Special Operations Forces, Interagency, Allies and Partners able to rapidly or persistently address regional contingencies and threats to stability.” SOCOM 2020

The unique strategic role of SOF lies in their ability to establish a small-footprint presence with skill sets capable of addressing the defense, diplomacy and development challenges they may encounter. Since they bring expertise relevant to all three pillars of national defense and U.S. foreign policy, SOF can generate effects in all three domains and assist in gaining and maintaining immediate strategic initiative.

It is important to realize that the USG interagency community is not a body with a fixed structure and a developed operational culture. Instead, it is a loose and often undefined process of multiple structures and cultures that is often personality and situationally dependent for its success to an extent normally unfamiliar to the special operations warrior. Stepping outside the comfort zone of military organizations and operations introduces uncertainty about the ways and means to accomplish the mission and achieve assigned strategic objectives.

The special operations warrior can take some solace in the recognition that working the complex interagency environment is not a new challenge. As far back as 1940, the *Small Wars Manual of the United States Marine Corps* identified the problem: “One of the principal obstacles with which naval forces are confronted … has to do with the absence of a clean-cut line of demarcation between State Department authority and military authority.” Further on, the manual asserts that a need exists “for the earnest cooperation between the State Department representatives and naval authorities.”

What has changed, however, is the complexity of the national security environment and the number of departments, agencies, and organizations that now play roles in ensuring the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of our nation. What was once written about relationships between the DOD and the DOS now applies similarly to DOD relationships throughout the USG and beyond.
The SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual is intended to assist the special operations warrior, the 3-D warrior faced with the often bewildering array of USG interagency departments, agencies, and organizations as well as the HNs, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs who also act as players within any given AO. As noted earlier, this manual focuses on departments, agencies, organizations, and programs by identifying who they are, where they fit and how they contribute to CT efforts.

Recent experience teaches much about the rapidly changing CT environments SOF encounter. However, there exists little to prepare one for the diverse mix of players and agendas encountered within the multiple venues of any battle space. Sometimes it might appear that there are lots of different people and organizations performing all sorts of unrelated and uncoordinated tasks directed toward unclear objectives.

If true, such a situation represents a recipe for failure. The reality is probably less severe. The ideal is to achieve synchronization of all the various skill sets and resources available within the various organizations of the USG and also externally with HNs, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

At its core, the interagency process synchronizes U.S. strategic national security efforts. Navigating the interagency environment requires special operations warriors to be guided by achievable expectations and to maintain high levels of situational awareness, display a willingness to listen and learn, and exercise the skill of knowing when to lead, support or, when appropriate, enable those outside DOD to accomplish their objectives.

Though it may sometimes appear to be the most efficient course of action, expecting the military to perform every required task in the AO is typically self-defeating and risks alienating those most in need of assistance. It is likely that, somewhere in any AO, there exists a USG interagency component or external organization that has the skill sets and resources to accomplish a given task. The first step is to review existing policy and strategy to determine which agency has been designated the lead in a given situation.

The assignment of lead agencies establishes responsibility for task accomplishment and defines the paths for the required work flow.

Beyond the USG interagency process, the coordination of the agendas of HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO initiatives strengthens the shared effort even more. However, by its very nature, that inclusion carries with it the risk of jeopardizing the unity of effort.

The Special Operations Warrior plays a variety of essential roles within the CT interagency process, chief among them as a unique source of expertise, experience, and leadership. SOF serve as strategic enablers on the ground who act across interagency structures and animate interagency activities.
Counterterrorism Roles, Missions, and Responsibilities

Awareness of the various Departments, agencies, and organizations playing interagency CT roles is helpful for the special operations warrior. Though based in Washington, D.C., representatives of the USG interagency community are also present on the ground within the AO through the work of the U.S. Embassy Country Team and are likely to have an impact on military operations (see Chapter 2, Overseas Interagency Structures).

Beginning with the White House, this section identifies the roles, missions, and responsibilities of the USG interagency components engaged in meeting the challenges of overseas CT threats to U.S. security. As noted earlier, the interagency community is not a “place” or a formal organization with clear lines of coordination. Rather it is a process of information exchange, coordination, and collaboration among all the various USG departments, agencies, and organizations tasked with CT responsibilities. How these individual components work together is addressed later in this chapter.

The White House
www.whitehouse.gov

The President, supported by and working through the NSC and other senior officials, directs the development and implementation of national CT strategies and policies, oversees necessary planning, and makes the required decisions to activate those plans. Continuous liaison between the White House and the various USG interagency components seeks to ensure the availability of the most timely and accurate information and the clearest strategic guidance to enable the achievement of national security goals against specific threats and within the targeted areas of operation.

Interagency Work Flow

Throughout the USG, the work flow of information exchange, analysis, assessments, draft strategy, policy options, courses of action, consequence analysis, and recommendations for the way ahead moves laterally among the relevant USG interagency components. Products from that work flow then rise vertically from the USG interagency community through the structure of the NSC to the President.

Once strategies, policies, and decisions are promulgated, the engaged USG interagency components use them to guide the direction, management, oversight, and evaluation of national CT activities throughout the world. Figure 1 portrays the work-flow relationship between the USG interagency community and the NSC.

Overseas, the U.S. Embassy Country Team, led by the ambassador, becomes the “face” of the USG interagency process. Staffed with representatives of the relevant USG interagency components, the Country Team takes those steps necessary to achieve U.S. CT objectives. It works with the on-scene military commander to synchronize Country Team activities with military operations and with the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs to maximize the effects of the common effort.

The National Security Council (NSC)
www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc

The NSC came into existence under the National Security Act of 1947 and has been under the Executive Office of the President since 1949. It provides advice and counsel to the President on the synchronization of foreign, military, and domestic policies to ensure the national security of the United States. As the NSC is the President’s coordinating hub for national security power, its structure changes as administrations change, and each version of the NSC is crafted to meet the preferences and priorities of each chief executive. It is through the NSC that all the components of national power (DIME-FIL) are animated to address CT and other national security threats.

Traditionally, an early step for a new administration is to publish its vision of the ideal structure for the NSC and to define work-flow procedures and responsibilities. Predictably, some Presidents are more involved with the details of the NSC workings than others.

President Barack Obama issued PPD-1 on 13 February 2009 to begin the process of outlining his vision for the structure and functioning of the NSC. As per
PPD-1, the NSC consists of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Treasury, Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, Chief of Staff to the President, National Security Advisor, DNI, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Counsel to the President is invited to attend every meeting; the Deputy National Security Advisor attends and serves as the Secretary.

PPD-1 specifies additional attendees from throughout the USG departments and agencies when discussing issues concerning international economic issues, homeland security or CT, and science and technology.

Figure 2 identifies the NSC participants. As noted earlier, the specific NSC structure varies from administration to administration as is seen in the provisions of PPD-1. However, the basic elements of the NSC typically will remain in place as administrations change.

The NSC staff conducts issue and situation analyses, develops policy options and courses of action, projects consequences of policy development, formalizes recommendations for the President, publishes and circulates documentation of Presidential decisions, and oversees policy execution based on those decision documents.

As we have noted, President Obama’s national security decisions are documented in PPDs. In the recent past they have been called National Security Presidential Directives (George W. Bush administration), Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) (Clinton administration), National Security Directives (NSDs) (George H.W. Bush administration), and National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) (Reagan administration). Regardless of title, the documentation of Presidential decisions becomes the touchstone for the actions of the USG interagency components.

It should also be remembered that these directives constitute the President’s Executive Branch decisions. They should be in compliance with existing law and, by themselves, constitute direction rather than law.

The National Security Council Principals Committee (NSC/PC)

The NSC/PC serves as the senior interagency body that is responsible for discussing policy issues and situations critical to the national security of the United States. It is chaired by the National Security Advisor, who sets the agenda and supervises the preparation and presentation of assessments, reports, and options that support the work of the committee.

Additional members include the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Homeland Security, Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, Chief of Staff to the President, the DNI, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Deputy National Security Advisor, Deputy Secretary of State, Counsel to the President, and Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs are invited to each NSC/PC meeting. The heads of other departments, agencies, and organizations are included as appropriate depending on the issues or situations under discussion, including international economic issues, homeland security or CT issues, and science and technology issues. Given the broad scope of its responsibilities, the NSC/PC serves as a strategic hub for interagency policy deliberations and recommendations and provides oversight for policy implementation.
The National Security Council Deputies Committee (NSC/DC)
The NSC/DC serves as the senior sub-cabinet venue for interagency process coordination. It assigns work to and reviews the output of NSC staff and policy groups. The NSC/DC acts to ensure that issues brought before the NSC/PC and the NSC itself have been properly analyzed, staffed, and structured for review and, as appropriate, decision.

Chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor, membership includes the Deputy Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Treasury, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Attorney General, Deputy Secretary of Energy, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, Deputy Director of the OMB, Deputy to the United States Representative to the United Nations, Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs. As with the NSC/PC, discussion of homeland security or CT, international economic, or science and technology issues will include representatives from other executive departments and agencies.

The NSC/DC serves to sharpen the focus of interagency coordination as information and recommendations flow from the Interagency Policy Committees and then through the NSC process to the President. Decisions are then documented and disseminated for execution.

The National Security Council Interagency Policy Committees (NSC/IPCs)
Oversight of national security policy development and execution is accomplished by a collection of regional and functional Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs). They are engaged in the daily management of the interagency process for specific national security issues and situations.

Once again, IPCs exist in every Presidential administration, though their specific number, areas of interest, and work flow are likely to vary. Likewise, individual IPC membership, meeting schedules, and work flow are likely to reflect the requirements of the individual IPC.

IPCs conduct analysis; prepare assessments, strategy drafts, policy options, and courses of action; and
craft recommendations for the NSC/DC, NSC/PC, and NSC. Once issued, the IPCs monitor the implementation of Presidential decisions within their areas of responsibility.

The PPD of 13 February 2009 outlines the purposes of the IPCs and changes their previous name from Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs: a term that remains in pre-2009 documents). It also mandates that “an early meeting of the NSC/DC will be devoted to setting up the NSC/IPCs and providing their mandates for reviewing policies and developing options in their respective areas for early consideration by the interagency committees established by this directive.”

It has not been the practice of the Obama administration to publish a definitive public list of IPCs. Various IPCs have been established, many of which are temporary in nature to address specific issues or situations and are then disbanded. Typically presidents will expand the scope and number of IPCs under whatever name they are known. Such a trend is not unusual as presidential visions and ways of doing business adapt over the course of the administration to new circumstances and changes in the threat environment.

By way of historical context, administrations typically feature a mixture of regional and functional policy committees. Though obviously dated, the information below provides a sense of the wide variety of national security issues of concern to the NSC and the USG Interagency. According to the 15 August 2011 Annual Update on the National Security Process: The National Security Council and the Interagency System (Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University), President George W. Bush’s regional PCCs included (with lead agency identified):

- a. Europe and Eurasia (State)
- b. Western Hemisphere (State and NSC Co-chair)
- c. Mexico/Central America Regional Strategy (State and NSC Co-chair)
- d. East Asia (State)
- e. South and Central Asia (State)

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**Figure 2. National Security Council**

Regular NSC Attendees, PPD-1, 13 February 2009

- President
- Vice President
- Secretary of State
- Secretary of Defense
- Secretary of Energy
- Secretary of the Treasury
- The Attorney General
- Secretary of Homeland Security
- Representative of the USA to the United Nations
- Chief of Staff to the President
- National Security Advisor
- Director of National Intelligence
- Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Deputy National Security Advisor (Secretary)
- Heads of Other Departments and Agencies As Appropriate

* National Security Council

** Director of National Intelligence

** Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
Secretary of Homeland Security
Representative of the USA to the United Nations
Chief of Staff to the President
Counsel to the President
Deputy National Security Advisor (Secretary)
Others As Appropriate

* Statutory and Non-Statutory Participants
** Statutory Advisors
+Non-Statutory Member
f. Iran (State and NSC Co-chair)  
g. Syria-Lebanon (State and NSC Co-chair)  
h. Africa (State and NSC Co-chair)  
i. Russia (State and NSC Co-chair)  
j. Iraq (NSC)  
k. Afghanistan (State and NSC Co-chair)  

Functional PCCs from the Bush Administration included:

a. Arms Control (NSC)  
b. Biodefense (NSC and HSC)  
c. Combating Terrorism Information Strategy (NSC)  
d. Contingency Planning/Crisis Response Group (NSC)  
e. Counterterrorism Security Group (NSC and HSC)  
g. Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations (NSC)  
h. Detainees (NSC)  
i. Global Environment (NSC and NEC Co-chair)  
j. HIV-AIDS and Infectious Diseases (State and NSC)  
k. Information Sharing (NSC and HSC)  
l. Intelligence and Counterintelligence (NSC)  
m. Interdiction (NSC)  
n. International Development and Humanitarian Assistance (State and NSC Co-chair)  
o. International Drug Control (NSC and ONDCP)  
p. International Finance (Treasury)  
q. International Organized Crime (NSC)  
r. Maritime Security (NSC and HSC)  
s. Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense (NSC)  
t. Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations (State and NSC)  
u. Records Access and Information Security (NSC)  
v. Space (NSC)  
w. Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications (State)  
x. Transnational Economic Issues (NSC)  
y. Weapons of Mass Destruction—Terrorism (NSC)  
z. Avian and Pandemic Influenza (NSC and HSC)  
   a. Communication Systems and Cybersecurity (NSC and HSC)  

Predictably, the number of functional PCCs under President George W. Bush’s administration increased significantly as the threat environment changed dramatically during his time in office.

A similar mosaic of Interagency Policy Committees has characterized the Obama Administration since 2009, as have a variety of IPCs that have been formed to address specific issues and then have dissolved once their purposes have been fulfilled.

DOD representation exists on the NSC, NSC/PC, NSC/DC, and on most IPCs.

**Strategic Policy Documents**

Acting through the NSC, the President has developed several different strategies that drive the development of additional strategies and the writing and execution of operational plans. Chief among these are:

a. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America  
b. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism  
c. The National Strategy for Homeland Security  
d. The National Counterintelligence Strategy  
e. The National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding  
f. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime  

Given that strategic guidance, the Secretary of Defense has promulgated *The National Defense Strategy*, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has provided direction through *The National Military Strategy*.

In response to all of these, the commander of USSOCOM has been tasked by the Secretary of Defense to prepare *The Global Campaign Plan for the War on Terror* from which each geographic combatant commander has developed a supporting theater campaign plan.

Within the DOD, these strategies and plans are further delineated under classified Contingency Plans and Execute Orders related to CT.

**National Security Strategy of the United States (May 2010)**

One of the evolutionary trends in recent years has been the elimination of distinctions between “homeland security” and “national security”. President Obama
has created a single, integrated National Security Staff (NSS) structure to handle policy development and execution and to manage both homeland security and national security crises. This step has served to eliminate redundancy and duplication of effort and has resulted in a clearer shared picture of the national security environment facing the United States. The merger has also facilitated unity of effort on matters of national security and placed critical NSC policy concerns under a single leadership authority. Reflecting this merger into a “National Security Team” (a term frequently used by Obama Administration officials when communicating through the news media), the following constitute the “Guiding Principles” contained in the current National Security Strategy of the United States:

- Defeat Terrorism Worldwide
- Strengthen our Biological and Nuclear Security
- Improve Intelligence Capacity and Information Sharing
- Ensure a Secure Global Digital Information and Communications Infrastructure
- Promote the Resiliency of our Physical and Social Infrastructure
- Pursue Comprehensive Transborder Security
- Ensure Effective Incident Management

**National Strategy for Counterterrorism (June 2011)**

As laid out in the National Security Strategy for Counterterrorism, one of the president’s top national security priorities is “disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents to ensure the security of our citizens and interests.” This definition and the supporting strategic content make it clear that “we are at war with a specific organization—al-Qaeda.” According to the strategy, the principle target for CT initiatives is the “collection of groups and individuals who comprise al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents.”

The strategy also provides direction for this manual by emphasizing that “U.S. CT efforts require a multi-departmental and multinational effort that goes beyond traditional intelligence, military and law enforcement functions.” No single agency, country or organization can alone defeat al-Qaeda, its affiliates and its adherents. Logically, an awareness, familiarity, and, if possible, understanding of the vast number of domestic and international organizations engaged in CT efforts is essential for the SOF Warrior whose strategic, operational and tactical responsibilities cut across the organizational infrastructures, cultures and missions of the various players.

The National CT Strategy is grounded on four core principles:

- Adhering to U.S. Core Values
- Building Security Partnerships
- Applying CT Tools and Capabilities Appropriately
- Building a Culture of Resilience

The strategy identifies eight “over-arching CT goals”, each of which represents a component of SOF strategic identity. These are:

- Protect the American People, Homeland, and American Interests
- Disrupt, Degrade, Dismantle, and Defeat al-Qaeda and Its Affiliates and Adherents
- Prevent Terrorist Development, Acquisition, and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Eliminate Safe Havens
- Build Enduring Counterterrorism Partnerships and Capabilities
- Degrade Links between al-Qaeda and its Affiliates and Adherents
- Counter al-Qaeda Ideology and Its Resonance and Diminish the Specific Drivers of Violence that al-Qaeda Exploits
- Deprive Terrorists of their Enabling Means


The threats posed by the activities of transnational organized crime (TOC) present themselves with greater complexity and result in volatility and instability. Criminal networks frequently threaten U.S. security by taking advantage of corrupt elements within other national governments. The end-state sought by this strategy is to “reduce transnational organized crime from a national security threat to a manageable public safety problem in the United States and in strategic regions around the world.” To achieve this end-state, the strategy mandates five policy objectives:
a. Protect Americans and our partners from the harm, violence, and exploitation of transnational criminal networks

b. Help partner countries strengthen governance and transparency, break the corruptive power of transnational criminal networks, and sever state-crime alliances

c. Break the economic power of transnational criminal networks and protect strategic markets and the U.S. financial system from TOC penetration and abuse

d. Defeat transnational criminal networks that pose the greatest threat to national security by targeting their infrastructures, depriving them of their enabling means, and preventing the criminal facilitation of terrorist activities

e. Build international consensus, multilateral cooperation, and public-private partnerships to defeat TOC

The strategy calls for the creation of an Interagency Threat Mitigation Working Group to identify TOC groups, prioritize their threat potentials, and coordinate the most efficient application of all relevant elements of national power to combat them.

This focus on transnational criminal organizations is significant because terrorists and insurgents are becoming increasingly reliant on criminal networks to generate funding and provide logistical support for their own activities. Thus the nexus between terrorists and criminals represents a strategic threat that demands strong interagency attention. The Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) on Illicit Drugs and Transnational Criminal Threats is responsible for overseeing the interagency implementation of the Strategy to Combat TOC in coordination with other IPCs such as the Maritime Security IPC.


This attention is appropriate because criminal organizations serve as agents of instability in undergoverned and ungoverned spaces, thus creating the conditions that facilitate the growth of terrorist and insurgent threats. TOC is able to penetrate political processes through the bribery of corrupt government officials and establish parallel economic and social systems, infiltrate financial and security sectors, and create their own systems of governance, security and rule of law.

Various listings of national security threats exist, none of which is exhaustive. However, the Strategy to Combat TOC highlights some of the most compelling:

1. Crime-Terror-Insurgency Nexus
2. Expansion of Drug Trafficking
3. Human Smuggling (illegal entry)
4. Trafficking in Persons (involuntary servitude, slavery, debt bondage, forced labor)
5. Weapons Trafficking
6. Intellectual Property Theft
7. Cybercrime

Department of State (DOS)
www.state.gov

The DOS serves as the designated USG lead in fighting terrorism overseas. Therefore, a major slice of USG CT components resides within the DOS, and these DOS components are presented below. Moreover, as indicated in the earlier discussion of Civilian Power, DOS is structuring its capabilities to serve as the proponent for the Diplomatic Pillar of National Security and Foreign Policy while the USAID acts as the lead agency for activities undertaken as part of the Development Pillar.

Bureau of Counterterrorism (S/CT)
www.state.gov/j/ct/

Along with the articulation of the doctrine of Civilian Power, perhaps the most important change in the CT posture of the United States in the past two years has been the establishment of the Bureau of Counterterrorism on 4 January 2012. In his remarks marking the launch of the bureau, Ambassador Daniel Benjamin made it clear that the new bureau would be “moving
well beyond coordination”, which was the essence of the previous “Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism”. Having said that, Ambassador Benjamin continues to be called the “Coordinator for Counterterrorism”, which sustains the very important facilitator role that has traditionally accrued to that individual.

Thus the Bureau of Counterterrorism will continue to serve as a central CT hub in the USG National Security structure. The primary mission of the new bureau: “working with the National Security Staff, U.S. Government agencies, and other Department of State Bureaus, the Bureau of Counterterrorism develops and implements CT strategies, policies, and operations. It oversees programs to counter violent extremism, strengthen homeland security, and build the capacity of partner nations to deal effectively with terrorism.”

A detailed mission analysis reveals that the bureau serves as a source of strategic guidance and effort that will affect the full range of capabilities contained in the USG “Counterterrorism Team.” Capturing the concepts of civilian power and the Diplomatic Pillar discussed in the 2010 QDDR, Ambassador Benjamin spoke of the “growing importance of civilian CT work, what we here call Strategic Counterterrorism.” Examples of initiatives under Strategic Counterterrorism include a strong reliance on Counterterrorism Diplomacy, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, and a new Strategic Plans and Policy Unit to improve the quality of strategic thinking and planning and a fresh set of metrics to measure the effectiveness of on-going programs.

Four guiding principles provide strategic direction:

a. Defeat terrorists and their organizations
b. Deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists
c. Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit
d. Defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad

The Bureau of Counterterrorism pursues four lines of operation as part of its strategy to defeat the terrorist enemy:

a. Apply all elements of national power (DIME- FIL) in cooperation with international partners, allies and like-minded non-state actors/
b. Attack the terrorist enemy’s three-part “threat complex”
   i. Leadership—global actors who provide leadership, resources, inspiration and guidance to extremist networks around the world.
   ii. Safe Havens—Areas (often crossing political or geographic boundaries) that provide a secure base for extremist action, including:
      – Physical Safe Havens (failed/failing states, under-governed areas, and sponsors who provide safe areas where terrorists train and organize)
      – Cyber Safe Havens (Electro-magnetic and internet-based means for communication, planning, resource transfer and intelligence collection)
      – Ideological Safe Havens (Belief systems, ideas and cultural norms that enhance the enemy’s freedom of action)
   iii. Underlying conditions that terrorists exploit (grievances, communal conflicts, societal structures and adverse economic environments that provide fertile soil for extremism to flourish)
c. Build trusted networks that undermine, marginalize and isolate the enemy, and empower legitimate alternatives to extremism.
d. Respond on four levels (global, regional, national and local) over an extended timeframe, to isolate the threat, defeat the isolated threat, and prevent its re-emergence in the long-run. This response includes:
   i. A global campaign to counter al-Qaeda and associated networks.
   ii. Regional campaigns to target and eliminate terrorist safe havens.
   iii. National efforts to improve the security of partner nations and to provide development assistance designed to build liberal institutions, support the rule of law, and enhance our partners’ capacity to resist the terrorist threat.
   iv. A focus on unique local conditions when designing and implementing CT strategies
In addition to establishing strategic goals and marshaling the resources necessary to support the accomplishment of those goals, the Bureau of Counterterrorism employs the elements of national power to conduct a wide range of tasks. Among those are:

a. Build the political will and CT capacity of partner governments
b. Develop public diplomacy strategies that delegitimize terrorism, encourage moderates to oppose extremism, and explain USG CT policy
c. Designate Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) to freeze their assets and isolate them internationally
d. Provide deterrence and rapid response to international terrorist incidents
e. Deliver creative and flexible anti-terrorism and CT finance training
f. Enhance border security and global terrorist watch listing
g. Provide expert CT assistance in support of embassies and partner nations
h. Integrate homeland security initiatives with foreign policy
i. Lead technology development to effectively combat terrorism
j. Develop the intellectual capital necessary for a decades-long struggle

To meet its responsibilities, the Bureau of Counterterrorism has a Principal Deputy Coordinator and three Deputy Coordinators, each of whom leads a functional directorate (see Figure 3).

The Deputy Coordinator of Homeland Security and Multilateral Affairs seeks an integrated approach to link homeland security and international CT activities. The S/CT maintains a strong relationship with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the White House Homeland Security Council. The S/CT chairs the DOS Homeland Security Coordinating Committee (HSCC). The Office of Trans-Regional Affairs and Designations oversees the operations of the Terrorist Designations Unit and the International Organizations Unit.

The Deputy Coordinator of Operations pursues two primary missions:

a. Assist the DOD to develop and implement overseas CT policies, plans and operations. Simultaneously, the directorate advises DOS officials at home and abroad on DOD CT concepts and proposals
b. Sustain and lead the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST), which is the USG’s only on-call asset capable of responding to terrorist incidents worldwide

As part of its larger interagency role, operations co-chairs both the Hostage Policy Subgroup, responsible for updating and executing USG policy during incidents involving the detention of Americans abroad, and the Interagency Athletic Events Security Coordination Group that coordinates U.S. assistance to security operations associated with the Olympic Games and other major international sporting events.

The Deputy Coordinator of Regional Affairs and Programs is responsible for developing, coordinating, and executing national, regional, and multilateral U.S. CT policy. Central to its efforts is the ongoing challenge of building political will and capacity within partner nations. It works with members of the U.S. Counterterrorism Team and other USG interagency structures to ensure that all elements of national power are used most effectively to target terrorists by engaging partner nations, allies, and like-minded non-state actors. Regional officers focus on the Western Hemisphere, Europe and Eurasia, the Near East, Africa, South and Central Asia, and East Asia and the Pacific. They operate extensive consultative and coordination networks within DOS, the USG interagency community, and their regions.

The directorate also focuses its efforts to build partner nation capabilities to combat terrorism. These include assisting nations to develop the practical capacities in law enforcement, border control, and banking regulation as tools to identify, interdict, and defeat terrorists. The Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA), implemented by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and discussed later, is the primary program for developing law enforcement skills and providing equipment to partner nations. Along with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the directorate co-chairs the interagency Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) discussed
later. The directorate also provides policy, planning, and programming guidance to the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) (www.state.gov/s/ct/about/cl6663.htm) that shares information with partner nations about suspected terrorists seeking to enter or pass through their territories.

S/CT Programs
www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm

- Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). This strategic initiative involves considerable investment from a variety of organizations from throughout the DOS and the wider USG interagency structure. It is managed both from Washington, DC, and by individual country teams operating from U.S. Embassies overseas. It operates under the oversight of the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and in close coordination with the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC). The CVE program works three major lines of operation:

1. Provide positive alternatives to those most at-risk of recruitment into violent extremism
2. Undermine the al-Qaeda ideology that glorifies violence
3. Increase partner capacity (civil society and government) in order to stem terrorist recruiting

Because so much effort is focused on the local, indigenous level, much of the effort is based on community-based initiatives. Some of these include interfaith and intercultural tolerance programs; youth sports programs, and skill training. Efforts to counter and discredit al-Qaeda propaganda rely on credible local individuals who are victims of al-Qaeda violence, former militants, women, and other community leaders.

- Counterterrorism Finance (CTF) Unit. The success of any strategy relies on the mustering of adequate resources to support the achievement of the assigned policy goals. This is as true for terrorists and transnational criminals as it is for the United States and its partners who confront them. One of the tasks for the counterterrorists is to deny their adversaries money, resources and support. The CTF Unit provides training and technical assistance to governments around the world to increase their capacity to investigate, identify and interdict the flow of money to terrorists and their networks. CTF efforts focus on developing necessary legal frameworks and regulatory systems while establishing Financial Investigative Units as part of skill and capacity building within partner nations. CTF teams up with the Terrorist Designations Unit within the Bureau of Counterterrorism to identify financial support structures for terrorists and then eliminating them. CTF efforts are focused on five operational areas:

a. Legal frameworks
b. Financial regulatory systems
c. Financial intelligence units
d. Law enforcement
e. Judicial/prosecutorial development

- Counterterrorism Preparedness Program. This is a series of national and international exercises that are intended to build national capacity to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from large-scale terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

- Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST). The FEST is the USG’s only interagency, on-call, short-notice team prepared to respond to incidents around the world. Its purpose on the ground is to provide advice and assistance to the Chief of Mission on
assessing and coordinating U.S. crisis response efforts. It includes representatives from DOS, DOD, IC, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other agencies, such as the Department of Energy (DOE), as required by the situation.

- **Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)**
  Established on 22 September 2011, the GCTF is an informal, multilateral CT forum that seeks to identify civilian CT requirements, mobilize the expertise that resides in the member nations, and gather the resources necessary to address those CT needs while building global cooperation. It consists of 30 founding members (29 countries and the European Union (EU)). The GCTF areas of interest reflect the consensus view that it is necessary to address a wide variety of conditions that contribute to the development of terrorists, terrorist groups and terrorist networks. These include CVE, strengthening criminal justice and other terrorist-focused rule of law institutions, and building national CT capacity. The forum works through five working groups: Criminal Justice Sector and Rule of Law; CVE; Capacity Building in the Sahel; Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa Region; and Capacity Building in Southeast Asia.

- **International Security Events Group (ISEG).** The ISEG functions under the direction of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security Major Events Coordination Unit. It works with its USG interagency and international partners to assess threats to major events such as the Olympic Games, World Cup Soccer and the Pan American Games with an eye toward developing contingency strategies and response plans. This may include staging of the FEST. The development of scenario-driven exercises may also become a part of the ISEG support protocol.

- **Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI).** One of the most important components of on-going CT initiatives is the denial of safe havens and sanctuaries to terrorist groups and networks. As terrorists operate without regard to traditional political boundaries, they seek to establish themselves in ungoverned spaces where they enjoy impunity from official sanctions while seek to establish their own legitimacy by claiming land and establishing their own governmental, social, legal, and economic systems. Examples of this behavior can be found along the Pakistan/Afghanistan Border; Yemen; the Trans-Sahara Region; and Somalia. RSI initiatives now exist in nine areas: South East Asia; Iraq and its neighbors; Eastern Mediterranean; Western Mediterranean; East Africa; Trans-Sahara; South Asia; Central Asia; and Latin America. RSIs function under the authority of the Chief-of-Mission and bring together members of the Country Team, Military, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence agencies to assess threats, devise solutions and identify necessary recourses. Specific RSI goals include:

  1. Identify key CT issues and concerns across a region
  2. Develop a common strategic approach to address CT issues
  3. Pool resources and tasks to generate unified effort across the USG
  4. Create ongoing interagency partnerships to address CT issues
  5. Form a basis for closer cooperation between regional partner nations
  6. Leverage resources from partner organizations

- **Technical Support Working Group (TSWG).** [http://www.tswg.gov/](http://www.tswg.gov/) The TSWG is an interagency grouping that develops the technology necessary to conduct CT programs. It is co-chaired by the Bureau of Counterterrorism and the DOD’s Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO). The TSWG also works with various North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners, non-NATO partners, and various other partner nations.

- **Terrorist Screening and Interdiction Programs (TSI).** The TSI is focused on sharing information among domestic agencies and neighboring countries with an eye toward disrupting the movement of terrorists and their networks across international boundaries. Limiting terrorist mobility disrupts their freedom of action and increases the shared security of international partners.
• Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) www.state.gov/documents/organization/159220.pdf The TSCTP program is a U.S.-funded and implemented capacity-building effort to counter violent extremism and contain/cutoff terrorist groups and networks in the pan-Sahel region. The focus is on the countries of the pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Burkina Faso) and the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia).

• The Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PREACT). www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2011/169150.htm This group used to be known as the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI). PREACT serves as the East African counterpart of the TSCTP. The program is designed to build CT capacity to address short-term threats and long-term vulnerabilities. The program employs military, law enforcement and development resources to achieve its strategic objectives. Issues of concern include reducing terrorist operational capabilities, improving border security, encouraging regional cooperation, and CVE. Member countries include Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

Terrorist Designations and State Sponsors of Terrorism www.state.gov/j/ct/list
Terrorist Designation Unit
www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123086.htm

The Secretary of State exercises the authority to publicly identify terrorists and terrorist organizations. Once defined, these identifications, or designations, trigger specific requirements about how U.S. individuals and businesses interact with anyone on the designation list. The Public Designations Unit evaluates candidates for inclusion, submits them to the Secretary of State for review and approval, and then monitors to ensure that sanctions placed against a specific individual or group are enforced appropriately. The Foreign Terrorist Organizations List focuses on travel related to terrorist organizations, criminalizes material support to terrorist organizations, and assists in freezing the financial resources of terrorist organizations located in U.S. financial institutions. The maintenance of the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL) also assists in efforts to identify and take action against terrorists and terrorist organizations.

Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)
www.state.gov/m/ds

The DS serves as the security and law enforcement arm of the DOS and has as its mission the responsibility to create a secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. It prepares and executes programs to protect U.S. embassies and personnel overseas (through the regional security officers) and to secure facilities and information systems. DS personnel serve as the Secretary of State’s Protective Detail, work in the Diplomatic Protection Division, and operate the Protective Liaison Division to coordinate security with the diplomatic corps stationed within the United States. In addition to protecting people, property and information, DS is skilled in international investigations, threat analysis, cyber security, CT, and security technology.

The criminal investigative branch of DS, the Diplomatic Security Service, also conducts investigations of passport and visa fraud as a way of preventing access by suspected terrorists to the U.S. and partner nations. DS operates from offices in 25 U.S. cities and in 159 foreign countries worldwide and establishes close working relationships with local law enforcement organizations. The Regional Security Officers who serve on the Country Teams come from DS. Both the ATA and the Rewards for Justice Program are the responsibility of the DS. Among other interagency components, the DS works closely with the DHS’s Document and Benefit Fraud Task Force and the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. DS also has responsibility to provide protection for the Secretary of State and for defined foreign government officials visiting the U.S. who do not receive protection from the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) or the FBI.

Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA)
www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm

The ATA is managed by the Office of Antiterrorism Assistance. It is designed to encourage and nurture cooperative initiatives between U.S. law enforcement agencies and similar organizations within those partner countries cooperating in efforts to deal with
terrorism. Programs focus on training for bomb detection, crime scene investigation, airport and building security, maritime protection measures, and VIP protection. More broadly, ATA seek to increase capacity to protect national borders, secure critical infrastructure, protect national leadership, and respond to and resolve terrorist incidents. Rule of law and respect for human rights are recurring themes in all ATA programs. While providing training and equipment resources, the ATA also helps to build and strengthen bilateral relations so important to the broader CT effort. These relationships serve to increase the security of Americans living and traveling overseas and play an important role in international CT efforts. Since the program was established in 1983, more than 84,000 security and law enforcement officials from 154 countries have participated in the ATA.

**Intelligence and Threat Analysis (ITA)**

http://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8584.htm

The ITA serves as the coordinative interface between the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the IC on all matters of international and domestic terrorism. ITA places particular emphasis on monitoring threats against the Secretary of State, senior U.S. officials, visiting dignitaries, foreign diplomats living inside the U.S., and foreign missions within the U.S. for whom DS has security responsibilities. ITA threat assessments are used to inform policy development and operational decision making by DOS and DS senior leadership. Working closely with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, ITA provides threat warnings to and other essential information to the public through the Consular Information Program. As part of this process, the ITA maintains the Security Environment Threat List (SETL). ITA conducts trend analysis and develops case studies of terrorist incidents, political violence and criminal violence that affect the security of Americans overseas. It also provides its analysis to other intelligence organizations, U.S. law enforcement agencies, and U.S. businesses in the U.S. and throughout the world.

**Rewards for Justice Program**

www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8651.htm

Originally established by the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, the Rewards for Justice Program was expanded under the terms of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (commonly known as the Patriot Act). Currently this DOS-managed program (Bureau of Diplomatic Security) offers awards of as much as $5 million for information that solves or prevents terrorist acts or leads to the capture and conviction of those responsible. The Secretary of State has the authority to offer rewards in excess of $5 million for specific cases. More than $100 million has been paid to credible informants, with notable successes in arresting those involved with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and of certain high-value targets in Iraq. Information can be provided to any FBI office, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security or through the regional security officers in U.S. embassies overseas. Information gathered through the program is shared with partner nations who are also at risk.

**Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC)**

www.osac.gov

The OSAC is a Federal Advisory Committee operating under a USG charter that came into being in the wake of increased terrorist threats to U.S. businesses and organizations operating internationally. It is intended to promote security cooperation between U.S. private sector interests around the world and the DOS. The program currently has more than 4,600 U.S. companies and other organizations with international interests participating. The OSAC “council” is made up of 30 private sector and four public sector organizations. The OSAC seeks to orchestrate security cooperation between its members and the DOS. As part of its activities, the council operates committees on Security Awareness and Innovation, Country Councils and Outreach, and Threats and Information Sharing. A system of country councils scattered around the world provides interface between U.S. embassies and consulates and the local U.S. communities to exchange security information.

**Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM)**

www.state.gov/t/pm

The PM serves as the main coordination node for interface between DOS and DOD. PM’s mission “integrates diplomacy and defense, and forges strong international partnerships to meet shared security challenges.” It performs critical interagency functions by providing policy guidance on international security, security
assistance, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade. The DOS-DOD relationship established through PM orchestrates the concept of “Smart Power” in the following ways:

- Provides the Secretary with a global perspective on political-military issues
- Supports formulation of regional security policy and conducts bilateral political-military dialogues
- Promotes regional stability by building partnership capacity and strengthening friends and allies through security assistance programs
- Regulates U.S. arms transfers and defense trade
- Provides diplomatic support to the DOD for basing, military exercises, and overseas operations
- Contributes to Defense and Political-Military Policy and Planning
- Reduces threats from conventional weapons through humanitarian demining and small arms destruction programs

The Office of International Security Operations (ISO), contained within PM, forms the essential link between DOS and DOD on all operational matters. Operations include, but are not limited to: Freedom of Navigation (FON) clearances for the DOD; Counter-Narcotic/Terror Deployments; Coalition Affairs; Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO); Politically Sensitive Areas (PSA) List; Law of the Seas and other Naval issues; Force Protection; Significant Military Exercises Brief; Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET); Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA); requests for foreign deployment; and ship clearances.

Also contained within PM is the Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis, which supports the Security Assistance Team, the Political-Military Policy and Planning Team, and the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) Team. The Security Assistance Team develops military assistance policy and manages security forces funding through three programs:

- Foreign Military Financing
- International Military Education and Training
- Peacekeeping Operations

The Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers (PM/RSAT) and Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) also play major roles in building strong international partnerships. Other Bureau offices are the Office of Congressional and Public Affairs (PM/CPA), Office of Counter Piracy and Maritime Security (PM/CPMS), Office of Security Negotiations and Agreements (PM/SNA), and Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA). The PM Bureau strengthens the DOS-DOD relationship by providing the Secretary of State with a global perspective on political-military issues; supporting DOD by negotiating basing agreements, reviewing military exercises, facilitating overseas operations, and providing embedded Foreign Policy Advisors (POLADs) to military service branch chiefs and combatant commanders worldwide; promoting regional stability by building partnership capacity and strengthening friends and allies through security assistance programs; reducing threats from conventional weapons through humanitarian demining and small arms destruction programs, thus setting the stage for post-conflict recovery in more than 50 countries throughout the world; contributing to Defense and Political-Military Policy and Planning; and regulating arms transfers and U.S. defense trade.

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) www.usaid.gov (The Development Pillar)

The USAID plays critical roles both strategically and operationally in the USG interagency process. The agency’s history reaches back to the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Post-World War II Europe. USAID is an independent USG agency, operating under the policy direction of the Secretary of State. Its purposes are to advance U.S. foreign policy interests into expanding democratic and free market environments while simultaneously seeking to improve the lives of people living in the developing world. The 2010 QDDR set as one of its strategic goals “rebuilding USAID as the preeminent global redevelopment institution.”

As noted elsewhere, the QDDR’s emphasis on the Three Pillars of National Security and Foreign Policy resulted in the assertion that “development stands alongside diplomacy as the twin pillar of America’s civilian power.” The USAID development goals are accomplished by efforts in more than 100 countries to “promote broadly shared economic prosperity; strengthen democracy and good governance; improve global health, food security, environmental
sustainability and education; help societies prevent and recover from conflicts; and provide humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural and man-made disasters.” USAID provides regional assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa; Asia; Latin America, and the Caribbean; Europe and Eurasia; and the Middle East. It also acts as the lead USG agency for international disaster assistance. Consequently, USAID serves as an active member of the U.S. Embassy Country Team (frequently called the “Mission Director”) and remains a highly visible presence throughout any AO.

Along with other initiatives, such as the creation of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), USAID works with a large number of interagency partners within DOS and from other USG organizations, HN structures, IGOs, and NGOs. Additionally, USAID maintains relationships with thousands of U.S. private companies, and hundreds of U.S. based private voluntary organizations. USAID maintains four functional bureaus: Global Health; Economic Growth, Education and Environment; Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance; and Bureau for Food Security (BFS). Among its independent offices are the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs (OAPA); Office of Civil Rights and Diversity; Office of Faith-based and Community Initiatives; Office of Small Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU); and Office of Development Partners (ODP). Once again, the reenergized focus on the role of USAID is part of the QDDR emphasis on the importance and utility of civilian power throughout the Diplomacy and Development Pillars of National Security and Foreign Policy.

Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)
www.state.gov/j/cso/

Another consequence of QDDR initiatives is the elevation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. This step is, in part, to achieve the QDDR goal of “embracing conflict prevention and response within fragile states as a core civilian mission.” The CSO mission is to “prevent conflict, save lives, and build sustainable peace by resolving underlying grievances fairly and helping to build government institutions that can provide basic but effective security and justice systems.” CSO seeks to break cycles of violent conflict and mitigate crises. The bureau seeks to assist in conflict prevention and to support post-conflict nations with recovery. Specific tasks include conflict prevention; crisis response and stabilization; and addressing the underlying grievances and other causes of instability and violence. Currently working in more than 20 countries, CSO initiatives include “working to assist and unite the non-violent opposition in Syria; supporting outreach to ethnic minorities in Burma; taking a regional approach to reduce violent crime in the northern tier of Central America; and working with many partners to get a jump start on preventing election violence in Kenya.”

CSO works under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations and is organized functionally into four areas: Establish and Coordinate Policy and Programs; Assess, Plan, Implement, Deploy; Support and Recruit; and Evaluate, Learn, Communicate, Connect. These functions are carried out by the Office of Policy and Programs; Office of Overseas Operations; Office of Civilian Response Corps and Deployment Support; and Office of Partnerships. The CSO has a major impact on SOF who often share the operational environment with personnel and activities conducted by this new and expanded bureau.

Smuggling Response Team (SRT)
www.state.gov/j/isn/c26798.htm.

The WMDT Smuggling Response Team provides guidance and oversight to the Nuclear Trafficking Response Group (NTRG), the Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP), and the Forensics Engagement Working Group (FEWG). Additionally, it facilitates USG cooperation with foreign partners responding to nuclear trafficking incidents overseas; helps to develop U.S. policy counteracting the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials; assists in building foreign partner capacity to counter nuclear and radioactive materials; and conducts diplomacy to promote counter nuclear-smuggling tools.
Nuclear Trafficking Response Group (NTRG)  
www.state.gov/t/isn/c26798.htm

The NTRG was established in 1995 to coordinate USG responses to incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials overseas, including radiation alarms. The goals of the NTRG are to work with foreign governments to secure smuggled nuclear material — including facilities where diversions occurred, prosecute those involved and develop information on smuggling-related threats (e.g., potential links between smugglers and terrorists). The NTRG is chaired by the DOS and includes representatives from the nonproliferation, law enforcement, and intelligence communities.

Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP)  
www.pnsp-state.net/

The PNSP was established in 2007 to help countries counter nuclear smuggling by increasing capabilities in the areas of prevention, detection, and response. PNSP supports projects developed by Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative where no other donor can be found or where there are opportunities to leverage foreign funding. To date, these projects have focused on securing radiological sources, monitoring open borders between fixed crossing points, and identifying legal gaps in national laws for prosecuting smugglers. PNSP also focuses on increasing foreign governments’ response capabilities by ensuring the entire spectrum of ministries follow a single set of well-exercised national operating procedures. PNSP is also dedicated to promoting nuclear forensics, which plays a critical role in promoting nuclear material security and investigating illicit uses of nuclear or radioactive material. PNSP is working to promote international nuclear forensics cooperation through National Nuclear Forensics Libraries and by promulgating nuclear forensic best practices for technical and law enforcement personnel.

Forensics Engagement Working Group (FEWG).  
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c26798.htm

The FEWG is an interagency working group that coordinates and facilitates USG outreach, engagement, and policy development on nuclear forensics. The group is chaired by the DOS and includes participants from the nonproliferation and law enforcement communities.

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (PD)—www.state.gov/r

The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs leads a comprehensive communications effort targeted at audiences both at home and internationally. The QDDR (2010) designated Public Diplomacy as a “Core Diplomatic Mission”, thus reflecting the importance of information and influence for U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy. The Under Secretary oversees the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of Public Affairs, and the Bureau of International Information Programs. These bureaus work together and with the broader interagency influence infrastructure to build strong relationships between the people and government of the United States and the citizens of the rest of the world. Specific tasks in this effort include communications with international audiences, cultural programming, academic grants, educational exchanges, and international visitor programs. The QDDR established five strategic objectives for the influence responsibilities carried out by the Under Secretary:

1. Shape the Narrative
2. Expand and Strengthen People-to-People Relationships
3. Counter Violent Extremism
4. Better Inform Policymaking
5. Deploy Resources in Line With Current Priorities

Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC)  

The CSCC was formed at the initiative of the President and the Secretary of State. It began its work on 27 September 2010. The Center’s current staff is made up of representatives from a number of agencies as well as State Department personnel from various bureaus. Effective communication is an essential part of the effort to support our national security, and the central responsibility of the CSCC is to take the lead in enhancing whole-of-government communication efforts and capabilities to counter the al-Qaeda narrative and disrupt radicalization efforts in foreign societies. The CSCC coordinates, orients, and informs USG-wide
communications with international audiences with the goal of using communication tools to reduce radicaliza-
tion and extremist violence and terrorism that threaten the interests and national security of the United States.

The CSCC operates under the broad policy direc-
tion of the White House and interagency leadership. The director reports to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (S/PD) and works closely with the Bureau for Counterterrorism (S/CT), as well as with the heads of other Department bureaus and other government agencies. CSCC coordinates closely within the State Department with S/CT’s CVE unit as well as with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the geographic bureaus, primarily through the S/PD for Public Diplomacy.

Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB) www.state.gov/e/eb

The EB mission is to promote economic security, both domestically and internationally. It serves as a hub for USG interagency economic policy seeking to promote national security by ensuring successful achievement of U.S. foreign economic policy goals. To this end, it also works with the EU, G-8, G-20, World Trade Organization (WTO), and other IGOs to engage the international community on issues of common interest. The EB coordinates within the USG interagency community with the Department of the Treasury and international partners such as the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, EU, and Persian Gulf States to deny terrorists access to the international financial system. EB efforts are spread across seven areas of interest: Commercial & Business Affairs (EB/CBA); Economic Policy Analysis & Public Diplomacy (EB/EPPD); Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions (EB/TRS); International Communications and Information Policy; International Finance and Development; Trade Policy and Programs; and Transportation Affairs.

Office of Terrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy www.state.gov/e/eb/esc/efs/

Working with and through the interagency process, the Office of Counterterrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy is responsible for obtaining international agreement and support for initiatives targeting terrorist financing. As conditions dictate, it also develops, adjusts, and terminates as appropriate U.S. sanctions imposed on specific countries. As part of its interagency efforts, the office also coordinates with the Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control and the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security to develop and provide policy guidance on import-export arrangements and licensing issues.

Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) http://travel.state.gov/about/about_304.html

The Bureau of Consular Affairs is involved with processing and issuing passports for U.S. citizens and providing assistance and care to U.S. passport holders traveling overseas. It also manages the immigrant and nonimmigrant visa programs. The visa program requires screening for possible terrorists and other undesirables while preserving access to those welcome to travel to the U.S. Because of the nature of its responsibilities, the Bureau of Consular Affairs is a major interagency participant in any AO. It also contributes to public diplomacy campaigns through its interactions with local nationals. Because of its international reach, the CA supports efforts to protect the lives and interests of American citizens abroad and assists with securing our domestic borders through its visa and passport protocols.

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) www.state.gov/j/drl

The DRL has the responsibilities to promote democracy, ensure the respect and protection of human rights and international religious freedom, and advance labor rights around the globe. Such values are specified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in various other regional and global agreements. As part of its international outreach, the U.S. employs a variety of tools to advance our freedom agenda to include bilateral diplomacy, multilateral engagement, foreign assistance, reporting and public outreach, and economic sanctions. Among other activities, DRL works with U.S.-based NGOs who coordinate the activities of those working on the ground throughout the world. DRL is involved with developing the capacity of civil and government institutions to promote human rights and bring about stability. DRL also participates in technical assistance projects, coordinates with local business and
Chapter 1: Interagency Counterterrorism Components

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
www.state.gov/j/inl

The INL provides advice to the President, Secretary of State, bureaus within the DOS and other departments, agencies, and organizations that make up the USG interagency process. Its two strategic objectives are to reduce the entry of illegal drugs into the United States and to minimize the impact of international crime on the United States and its citizens. To those ends, counternarcotics and anticrime programs support CT efforts by promoting the modernization of foreign criminal justice systems and their evolving operational capacities. Thus INL policies and programs designed to address international narcotics trafficking and crime have an impact on the funding of terrorists and terrorist organizations through the development of working relationships among international law enforcement agencies both regionally and globally. INL is committed to preventing the production, trafficking, and abuse of illicit drugs. The Office of Anti-Crime Programs works in the fields of anti-corruption, anti-money laundering/CT financing, border security/alien smuggling, intellectual property rights/cybercrime, and international organized crime. Additionally, INL is responsible for guiding the U.S. participation in the Merida Initiative, a partnership relationship with Mexico that fights organized crime and the violence associated with such activities while advancing respect for human rights and the rule of law. The Merida Initiative pursues the following four lines of operation: Disrupt organized criminal groups; strengthen institutions; build a 21st century border; and build strong and resilient communities.

Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
www.state.gov/s/inr

As a member of the USG’s IC, INR’s primary responsibility is to provide quality intelligence information and resources to support U.S. diplomacy and the achievement of national security objectives. INR analysts rely on all-source intelligence, diplomatic reporting, in-house public opinion polling, and interactions with domestic and foreign scholars. It seeks to provide global coverage of terrorist threats and other relevant concerns. INR produces reports on topics of interest to include political/military developments, terrorism, narcotics, and trade. It is also a regular contributor to the IC’s National Intelligence Estimates, the Presidential Daily Brief, and other senior level products. INR also conducts policy reviews of counterintelligence and law enforcement activities. Its Humanitarian Information Unit provides unclassified information to the USG interagency community and other partners to support responses to humanitarian crises worldwide. INR also maintains an unclassified database of independent states and sovereignty relationships to support global security initiatives. A relatively new responsibility within the IC is to serve as the “Executive Agent for Outreach” whereby INR establishes relationships between intelligence agencies and expertise residing in academia, think tanks, research councils, NGOs, and the private sector.

Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO)
www.state.gov/p/io

Established in 1949, the IO serves as the USG’s primary tool for interaction with the United Nations (UN) and a variety of other international agencies and organizations. It serves as the activity hub for the extensive U.S. multilateral engagement program on global issues such as peace and security, nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, economic development, climate change, and global health. The IO maintains diplomatic missions in New York City, Geneva, Vienna, Rome, Paris, Montreal, and Nairobi. Specific organizations include the UN Agencies for Food and Agriculture in Rome; the UN Education, Science and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the International Civil Aviation Organization; and the UN Environmental Program. Besides pursuing issues of interest, IO seeks to increase the effectiveness of multilateral relationships by advocating for more transparent, accountable, and efficient international organizations.

Bureau for International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)
www.state.gov/t/isn

The ISN leads the USG interagency efforts to block the spread of WMD. These include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems. ISN also
engages the international community through bilateral and multilateral relationship-building. To achieve its goals, ISN promotes international consensus on WMD proliferation through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy; leads the development of diplomatic responses to specific bilateral and regional WMD proliferation challenges; develops and supports strategic dialogues with key states or groups of states who are engaged in WMD issues and initiatives; addresses WMD proliferation threats posed by non-state actors and terrorist groups by improving physical security, using interdiction and sanctions, and plays a central role in the Proliferation Security Initiative; and works closely with the UN, G-8, NATO, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other international institutions and organizations to reduce and eliminate the threat posed by WMD. ISN pursues these goals through a variety of different offices to include:

- Nuclear Affairs
  - Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs
  - Office of Nuclear Energy, Safety and Security
  - Office of Regional Affairs

- Non-Nuclear and Counter-Proliferation
  - Office of Missile, Biological and Chemical Nonproliferation
  - Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction
  - Office of Counter-Proliferation Initiatives
  - Biological Policy Staff

- Nonproliferation Programs
  - Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction
  - Office of Export Control Cooperation
  - Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
  - Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism
  - Office of Strategic Communications and Outreach

ISN is also engaged with the Biological Weapons Convention involving 165 countries; the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism including 85 partner nations and four official observers; and the Foreign Consequence Management Program. The Proliferation Security Initiative (www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm) engages more than 90 nations in a shared commitment to stop the trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials among state and non-state actors of concern to the international community.

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What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security — diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development … civilian participation is both necessary to making military operations successful and to relieving stress on the men and women of our armed services who have endured so much these last few years, and done so with such unflagging bravery and devotion. Indeed, having robust civilian capabilities available could make it less likely that military force will have to be used in the first place, as local problems might be dealt with before they become crises.

— Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, reported quote, Manhattan, Kansas, 26 November 2007

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Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) www.state.gov/g/prm

PRM is focused on the very difficult mission of providing aid and sustainable solutions for refugees, victims of conflict, and stateless people around the world through repatriation, local integration, and resettlement within the United States. More specifically, the PRM mission is to “provide protection, ease suffering, and resolve the plight of persecuted and uprooted people around the world on behalf of the American people by providing life-sustaining assistance, working through multilateral systems to build global partnerships, promoting best practices in humanitarian response, and ensuring that humanitarian principles are thoroughly integrated into U.S. foreign and national security policy.” It provides assistance through a complex network of multinational organizations to include the UN High Commissioner on Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine.
Refugees in the Middle East. With a staff of some 130 civil servants and Foreign Service staff, PRM does not provide aid directly to refugees, but works through international organizations to manage contributions to the agencies and monitor the programs that are U.S. funded to ensure compliance with USG goals and policies. Working through local officials, IGOs and NGOs, the PRM seeks three durable solutions: repatriation; local integration; and resettlement. This engagement can provide an important assist to the SOF Warrior addressing the challenges of population migration, refugees and displaced persons while seeking to work with IGOs and NGOs they encounter within their operating environments.

**Foreign Service Institute (FSI)**
[www.state.gov/m/fsi](http://www.state.gov/m/fsi)

The FSI is the primary training base for the USG’s Foreign Service officers and support personnel as they prepare themselves to advance U.S. foreign affairs interests overseas and in Washington, D.C. The FSI program of instruction contains more than 600 courses (including training in some 70 foreign languages) available to the Foreign Service community, interagency departments, agencies and organizations, and the military services. The George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center supports an enrollment of some 100,000 enrollees annually from the DOS, more than 40 other USG agencies, and the military services. Courses range from a half-day to 2 years and focus on developing cultural, leadership, and management skills within the U.S. foreign affairs community and their families. The FSI serves as an important forum for gathering lessons learned and imparting them to its enrollees. It is organized into five schools like a university to include The School of Language Studies, The School of Applied Information Technology, The School of Leadership and Management, The School of Professional and Area Studies, and the Transition Center.

**U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN)**
[www.usun.state.gov/about](http://www.usun.state.gov/about)

Established in 1947 under the provisions of the United Nations Participation Act, the U.S. Mission to the UN represents the U.S. at all meetings of the UN as part of a comprehensive effort to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives. It further engages the UN Secretariat and the member nations in consultations and negotiations to gain support for U.S. positions and initiatives. The mission staff consists of some 150 people who manage issues involving political, economic and social, legal, military, public diplomacy, and management issues at the UN. The U.S. delegation provides a continuous flow of information to DOS and U.S. embassies throughout the world and develops recommendations on how to proceed on issues before the UN. Of particular interest is the U.S. Mission’s Military Staff Committee (MSC). It serves as the representative of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the United Nations Military Staff Committee, which includes military representatives of the Permanent Five (P5) members of the UN Security Council. Additionally, the MSC advises the U.S. Permanent Representative and staff on military and security aspects of UN peacekeeping operations.

**Department of Defense (DOD)**
[www.defense.gov](http://www.defense.gov)

As the proponent of the Defense Pillar of the 3-Ds (Defense, Diplomacy and Development), the DOD provides its full range of capabilities and resources to the CT effort. As a major participant in the NSC process, it plays an important role in the workings of the USG interagency community as it goes about its work to meet national security goals by defeating the terrorist threat to the U.S. DOD further participates in a variety of interagency clusters that perform specialized roles within the CT fight. The activities of all DOD components are under specified organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. For example, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence oversees the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The DOD components listed here obviously do not represent a comprehensive survey of DOD capabilities and resources. However, they do reflect major DOD components identified by the DOS as part of the U.S. Counterterrorism Team and those with the most obvious roles in USG interagency CT efforts.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC)
http://policy.defense.gov/OUSDPOffices/ASDforSpecialOperationsLowIntensityConflict.aspx

The ASD/SOLIC is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to special operations and low-intensity conflict. The ASD/SOLIC provides policy oversight for strategic capabilities, force transformation, and resources while supervising special operations and low-intensity conflict activities. USSOCOM’s 2007 Posture statement and Section 167 of Title 10 of the United States Code (USC) provide similar, though not identical, lists of SOF activities. These include CT, unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, information operations, military information support operations (MISO), and WMD counter-proliferation. Additionally, the ASD (SO/LIC) retains policy oversight responsibility for strategic capabilities, force transformation, and resources. Included is capability development involving general-purpose forces, space and information capabilities, nuclear and conventional strike capabilities, and missile defense. The ASD (SO/LIC) is responsible for Counter-narcotics and Global Threats; Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations; and Special Operations and Combating Terrorism.

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
www.darpa.mil

DARPA was established as part of DOD to conduct advanced research and manage development programs. DARPA’s mission is to prevent strategic surprise to the U.S. and to create strategic surprises for our enemies by maintaining the technological superiority of the U.S. military. Through the years, DARPA has continuously refocused its work in direct response to, or in anticipation of, national security threats and revolutionary technology opportunities. Most recently, its strategic thrusts have included detection, precision ID, tracking, and destruction of elusive targets; urban area operations; advanced manned and unmanned systems; detection, characterization and assessment of underground structures; robust, secure, self-forming networks; space; increasing the tooth-to-tail ratio; biorevolution; and core technology. DARPA pushes technology transitions and seeks solutions to technological challenges. Among many others, specific efforts focus on investing in research and technologies that enable strategic advantage of technological surprise; developing technologies and systems that facilitate “game changing” tactics, techniques, and procedures that address the entire spectrum of armed conflict; conducting irregular operations in difficult politico-military circumstances; countering asymmetric threats; maintaining superiority on the conventional global battlefield (force protection, force projection, anti-access, logistics); detecting, preventing, and negating weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and creating and maintaining situation awareness.

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
www.dia.mil

The DIA is the chief provider of military intelligence to DOD and serves as a major participant in the USG IC. The Director of DIA acts as the principal advisor on intelligence matters to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. DIA provides intelligence products to policy makers, war fighters and force planners for their use in meeting their responsibilities within the national security arena. DIA applies varied expertise in a wide range of interests to include military, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking and defense-related political and economic issues.

DIA strategic goals include:

1. Prevent Strategic Surprise and Support Contingency Operations
2. Strengthen Core Mission Capabilities
3. Partner and Innovate to Gain Advantage
4. Optimize Performance Relevance

DIA’s workforce of more than 16,500 military and civilian personnel represents expertise in foreign military and paramilitary forces, capabilities, and intentions; proliferation of WMD; international terrorism; international narcotics trafficking; information operations; and defense-related foreign political, economic, industrial, geographic, and medical and health issues. DIA has established the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) to consolidate terrorism-related intelligence gathering and reporting. October 2007 saw the establishment of the Defense
Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) to improve coordination of intelligence activities in support of the combatant commands (COCOMs).

The DIOCC also serves as the interface with the National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C), a DNI organization. The DIOCC operates and maintains a 24/7 global situational awareness center to address the intelligence requirements of the national leadership and COCOMs; serves as the lead organization for DOD intelligence planning; and provides direct, on-site support to all COCOM Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) through various means including Joint Intelligence Support Teams. DIA personnel operate around the world. Major U.S. facilities include the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, D.C.; the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center at Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland; and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center at Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama. As part of its responsibilities, DIA operates the Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service and the Defense Attaché System.

The director of the DIA also commands the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR).

**Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)**

www.dsca.mil

Working under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, the DSCA is responsible for directing and managing security cooperation programs and resources in support of national security objectives. Security cooperation activities are intended to build relationships that promote specified U.S. interests; build allied and friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access. An important subset of security cooperation is security assistance, which represents a collection of programs to deliver weapons systems and other defense items as well as various services to friendly governments to promote defense burden sharing and regional stability. Examples of security assistance initiatives include Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing grants or loans, and International Military Education and Training (IMET). Figure 4 reflects the interagency relationships with the DSCA serving as the hub for interagency coordination. Examples of DSCA efforts include: $96 Billion in Foreign Military Sales from 2005-2010; 768 Security Cooperation Officers in 148 countries; 12,901 active FMS cases valued at $385 billion; 274 ongoing Humanitarian Assistance Projects in 82 countries; 7,344 International Students from 148 countries; and 9,000 Regional Center Participants.

**Military Department Intelligence Services**


The military departments (MILDEPs) field unique intelligence organizations with a full-spectrum of collection, analysis, production, and dissemination capabilities, appropriately linked to the service’s areas of expertise. For instance, U.S. Air Force intelligence, working through organizations like the Air Force Intelligence Analysis Agency and the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency, relies on sophisticated technology such as manned and unmanned air- and space-based systems such as the U-2, Global Hawk, Predator, and Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System (TARS) to generate a wide variety of intelligence products.

Because of their mission orientations, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marines rely heavily on HUMINT techniques continuously enhanced by other technology-based resources. The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command conducts intelligence, security and information operations for military commanders and decision makers. The Army relies on extensive Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) capabilities to provide a continuous flow of credible intelligence into the decision cycle. The Marines integrate trained intelligence personnel into all echelons of command beginning with battalion/squadron and employ Intelligence Battalions for all-source intelligence; Radio Battalions for Signal Intelligence (SIGINT); Unmanned Aerial Systems squadrons for airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); and Reconnaissance Battalions for ground reconnaissance. With the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) serving as its production center, much
of the Marines’ focus is placed on the complexities of expeditionary warfare.

With its sustained global reach, the U.S. Navy serves as the primary agency for maritime intelligence. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is co-located within the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC). The intelligence content supports the core Navy missions to include forward presence, maritime security, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), power projection, sea control, and deterrence. ONI also provides intelligence on foreign naval capabilities, trends, operations and tactics, and global civil maritime activities.

Intelligence gathered from the MILDEPS flows through the IC and other interagency venues to support CT efforts overseas and other national security priorities. Each Military Department Intelligence Service serves as an individual member of the IC.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
www1.nga.mil/Pages/Default.aspx

NGA is responsible for supplying timely, relevant, and accurate geospatial intelligence in support of U.S. national security objectives. It provides imagery and geospatial information to assist decision makers and military commanders in understanding the intricacies of areas of the earth that are of interest. NGA provides tailored, customer-specific geospatial intelligence, analytic services, and solutions to assist in planning, decision making, and execution. Geospatial Intelligence refers to the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the earth. Among other activities, NGA provides information to support humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. It also manages the National System for Geospatial Intelligence. NGA is a member of the U.S. IC and is designated as a DOD Combat Support Agency.

Figure 4. Defense Security Cooperation Agency
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
www.nro.gov

The NRO designs, builds, and operates the nation’s reconnaissance satellites and serves as the “nation’s eyes and ears in space.” Because of the unique placement of its resources, the NRO is able to provide global situational awareness of activities on the ground while focusing specifically on locations of particular national security interest. It is a major interagency player, working with the NSA, NGA, CIA, U.S. Strategic Forces Command, the MILDEPs, IC, DOS, Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Treasury, and the rest of the Interagency Community. NRO also draws expertise from private sector aerospace companies and research centers. Its budget, the National Reconnaissance Program, comes through the National Intelligence Program and the Military Intelligence Program. NRO systems provide:

- Monitoring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Tracking international terrorists, drug traffickers, and criminal organizations
- Developing highly accurate military targeting data and bomb damage assessments
- Supporting international peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations
- Assessing the impact of natural disasters to include earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, and fires

National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS)
www.nsa.gov

The core mission of the NSA/CSS is to lead the USG in cryptology that encompasses both SIGINT and Information Assurance (IA) products and services, and enables Computer Network Operations (CNO) in order to gain a decision advantage for the Nation and our allies under all circumstances. To those ends, NSA/CSS serves as the nation’s cryptologic organization that pursues the tasks of Signals Intelligence and Information Assurance. It “enables Network Warfare operations to defeat terrorists and their operations at home and abroad, consistent with U.S. laws and the protection of privacy and civil liberties.” NSA/CSS serves a wide variety of customers throughout the interagency process to include the military leadership, senior policy makers, and those involved with CT and counterintelligence activities. It also works with certain international allies in support of their efforts. Areas of interest include terrorism, narcotics trafficking, criminal gangs, and asymmetric threats. Among the NSA’s assets are the NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center, National Security Operations Center, and the Research Directorate. Executive Order 12333, originally issued on 4 December 1981, established NSA/CSS responsibilities. Some of these include:

- “Collect (including through clandestine means), process, analyze, produce, and disseminate signals intelligence information and data for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes to support national and departmental missions;
- Act as the National Manager for National Security Systems as established in law and policy, and in this capacity be responsible to the Secretary of Defense and to the Director, National Intelligence.
- Prescribe security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling, and distribution of signals intelligence and communication security material within and among the elements under control of the Director of the National Security Agency, and exercise the necessary supervisory control to ensure compliance with the regulations.”

EO 12333 was amended on 31 July 2008 in order to:

- Align EO 12333 with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004;
- Implement additional recommendations of the 9/11 and WMD Commissions;
- Maintain or strengthen privacy and civil liberties protections.

The CSS ensures military integration by coordinating and developing policy and guidance on Signals Intelligence and Information Assurance missions. CSS was established in 1972 to assure full partnership between the NSA and the Military Department Cryptologic Components. These include the United States Fleet Cyber Command; the United States Marine Corps Director of Intelligence; the United States Army’s Intelligence and Security Command; the United States Air Force’s Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency; and the United States Coast Guard Deputy Assistant Commandant for Intelligence.
Known as the “Army’s Face to the World” because it serves as the primary entry point for U.S. Army material and service-related Foreign Military Sales Requirements, USASAC is responsible for managing security and assistance programs for the Army. The command has its headquarters at Redstone Arsenal in Alabama. Security Assistance is supervised and directed by the DOS in coordination with the White House, Congress and Treasury Department. Strategic goals of security assistance include achieving regional security, deterring aggression, maintaining alliances, enhancing coalition partners, and affirming democratic values. Military assistance programs are conducted by DOD. USASAC manages some 4,600 Foreign Military Sales cases with a total value of more than $134 billion. It currently serves 140 allies countries and multinational organizations.

United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)  
www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/Cyber_Command

As a new sub-unified command subordinate to the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), USCYBERCOM achieved full operating capability on 31 October 2010. It is located at Fort Meade, Maryland. According to its mission statement, CYBERCOM is “responsible for planning, coordinating, integrating, synchronizing, and directing activities to operate and defend the DOD information networks and, when directed, conducts full-spectrum military cyberspace operations (in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations) in order to ensure U.S. and allied freedom of action in cyberspace, while denying the same to our adversaries.” The command “centralizes direction of cyberspace operations, strengthens DOD cyberspace capabilities, and integrates and bolsters DOD’s cyber expertise.” CYBERCOM is fully engaged in the USG interagency structure and with international partners in pursuing its responsibilities. The command’s Service Elements include Army Cyber Command; 24 AAF/Air Force Cyber Command; Fleet Cyber Command; and Marine Forces Cyber Command.

United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC)  
www.army.mil/info/organization/usasac/

Defence Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) & USSTRATCOM Center for Combating WMD  
www.dtra.mil

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)  

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD (P))  
http://policy.defense.gov

Department of Justice (DOJ)  

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)  
Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI)  
www.usdoj.gov/dea/index.htm

Operating from 21 field divisions within the U.S. and some 86 offices in 63 countries, DEA/ONSI maintains a major international law enforcement presence in support of national security objectives. DEA representatives serve on U.S. Embassy Country Teams (Chapter 2). “DEA has sole responsibility for coordinating and pursuing drug investigations abroad and works in partnership with foreign law enforcement counterparts.” The DEA/ONSI works with the IC and the wider interagency process to address threats from drug traffickers, immigration violators, and global terrorist networks. Among its responsibilities are the following:

a. Investigate and prepare for the prosecution of major violators of controlled substance laws involving interstate and international environments

b. Investigate and prepare for the prosecution of criminals and drug gangs who perpetuate violence in communities and terrorize citizens through fear and intimidation

c. Manage a national drug intelligence program in cooperation with federal, state, local, and foreign officials

d. Coordinate with various government agencies, to include foreign governments, to conduct programs to reduce illicit-drug availability within the U.S. through crop eradication, crop substitution, and training of foreign officials

e. Oversee all programs involving law enforcement counterparts in foreign countries under the policy guidance of DOS and the local Country Teams
f. Conduct liaison with the UN, Interpol, and other similar organizations with interests in international drug control efforts

The DEA’s Office of National Security Intelligence (ONS) represents the agency in the IC and contributes both to the task of combating terrorism and leveraging IC support to the DEA’s law enforcement mission.

**Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) – Counterterrorism**

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism

The FBI, the lead federal agency for combating domestic terrorism, works both domestically and internationally to combat terrorism and other threats to national security. The FBI serves as the lead USG investigative agency for a domestic terrorist incident. As an interagency player, the FBI works closely with the law enforcement, intelligence, military, and diplomatic communities to meet their domestic responsibilities to neutralize terrorist individuals and cells within the U.S. and to assist in dismantling terrorist networks worldwide.

The FBI’s National Security Priorities include Terrorism (international terrorism, domestic terrorism, and WMD); Counterintelligence; and Cyber Crime (computer intrusions, internet fraud, and identity theft). Their criminal priorities, which often complement FBI CT efforts, include public corruption; civil rights; organized crime; white-collar crime; and violent crime and major threats.

The National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) operates with the FBI’s Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) to co-locate interagency representatives from the law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, defense, public safety and homeland defense communities.

The setup allows for immediate access to FBI and participating agency databases and assures the rapid exchange of information and the working of issues and operational requirements. Information flows into the NJTTF from a variety of sources, including from some 100 JTTFs that are scattered throughout the U.S. The DOJ/FBI-led JTTFs retain their interagency identity and incorporate investigators, linguists, SWAT members, and other expertise from a cross-section of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. JTTFs are domestically focused and combine federal, state, and local resources. Today more than 4,400 people from over 600 state and local agencies and 50 federal organizations work within the JTTF system.

Members of the USG interagency infrastructure include, among others, the DHS, DOD, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).

The FBI maintains 56 offices in major U.S. cities and 380 smaller sub-offices that provide coverage to the continental United States and in support of operations in more than 200 countries, territories, and islands. FBI officers working in more than 60 offices worldwide are identified on the U.S. Embassy Country Teams, discussed in Chapter 2, as legal attaches. Their responsibilities include sharing information, identifying threats to national security, disabling those threats if possible, investigating crimes and incidents, and identifying, tracking and apprehending terrorists and terrorist organizations. In addition to working with local authorities to meet its responsibilities, the FBI also conducts training for local law enforcement within their geographic areas of responsibility. The total FBI budget for FY 2012 was approximately $8.1 with increases of $119.2 million in programs supporting CT, computer intrusions and other supporting programs.

**Federal Bureau of Investigation – Most Wanted Terrorists**

www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists

In coordination with the interagency Rewards for Justice Program, the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) (www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/tsc/tsc) maintains a Terrorist Watch List of those terrorists wanted worldwide. The list is the product of a comprehensive database of identifying information about those known or reasonably suspected of being engaged in terrorist activity. Photos on Web sites and other media communicate the identity of these individuals and seek additional input and tips about their location and habits to assist in their capture and prosecution. Generally, the individuals posted on various websites have been indicted by Federal Grand Juries for the crimes indicated. The list serves as a valuable asset in supporting screening agencies to positively identify known or suspected terrorists trying to obtain visas, enter the country, board aircraft, or engage in other activities. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) relies on the list as an important source of information to be shared with both domestic and international agencies.
Established on 12 September 2005, the NSB represents the consolidation of FBI CT, counterintelligence, weapons of mass destruction, and intelligence components under the leadership of a single Bureau official. The formal NSB infrastructure includes: the Counterterrorism Division; Counterintelligence Division; Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate; the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC); and the High-Value Detainee Interrogation. Drawing on the information derived from the JTTFs located throughout the U.S. and the Field Intelligence Groups, the NSB produces assessments of the structure, capabilities, motivation/ideology, and linkages among terrorist groups and networks. NSB is also responsible for the conduct and management of all foreign counterintelligence investigations. Its goal is to “develop a comprehensive understanding of the threats and penetrate national and transnational networks that have a desire and capability to harm us.” These include terrorist organizations, foreign intelligence services, criminal organizations, and those seeking to develop and spread WMD.

Under the terms of the USA PATRIOT Reauthorization and Improvement Act of 2006, the President established the position of Assistant Attorney General for National Security with responsibilities for the NSD. This step brought together CT, counterespionage, FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act), and other expertise from throughout DOJ into a single organization.

The NSD combats terrorism and other threats to national security by enabling greater cooperation and ensuring greater unity of purpose among prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, intelligence attorneys, and the IC. Areas of interest include Intelligence Operations and Litigation, CT to include the Antiterrorism Advisory Council, Counterespionage, Oversight, Law and Policy, Foreign Investment, and Victims of Terrorism. The Division is organized into the Counterterrorism Section (CTS); Counterespionage Section (CES); the Office of Intelligence; Operations Section; Oversight Section; Litigation Section; the Law and Policy Office; the Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism; and an Executive Office.

Specific responsibilities of the NSD include the following:

a. Promote and oversee a coordinated national CT enforcement program that engages the USG interagency community to include the 93 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices
b. Oversee and support the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council
c. Consult, advise, and collaborate with prosecutors nationwide on international and domestic terrorism investigations, prosecutions, and appeals
d. Share information and advice to international prosecutors, agents, and investigating magistrates
e. Develop training for prosecutors and investigators on relevant tactics, laws, policies, and procedures.
f. Provide guidance on interpretation and application of new terrorism statutes, regulations, and policies
g. Serve as the DOJ representative on interagency boards, committees, and other groups focused on national security
h. Establish and maintain the Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism
i. Ensure the rights of victims and families are honored and respected

The CTS is “responsible for the design, implementation, and support of law enforcement efforts, legislative initiatives, policies and strategies relating to combating international and domestic terrorism.” The section works through investigations and prosecutions in its efforts to prevent and disrupt acts of terrorism anywhere in the world. Among its responsibilities:

- Investigate and prosecute international and domestic terrorism cases
- Investigate and prosecute terrorist financial matters
- Coordinate with USG agencies such as the DOS, DOD, DHS, Treasury Department, FBI and the IC to prevent terrorist attacks through detection
and analysis and to provide relevant information to those operating in the field
• Conduct training and information programs on law, policy, procedure and guidelines for foreign and domestic law enforcement personnel, intelligence officials, private sector security practitioners, and the general public
• Assist the Anti-Terrorism Task Force Coordinators in the U.S. Attorney’s Offices
• Participate in the foreign terrorist designations process in coordination with other DOJ agencies, the DOS and the Treasury Department
• Provide staffing to the FBI’s SIOC
• Share information and provide assistance to international investigators and prosecutors to assist in identifying and moving against international threats
• Provide legal advice to U.S. federal prosecutors on relevant federal statutes

Additional DOJ Organizations and Initiatives
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
www.atf.gov
Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)
Counterterrorism Section (CTS)
www.usdoj.gov/nasd/counter-terrorism.htm
Field Intelligence Group (FIG)
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)
www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/
foreign-terrorist-tracking-task-force-ftttf
INTERPOL Washington—United States National Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington-USNCB)
http://www.justice.gov/interpol-washington/
Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx)
www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/n-dex/n-dex
Office of Intelligence
www.justice.gov/nasd/intelligence.htm
Terrorism Financing Operations Section (TFOS)
www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorизм_financing
Terrorism and International Victim Assistance Services Division (TIVAS)

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
www.dhs.gov
As its title indicates, DHS has as its primary focus securing the U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks as well as other man-made and natural threats. The department leads a variety of agencies whose purpose is relevant to both domestic and international CT efforts. DHS came into being under the terms of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. That legislation consolidated 22 existing federal agencies and many additional federal responsibilities that were then distributed throughout the USG. Beyond its various organizations and capabilities, DHS oversees a system of Centers of Excellence that are engaged in the development of new technologies and the sharing of critical knowledge that serves not only DHS, but cuts across the various stovepipes that have traditionally made up the USG interagency process. Some of these centers include: The Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events; National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD); National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START); National Center for the Study of Preparedness and Catastrophic Event Response; Center for Awareness & Location of Explosives-Related Terrorism; National Center for Border Security and Immigration (NCBSI); Center for Maritime, Island and Remote and Extreme Environment Security; National Transportation Security Center; and the Center of Excellence in Command, Control, and Interoperability.

As senior policy guidance has increasingly aligned national security and homeland security efforts, SOF and other DOD interface with DHS agencies and programs has steadily increased. One example involves close coordination with the Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Directorate; HSI is discussed below under Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The importance of the USSOCOM—DHS relationship is reflected in the fact that a Special Operations Support Team (SOST) is permanently assigned to DHS.

Under its CT portfolio, DHS pursues the following three strategic goals:

1. Prevent terrorist attacks
2. Prevent the unauthorized acquisition, importation, movement, or use of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear materials and capabilities within the U.S.

3. Reduce the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and key resources, essential leadership, and major events to terrorist attacks and other hazards

Areas of emphasis include: global aviation security; cargo screening; enhancement of national preparedness and support to state and local law enforcement; strengthening of international partnerships; and protection of critical infrastructure.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
www.cbp.gov

With its core mission as “guardians of our nation’s borders,” the CBP pursues its priority responsibility to prevent terrorists and their weapons from entering the U.S. Relying on the work of more than 45,000 people, CBP is responsible for apprehending individuals attempting to enter the U.S. illegally; stemming the flow of illegal drugs and other contraband; protecting agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests and diseases; protecting U.S. businesses from theft of their intellectual property; and regulating and facilitating international trade, collecting import duties, and enforcing U.S. trade laws. Its efforts are guided by the National Border Patrol Strategy; the Secure Border Initiative (SBI); Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism; and the Container Security Initiative. Its strategic goals include: preventing terrorism; unifying as one border agency; balancing trade and travel with security; and modernizing and managing for results. CBP works through its National Targeting Center (NTC), which coordinates within the USG interagency process to identify threats in advance of an incident, and participates in targeting support of USG CT initiatives. It focuses on three functional areas: Border Security, Trade and Travel. On a typical day, CBP processes 933,456 passengers/pedestrians entering the U.S. and 64,483 truck, rail, and sea containers. It also executes some 932 apprehensions and seizes 13,717 pounds of drugs. CBP will facilitate about $2 trillion in legitimate trade each year as it pursues its enforcement of regulations.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
www.ice.gov

As the largest investigative agency within DHS, ICE plays a major CT role by enforcing customs and immigration laws and other supportive activities. Its principal targets are illegal immigrants who could pose threats to the U.S. and the financial and material resources they rely on to facilitate terrorist or other criminal activity. The agency employs some 20,000 employees in all 50 states and 47 foreign countries. ICE conducts its activities through two integrated operational directorates: Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and Enforcement and Removal Operations. ICE is the second largest federal law enforcement presence within the DOJ/FBI’s interagency NJTTF. As such, it participates in information exchange, planning, and other work functions among the USG interagency components. Its 2010-2014 Strategic Plan establishes these four priorities: Prevent terrorism and enhance security; Protect the borders against illicit trade, travel and finance; Protect the borders through smart and tough interior immigration enforcement; and Construct an efficient, effective agency. ICE also is involved with money laundering (including a Trade Transparency Unit) and financial crimes investigations; international operations (73 offices in 47 countries) in which ICE personnel work on the ambassador’s Country Team; and the ICE Cyber Crimes Center.

Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) http://www.ice.gov/about/offices/homeland-security-investigations/

The HSI Directorate is an ICE asset that is responsible for investigating domestic and international activities associated with the illegal movement of people and goods into, within, and out of the United States. HSI focuses on immigration crime; human rights violations; human smuggling; smuggling of narcotics, weapons and other forms of contraband; financial crimes; cybercrime; and enforcement of export regulations. Of particular importance is that HSI is responsible for ICE international affairs operations and intelligence functions. HSI employs more than 10,000 people, to include 6,700 special agents working out of some 200 cities in the U.S. and 47 countries. The directorate conducts criminal investigations against terrorists and their networks as well as against transnational criminal
organizations that threaten U.S. national security. It conducts operations through six primary divisions: Domestic Operations; Intelligence; International Affairs; Mission Support; National Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Coordination Center; and National Security Investigations. Its international activities focus on, among others, relationship development; capacity building; transnational criminal organizations; international smuggling; financial systems to include money-laundering and fraud; and immigration fraud. The responsibilities of attaches assigned to 73 offices in 47 countries include: coordinating investigations with foreign law enforcement counterparts; providing training and capacity building to foreign law enforcement counterparts; assisting in removal operations by facilitating ICE efforts to repatriate removable aliens; and referring requests from host country agencies to ICE domestic investigative offices. The HSI Forensic Laboratory conducts a wide variety of examinations, research and analysis to include acting as the only U.S. crime laboratory specializing in authentication of travel and identity documents. The laboratory is also an interagency asset as it supports HSI investigations, the rest of DHS, and domestic and international law enforcement agencies. HSI also investigates and seeks to disrupt international cash smuggling through its National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center.

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
http://www.dhs.gov/about-office-intelligence-and-analysis

The DHS intelligence function includes I&A and other separate intelligence offices located within each of the departments’ operational components. The I&A mission is to “equip the Homeland Security Enterprise with the intelligence and information it needs to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient.” The Under Secretary for I&A (U/SIA) serves as the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer and is responsible to both the Secretary for Homeland Security and the DNI. I&A’s four strategic goals are to: promote understanding of threats through intelligence analysis; collect information and intelligence pertinent Homeland Security; share information necessary for action; and manage intelligence for the Homeland Security Enterprise. Through its information-sharing mission, I&A serves as the USG Interagency lead in sharing information and intelligence with local, tribal and territorial governments and the private sector. In addition to serving as a critical information and intelligence hub for those entities, I&A performs the same function for DHS leadership and components as well as the wider IC. I&A pursues five lines of analysis to include threats related to border security, threat of radicalization and extremism, threats from particular groups entering the U.S., threats to the Homeland’s critical infrastructure and key resources, and WMD and health threats. Relationships with the CBP and ICE are particularly important for addressing border issues. I&A synchronizes internal intelligence activities through the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC). To ensure the strongest possible unity of effort, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis directs the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (IE), which includes I&A and diverse organizations such as Customs and Border Protection; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, USCG, Transportation Security Administration, USSS; and the Federal Emergency Management Administration. I&A serves as the executive agent for the Department of Homeland Security State and Local Fusion Center Program and has officers working out of dozens of fusion centers located throughout the country. While I&A serves as the DHS representative within the IC, the separate intelligence offices in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration, USSS, and Citizenship and Immigration Services all maintain strong relationships and interaction with various members of the IC because of the specialized nature of their responsibilities. Recent I&A initiatives include the Homeland Security Intelligence Framework and the Intelligence Enterprise Management Catalogue, both serving as information, assessment and management tools.

Office of Policy
www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0870.shtm

The Office of Policy strengthens homeland security by developing and integrating DHS-wide planning, programs, and policies in order to better coordinate the DHS’s prevention, protection, response, and recovery missions.

The Office of Policy does the following:
a. Leads coordination of DHS-wide policies, programs, and planning
b. Provides a central office to develop and communicate policies across multiple DHS components
c. Provides the foundation and direction for DHS-wide strategic planning and budget priorities
d. Bridges multiple DHS components and operating agencies to improve communication, eliminate redundancies, and translate policies into timely action
e. Creates a single point of contact for internal/external stakeholders that allow for streamlined policies across DHS

Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
www.tsa.gov
Though most familiar for its presence in some 450 U.S. airports, the TSA is further engaged through the USG interagency process to assist in the security of the nation’s entire transportation system of highways, railroads, buses, mass transportation systems, and ports to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. TSA employs some 50,000 security officers, inspectors, directors, air marshals and managers to protect the nation’s transportation system.

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
www.uscg.mil
The more than 43,000 active-duty, 7,800 reservists, 8,300 civilians, and almost 33,000 volunteer Auxiliary members of the USCG conduct a variety of missions designed to monitor shipping traffic near and approaching U.S. shores and to secure U.S. ports, harbors, and coastline. It performs within five functional roles including maritime security, maritime safety, protection of natural resources, maritime mobility, and national defense. The USCG also participates as a full member of the IC. Internationally, the USCG works with other countries to improve maritime security and to support U.S. diplomatic activities. The USCG’s presence in ports and along shorelines, both domestically and internationally, positions it as a source of intelligence not always available through other collection means. The USCG’s Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Program includes its National Intelligence Element, the Criminal Investigations Service, the Counterintelligence Service, the Intelligence Coordination Center, and the Cryptologic Service. A sampling of FY 2011 mission highlights include:

- Responded to 20,510 search and rescue cases and saved more than 3,800 lives
- Removed more than 166,000 pounds of cocaine bound for the U.S.
- Conducted nearly 1,700 security boardings of high-interest vessels for the U.S.
- Interdicted some 2,500 undocumented migrants attempting to enter the U.S. illegally

U.S. Secret Service (USSS)
www.secretservice.gov
The USSS has both protective and investigative responsibilities that cause it to engage the USG interagency process for information exchanges, planning coordination, and other critical activities within the CT effort. It plays a critical role in securing the nation’s financial infrastructure and money supply while protecting national leaders, visiting heads of state, and various security venues. The USSS operates out of more than 150 offices within the U.S. and abroad.

Additional DHS Organizations and Initiatives
Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Counterterrorism Policy
www.dhs.gov/person/david-heyman
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
www.fema.gov
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (International Programs Division)
www.fletc.gov
Federal Protective Services
www.dhs.gov/federal-protective-service
National Fusion Center Network
www.dhs.gov/national-network-fusion-centers-fact-sheet
National Protection and Programs Directorate
www.dhs.gov/about-national-protection-and-programs-directorate
Office of Strategic Plans
www.dhs.gov/office-strategic-plans
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis
Department of the Treasury (Treasury)
www.treasury.gov/Pages/default.aspx

The Department of the Treasury’s CT role focuses on ensuring the sound functioning of the U.S. and international financial systems in the face of security threats to their stability. Through participation in the USG interagency process and coordination with partner nations and international organizations, Treasury targets and manages sanctions against foreign threats to U.S. financial systems while also identifying and targeting financial support networks established to sustain terrorist and other threats to national security.

Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Foreign-Assets-Control.aspx

OFAC is the Treasury agency responsible for managing and enforcing sanctions against targeted countries, terrorists, drug traffickers, and those suspected in the proliferation of WMD. OFAC is linked throughout the USG interagency process and with the international community through the UN and other IGOs, international mandates, and direct cooperation with partner nations. The office acts to establish controls on financial and trade transactions and, when authorized, to freeze assets under U.S. jurisdiction. Such sanctions are multilateral in nature and require close coordination with international organizations and allied governments. Specific sanction programs include those targeted against Iran, Syria, and Cuba. There are also non-proliferation sanctions, counter-narcotics sanctions, and CT sanctions. OFAC also deploys attaches to postings in various countries in support of the Country Team.

Office of International Affairs
www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-International-Affairs.aspx

The Office of International Affairs is responsible for the development of U.S. international financial and trade policy. It is led by the Under Secretary of International Affairs and oversees the following functional areas: International Finance; International Markets and Development; Asia; Development Policy and Debt; Environment and Energy; Europe and Eurasia; International Monetary and Financial Policy; Investment Security; Middle East and Africa; Technical Assistance and Afghanistan; Trade and Investment Policy; Western Hemisphere; and China and the Strategic Economic Dialogue.

The office encourages international financial stability and sound economic policies that address various issues to include monitoring possible threats to the U.S. It also tracks economic and financial conditions around the world and then coordinates with financial markets, other governments, and international financial organizations to develop and promote constructive policies.

The Office of International Affairs is concerned with worldwide monetary conditions, trade and investment policy, and international debt issues.

Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI)
www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Terrorism-and-Financial-Intelligence.aspx

TFI synchronizes the Treasury intelligence and enforcement capabilities to protect the U.S. financial system by targeting rogue nations, those supporting terrorists, those involved with the proliferation of WMDs, drug traffickers, and various other national security threats. It “develops and implements USG strategies to combat terrorist financing domestically and internationally; develops and implements National Money Laundering Strategy as well as other policies and programs to fight financial crimes.” It interfaces with the USG interagency process at several nodes, to include the IC, to produce maximum effects. The discussion of Counterterrorism Finance Efforts later in this chapter provide additional interagency and multilateral details on TFI activities.

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA)
www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Intelligence-Analysis.aspx

The OIA came into existence as a result of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2004. The office operates as a subordinate agency of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Analysis (TFI). OIA gathers, analyzes, and produces intelligence on financial support networks for terrorist networks and other threats to national security. Its strategic priorities are terrorist financing, insurgency financing, and rogue regimes/proliferation financing. More specifically, OIA combats terrorist facilitators, WMD proliferators, money launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security
threats. OIA has developed expertise in understanding how terrorist financial networks operate and in developing intelligence to help cut off necessary funding mechanisms. OIA is also active in tracking resources flowing to rogue states involved with the production and proliferation of WMDs. OIA is a member of the U.S. IC.

**Office of the Director for National Intelligence (ODNI)**  
[www.dni.gov](http://www.dni.gov)

The DNI serves as the head of the USG IC. The DNI began functioning in April 2005, but the concept of a coordinator of national intelligence has been under discussion since the mid-1950s. The DNI manages and oversees the execution of the National Intelligence Program. The director serves as the principal intelligence advisor to the President, NSC, and Homeland Security Council. The DNI responsibilities include leading the IC; overseeing the coordination of foreign relationships between the IC and the intelligence services of foreign governments; establishing requirements and priorities for national intelligence; and transforming the IC into a unified, collaborative, and coordinated organization. Among the ODNI offices are Acquisition, Technology, & Facilities; Intelligence Integration; Partner Engagement (PE); and Policy & Strategy. ODNI Centers include: Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity; Information Sharing Environment (ISE); National Counterproliferation Center; National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); National Intelligence Council (NIC); and Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX). Figure 5 identifies the USG interagency components that populate the IC.

**Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**  

First established in 1947 by the National Security Act, the CIA’s role was modified under the terms of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, which created the ODNI. It remains the largest producer of all-source national security intelligence to senior U.S. policy and decision makers. The director of the CIA works with all agencies contained within the interagency IC and reports to the DNI. The CIA employs human and other resources to collect, evaluate, organize, assess, and disseminate intelligence products throughout the USG interagency process to policy makers, decision takers, and other users. The CIA functions through the National Clandestine Service (NCS), Directorate of Intelligence (DI), Directorate of Science & Technology (DS&T), and the Directorate of Support (DS).

**National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)**  
[www.nctc.gov](http://www.nctc.gov)

Established by the Intel Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and defined by Executive Order 13354 on 27 August 2004, the NCTC has as its mission to “lead our nation’s effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.”

The NCTC hosts more than 500 analysts and others from more than 16 departments, agencies, and organizations and provides information sharing through more than 30 networks in an effort to identify those who pose threats to the U.S. The NCTC draws on the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) and the NCTC Online (NOL), which is a data library of CT information with a worldwide reach.

As depicted in Figure 5, the NCTC, along with the DNI, serves as the principal hub for IC coordination. In that role, the NCTC serves as the lead organization for CT intelligence and strategic operational planning for CT activities while conducting business from a continuously functioning operations center that is staffed with representatives from throughout the IC and other organizations such as the Capitol Police.

The NCTC produces a range of analytic and threat information products for the President, cabinet officials, senior policymakers, and leadership from the intelligence, defense, law enforcement, homeland security, and foreign affairs communities. Various groups working under the NCTC include the Radicalization and Extremist Messaging Group, and the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Counterterrorism Groups. By law, the NCTC conducts strategic and operational planning that incorporates all the elements of national power to ensure the best-possible effects.

While the individual members of the IC carry on their traditional functions in support of their parent department, agency, or organizations, intelligence of
mutual interest concerning both national and homeland security terrorism issues and events is exchanged and acted on through the IC interagency process.

**Department of Agriculture (USDA)**  
**Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS)**  

Most broadly, the FAS conducts activities to improve foreign market access for U.S. products, build new markets, improve the competitive position of U.S. agriculture in the global marketplace, and provide food aid and technical assistance to foreign countries. It seeks to introduce resources and guidance on the ground to encourage agricultural growth as a component of economic development. FAS representatives are present in 98 offices covering 162 countries and are participants on U.S. Embassy Country Teams (see Chapter 2). FAS overseas offices function under the management of the Office of Foreign Service Operations (OFSO). Offices are clustered by area and overseen by separate area directors to include: Europe; Africa and the Middle East; North Asia; South Asia; and Western Hemisphere. Office types include American Institute in Taiwan (AIT); Agricultural Trade Office (ATO); Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO); Office of Agricultural Affairs (OAA); Office of Capacity Building and Development (OCBD); U.S. Mission to the European Union (USEU); U.S. Mission to the UN (UNMIS); and U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). FAS participates within the USG interagency process in a variety of ways, including working closely with USAID to administer various U.S. food aid programs. FAS also serves as a link to the WTO on a variety of issues.

**Department of Commerce (DOC)**  
**Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)**  

The BIS assists in support of national defense and economic security objectives through export controls, treaty compliance, and the assurance of U.S. technology leadership. It manages and enforces dual-use export controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, and to block the transfer of weapons to terrorists, those countries supporting them.
and rogue states. It plays critical roles on matters of national security, economic security, cyber security, and homeland security. Its USG Interagency relationships include the NCS, DHS, DOD, DOS, Energy Department and the IC. Aspects of the BIS mission cause the bureau to interact with international organizations and foreign countries.

Department of Energy (DOE)
Office of Intelligence (IN)
www.energy.gov/nationalsecurity

The DOE’s intelligence programs reach back as far as the World War II Manhattan Project. IN conducts assessments of the global threats from nuclear terrorism and works to stall the proliferation of nuclear technology, resources, and expertise. The IN focuses on nuclear weapons and nonproliferation; energy security; science and technology; and nuclear energy, safety, and waste. Working through the interagency IC, the Office of Intelligence enables the exchange of intelligence throughout the USG interagency process on energy matters and conducts evaluations of emerging threats to U.S. economic and security interests. More specifically, IN serves as the IC’s technical intelligence resource in the core areas of nuclear weapons and nonproliferation; energy security; science and technology; and nuclear energy, safety, and waste. Separate from the Office of Intelligence, DOE also provides Nuclear Emergency Support Team assistance to deal with technical aspects of radiological or nuclear terrorism.

Functioning of the Interagency Counterterrorism Components

The previous section identified the various components of the interagency process that deal with CT. They are identified by their parent department, agency, or organization. However, like the military, these various components generally do not act without coordination with other USG components or structured task organization.

The functioning of the USG interagency process is organized around a collection of coordinating “hubs” that are clustered to accommodate USG departments, agencies, and organizations in pursuit (within the purview of this manual) of specific overseas CT goals. Many of these interagency hubs have evolved over time and have taken on a sense of permanency with specific departments, agencies, and organizations assigned “lead” responsibilities.

Other interagency bodies are put together on an ad-hoc basis to address specific requirements, events, situations, or issues. These are also led by designated leads to ensure specific national security goals are met. Once those goals have been achieved, the ad-hoc body disbands. As noted earlier, the Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs) within the NSC structure frequently share this ad-hoc nature.

Chapter 2 discusses how the U.S. Embassy Country Team overseas, operating with support from the interagency process in Washington, D.C., is responsible for integrating the various interagency components on the ground to gain maximum effects. The Country Team also interfaces with HN, partner nations, IGO, and NGO initiatives committed to the CT effort in the AO. It is a dynamic and potentially confusing environment within which participants often expend their skills and resources in multiple directions simultaneously.

This section identifies the functional clusters that address specific issues such as CT, intelligence, finance, disaster response, and technology.

The USG Counterterrorism Components/“Team”
www.state.gov/s/ct/team/index.htm

The first of these clusters is the DOS “U.S. Counterterrorism Team.” As noted earlier in this chapter, the DOS serves as the designated lead agency for coordinating and managing USG CT initiatives overseas. Some may find that fact confusing. Those who are not informed of the structure and functioning of the interagency process are frequently surprised at the complexity associated with the numbers of players and the apparent looseness of the working relationships among the members of the U.S. Counterterrorism Team.

As depicted in Figure 6, the U.S. CT components extend throughout the USG to bring together a wide variety of resources to address CT threats. Membership changes from time to time. At the time of the publication of Version 3 of this manual, the USG Counterterrorism Team consists of:
Chapter 1: Interagency Counterterrorism Components

- The White House (both National Security and Homeland Security issues)
- Department of State
  - Secretary of State
  - Bureau of Consular Affairs
  - Bureau of Diplomatic Security
    - Anti-Terrorist Assistance Program
    - Overseas Advisory Council
    - Rewards for Justice Program
  - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
  - Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
  - Bureau of Intelligence and Research
  - Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
  - Bureau for International Security and Nonproliferation
  - Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
  - Foreign Service Institute
  - Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
- Department of Defense
  - Defense Intelligence Agency
- Department of the Treasury
  - Office of Foreign Assets Control
- Department of Justice
  - Counterterrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement
  - Federal Bureau of Investigation—Terrorism (FBI-Terrorism)
- Department of Homeland Security
  - U.S. Coast Guard
  - Customs and Border Protection
  - Directorate for Preparedness
  - Immigration and Customs Enforcement
  - Policy Directorate
  - Research and Technology—Centers of Excellence
  - Transportation Security Agency
  - U.S. Secret Service
- Central Intelligence Agency

Figure 6. USG CT Components. The DOS Web site refers to this cluster as the “U.S. Counterterrorism Team.”
The Bureau of Counterterrorism, led by the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, shown in yellow, acts as the central hub for that part of the interagency process dealing with CT. There is no command relationship defined.

However, the interagency work flow discussed earlier typically passes through the Coordinator for Counterterrorism into the NSC Process and then back through for action and management. Specific roles, missions, and responsibilities for the members of the U.S. CT components are contained in the previous section.

**The USG Intelligence Community (IC)**

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 restructured the coordinative relationships among the members of the USG IC. The legislation established the ODNI with the responsibility to act as the lead agency for the IC, execute the National Intelligence Program, and serve as the principal advisor to the President and NSC on intelligence issues involving national security.

Figure 5 portrays the IC. With the ODNI serving as its interagency intelligence “hub,” the members of the IC represent an extensive cross-section of the USG. As noted earlier in discussions about the agencies contained within the DHS, the 17 core members of the IC also maintain close working relationships with other agencies uniquely positioned to develop useful intelligence information. This fact adds to the inherent complexity of the extensive USG IC and requires a high level of situation awareness on the part of SOF warriors and others who rely on the IC membership. The current members of the IC include U.S. Air Force Intelligence; U.S. Army Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency; USCG Intelligence; DIA; DOE; DHS; DOS; Department of the Treasury; Drug Enforcement Administration; FBI; U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; National Reconnaissance Office; NSA; U.S. Navy Intelligence; and the ODNI.

The IC produces a wide variety of intelligence products. At the most senior level, these include the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and the World Intelligence Review (WIRE). However, there are numerous other reports available to IC members and associates from throughout the USG.

Oversight of the IC is exercised by a variety of Executive and Legislative Branch organizations. Executive Branch supervision is carried out by the NSC and by the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB), the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), and the OMB.

The DNI and IC are responsible for providing timely and objective intelligence to the President, other department and agency heads, and the Congress as required to successfully prosecute CT activities. They are also tasked to develop, resource, execute, and evaluate intelligence strategies and programs on all matters involving national security and homeland security.

To facilitate its leadership of the IC, the ODNI organization consists of the following mission support activities:

- Center for Security Evaluation
- Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity
- Mission Support Center.
- National Counterterrorism Center
- National Counterproliferation Center
- National Intelligence University
- National Intelligence Council
- National Intelligence Coordination Center
- Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive
- Special Security Center

With the large number of intelligence agencies scattered throughout the USG, the DNI and IC face the challenge of synchronizing USG activities in support of national intelligence requirements. In addition to the IC, there are other interagency bodies that are concerned with information exchange and intelligence operations.

**Information Sharing Environment (ISE)**

Experience teaches that success in preventing future terrorist attacks and successfully targeting terrorists and their networks rests on the effective sharing of information among all relevant parties. This
engagement involves the efficient gathering, analysis, and sharing of intelligence among the organs of the USG, state, local and tribal governments, the private sector, and partner nations. The goal is to detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks against the U.S. and its interests around the world.

It has become clear that greater institutional flexibility and resilience are required of all participants. To support a wide-ranging agenda of initiatives, the ISE was created through Section 1016 of the Intel Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 and supports the intelligence, law enforcement, defense, homeland security, and foreign affairs communities of the USG. Structurally, the ISE is led by a program manager and supported by the Information Sharing Council.

The ISE pursues the following goals: 1) create a culture of sharing, 2) reduce barriers to sharing, 3) improve sharing practices with federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign partners, and 4) institutionalize sharing. To achieve these goals, the ISE employs various specific approaches to include these:

a. Facilitate the establishment of a trusted partnership among all levels of government, the private sector, and foreign partners
b. Promote an information-sharing culture among ISE partners by facilitating the improved sharing of timely, validated, protected, and actionable terrorism information supported by extensive education, training, and awareness programs for ISE participants
c. To the maximum extent possible, function in a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated manner
d. Develop and deploy incrementally, leveraging existing information-sharing capabilities while also creating new core functions and services
e. Enable the federal government to speak with one voice on terrorism-related matters and to promote more rapid and effective interchange and coordination among Federal departments and agencies and state, local and tribal governments, the private sector, and foreign partners, thus ensuring effective multidirectional sharing of information
f. Ensure sharing procedures and policies protect information privacy and civil liberties

Analysts, operators and investigators support the ISE from a variety of communities within the USG Interagency structure. These include law enforcement, public safety, homeland security, intelligence, defense, and foreign affairs. The ISE Program Manager (PM-ISE) is responsible for harmonizing the efforts of the expertise from these and other agencies. On 19 December 2012, the President signed the new National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding. It contains three guiding principles:

a. Information is a national asset
b. Information sharing and safeguarding requires shared risk management
c. Information informs decision making

Fusion Centers & Intelligence Sharing
www.it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=nationalInitiatives&page=1181

Various states and municipalities have established fusion centers to ensure the efficient sharing of information of importance to the law enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and CT communities. Most of the scores of functional fusion centers now operating follow guidelines developed through the DOJ-sponsored Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative and the DHS-sponsored Homeland Security Advisory Council. These guidelines are divided into three areas of concentration: law enforcement intelligence, public safety, and the private sector. The National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012sharingstrategy_1.pdf) guides the interagency effort.

Federal support includes:

a. DHS and DOJ’s Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and Services
b. DHS’s Fusion Center Initiative, including providing DHS personnel to the fusion centers to assist
c. DOJ’s Information Sharing Resources for the Justice and Public Safety Communities
d. DOJ’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative
e. National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC)
f. Criminal Intelligence Training Master Calendar
Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG)

Established by the President and Congress, the ITACG seeks to improve the quality of “federally coordinated” terrorism-related information in support of the interagency efforts of the NCTC. As appropriate, its activities reach beyond the USG to supply relevant information to State, Local, and Tribal officials, and the Private Sector (SLTP). The ITACG pursues its domestic responsibilities by: “working with analysts to create products for SLTP partners; providing SLTP perspective to draft intelligence products; requesting classification downgrades for terrorism-related products suitable for first responders; helping get appropriately classified information to SLTP boots on the ground; and facilitating briefing opportunities for analysts to interact with SLTP partners.”

Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX)
www.ncix.gov

The office of the ONCIX is a component of the ODNI and is made up of representatives from USG intelligence and security departments, agencies, and organizations. It is led by the National Counterintelligence Executive who is appointed by the DNI in consultation with the Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and Director of the CIA. Its mission is to “provide effective leadership and support to the counterintelligence and security activities of the U.S. IC, USG, and U.S. private sector entities who are at risk of intelligence collection or attack by foreign adversaries.” Priority issues include Cyber Security; Economic Espionage; Insider Threats; and Supply Chain Threats. The ONCIX is responsible for conducting an annual National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment and other counterintelligence reports, developing and executing the National Counterintelligence Strategy, and preparing assessments of strategy implementation with an eye toward improving the effectiveness of counterintelligence operations.

The National Counterintelligence Executive works through two Deputy Directors:

- Deputy Director for Strategic Capabilities (Analysts, Collection and Coordination Directorate; Mission Integration Directorate; Special Security Directorate; and Strategic Partners Group)
- Deputy Director Emerging Threats (Acquisition Risk Directorate; Center for Security Evaluation Directorate; Export Control Reform Coordination Directorate; Technical CI and Cyber Directorate; and National Insider Threat Task Force)

In September 2010, the ONCIX assumed responsibility for the ODNI’s Special Security Center (SSC) and Center for Security Evaluation (CSE).

Counterintelligence Policy Board. The ONCIX also chairs the Counterintelligence Policy Board (Figure 7), which reports through the NSC to the President. In addition to the ONCIX, membership includes senior representatives from the DOJ, FBI, DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOS, DOE, and the CIA. As with all such bodies, representation from other departments, agencies, and organizations may be mandated by the President.

Interagency Counterterrorism Finance Efforts

Efforts directed at identifying, tracking, and disrupting the funding of terrorist and criminal networks and related violent activities have given rise to new, restructured and more visible organizations and structures within the USG interagency infrastructure. USG CT efforts to locate, track, disrupt, and eliminate financial
support of terrorists and their networks are coordinated within the USG as shown in Figure 8. Additionally, interagency finance activities are enhanced through interaction with other countries and IGOs who are concerned with ensuring the stability of the international financial systems and the prevention of their abuse by criminal elements, especially terrorists. Chapter 3 identifies in detail the major international players in this process. One of those IGOs, the Financial Action Task Force, is included in this discussion.

Traditionally, a distinction has been drawn between terrorists, who pursue ideological or political goals, and criminals, who are focused on economic goals such as accumulation of wealth. Recent experience teaches that this contrast is no longer as precise as assumed earlier. Terrorists have come to rely on criminal activities to fund their terrorist activities. At the same time, criminals, both domestic and TCO, have frequently turned to the employment of terrorist tactics to eliminate competing groups and create fear and instability to enable them to establish safe areas from which to operate. Sometimes it’s difficult and potentially misleading to superficially label an incident as terrorist or criminally motivated.

In a 2010 report on Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Gretchen Peters argues that “insurgent and terrorist groups operating in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan are deepening their involvement in organized crime.” She goes on to state that “militant groups on either side of the frontier function like a broad network of criminal gangs.” “Anti-state actors” rely on “poor governance” and “widespread state corruption” to enable them to “engage in and protect organized crime.”

Peters suggests that there is a predictable evolution from politically motivated militant group (terrorist and insurgent) to criminal enterprise. She cites FARC, groups in the Balkans, and even the Taliban as examples of her theory. She also argues that such transformation of motivation and roles offer counterterrorist and counterinsurgent actors a strategic opportunity to exploit popular skepticism and discontent through the employment of carefully prepared influence and information campaigns.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank estimate that 3-5 percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is laundered annually by drug traffickers, transnational criminal organizations (TCO), and others conducting some 300 different criminal acts in the dangerous nexus of terrorist and criminal activities. This percentage translates into some $2.17-3.61 trillion per year.

As discussed earlier, the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) plays a major coordinative role in the CT Finance efforts. Organizations involved in this wider coordination include the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (TFFC) and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA). One of its bureaus is the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which supports interagency and international investigations on matters of domestic and international financial crime (see below). TFI administers the Treasury Forfeiture Fund through the Treasury
Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture (TEOAF). Areas of special interest include the designation of individuals and groups who commit terrorist acts; working with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF); protecting charitable organizations from exploitation by terrorist and criminal groups; monitoring and tracking Hawala and other Alternative Remittance Systems; and conducting the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP).

The following is a list of offices and organizations that are yoked together within various interagency structures to address the challenges of identifying, tracking and disrupting terrorist finance networks. Some have been discussed earlier in a discussion of its roles within its parent organization. Others are presented briefly here:

**Financial Action Task Force (FATF)**

www.fatf-gafi.org/

The FATF is an IGO that, since its founding in 1989 by the G-7 countries, has grown to 36 members (including two regional organizations) with several more organizations holding associate or observer status. Its primary focus is on combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Because of its broad linkage through financial organizations around the world, the FATF plays a critical role in information exchange, policy development, and the building of consensus to act. Its international network includes the following associate members:

- Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering
- Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
- Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism
- Eurasian Group
- Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group
- Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America
- Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa
- Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force

The FATF pursues its mandate by setting international standards to combat money laundering and terrorist financing; assessing and monitoring compliance with FATF standards; conducting studies of money laundering and terrorist financing methods, trends, and techniques; and responding to new and emerging threats. The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Terrorist Finance and Financial Crimes (TFFC), a subordinate element of the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI), leads the USG’s participation in the FATF.

**Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)**

www.fincen.gov/

FinCEN’s mission is to “enhance the integrity of financial systems by facilitating the detection and deterrence of financial crime.” It is involved with the collection, processing, securing and disseminating information and data to law enforcement and financial regulatory partners. FinCEN also has authority to regulate financial institutions. In that role, it enforces the money-laundering rules governing some 100,000 banks and other financial institutions and programs. FinCEN serves as the Financial Investigative Unit for the U.S. and works with more than 100 similar organizations in other countries. The strategic direction for the organization is captured in the phrase: “Follow the Money”.

**National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center (NBCSC)**

(ICE/HSI/DHS)

www.ice.gov/bulk-cash-smuggling-center/

The NBCSC identifies, tracks, and disrupts bulk smuggling of cash domestically and throughout the world. As enforcement of money-laundering regulations has stiffened, terrorists and criminals have shifted to the movement of large quantities of cash into and out of the U.S. and other countries. In 2010, HSI special agents arrested 203 individuals and seized more than $101 million in cash.

**Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) (ICE/DHS)**

www.ice.gov/about/offices/homeland-security-investigations/

As discussed earlier, HSI plays a major role in tracking all sorts of criminal activity to include financial crime both domestically and internationally.

**Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (DHS)**

www.ice.gov/

Working through the HSI, the Trade Transparency Unit, and other investigative assets, ICE plays a lead role in money laundering and financial crime cases. These include various domestic scenarios as well as Foreign Corruption Investigations and Trade-Based Money Laundering.
Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS) (FBI)
TFOS seeks to identify previously unknown terrorist cells and organizations by focusing on their financial support structures. In addition to pursuing domestic terrorist organizations, they work closely with international law enforcement officials in individual countries and with international law enforcement organizations.

Counterterrorism Finance (CTF) Unit (DOS)
is responsible for following leads on financial matters and, ultimately, denying terrorist and their networks access to money, other resources and form of support. CTF orchestrates the delivery of technical assistance and training to partner nations to improve their capabilities to identify, track and disrupt the flow of money and resources to terrorists. It also assists other countries to develop their own Financial Investigative Units. During FY 2011, CTF programs took place in 35 countries and regions. CTF is an interagency initiative engaging the DOS, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), FBI, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), DOJ, DHS, and Treasury.

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) (DOS)
employs multiple Anti-Money Laundering and Counterterrorism Financing (AML/CTF) policies, strategies, and tools to prevent, trace and recover assets acquired from criminal activity.

The Office of Terrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy (DOS)
works with various bureaus, offices and interagency partners to:

a. Coordinate efforts to build international support for actions against terrorist financing structures
b. Coordinate efforts to create, modify, or terminate sanctions (as appropriate) against foreign countries
c. Coordinate domestic and international efforts targeted on the Somali pirate threat
d. Develop strategies employing various sanctions regimes

The DOS Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB)
Counter-Threat Finance and Sanctions (TFS), led by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, pursues a wide agenda of international engagement targeted on the financing of terrorist activities. It is made up of two offices:

- Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation (EB/TFS/SPI)
- Office of Threat Finance Countermeasures (EB/TFS/TFC)

Counterterrorism Section (CTS) (DOJ)

www.justice.gov/nsd/counter_terrorism.htm
The CTS plays a major role in CT Finance activities by investigating and prosecuting terrorist finance matters taking on a variety of forms.

Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) (Treasury). Discussed earlier.

Office of International Affairs (Treasury)
Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) (Treasury)
Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) (Treasury)
U.S. Secret Service (USSS) (DHS)
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) (DOC)

www.commerce.gov

Counterterrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement

www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/mission
Working through the interagency process, DOJ has consolidated a listing of CT training available through the USG, the private sector, and nonprofit organizations. The Counterterrorism Training Coordination Working Group, operating under a mandate from the DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs, is responsible for this effort.

Reflecting the interagency makeup of the working group and training availabilities, membership includes the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, the FBI, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, the Office of Justice Programs, the Office of the Police Corps and Law Enforcement Education, the Office for Domestic Preparedness, the U.S. Army Military Police School, the DHS, and the U.S. Department of Labor.

Figure 9 (on the next page) depicts the Counterterrorism Training Working Group, with the hub indicated in yellow.
Cyber Threats begin with the home computer, protected by some form of anti-virus program, through public and private sector networks, to the heart of the National Security system. Action novels and movies have replaced exchanges of information between intelligence agents in dark alleys in Cold War Europe with menacing hackers who attack computers and computer systems in all environments. They use worms, viruses, malware, and other techniques to penetrate those systems and threaten individuals, governments, businesses and corporations by stealing identities, proprietary information, military and intelligence data, financial data, and passwords to access bank accounts and other instruments of wealth. Sometimes the objective is to achieve kinetic effects through cyber attack by destroying everything that is on a hard drive or server.

No one is immune. Yet each person, business and organization is affected differently. However, as with any threat, no single organization—public or private sector—can successfully defeat cyber threats alone.

Thus cyber threats to the USG interagency infrastructure provide a case study of the evolution of an issue-specific interagency response. As every organization is threatened, each one seeks to protect itself by creating mechanisms that can defeat even the cleverest hacker’s intrusion attempt. In addition to everyone in the USG attempting to protect their own systems, each relies on cyberspace to do business. For example, the IC relies on cyberspace for the gathering and sharing of information, intelligence, and counterintelligence; DOD is concerned with specific National Security Threats emerging from cyberspace; DOS is concerned with safeguarding the sensitive information of diplomacy; law enforcement agencies like the FBI, HSI, and others and regulatory agencies in the Treasury Department, DOC, DOE, and elsewhere maintain significant presences in cyberspace that bring with them vulnerabilities to mischief and deliberate targeting.

While not strictly a threat, mastery of information and influence technology, often rooted in the social media capabilities of cyber space, is important to those involved with Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs and MISO initiatives. Theirs is the business of narrative development and perception shaping, both quite
vulnerable to the instantaneous movement of text, photos and video images through text messaging, Twitter, and the seemingly endless appearance of even newer cyber communication techniques.

Once again, no one is immune. Many interagency structures have developed and adapted to address traditional threats to National Security. While IA efforts to confront cyber threats are not as advanced as many of the others, components are emerging.

As always, policy and strategic guidance comes from the National Security Staff and the NSC. In January 2008, President George W. Bush established the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) (HYPERLINK “http://www.whitehouse.gov/cybersecurity/comprehensive-national-cybersecurity-initiative” www.whitehouse.gov/cybersecurity/comprehensive-national-cybersecurity-initiative). The CNCI is made up of multiple initiatives focusing on various cybersecurity challenges. Its strategic goals are to:

a. Establish a front line of defense against today’s immediate threats
b. Defend against the full spectrum of threats
c. Strengthen the future cybersecurity environment

Subsequently, President Obama has built upon the CNCI. In December 2009, he appointed a new White House Cyber Security Coordinator along with the Cybersecurity Office that resides in the National Security Staff. Close coordination is maintained between this office, the Federal Chief Information Office, Federal Chief Technology Officer, and the National Economic Council.

According to the Cyberspace Policy Review, directed by the President, “Cyberspace policy … encompasses the full range of threat reduction, vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international engagement, incident response, resiliency, and recovery policies and activities, including computer network operations, information assurance, law enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they relate to the security and stability of the global information and communications infrastructure.”

The general strategic goals established by the NSS are:

a. Improve our resilience to cyber attacks
b. Reduce the cyber threat

Specific steps to achieve these goals include “hardening our digital infrastructure to be more resistant to penetration and disruption; improving our ability to defend against sophisticated and agile cyber threats; and recovering quickly from cyber incidents—whether caused by malicious activity, accident, or natural disaster.” The review identified 10 specific actions that should take place. Some of these are:

1. Designate a privacy and civil liberties official to the NSC Cybersecurity Directorate
2. Conduct interagency-cleared legal analyses of priority cybersecurity issues
3. Initiate a national awareness and education campaign to promote cybersecurity
4. Prepare a cybersecurity incident response plan and initiate a dialogue to enhance public-private partnerships

One of those recommendations, for the promulgation of an International Strategy for Cyberspace, was completed and signed by the President in May 2011.

With initial policy and strategic guidance in place and evolving, various USG interagency programs, structures and partners have emerged to address cybersecurity:

- Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative
- White House National Security Coordinator
- National Security Council Cyber Security Directorate
- Joint Interagency Cyber Task Force
- Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues
- (S/CCI) (DOS)
- United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)
- Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) (DHS)
- FBI Cybercrime (computer intrusions, internet fraud, identity theft)
- U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Cyber Crimes Center
  - Cyber Crimes Section (money laundering, financial fraud, narcotics & human trafficking)
  - Computer Forensics Section
  - Cyber Administration Section
• Electronic Crimes Task Force—London (DHS) (2 in Europe) (prevent, detect, and investigate electronic crimes to include terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure and financial payment systems)
• Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) (DOC)
• Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and similar investigative/law enforcement agencies
• Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
• National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC)
• Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) (DOS)
• Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX)
• National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) http://csrc.nist.gov/nice/

Once again, the list above is by no means comprehensive. However, it does identify the emerging structure and some of the interagency partners working against cyber threats to National Security.

Interagency Organizations and Initiatives

As we have seen, the dynamic interaction of the USG interagency process requires the participation of many departments, agencies, and organizations from throughout the USG. Though placed within a specific department such as the DOS or DOD, USG interagency components rely on expertise and resources far beyond the boundaries drawn within any specific organizational chart.

Given the numbers and wide variety of participants, programs, and relationships, many volumes could be written about the challenges of navigating the USG interagency process. However, for the purposes of this manual, it is most useful to identify as many participants and programs as possible and to chart their relationships to arrive at an awareness of the existing capabilities and complexities. Such basic understandings empower the special operations warrior at strategic, operational, and tactical levels to function credibly and effectively.

The influence of these various participants is felt in their collection and assessment of information and in their development of various options as the USG interagency process flows upward through the NSC/DC and NSC/PC to the President. Once a decision is taken, the various USG organizations, both standing and ad-hoc, then play important roles in overseeing the execution of policy and the evaluation of its effectiveness.

The functioning of CT efforts requires regular liaison, sometimes in the form of embedded interagency liaison teams, to ensure the closest possible coordination of efforts.

To improve the efficiency of its liaison mission, USSOCOM has placed Special Operations Support Teams (SOST) within departments, agencies, and organizations of the USG. Their purpose is to provide an embedded liaison team at critical nodes of the interagency process to facilitate the exchange of information, the development of courses of action, the preparation of recommendations, and the efficient execution of executive orders.

Because the interagency environment is continuously evolving and changing, no exhaustive list of interagency organizations and programs is possible. However, the following are the kinds of organizations that have an impact on the effectiveness of SOF.

United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) (www.africom.mil)
To reduce the frequently ad-hoc nature of the USG interagency process, DOD has partnered with other USG components to form USAFRICOM. USAFRICOM is the first organization of its kind to institutionalize the interagency structure necessary for the achievement of U.S. national security objectives in a very complex region of the world.

Prior to the establishment of USAFRICOM, no fewer than three U.S. military headquarters were responsible for building relationships with countries that make up the African continent. The USG interagency process was made more complex as other USG departments, agencies, and organizations pursuing diplomatic, economic, and informational national
security objectives simultaneously functioned throughout the continent.

USAFRICOM is traveling the unique path of incorporating DOS, USAID, Treasury, DOC, USCG, and other USG components into the staff and leadership structure of the command. This step has resulted in far greater inclusion than the current USG interagency process could ever achieve.

For instance, USAFRICOM features two deputy commanders. One represents the traditional Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO). That officer is complemented by a senior U.S. diplomat who serves as the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA). The DCMA directs planning and programming for health, humanitarian assistance and demining actions, disaster response, security sector reform, strategic communications, and others related functions. Based on background and experience, the DCMA is also well suited to ensure that USAFRICOM activities are in line with U.S. foreign policy objectives, a check traditionally made through the USG interagency process. Staffing throughout USAFRICOM will support the efforts of the DCMA and provide immediate interface and coordination with the more traditional military staff structure.

As of December 2010, AFRICOM had four Senior Foreign Service Officers in key positions and more than 30 people from 13 USG interagency partners who were occupying leadership, management and staff positions.

Flowing logically from AFRICOM’s mission, the Commander’s Intent speaks of “sustained engagement to enable our African partners to create a security environment that promotes stability, improved governance, and continued development.” The language expressing this intent is consistent with the concepts of civilian power, Defense, Diplomacy and Development put forward in the 2010 QDDR and animated by the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), USAID, and other agencies.

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Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST)
The DEST is one of a collection of response and recovery assets available to the consequence management efforts of the DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). These could include nuclear, biological, and chemical events. The response to any specific domestic incident, whether natural or man-made, is structured to meet the challenges encountered. The goal is to provide specialized skills and capabilities, establish emergency-response facilities, and assist in incident management efforts. The DOD is frequently called upon to provide specific assets and expertise along with other federal, state, local, and tribal agencies. For instance, the DOD provides transportation for DEST deployments. Among the organizations that are available for consequence management include Emergency Response Teams (ERTs), Federal Incident Response Support Teams (FIRSTs), Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATs), Nuclear Incident Response Teams (NIRTs), and Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs).

Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST)
www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#FEST
Of particular importance to the special operations warrior is the role played by the Operations Directorate of the DOS Bureau of Counterterrorism. One of the S/CT missions involves working with DOD to develop and execute overseas CT policies, plans, and operations. The Operations Directorate also acts as a communication hub for communicating DOD CT initiatives throughout the DOS infrastructure, both at home and abroad. Additionally, the directorate is responsible for training and leading the quick-response, interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) that is designed to react to events around the world on short notice.

The FEST provides crisis management expertise, time-sensitive information and intelligence, planning for contingency operations, hostage negotiating expertise, and reach-back capabilities to agencies in Washington, D.C. The FEST relies on expertise from DOS, DOD, FBI, DOE, and the IC (see Figure 10).

FESTs have deployed to more than 20 countries since the development of the organization in 1986. For instance, two FESTs deployed to Africa in 1998 in the wake of the terrorist bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya and in Tanzania. Consistent with their mission, the teams provided assistance to the ambassadors and helped manage the consequences of the attacks.

A FEST also went to Yemen in 2000 in response to the attack on the USS Cole as it anchored in the Port of Aden. Other FESTs are routinely involved with events and situations around the world such as the abductions of Americans in Ecuador and the Philippines. “Contingency” FESTs were also deployed to the Summer Olympic Games in Athens, Greece in 2004, the Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy in 2006, and to Lagos, Nigeria during a hostage crisis.

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
www.dsca.mil
Though a DOD component as identified earlier, the DSCA accomplishes its various security assistance missions by engaging a wide variety of members of the USG interagency process. Figure 4 identifies the various USG interagency components that play a role in the
process, with the DSCA serving as the coordination hub. The interagency security assistance process asserts itself both in Washington, D.C. and overseas, meaning that special operations warriors will inevitably encounter DSCA resources while conducting their missions.

**USSOCOM Interagency Engagement**

It is difficult—if not impossible—to imagine a SOF mission or activity that is not based on some sort of interagency cooperation and coordination. At the strategic, operational and tactical levels, SOF rely on building and sustaining strong, mutually beneficial relationships with a diverse collection of stakeholders. Thus, by its very nature, SOF relies on the interagency process as enablers for many—though certainly not all—of those relationships. As the quotation from SOCOM 2020 that was introduced earlier says, “our vision is a globally networked force of Special Operations Forces, Interagency, Allies and Partners able to rapidly or persistently address regional contingencies and threats to stability.”

SOCOM 2020 goes on to assert that “effective networks are best created before a crisis.” Success in that endeavor “demands unprecedented levels of trust, confidence, and understanding—conditions that can’t be surged.”

To ensure the most efficient environment for the exchange of information, coordination of activities, and synchronization of planning, USSOCOM for several years operated the USSOCOM Interagency Task Force (IATF) that included DOD, USG interagency components, and partner nations. The intent of the IATF was to move beyond ad-hoc liaison relationships to the creation of a forum where interaction is continuous and sustained. Participants in the IATF changed from time to time, but the nature of the IATF structure and process allowed for the accommodation of such changes. The IATF was disestablished in early 2013, but the rationale behind its existence and the coordination and cooperation principles persist in other structures.

In recent years, USSOCOM has employed the Special Operations Support Teams (SOST) Program that ensures direct access to interagency partners and that can leverage the right decision maker to ensure a more timely response/decision. The effectiveness of the SOSTs lies in the embedded nature of their members within other agencies and their on-scene responsiveness to their interagency partners. The success of the SOST initiative has resulted in an expansion of the number and dispersion of the teams to multiple components of the interagency community. Though the number of SOSTs will change, recent partners have included the following:

- Office of the Director of National Intelligence
- National Security Agency
- Defense Intelligence Agency
- Department of State
- Department of Homeland Security
- U.S. Coast Guard
- National Counterterrorism Center
- FBI
- National Capital Region Office
- USAID
- Department of the Treasury
- Department of Justice
- Drug Enforcement Agency
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
- Department of Energy
- National Target Center
- Defense Threat Reduction Agency
- Defense Security Cooperation Agency
- Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Experience teaches that SOF operations do not occur in a vacuum and, in fact, rely on coordination and support provided by other DOD, non-DOD USG departments and agencies, various host and partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

The structure of USSOCOM Interagency Engagement is now in transition. SOCOM 2020 has established the priority to “Expand the Global SOF Network.” Specific tasks associated with achieving this goal are:

1. Obtain Appropriate Authorities
2. Strengthen TSOCs
3. Strengthen National Capital Region & Regional Interaction
4. Align Enterprise to Support the Network

Ongoing changes in the way USSOCOM establishes and sustains its relationships with its interagency and international partners are a consequence of the intent to strengthen network engagement.
It is obvious that the national security environment is constantly changing. What is needed is an enhanced interagency/partner structure of coordination and collaboration to better position USSOCOM, working through a Global SOF Network, to respond to a wide variety of direct and indirect threats. The Global SOF Network “will more effectively support GCCs by increasing their SOF capabilities and enhancing SOF’s global posture; resulting in improved partner nation capacity, interagency coordination, and situational awareness” (USSOCOM Fact Sheet, 20 August 2012).

Though many of the specifics are still evolving at the time of publication, some of the responsibilities assigned to the new structure include:

a. Develop an interagency planning group to create a seamless information-sharing environment that contributes to common intelligence and operational pictures (CIP/COP)
b. Conduct analysis and planning that coordinates with all instruments of national power (DIME-FIL)
c. Be functionally organized and regionally aligned to support interagency, GCC and TSOC priorities
d. Create a continuous ‘thick’ two-way information flow between both the USSOCOM Global Mission Support Center in Tampa, and the new regional SOF centers
e. Consolidate various USSOCOM elements to:
   i. Integrate the Narcotics and Transnational Crimes Support Center support to Law Enforcement Activities under USSOCOM
   ii. Synergize and expand the activities of the current Special Operations Support Teams distributed
   iii. Analyze organizational policies, procedures and authorities that impede effective collaboration and execution of national security priorities; make change recommendations to DOD and IA leadership

These efforts—and others—are intended to introduce greater efficiencies into interagency and partner nation coordination and collaboration. The ultimate goal is for USSOCOM to “build and employ a Global SOF Network with our USG interagency partners and strengthened with willing and capable partner nation SOF” (USSOCOM Fact Sheet, 20 August 2012).

Additional USSOCOM Organizations and Programs
Civil-Military Support Element (CMSE)
Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET)
Military Information Support Team (MIST)
Special Operations Support Teams (SOST)

Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)
www.ndu.edu/chds/docUploaded/CTFP%20article.pdf
The CTFP was established under the 2002 DOD Appropriations Act as a security cooperation tool in support of the global war on terrorism. It provides education and training opportunities for foreign military officers, ministry of defense officials, and foreign security officials to build individual proficiency while enabling regional cooperation. It complements other programs such as IMET, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs), Counter Narco Terrorist (CNT) training, Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)-related training, and Defense and Military Contacts (DMC) programs. CTFP goals include the following:

   a. Build the CT capabilities and capacities of partner nations
   b. Build and strengthen a global network of combating terrorism experts and practitioners committed to participation in support of U.S. efforts against terrorists and terrorist organizations
   c. Counter ideological support for terrorism

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOL&IC) serves as the senior policy official for CTFP initiatives while the director of the DSCA is responsible for the management and execution of all CTFP programs. In addition to courses with a general combating terrorism focus, programs are also offered in more specific areas such as Intelligence, Maritime Operations, Legal Issues, and Special Forces.
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)

The Technical Programs Unit of the DOS Bureau of Counterterrorism is responsible for providing policy oversight for TSWG, an interagency organization that draws its management direction and technical oversight from DOD through the ASD (SO/LIC). Figure 11 (obtained from the DOD Web site) lays out the structure of the TSWG and identifies the various interagency linkages that are involved. The TSWG comes under the management of the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO). The CTTSO is truly interagency in character, working with more than 100 government agencies as well as state, and local government, law enforcement agencies, and national first responders. By doing so, it addresses both domestic and international threats.

Additional Interagency Programs

Several interagency programs, in addition to those already discussed, have relevance to CT operations overseas. Figure 12 presents an overview of these additional interagency programs. Each relies on the inclusion and participation of multiple partners from throughout the USG interagency process for its operational effectiveness.

Business Executives for National Security (BENS)

While not a USG agency, BENS is concerned with providing the U.S. with a strong and efficient security sector. It is a nonpartisan public interest organization whose membership includes business executives from a wide variety of professional and political backgrounds. It operates from regional offices in California (Silicon Valley/San Francisco Bay area); Kansas City;
New York Metropolitan Area; Southeast U.S. (Atlanta); Texas (Dallas, Houston, Austin & San Antonio); and the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. BENS was established in 1982 by Stanley A. Weiss and has been active ever since in providing quality business solutions to U.S. national security challenges. Over the years it has established working relationships with the White House, federal and state government agencies, and the Congress. At the same time, BENS has been active in the public arena in voicing its independent positions on the issues of the day. It has had an influence on the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar), the creation of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, procedures for the closing of obsolete military bases, and the introduction of business-management practices into the DOD. In recent years, BENS has expanded its engagement to include DOS, Treasury, DHS—to include FEMA and the USSS—ODNI and the CIA. Within DOD, BENS with all the COCOMs. Among its current efforts are enhancing intelligence analysis; tracking terrorist finances; strengthening Cyber Security; and improving crisis management processes, techniques, and procedures.

Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)

www.opic.gov

OPIC is a self-sustaining (no taxpayer funding) USG agency established in 1971. Its purpose is to support the execution of U.S. foreign policy by assisting U.S. businesses to invest overseas while encouraging economic and market development within more than 150 countries worldwide. OPIC initiatives are focused on establishing the reform of free markets and other institutions to support good governance and political stability. Its programs ensure that reform encourages incorporation of best business practices that promote international environmental, labor, and human rights

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Figure 12. Additional Interagency Programs
standards. For several years, OPIC has operated its Anti-Corruption and Transparency Initiative to build credibility into the functioning of markets and the creation of wealth and social responsibility. By its very nature, OPIC works with many USG interagency components to affect conditions overseas in a way to support CT activities and other USG foreign policy goals. Since its establishment, OPIC projects have resulted in $75 billion in U.S. exports that have supported more than 276,000 U.S. jobs.
Chapter 2. Overseas Interagency Structures

It is understandable for the special operations warrior overseas to feel somewhat isolated and detached from USG activities back in Washington, D.C. However, it is prudent to recall that the departments, agencies, organizations, programs and agendas that are active in the USG interagency process back home—and discussed so far in this manual—are likely to be represented somewhere in the AO and must be accounted for.

Consequently, the distance between the USG interagency process and the AO is not as great as it first appears. It is also important to remember that the DOS serves as the lead USG department for combating terrorism overseas, which brings the interagency process immediately into play. It is not a DOD “show” alone. Responsibility for the USG role in Afghanistan and elsewhere centers principally on the Ambassador and the Country Team.

The Country Team

Led by the U.S. Ambassador—also referred to as the Chief of Mission (COM), the Country Team serves as the multifaceted “face” of the USG interagency process. The Country Team is made up of USG representatives who are placed on the ground to ensure the successful functioning of the programs administered by their parent departments, agencies, and organizations. Thus it is through Country Team cooperation and coordination that the various elements of national power (DIME-FIL) are brought to bear on specific challenges to include defense, diplomatic and development initiatives to combat terrorism.

Under each COM’s discretionary authority, the organization of country teams varies to suit the COM’s approach, the various U.S. programs in the country, and the particular senior officers of the represented agencies. The 2010 QDDR goes so far as to describe ambassadors as the “Chief Executive Officers of interagency missions.”

The various members of the Country Team bring to the mission their own respective organizational cultures, procedures, expectations, situation awareness, and levels of experience. In a sense, each represents its own agency “tribe”. Thus there exists a strong tendency toward “stove piping” of the effort, with individual Country Team members frequently remaining within their “tribal” comfort zones by exchanging information with and responding to direction from their leadership back in the U.S.

Ideally, the COM will be successful in integrating the stovepipes and in flattening the interagency work flow to bring about greater lateral coordination among participating departments, agencies, and organizations. After all, those representatives operate within the same U.S. embassy, sit around the same Country Team table, and are theoretically focused on the same desired end states.

As the work flow adapts to the conditions within the AO, it is also important to recall yet again that interagency is a process and not a collection of fixed organizational charts with specific responsibilities that are managed by a structured chain of command. As policy guidance, strategy, planning, and operational decisions move from the senior levels of the NSC through the layers of the USG interagency process to the Country Team, there is a real danger of losing track of the goals, intentions, resources, measures of effectiveness, and sensitivity to adjustments that may become necessary to improve the effectiveness of the effort.
The COM must translate the interagency policies, strategies, and plans into productive action on the ground. From a narrow perspective, the Country Team can serve as a partner for the special operations warrior, assisting with access to those within the interagency process who can provide assistance and support for SOF missions that fulfill Country Team objectives.

**U.S. Ambassador/Chief of Mission (COM)**

Contrary to some misperceptions, the COM is not simply the senior spokesperson for DOS interests as they “compete” with other Country Team agendas. In fact, the COM is the leader of the Country Team, which essentially serves as the “cabinet” for the COM. The COM’s authority is defined by the President; the COM serves as the President’s personal representative.

Continuing a tradition begun by President John F. Kennedy in May 1961, each incoming COM receives a letter from the President defining the nature and parameters of his/her responsibilities. These include orchestrating the efforts of more than 30 government agencies toward achieving a wide range of diplomatic, economic, security, and intelligence objectives.

The status of the COM was codified in Section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (PL 96-465):

“Under the direction of the President, the chief of mission to a foreign country —

(1) shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of a United States area military commander); and

(2) shall keep fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government within that country, and shall insure that all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of a United States area military commander) comply fully with all applicable directives of the chief of mission."

The primacy of the COM’s authority does not mean that other members of the Country Team are prevented from maintaining relationships with their parent organizations. In fact, such contacts are useful for maintaining situation awareness as long as the COM, his deputy, and Country Team are kept updated.

As the President’s personal representative, the COM is responsible for providing clarity of purpose and for ensuring the implementation, management, and evaluation of foreign and security policies within the AO.

**Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM)**

The DCM is responsible for the management of embassy operations and works with the COM to guide the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals through the functioning of the Country Team. As with all deputy positions, the DCM acts in the absence of the principal and thus exercises the authority and responsibilities of the COM at those times. The DCM is also known as the Charge d’Affaires and serves as COM when there is no Ambassador.

Figure 13 portrays the operational interagency environment. The Country Team block summarizes the complexity of the USG interagency process. The participation of the others shown, many of whom could be inadvertently operating at cross purposes, renders the challenge even more difficult.

It is always a wise course of action for the special operations warrior entering an AO for the first time or returning after a period of absence to come to an early understanding about how things work and how they got to be that way. The answer may not always be satisfactory, but it is important to be aware so as not to seek changes that are unworkable, unwanted, or not needed in the first place.

**The Interagency Components within the Country Team**

Executing the work output of the USG interagency process takes place within the AO, closest to the immediate challenges and threats, and farthest away from the policy and decision makers who set the USG interagency process into motion. Any shortcomings in the USG interagency process are present and often magnified. The special operations warrior should understand the makeup of the Country Team and recognize the critical areas of expertise that reside within each functional area. All are important, but some have a greater impact than others on the SOF mission.


**Agricultural Attaché**

The Agricultural attaché is a Foreign Service officer from the DOA’s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). Attaches operate from more than 100 offices in 82 countries; they also monitor and report on agricultural trade matters in more than 70 additional countries. Agricultural attachés provide direct management of FAS programs within the country to distribute needed food supplies and provide technical assistance. They coordinate with USAID and other agencies in support of broader USG assistance programs designed to improve living conditions for the local population. In Afghanistan and Iraq, much of this coordination takes place within the structure of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Village Support Operations (VSO).

**Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT)**

The SDO/DATT is designated by the Secretary of Defense as the principal DOD official in the U.S. embassies. The DOD designated the position in 2007 to ensure unified DOD representation in U.S. embassies. The SDO/DATT is also the COM’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer (defense attaché) assigned to a U.S. diplomatic mission, and the point of contact for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. All DOD elements assigned, attached to, or operating from U.S. embassies are aligned under the coordinating authority of the SDO/DATT except for the Marine Security Detachment, which is under control of the regional security officer (RSO). In most embassies the defense attaché and Security Cooperation Offices remain as separate units with distinct duties and statutory authorities, but both report to the SDO/DATT.

**Defense Attaché Office (DAO)**

The in-country representation of each of the DOD service chiefs is carried out through the DAO by each of the service attachés. The DAO reports to the SDO/DATT, in some
embassies through a deputy for Defense Attaché Affairs when appropriate. In some cases the DAO also manages Security Assistance (SA) programs where no designated Security Cooperation Office is in the embassy. The DAO is manned through the Defense Attaché System (DAS) and under management of DIA. As the development of military capacity is a central CT task, this office provides a crucial link to the HN security sectors whose effectiveness will ultimately bring about successful outcomes.

Drug Enforcement Attaché
The drug enforcement attaché performs a variety of functions both to enable USG counterdrug operations and to build HN capacity through relationship building, training, and mentoring. The attaché serves as an interagency point of contact for those assisting in counterdrug operations within the AO.

ICE Attaché
ICE, Office of International Affairs, stations ICE attachés in offices co-located with U.S. embassies and senior ICE representatives co-located at U.S. consulates. The attachés work closely with the ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and other investigative agencies to conduct complex inquiries into a variety of customs threats and other criminal behavior. ICE attachés also conduct liaison with HN officials to provide training, assist with infrastructure building, and support regulatory and compliance functions within the AO. They also establish relationships with the HN Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their local law enforcement counterparts.

Legal Attaché
Legal attachés are assigned by the FBI to oversee its CT programs around the world. The specifics of the effort are contained in Chapter 1, in the section on the USG Counterterrorism Components under FBI–Counterterrorism.

Narcotics Control Officer
The narcotics control officer is an asset of the DOS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs who is assigned to the U.S. embassy to serve as liaison to the HN and to carry out a number of tasks in support of counterdrug programs. Responsibilities include collecting information, strategic and operational planning, and training. The narcotics control officer assists in the development of the U.S. embassy counterdrug strategies and contingency plans targeting drug producers and traffickers. The NCO also seeks to harmonize USG and HN counterdrug priorities while assessing risks and evaluating progress.

NCOIC, U.S. Marine Corps Security Guard Detachment (MSG)
Working under the supervision of the RSO and in coordination with the Diplomatic Security Service, the MSG is responsible for providing for the security of embassy facilities and the protection of classified information. The Marines also support the protection of visiting dignitaries and assist the RSO in developing security plans for the external defense of embassy property. That external mission is often carried out by HN assets, reinforced by the MSG.

Public Affairs Officer (PAO)
The Country Team’s PAO performs traditional responsibilities as spokesperson, coordinator of international education and visitor programs, and facilitator of information exchanges. The office is also responsible for coordinating public diplomacy initiatives so essential to presenting an accurate narrative of U.S. efforts within the country. The public diplomacy role causes the PAO to perform front-line duties in the effort to challenge and defeat the ideological foundations of terrorists and their networks.

Regional Security Officer (RSO)
This officer is a representative of the Diplomatic Security Service and responsible for creating a secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and the protection of diplomatic personnel and facilities. The RSO serves as the personal advisor to the ambassador on all security issues and coordinates the mission’s security program. They coordinate security efforts with other Diplomatic security personnel, U.S. Marine Security Guards, local security guards, and local security investigators. Of special interest to the special operations warrior is the role of the regional security officer as the liaison between the Country Team and the host government law enforcement community. As an
effective local, regional, and national police force is central to effective governance, the development of a credible HN law enforcement capacity is a critical mission for the regional security officer and the Country Team.

**Resident Legal Advisor (RLA)**

RLAs are assigned through the DOJ’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training. They focus primarily on providing assistance to Rule of Law programs within HN justice institutions and law enforcement agencies. RLAs seek to build justice sector capacity to increase effectiveness in dealing with terrorism, organized crime, corruption, and other criminal activity. In addition to building relationships with the USG, RLAs also assist HNs to develop regional crime-fighting relationships and justice reform.

**Security Cooperation Organization (SCO)**

The SCO is responsible for conducting the in-country management of security assistance programs to the HN. The SCO reports to the SDO/DATT, in some embassies through the Deputy for Security Cooperation when appropriate. To accomplish this mission, the SCO maintains relationships with HN counterparts while coordinating with other members of the Country Team, the regional military commander, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DSCA, and the MILDEPs. Programs include equipment transfers, a wide variety of in-country and U.S. training opportunities, and other defense-related resources and services under the terms of Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs). The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) manages the financial resources to support approved LOAs. The SCOs are tailored and named differently throughout the world. Many are referred to as Military Groups (MILGPs) and are tailored in structure and mission to meet the requirements of the HN. Within U.S. policy constraints, the MILGP can conduct training, support the introduction of new equipment, mentor the reform of HN security sector institutions, and provide advisory support to HN security forces.

**Treasury Attaché**

Depending on the country, the Treasury Department can field more than one attaché team. The first of these is the Treasury attaché, sometimes referred to as the financial attaché. These representatives are responsible for representing the department on issues within the traditional purview of Treasury. Country Teams in Afghanistan and Pakistan are among those hosting a Treasury attaché. In some embassies, including Colombia and Mexico, attaché offices are present from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). OFAC attachés are focused primarily on counter-narcotics issues and are responsible for managing OFAC sanctions within their areas of responsibility. OFAC also has deployed investigators who are attached to the Afghan Threat Finance Cell.

**USAID Representative**

Chapter 1 discusses the broad range of responsibilities and programs that reside within USAID. The USAID Representative—often called the Mission Director—and staff on the ground are responsible for direct management and resourcing of a wide variety of activities in the areas of agricultural, health, education, economic, and institutional reform. USAID also assists in reinforcing the unity of effort by coordinating with and frequently overseeing the activities of some, but by no means all, NGOs in the AO. USAID maintains an active presence that assists in the functioning of PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq.
SOF Operations

SOF pursuing CT responsibilities frequently require access to the interagency representatives who serve on the Country Team. Predictably, such interactions will not be restricted to military personnel such as the defense attaché. They are likely to also involve interagency relationship building with USAID, DEA, RLAs, and law enforcement representatives such as the FBI, HSI, and Regional Security Officer. The increasing involvement of Conventional Forces in the Security Assistance Mission also mandates regular coordination with those organizations as they appear and conduct operations.

SOF can enter an AO under a variety of conditions and assistance needs. The most obvious, of course, is through the SDO/DATT assigned to the embassy to provide assistance. However, SOF may also be engaged in a specific HN to assist in building law enforcement capacity at the request of the various law enforcement representatives. Additionally, disasters or humanitarian assistance missions may cause the USAID representative to advocate for a SOF presence.

While the COM is personally responsible to the President for the successful functioning of the Country Team, he or she exercises no control over U.S. military personnel operating under the command of a geographic combatant commander (GCC). To improve coordination, agreements have been negotiated, formalized, and put in place to define the relationship between the COM and the GCC and how both can work together to accomplish U.S. national security objectives.

Typically, the DOS, working through the COM, assists with the entry of U.S. military forces into the HN by negotiating the specific goals of the effort, terms of the military’s presence, tasks to be accomplished, length of stay and/or measures of success leading to a withdrawal.

Beyond that, it should be clear that unique SOF capabilities frequently result in greater direct coordination and interaction with the Country Team than by conventional military organizations.

Interagency Organizations and Initiatives

While the Country Team plays the central role in meeting U.S. CT objectives, operating within the AO frequently brings the special operations warrior into contact with other coordination venues. The following organizations and initiatives serve as synchronization nodes for a wide variety of activities.

Interagency Development Efforts (The Third Pillar)

It may well be that the clearest synergy among the “Three Pillars” of National Security and Foreign Policy is in the Development venue. Security (Defense) is necessary for Development to take place; Diplomacy serves as an enabler for Defense and Development to occur; and Development creates the sustainable HN stability and resilience that lead to disengagement for the United States and self-reliance for the HN and the surrounding region. USAID discussions of the “Provincial Reconstruction Team Mandate” animates this observation by affirming that “PRTs seek to establish an environment that is secure and stable enough for the operation of international and Afghan civilian agencies to provide development support.”

Beyond reliance on the PRT option to drive stability and development programs, USAID sees its mission as going beyond stable environments to “deliver services in less secure or under-secure areas of Afghanistan.” Obviously, much of this effort takes place in coordination with military forces, notably SOF. More specifically, USAID materials speak about USAID—SOF “Shared Space Coordination” that focuses on the following concerns:

a. Counterinsurgency and Stabilization—Clear, Hold, Build Continuum
b. Counter—Extremism
c. Illicit Power Structures
d. Conflict Prevention and Mitigation
e. Development and Civil Affairs
f. Disaster Prevention and Management
Chapter 2: Overseas Interagency Structures

Other shared-space operations include:

g. Afghanistan—Village Stability Operations
h. Yemen—Stabilization Strategy
i. Pakistan—Civil Affairs and Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in Semi & Non-Permissive Areas
j. Maghreb through the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism (TSCTP) Efforts
k. Haiti—Earthquake Relief

As discussed in Chapter 1, the USAID has taken on the role of proponent for the Development Pillar of National Security and Foreign Policy. However, as with all interagency initiatives, USAID is joined by the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and a wide variety of other partners from within DOS, DOD, DOC, DOE, USDA, and other USG interagency resources who work together to work to reduce instability and other conditions in failing and post-conflict states that could contribute to the development and sustainment of violent extremism, terrorists and their networks, violent crime, trafficking, and various human catastrophes.

The Development Pillar is tasked to develop initiatives that create, sustain and synchronize an expeditionary, innovative, and interagency civilian capability for the USG to provide the skill sets and resources for post-conflict situations and to stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition. The 9 Principles of Development are:

1. Ownership (host nation and indigenous population)
2. Capacity building
3. Sustainability
4. Selectivity
5. Assessment
6. Results (measures of effectiveness)
7. Partnership (USG interagency elements; partner nations; HN resources; IGOs, NGOs, private sector)
8. Flexibility
9. Accountability

Figure 14. Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)
Former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton emphasized what she calls the employment of “Smart Power,” leveraging the various diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, cultural expertise, and other resources that reside throughout the USG to meet the foreign policy and national security goals of the United States.

Because of the roles and responsibilities civilian power plays in delivering Smart Power, it is almost inevitable that SOF will encounter and perhaps assist members of the development interagency and its efforts within a variety of AOs. For instance, the withdrawal of military forces from Iraq was matched by an expansion of USG civilian capacity within the country. A similar plan is unfolding in Afghanistan.

Under an earlier interagency system, the organizations below, among others, were engaged in stabilization and reconstruction initiatives. As the new “Soft”, “Indirect” or “Civilian” power model takes shape, it is safe to assume that many, if not all, of these will continue to play critical roles:

- DOS
- USAID
- DOD (various Security Force Assistance, Security Cooperation initiatives)
- U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
- DOJ
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
- Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (SO/LIC&IC)
- U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
- DOJ—International Criminal Investigative Training Program—ICITAP
- DOS—International Narcotics and Law Enforcement’s Civilian Police Programs
- DOS—Office of the Director General, Diplomatic Readiness Initiative
- DOS—Office of Population, Refugees, and Migration
- DOS—Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
- DOS (Foreign Services Institute)
- CIA
- USAID—Office of Democracy and Governance
- USAID—Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
- USAID—Office of Transition Initiatives
- Department of the Treasury
- Food Agricultural Service—U.S. Department of Agriculture
- Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations (ASD(SO/LIC))

Organizations on the ground such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), VSO, and Village Support Operations Platforms continue to play important roles as interagency initiatives on the ground in Afghanistan and in other forms elsewhere. While the names of such organizations will inevitably change over time and location, the basic principles of face-to-face needs assessments, gathering of necessary resources, and coordinated work with indigenous populations and partners from the USG interagency structure, allied and partner nations, HN organizations, IGOs, and NGOs will continue to evolve.

Interagency cooperation among the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the DOS Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the DOS Policy Planning Staff (S/P) has resulted in a “Watchlist” of countries who are particularly vulnerable to failure or have begun to demonstrate troubling weakness and inability to function.

Central to the USAID/CSO/interagency efforts is the coordinated, strategic application of resources to address conditions within those various “Watchlist” countries. What has emerged is what is characterized as the “first strategic doctrine ever produced for civilians engaged in peace building missions.

The coordination of the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) and the U.S. Army has resulted in a “Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction” (Figure 15. http://www.usip.org/publications/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction) that establishes Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. These serve as a “practical roadmap for helping countries transition from violent conflict to peace.” (USIP description of the initiative).

The application of these principles enables the Defense, Diplomatic, and Development (3-D) capabilities and resources of the USG to act in support of individuals and institutions who seek peaceful resolution to conflict and restore conditions in post-conflict states. Figure 15 identifies the desired “End States”, which are
expanded further in the complete document entitled “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction” (http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/guiding_principles_full.pdf) from which the chart is extracted.

This understanding of the need for measures of effectiveness is an important component for ensuring the effectiveness of interagency cooperation.

One indication of a growing awareness of the need to enable the coordination and collaboration among the State Department, Defense Department, and USAID is the creation of the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), established by Congress in December 2011. The idea is to create a “pot” of money, administered and funded jointly by the DOS and DOD, that allows for the efficient employment of Defense, Diplomatic, and Development initiatives in response to rapidly developing security threats or opportunities. The vision is that “pooled” DOD and State Department funds would be used to develop interagency responses to build the security capacity of foreign states, prevent conflict, and stabilize countries in conflict or emerging from conflict.” (Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF): Summary and Issue Overview, Congressional Research Service (CRS), 1 August 2012) The goal is to cut the request, justification, approval, and execution timeline to achieve as much immediacy of action as possible.

According to the Congressional Research Report, “the GSCF provides resources for training and other support to enable foreign military and security forces to conduct security and counterterrorism operations and participate in coalition operations, as well as for justice sector, rule of law, and stabilization programs.” While funds originate from both DOS and DOD budgets, the GSCF is placed within the DOS budget with the Secretary of State in the lead for execution. The GSCF has emerged as a responsive funding mechanism to address persistent shortcomings in harmonizing Defense, Diplomacy and Development efforts. As identified by the CRS Report, these are:
a. Provide the State Department with a flexible funding account to respond to emerging needs and crises
b. Develop mechanisms to promote greater inter-agency cooperation in planning security and stabilization programs
c. Clarify and rationalize security roles and missions
d. Create a ‘unified’ budget system for national security missions along functional rather than agency lines

Civilian Response Corps
www.civilianresponsecorps.gov/
Like many other aspects of Diplomacy and Development, the concept of the Civilian Response Corps has been refined as part of the QDDR process. Many of the adjustments have come as a result of deployment and exercise experiences. The CRC serves as an innovative, whole-of-government expeditionary organization designed to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance to weakened countries or to those emerging from conflict.

The CRC is a group of Foreign Service and Civil Service Officers representing nine different USG agencies. These are, in addition to USAID personnel, DOS, DOJ, USDA, DOC, Department of Health and Human Services, DOT, DOE, and DHS. They are prepared to deploy within 48 hours to anyplace in the world to pursue conflict prevention or post-conflict reconstruction missions. CRC operates under the direction of the Office of Civilian Response (OCR). OCR ensures access to the full spectrum of foreign assistance expertise within USAID and makes it available to the CRC.

The CRC has established a variety of relationships to include supporting, liaising with, and coordinating with the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and with other organizations with appropriate skill sets throughout the USG interagency structure. CRC supports USAID missions, U.S. Embassy Country Teams, and COCOMs in critical areas of the world.

CRC’s Operating Priorities include:

a. Strengthen USAID’s and the USG’s prevention of, preparation for, or response to crisis or transition situations
b. Assistance is short to medium term, generally 3-9 months
c. Planning, programming, and management of OCR deployments are directly supportive of USAID requirements and objectives

Capabilities that are provided by the CRC include:

a. Conducting contingency planning for disaster scenarios as part of an interagency team
b. Coordinating civilian-military operations
c. Providing technical surge capacity to Embassies for pre-election and election observation activities
d. Designing, implementing and monitoring the humanitarian portfolio in a complex emergency
e. Assessing and adapting public health and other programming to a stabilization strategy
f. Aiding in the programming of funds for large scale disarmament, demobilization and reintegration [DDR] programs
g. Developing procurement plans for rule of law and anti-drug trafficking programming

Other support CRC can provide to the Country Team in a country facing conflict and instability include:

a. Providing surge staffing for U.S. embassies in conflict-prone countries
b. Helping local authorities promote security and economic stability
c. Identifying a country’s conflict drivers and resiliencies and developing the U.S. response
d. Training and partnering with foreign governments and multilateral groups, leveraging expertise across the U.S. Government, and gathering lessons from around the world

The QDDR also called for the establishment of an “Expert Corps” that will “draw on expertise across and outside the U.S. Government.” This will allow the CRC to deploy personnel possessing critical skills that are not always available within the USG structure, but are important to achieving national security and CRC objectives. Consequently, special operations warriors
interacting with Civilian Response Corps and Expert Corps members should be prepared to interact with different cultures, expectations, and levels of experience.

CSO and CRC are also heavily involved with the International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative (ISPI), which began its work in October 2009. In addition to members of the USG interagency community, the ISPI includes 15 countries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the U.S.) and six international organizations—African Union (AU), EU, Organization of American States; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), UN, and the World Bank. ISPI’s mission is to “improve the effectiveness of stabilization and peacebuilding operations by enhancing civilian capability globally and strengthening interoperability among international actors engaged in peacebuilding.”

Coordination of Humanitarian Efforts Within the AO

Because so many HN, IGO, NGO, and military organizations, and resources can be operating in any given AO, coordination and establishment of objectives and unity of effort are always challenging. USAID has the mission lead, to the extent possible in a sovereign nation, for coordinating humanitarian assistance efforts on behalf of the USG.

NGOs have traditionally seen independent action as their best path to survival and success. The perception of neutrality therefore is essential to the NGOs. Consequently, it is predictably counterproductive to enlist NGO assistance in providing military forces with their assessments of local needs and the security situation on the ground. Information exchange is not a task NGOs typically assign themselves.

Working through a coordination mechanism such as that USAID provides is the most workable plan. If nothing else, the consequences of alienating the NGO community are unacceptably high. Tension and distrust also distract from essential mission tasks.

Part of this reluctance to cooperate is for security reasons. Once NGOs are compromised and linked to unpopular governments or unwanted international assistance, they can become targets. Their effectiveness is also diminished as the local population could become less likely to approach them for assistance for fear of reprisals.

For a variety of reasons, recent years have seen a shift in the attitude of many NGOs, resulting in a greater synchronization of efforts. Increasingly the flexible, situationally aware, highly skilled NGO staffs on the ground are doing much of the actual work of humanitarian response in coordination with HN authorities, IGOs, other NGOs, and international military forces.

Various mechanisms for coordinating collective humanitarian responses to wars and natural disasters have evolved. Given the diversity of the participants and the complexity of the operational environments, they predictably operate under different names, but frequently perform very similar functions.

Thus the careful establishment and management of interagency coordination hubs are essential to minimizing the duplication of effort and limiting the risks of excluding those wishing to participate.

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)

One example of a USG interagency initiative, primarily employing civilian power, that is engaged throughout the world with local officials is ICITAP. Founded in 1986, the organization works with foreign governments to develop law enforcement infrastructures that reduce the threats of transnational crime and terrorism, combat corruption and protect human rights. Teams work through field offices attached to a U.S. Embassy. The DOS, USAID, DOD, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation serve as partners for ICITAP and provide funding for its activities.

The organization is nested within the Criminal Division of DOJ. It frequently teams up with the DOJ Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training. Working together, the two organizations have been successful in developing strong relationships with law enforcement institutions around the world. These partnerships have contributed to DOJ success in achieving one of its primary missions: to support the U.S. national security strategy in combating international terrorism and transnational crimes such as human trafficking, organized crime, public
corruption, money laundering, narcotics, cybercrime, and intellectual property violations.

ICITAP personnel provide expertise in organizational development; basic police services; community policing; terrorism and transnational crime; public integrity and anticorruption; specialized and tactical skills; marine and border security; academy and instructor development; criminal justice coordination; criminal investigations; forensics; corrections; and information systems.

Assistance programs generally focus on three development challenges; representative areas of focus are provided for each:

1. Emerging democracy and developing country (Basic investigative skills; professional standards and ethics; anticorruption investigation; human rights standards and use-of-force protocols; organizational development; transnational crime investigation)
2. Post-conflict reconstruction and international peacekeeping mission (Recruitment and vetting; training academy and instructor development; budgeting, planning, payroll, and procurement; command and control structures; leadership and management skills; critical incident management capabilities)
3. Partners in combating terrorism (Border and marine security; information systems and investigative, forensic, and criminal databases; cybercrime, post-blast, and kidnapping investigations)

SOF interaction with ICITAP personnel and programs is likely because of the types of skill-set development efforts practiced by both and shared areas of operation. Among other places, current ICITAP programs are underway in places like Algeria, Colombia, Indonesia, East Africa, and Central Asia. Past programs have included Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Iraq, and Uganda. ICITAP also relies on the Civilian Response Corps for much of its police, corrections, criminal justice, and forensic expertise.

Humanitarian Information Centers (HICs) have emerged as nodes for information exchange and the development of information management procedures and technology. With an eye toward developing common practices and standards, HICs serve as venues for data collection, data distribution, and coordination of plans and projects.

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centers (HACCs) are established by military organizations participating in humanitarian operations. They are designed to support all forms of interagency information exchange, coordination, planning, and execution of programs. They ensure an open link to NGOs and IGOs operating within the AO. HACCs provide a means by which the diverse agendas, skill sets, and resource bases of all humanitarian response agencies can be synchronized.

A Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) may be established by the HN, the UN (UNHOC), or a lead USG agency. The HOC is designed to provide a venue for interagency policy makers to coordinate the humanitarian response. Representatives include HN organizations, international embassies involved in the effort, UN officials, IGOs, NGOs, and military forces.

A Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) is typically located within a secured, military-controlled facility. Access is limited to the key HN leadership and that of partner nations, major IGOs, and NGOs. Collectively they develop the plans and manage the execution of humanitarian operations within the AO.

A Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) is both a place and a process for coordinating the efforts of U.S. military forces, relevant USG interagency components, HN representatives, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs. It is not a command and control center and exercises no directive authority over the participants. It does, however, provide an opportunity to conduct information exchanges, build relationships, and synchronize efforts within the AO.

Management of the CMOC may fall to a multinational force commander, shared by U.S. and multinational force commanders, or shared between a U.S. military commander and a USG civilian agency head. As always, the specific structure depends on the situation. Civil Affairs officers typically serve as directors and deputy directors.

Other military skills present can include legal, operations, logistics, engineering, medical, and force
protection. Additional expertise and resources are provided by the USG interagency community (usually through the Country Team), HN organizations, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

A Civil-Military Information Center (CIMIC), similarly to a CMOC, is located outside of a secured military facility and functions similarly to a HACC. As with the other coordinating mechanisms, a CIMIC acts as a source of information and a venue for coordinating plans and projects. It also serves as an external information source for parties to the humanitarian effort and to local populations.

Though institutional suspicion, confusion, and duplication of effort remain, they are less than before. As with any interagency national or international functional area, designation of lead organizations and coordination hubs is a necessary first step. Protocols for accommodating diverse organizations and agendas lead to the establishment of procedures for information exchanges, planning approaches, and shared oversight of activities designed to bring about successfully executed humanitarian operations.

**Interagency Task Force (IATF)**

An IATF is made up of USG interagency representatives, including the DOD, partner nations, and others who are tasked with taking on specific issues or missions. Their primary focus is on geographic or functional responsibilities.

Unlike the FBI’s JTTF or coordinative organizations, IATFs are typically intended to be short-term organizations with specific tasks to perform and with the authority under a single commander to act on those tasks. They then disband once their purposes are fulfilled.

The ad-hoc purpose and structure of IATFs, however, provides flexibility that allows them to adapt to changing situations and thus occasionally breed longer-than-anticipated life cycles as missions expand or threats become more immediate. IATF-South represents such an example.

**Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATFS)**

www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/

Increased DOD involvement with counterdrug operations took shape beginning in 1989 with various commanders in chief (CINCs) establishing individual task forces and other organizations focused on the mission. With reorganization in 1994 and a consolidation in 1999, the life cycle of IATF-South now spans nearly two decades in one form or another.

JIATF-South’s mission is to “conduct interagency and international Detection & Monitoring operations, and facilitate the interdiction of illicit trafficking and other narco-terrorist threats in support of national and partner nation security.”

The JIATF-South’s strategic goals include:

- Eliminate the primary flow of illicit drugs in and through the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- Expand to include all critical international and interagency partners
- Achieve 100 percent domain awareness of illicit trafficking
- Shape the command for success

Although developed in the counter-drug environment, JIATF-South has become a model for the organization, staffing, coordination, information sharing, intelligence fusion, planning, and execution for other IATFs faced with different complex missions. This model includes many of the interagency features of the developing USAFRICOM structure discussed in Chapter 1.

Within the DOD, JIATF-South synchronizes activities with the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Army National Guard, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Southern Command. USG interagency partners include:

- U.S. Coast Guard
- Customs and Border Protection
- Central Intelligence Agency
- Drug Enforcement Administration
- Defense Intelligence Agency
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Immigration and Customs Enforcement
- National Security Agency
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

To extend its reach, several Hemispheric and European countries have sent liaison teams and, in some cases, maritime assets to support the JIATF-South mission.
**Interagency Task Force-South**

**International Liaison Missions**

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**Interagency Task Force-CT (Afghanistan)**

As U.S. military forces began their fight against the Taliban and other insurgent forces in the fall of 2001, USCENTCOM established IATF-CT that deployed to Afghanistan in support of the effort. Its primary responsibilities were to act as an intelligence-gathering fusion center and to operate the interrogation facility at Bagram Air Base.

From its beginning, IATF-CT maintained a strong interagency structure. Among others, membership included:

- a. Federal Bureau of Investigation
- b. Central Intelligence Agency
- c. Diplomatic Security Service
- d. Customs Service
- e. National Security Agency
- f. Defense Intelligence Agency
- g. New York’s Joint Terrorism Task Force
- h. Department of Justice
- i. Department of the Treasury
- j. Department of State

A few allied nations also provided representatives who worked side by side with the others to exchange information and collectively apply their skill sets, experiences, and resources to the effort.

As conditions on the ground in Afghanistan evolved, the IATF-CT returned to the U.S. in the spring of 2002 and began a transformation from the temporary, ad-hoc structure and focus of an IATF to more sustained operations as USCENTCOM’s JIACG that continues to function.

**Both IATF-South and IATF-CT** came into existence to address a specific threat to U.S. national security. Because of their effectiveness and adaptability, both continue to function well beyond the time limits one would expect for such an organization.

Though its title remains essentially the same, IATF-South’s responsibilities have broadened significantly while remaining engaged in its original mission as a central player within U.S. and partner-nation counter-drug operations. By contrast, IATF-CT has undergone a name change that reflects the expansion of its responsibilities within a mix of related missions.

What remains the same is that both organizations have survived and grown because of their abilities to accommodate the vastly different cultures, skill sets, and procedures that make up their diverse memberships. Harmonizing these differences has allowed both to make continuing contributions to the accomplishment of national security objectives and to act as models for newer IATF organizations created to address CT and other security threats.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

PRTs were first established in Afghanistan, where the Gardez City PRT opened in early 2002. PRTs are designed to assist in extending the influence of the central government from Kabul and other major cities into those isolated areas so that they are less likely to fall under the influence of destabilizing forces that breed and harbor terrorists and their networks. The goal is to assist the central government to build its credibility and support across a country roughly the size of Texas. PRTs facilitate the international delivery of assistance into Afghan districts and promises, with a particular emphasis on improved security, practice of good governance, and local development.

The PRTs vary in size depending on local needs and the prevailing security situation. In addition to military personnel, the PRT includes USG interagency representation (working through the Country Team), partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

PRT leadership consists of both military and Foreign Service officers who strive to synchronize the agendas, policies, strategies, procedures, and activities of all participants to gain the greatest impact of the shared effort. PRTs work closely with local village, district and provincial officials, and military operational units to strengthen local governance, reform the security sector beginning with the police, and execute reconstruction and development projects.

Among others, PRT tasks involve establishing security, developing and executing plans for reconstruction and development, improving governance through the mentoring of local and district leaders and other measures, and judicial reform.

DOS, USAID, USDA, and other members of the USG interagency community play prominent roles in building government capacity, combating corruption, discouraging poppy growth, encouraging the growth of alternative crops, and local and regional planning.

Specific USAID responsibilities include:
- Monitor current USAID projects and provide information about national programs to local officials as requested
- Identify, coordinate, implement and monitor completion of Local Governance and Community Development projects
- Support the visits of USAID technical and management staff from headquarters to the field, setting up appropriate contacts with local officials on these visits and working with the PRT to provide logistical support as needed

Village Stability Operations (VSO)

In addition to PRTs, SOF in Afghanistan have been in recent years conducting VSO in strategically important areas of rural Afghanistan. VSO are conducted around basic COIN campaign doctrine calling for “bottom-up” stability operations designed to restore local governance that has frequently not existed in the past or has been bypassed or ignored. Places like Afghanistan and similar social and political environments frequently have traditional indigenous methods of governance that can be brought into play to create conditions that are not favorable to terrorists, rogue criminals, or insurgents. VSO efforts are conducted in four phases:

1. Shape (to include gaining indigenous consent and investment in the VSO process).
2. Hold (to include SOF, supported by partner and coalition countries, HN agencies and indigenous police and military forces)
3. Build (to include meeting basic needs that contribute to the quality of life, undermine grievance narratives, and provide local populations with grounds for hope for a better future)
4. Expand and Transition (to include reducing village and district isolation—and vulnerability to terrorist, rogue criminal and insurgent influences—by creating connections between local leadership structures, through district and provincial governance, to the central government in places like Kabul)

NOTE: Over time, the roles and functions played by PRTs, VSO, and other structures and programs will evolve and adapt to the unique conditions they find on
the ground in a specific operational environment. Just as PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan didn’t look or function in exactly the same ways, future programs will take on different appearances and provide similar, but not identical, services. The same will be true of VSO. Positive effects should be the focus, not a concern over terminology.

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, successor to the very effective Pan-Sahel Initiative, is a DOS-led interagency program involving DOS, DOD, USAID, and others in a broad initiative to confront the threat of violent extremism and terrorism in the Maghreb and Sahel in Africa. The initiative’s broad strategic goal is to defeat terrorist organizations by:

- Strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities
- Enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security forces
- Promoting democratic governance
- Discrediting terrorist ideology
- Reinforcing bilateral military ties with the United States

The five-year initiative brings together CT, democratic governance, military assistance, and public diplomacy activities. In addition to USG interagency components, regional IGOs such as the African Union (Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism) are involved with the efforts. Interagency participants have identified four specific strategic goals to be accomplished within the operational environment:

1. Build local capacity
2. Counter radicalization
3. Foster regional cooperation
4. Enhance public diplomacy and communication strategies

The partnership focuses on nine countries, including the Maghreb nations of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Sahel nations of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Nigeria and Senegal are also participants.

Military support for the TSCTP is present in the form of USAFRICOM’s Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), which is the USG’s regional war on terrorism. However, OEF-TS engages TSCTP primarily as a security and cooperation initiative. OEF-TS partners with Algeria, Burkina Faso, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal.

Funding for the TSCTP comes from a variety of USG sources. Among them are DOD Title 10 funding, Peacekeeping Operations, Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs, Development Assistance, and Economic Support financing. NGOs engaged in the region have also contributed.

Capacity-building programs focus on nurturing tactical intelligence capabilities that encourage the development of “eyes and ears” to identify and target potential terrorists and their networks. Counterterrorism Assistance Training and Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) efforts are also involved.

A variety of train-and-equip programs support CT efforts to provide weapons, equipment, training, and tactical mentoring to stop the flow of uncontrolled weapons, goods, and people and to neutralize safe havens where terrorists thrive.

Efforts in counter radicalization, public diplomacy, and communications have contributed with a variety of initiatives. Programs to reduce the pool of potential terrorist recruits have focused on encouraging youth employment and civic education, improving educational access and quality, and reintegrating former combatants.

Additionally, programs to increase government credibility and reduce ungoverned areas have sought to improve good governance practices at the local level, the capacity of rule-of-law systems, and the ability of the government to be seen as providing necessary goods and services to their populations.

Upgrading communication capacity within the partner countries allows the government to counter extremist claims and behavior by keeping their populations informed about what is being done to protect them and improve their quality of life. Ideally, favorable views of the USG and its support of the HN government breed popular respect for a government that is able to partner with such a helpful ally.
Chapter 3. Beyond the USG Interagency Community

Beyond the complexities of the USG interagency process experienced both in Washington, D.C. and within the Country Team, SOF must also account for and interact with representatives of the HN government and a mosaic of partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs. Predictably, each is operating on a separate agenda-driven path.

The USG interagency process exists to coordinate the CT activities of disparate departments, agencies, and organizations with the goal of achieving assigned U.S. national security objectives. By contrast, there is no pretense that any similar mechanism exists on the ground overseas to bring about such effects once the SOF community steps outside the USG interagency environment and the Country Team.

Representatives of the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs are not part of the USG interagency process. However, their mere presence and activities within the operational environment inevitably have a major impact on the establishment and sustainment of the unity of effort required to meet both U.S. and international security objectives. More than ever, knowing and understanding those working alongside you become at least as important as an awareness of active or potential adversaries.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO environment to help the special operations warrior gain a general awareness of the other players present on the ground. It is not an exhaustive survey of the environment. In fact, the specific IGOs and NGOs introduced reflect only a small slice of the total participants. However, they do represent many of the more familiar players and offer a glimpse into characteristics that are often shared.

SOF personnel soon learn that introductions around the table at the beginning of a meeting represent more than polite hospitality. They are essential to identify the various players and their organizations while beginning to understand their agendas. Each of these other players possesses skills and resources relevant to the tasks at hand.

Again, however, it is necessary to remember that each applies its talents guided by what are often to us unfamiliar and seemingly inconsistent policies, strategies, plans, procedures, and organizational cultures. As with the USG interagency components serving the USG Country Team, HN officials, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs likewise bring with them their own unique “stovepipe” relationships.

It is frequently the case that some decisions can be made by local representatives operating at the tactical level, but more complex issues must be addressed in national capitals or in whatever country houses the headquarters of each IGO and NGO. Quite simply, many organizations operate either tactically or strategically and do not field an operational level decision maker to provide immediate guidance to their personnel or to help deconflict disputes.

These dissimilarities are not disqualifiers; in fact, such differences are inevitable and, one could argue, helpful if properly exploited. The immediate tasks become to identify who is on the ground, establish contact, identify goals and resources, and attempt to synchronize efforts to achieve a strong measure of unity of effort.

Success in relationship building is largely personality dependent, based on the ability of those on the ground to reach consensus on desired end states and to synchronize multilateral activities to achieve those end states.

Experience teaches that shared goals and objectives are not necessarily the same as a commonly accepted vision of a desired end state. Success will likely have many different definitions and metrics. In fact, sometimes the best one can hope for is a shared objective and an agreement to exchange information.
As with non-DOD USG departments, agencies, and organizations, no command relationships exist with the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs. Negotiation skills and the ability to listen emerge as premium assets. Once established, the relationships will be inevitably softer and less direct than is familiar to the special operations warrior.

Respectful coordination and, when possible, accommodation of HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO agendas are most useful in achieving success. Alienation is never helpful.

As a practical matter, the combining of the USG interagency process with the effective inclusion of international partners and other outside organizations introduces efficiencies into the operational environment. The base reality remains that no one can do it all alone. Ideally those best suited to specific tasks are given the responsibility to manage those tasks.

Consistent with this principle, FM3-24 notes that “In COIN, it is always preferred for civilians to perform civilian tasks.” Though not always possible, this is a solid principle for guiding USG interagency coordination, especially in an operational setting. The guidance becomes even more relevant when dealing with the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

Efficiciencies are also gained by applying the right mix of skill sets and resources to a specific challenge. It is not always true that the introduction of more personnel and resources inevitably results in a better outcome. Ensuring quality work is often more helpful than merely having more people performing the same tasks as before.

Ideally, cooperation among all the parties will result in a unity of effort through which USG, HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO efforts emerge as more than a collage of random, uncoordinated acts. The inclusion of HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO resources assists the common effort in working smarter in a specific direction (or several paths heading in the same general direction) toward the achievement of a desired end state.

However, even a cursory reading of the agendas and goals of the various IGOs and NGOs reveals considerable overlap and redundancy. Thus the harmonization of such efforts remains a persistent challenge, especially when there are literally hundreds or thousands of such organizations of varying size and impact who could be present in any given operational environment. Individually and collectively, they represent a stern challenge for the special operations warrior trying to make sense of it all.

**Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)**

**ABCA Armies**

www.abca-armies.org

Initiated in 1947 with a general plan and formalized in 1954 with the Basic Standardization Concept, the ABCA Armies has a long history of seeking standardization among its member armies. Initial membership included the armies of the United States United Kingdom, and Canada who sought to sustain the partnerships in place during World War II. Australia joined in 1963, with New Zealand moving from observer status to full membership in 2006 without any change to the organization’s title.

Recognizing the coalition nature of current and future wars, the ABCA Armies are concerned primarily with ensuring the standardization and interoperability necessary “to train, exercise, and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks.”

Strategic guidance is provided by the ABCA Executive Council, made up of national representatives at the level of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. That guidance is translated into interoperability objectives and the annual Program Plan of Tasks by the National Directors or ABCA Board, made up of officers at the one-star level. They typically meet four times annually, including one session with the Executive Council.

The work of the organization is conducted by the Program Office, based in Washington, D.C., through Capability Groups (CGs), Support Groups (SGs), Project Teams (PTs), and Information Teams (ITs).
African Union (AU)  
www.au.int/en/

The AU was established on 9 July 2002, by bringing together the separate countries of the continent. It is the successor organization to the Organization of African Unity. Current membership stands at 54 countries. It has developed several governing institutions to include the Pan African Parliament and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Its main administrative capital is in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Among the AU goals are to bring about political, social, and economic integration; develop common African positions on issues; achieve peace and security; and promote good governance through reform of governmental institutions and the respect for human rights. To date, AU troops have deployed to Burundi, Sudan’s Darfur Region, and Somalia to address security and humanitarian needs. The population of the African Union stands in excess of one billion people.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)  
www.aseansec.org

ASEAN was established, on 8 August 1967, in Bangkok with the signing of the ASEAN or Bangkok Declaration. The five founding members were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia joined later. The ASEAN region is home to more than 600 million people. ASEAN represents a collective effort to promote economic growth, social progress, and cultural development.

In 2003, ASEAN identified three “pillars” to assist in achieving its goals: The ASEAN Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. 1994 saw the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that includes the ASEAN countries plus others with an interest in the region. These include the U.S. and the Russian Federation. ARF’s goals are to promote confidence building, establish preventive diplomacy protocols, and develop conflict resolution strategies.

European Union (EU)  
http://europa.eu

The EU consists of 27 European countries forming a political and economic partnership. Nearly 500 million people live within the borders of the EU. Its three major bodies are the European Parliament (representing the people of Europe), the Council of European Union (representing the governments of Europe), and the European Commission (representing the shared interests of the EU). Among other issues, the EU is involved with free trade, borderless internal travel, a common currency, and joint action on crime and terrorism.

A major emphasis focuses on securing the external borders of the EU while allowing free trade and open travel. The EU makes use of an extensive shared database that enables police forces and judicial officials to exchange information and track suspected criminals and terrorists. The European Police (EUROPOL) is housed in The Hague, Netherlands, and maintains extensive intelligence information on criminals and terrorists. EUROPOL is staffed by representatives from national law enforcement agencies (e.g., police, customs, and immigration services). They monitor issues such as terrorism, drug trafficking, financial crimes, and radioactive/nuclear trafficking.

International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)  
www.interpol.int

INTERPOL is a structured IGO with 190 members under the direction of a General Assembly, Executive Committee, General Secretariat, and National Central Bureaus. The General Secretariat is located in Lyon, France and maintains an around-the-clock operations center staffed by representatives from the member countries.

INTERPOL supports four official languages: Arabic, English, French, and Spanish. Each member country maintains a National Central Bureau, which serves as the point of contact for international police issues and the exchange of information. The U.S. National Central Bureau is located within the DOJ and is staffed jointly by representatives of numerous U.S. law enforcement agencies.

In 2005, INTERPOL and the UN issued the first INTERPOL–UN Security Council Special Notice regarding individuals and organizations suspected of maintaining associations with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups.
INTERPOL has outlined a vision of “connecting police for a safer world.” Its abbreviated mission statement is to “prevent and fight crime through enhanced international police cooperation.” To do so, it has established four strategic priorities:

1. Secure global communication systems
2. 24/7 support to policing and law enforcement
3. Capacity building
4. Assist members in the identification of crime and criminals

More generally, INTERPOL assists police to understand criminal trends, analyze information, conduct operations, and arrest as many criminals as possible.

The IMF is based in Washington, D.C. and is the host to 188 member countries. It is a specialized agency of the UN with its own charter, governing structure and finances. The IMF promotes stability of international currencies and exchange protocols. It also works to stimulate international job growth through economic development and, when necessary, assistance to countries with severe debt and other financial threats. The IMF maintains surveillance of financial and economic trends throughout the world and within individual countries. It also makes loans to countries in need and provides technical assistance to encourage self-sufficiency in the operation of the world’s interconnected financial systems. It works with the World Bank, WTO, and others to achieve its goals. These include fostering global monetary cooperation, securing financial stability, facilitating international trade, promoting high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reducing poverty around the world. The activities of the IMF serve as resources for developing economic stability through cooperative interaction with countries and international organizations.

Organization of American States (OAS)
www.oas.org

The OAS is the oldest regional organization, dating back to the First International Conference of American States, held in Washington, DC, from October 1889 to April 1890. From that gathering emerged the International Union of American Republics. The OAS came into being in 1948 with the signing of the Charter of the OAS in Bogota, Colombia. The OAS has 35 member countries, 34 of which are active after the 1962 suspension of Cuba. It features four official languages: English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish. The OAS has traditionally viewed its main pillars of effort as Democracy, Human Rights, Security and Development.

Major policies and goals are outlined during the meeting of the General Assembly, which gathers annually at the foreign minister level. Regular activities are overseen by the Permanent Council that functions through the ambassadors appointed by the individual member countries. The Secretariat for Multidimensional Security is tasked with coordinating OAS actions against terrorism, illegal drugs, arms trafficking, anti-personnel mines, organized crime, gangs involved with criminal activity, WMD proliferation, and other security threats. The Secretariat is also responsible for developing confidence-building measures and other initiatives to ensure hemispheric stability and security.

The OAS has granted Permanent Observer Status to 67 states and the EU.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
www.osce.org

The OSCE consists of 57 countries from Europe, Central Asia, and North America. It also maintains “special relations” with 11 states in the Mediterranean Region, Asia and Australia. The OSCE calls itself the “world’s largest regional security organization.” It came into existence as a result of the 1 August 1975 Helsinki Final Act to serve as a forum for east–west dialogue during the era of Détente. OSCE has field operations in Southeastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus Region, and Central Asia. The OSCE seeks to address the politico-military, economic-environmental, and human dimensions of conflict. It serves as a forum for political negotiations and decision making in areas of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Efforts include activities in arms control, confidence and security-building measures, human rights, minority group integration, democratization, policing strategies, economic-environmental initiatives, and CT.
United Nations (UN)
www.un.org/en

Founded in 1945 at the end of World War II, the New York-based UN now consists of 193 countries. There are 30 organizations that make up the UN system and work to address the peacekeeping, humanitarian, and other goals of the organization. The organization describes four purposes:

1. Keep peace throughout the world
2. Develop friendly relations among nations
3. Help nations work together to improve the lives of poor people, to conquer hunger, disease and illiteracy, and to encourage respect for each other’s rights and freedoms
4. Serve as a center for harmonizing the actions of nations to achieve these goals

In 2006, the UN adopted the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, which “sent a clear message that terrorism in all its forms is unacceptable.” (UN) The strategy consists of four pillars. “These address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, preventing and combating terrorism, building States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism, and ensuring the respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.” (UN)

The UN is also involved with developing CT capacity within its member countries through the training of national criminal justice officials and the development of technology to assist in the effort. These approaches rely heavily on the effective application of the rule of law. In July 2005, the UN Secretary General established a Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force to coordinate CT efforts throughout the UN System. Chief among the initiatives is an online system for the exchange of CT information. The UN also plays a role in blocking terrorist funding networks through its coordination with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO)

The first UN peacekeepers were deployed in 1948 to monitor agreements between the new state of Israel and the surrounding Arab states. Over the years, the UN has undertaken 67 peacekeeping missions. During the early years, especially during the Cold War, UNPKO were limited in their scope, usually involving themselves with the enforcement of ceasefires and ensuring stability on the ground. Military observers and lightly armed troops employing confidence-building measures typically were the norm. The recent trend has been toward involving UNPKO in operations of greater complexity.

Tasks include government institutional reform; security sector reform; human rights monitoring; and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs (DDR) involving former combatants. There has also been a greater emphasis on addressing internal strife and civil wars. The required skill sets have also become more diverse. There exists a persistent need for individuals with nonmilitary skills such as administrators, economists, police officers, legal experts, de-miners, election observers, civil affairs and governance specialists, humanitarian workers, and strategic communicators.

As of 31 October 2012, the UN was involved in the following Peacekeeping Operations involving 81,319 troops, 13,627 police and 1,981 military observers from 115 countries:

1. Western Sahara
2. Darfur, Sudan
3. Kosovo
4. Cyprus
5. Lebanon
6. Syria
7. India and Pakistan
8. Haiti
9. Liberia
10. Cote d’Ivoire
11. Democratic Republic of the Congo
12. South Sudan
13. Abyei, Sudan
14. Middle East
15. Timor-Leste

Additionally, as of 30 September 2012, the UN was conducting Political and Peacebuilding Missions in 13 countries. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) remains under the direction of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. More than 2,100 persons, including local nationals, are included in Afghanistan. The other missions are:
1. Central African Republic
2. Libya
3. Lebanon
4. Middle East
5. Central Asia
6. West Africa
7. Sierra Leone
8. Guinea-Bissau
9. Gabon
10. Burundi
11. Somalia
12. Iraq

**UN Disaster Management Team (UNDMT)**

In coordination with the HN, the UNDMT operates through a resident coordinator who is tasked with establishing such a team in countries that have a history of disasters or national emergencies. The UNDMT facilitates information exchange and discussion of initiatives designed to mitigate the impact of catastrophic events. Plans enable the team to respond quickly to needs at national, regional, and district levels; install long-term recovery programs and future preparedness; and provide the necessary advice, technical resources, and supplies to manage the crisis. The team provides a focus for coordination, facilitating the exchange of information and the arrival at consensus on responding to disaster-related challenges.

Specific roles played by UNDMT include:

- a. Information-sharing
- b. Internal capacity building
- c. Ensuring quick response
- d. Enhancing partnerships
- e. Programming

As an example, the UNDMT in India (Figure 17) is made up of representatives from the following UN agencies: Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO); International Labor Organization (ILO); Development Program (UNDP); Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); Population Fund (UNFPA); High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); Children’s Fund (UNICEF); World Food Program (WFP); World Health Organization (WHO); and the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS).

**UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)**

Established on 28 March 2002, by the UN Security Council, UNAMA serves as the hub for international efforts to assist the recovery of Afghanistan. UNAMA operates under an annual renewal requirement; the
Security Council has renewed the UNAMA mandate March 2014.

According to that mandate, UNAMA is responsible to “promote peace and stability in Afghanistan by leading efforts of the international community in conjunction with the Government of Afghanistan in rebuilding the country and strengthening the foundations of peace and constitutional democracy.”

Afghanistan joined the UN on 19 November 1946. Because of its internal conditions, a long-term relationship has grown up between the country and the UN System and its NGO partners. UNAMA functions under the direction and with the support of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

It is guided, among other initiatives, by The Afghanistan Compact, a five-year plan to rebuild the country developed during the London Conference on Afghanistan from 31 January–1 February 2006. Also included are the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, the Paris Conference of June 2008, and the Afghanistan Conferences held in London in January 2010 and in Kabul in June 2010. UNAMA offers political advice and assists in institutional reform (government ministries, rule of law, security, economic and social development), the employment of Afghans in UN positions, building capacity across the elements of national governance, human rights initiatives, and reconstruction programs.

UN Afghan New Beginnings Program (ANBP)

www.undp.org.af/WhoWeAre/UNDPinAfghanistan/Projects/psl/prj_anbp.htm

The ANBP comes under the larger umbrella of the UN Development Program (UNDP). It was established in April 2003 to work with the Government of Afghanistan and its various international partners in the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of the Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) who operated under the direction of hundreds of war lords throughout the country.

The DDR Program was a product of coordination with the nation of Japan that provided funding and guidance in conjunction with the ANBP. While the true numbers in the AMF remain unknown, an early estimate set a broad range between 100,000 and 200,000 fighters. In early 2003, the ANBP set a goal of disarming 100,000. A ceremony in Kabul in July 2005 marked the conclusion of that phase of the DDR process.

During roughly the same period, the NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) teamed with the Afghan Ministry of Defense to conduct a Cantonment of Heavy Weapons also held by various war lords. The process began in December of 2003 and was successful in gathering and securing large numbers of tanks, artillery pieces, surface-to-surface rockets, and multiple-launch rocket systems. Since confirmed baseline numbers for fighters and weapons never existed, it is not possible to assess the ultimate success of either program. However, the coordinative efforts of the ANBP, Japan, and other participants did result in short-term efficiencies and established models for future cooperation.

The ANBP’s role in Afghanistan has expanded with the increased emphasis on Security Sector Reform and now plays major roles in the execution of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Specific areas of concern include:

1. Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (January 2005-March 2011)
3. DDR Program (2003-2006)

UN Development Program (UNDP)

www.undp.org

The UNDP (UN Development Program) is the UN’s global development network, an organization advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life. UNDP is on the ground in 166 countries and has been in Afghanistan for more than 50 years. During the time of the Taliban, the organization operated out of offices in Islamabad, Pakistan. In general, UNDP focuses on education and training, leadership skill development, institutional reform, accountability, and encouraging the inclusion of all stakeholders into the processes of governance.

Goals are clustered under the general areas of democratic governance, poverty reduction, crisis prevention and recovery, environment and energy, and HIV/AIDS.
Since 2007, UNDP has provided Afghanistan some $2.4 billion in aid; $768 million of that total came in 2010. These funds have been spent on the elections for president and national assembly, disarmament, reconstruction, institutional reform, security sector reform (police), and rural development.

**UN Mine Action Coordination Center for Afghanistan (UNMACCA)**

www.mineaction.org/org.asp?o=17

The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was established in October 1997. It serves as the UN System organization responsible for addressing all components of mine action. In the field, it provides mine-action support to areas affected by war, peacekeeping operations, and other humanitarian emergencies.

UNMAS operates in Afghanistan through UNMACCA, which maintains coordination with and receives policy guidance from the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The MOFA serves as the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) coordination hub for demining issues. In fact, the idea of mine action as a humanitarian responsibility began in Afghanistan in 1988/9. The Mine Action Program for Afghanistan began in 1989 with considerable assistance from partner NGOs. UNMACCA seeks to reduce human suffering and remove obstacles to development and reconstruction through all of the “pillars” of mine action: advocacy, demining (survey, marking, and clearance), stockpile destruction, mine risk education (MRE), and victim assistance (VA). The mine program is funded through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund.

The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) is one of the largest in the world because of the scope of the mine problem within the country. During the past two decades, some 12,000 hazard areas have been cleared throughout Afghanistan. The UNMACCA works through Area Mine Action Centres (AMACs) in Herat, Jalalabad, Mazar, Kunduz, Gardez, and Kandahar.

**UN World Food Program (WFP)**

www.wfp.org

Characterized as the “world’s largest humanitarian agency,” the UN’s WFP affects some 90 million hungry people in 80 countries every year. Much of the effort is focused on the world’s refugees and displaced persons. Over the years, the WFP has developed the capacity to react quickly to crises and is able to move into unstable situations to provide relief. It relies on a system of aircraft, ships, helicopters, trucks, and pack animals to assist in delivering supplies to those in need. WFP has developed the capacity and skill sets to address issues such as Food Security Analysis, Nutrition, Food Procurement, and Logistics to address worldwide hunger. Their current strategic plan lays out five objectives:

1. Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies
2. Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation efforts
3. Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations
4. Reduce chronic hunger and malnutrition
5. Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase

**UN World Health Organization (WHO)**

www.who.int/en

The WHO is the lead agency for coordination and management of health issues within the UN system. It focuses on specific health issues, research agendas, public health standards, technical assistance to countries in need, and health policy development. Its involvement on the ground in countries around the world has as its priorities: promoting general social, economic, and governmental development; fostering health security; strengthening health systems; harnessing research and information flow; enhancing partnerships with HN authorities and other IGOs and NGOs; and improving the performance of international and national healthcare systems. The WHO maintains an extensive agenda of health topics and assistance programs that result in a strong local presence, particularly within struggling countries and territories.

**World Bank**

www.worldbank.org

Though not a bank in the traditional sense, the organization is made up of 188 members who provide
technical and financial assistance to developing countries. Its collective mission is to reduce the impact of global poverty while seeking to improve living standards around the world. The World Bank works through two component development institutions, the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). It also includes three other members of the World Bank Group, the International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Guarantee Agency, and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Collectively, the World Bank structure provides low-interest loans and no-interest credit and grants to encourage reform and development of education institutions, health systems, infrastructure, communications initiatives, and other pressing challenges to improve the quality of life and stability of developing nations. Clearly, the World Bank can and does play a major role in the Development Pillar of U.S. Foreign Policy.

World Bank International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)

As one of the two components of the World Bank, the IBRD is concerned with middle income and credit-worthy poor countries who are struggling to improve their situations. It was established in 1944 as the first World Bank Group institution and is structured as a cooperative that is owned and operated for the benefit of its membership. IBRD issued its first bonds in 1947 and has since established itself as a major presence within the world’s financial markets where it raises most of its funding. Its purpose is to encourage sustainable growth through loans, financial guarantees, risk management services, and advisory assistance. It works in 188 countries.

World Bank International Development Association (IDA)
www.worldbank.org/ida

The IDA focuses on the very poorest countries in the world. It was established in 1960 and seeks to address world poverty through interest-free credits and grants to stimulate economic growth within the most challenging environments. Assistance programs are designed to improve equality and upgrade living conditions. IDA works in 172 countries and lends to 81 countries, nearly half of which are in Africa. It serves as the major source of donor funds for those countries. Since its establishment, IDA has issued loans, credits and grants in excess of $238 billion.

World Trade Organization (WTO)
www.wto.org

Established on 1 January 1995, the WTO serves as the only global international organization that focuses on the rules of trade between nations. Though a relatively young organization, it traces its roots to the 1948 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the 1986–1994 Uruguay Round of International Trade Negotiations and earlier negotiations under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO currently hosts new negotiations known as the “Doha Development Agenda” that were launched in 2001. The broad purpose of the WTO is to assist trade to flow as freely as possible while mitigating any negative consequences of that trade. Special attention is paid to social and environmental concerns. To accomplish its goals, the WTO performs three basic roles: a forum for negotiations, the keeper of the sets of rules that emerge from negotiations, and a venue for the settlement of trade disputes. The WTO is made up of 157 countries.

Additional Selected IGOs

Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
www.apec.org

Association of Southeast Nations Regional Forum (ARF) www.state.gov/j/ct/intl/io/arf/index.htm

Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
www.ifrc.org

International Organization for Migration (IOM)
www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home.html

Organization of American States/Inter-America Committee Against Terrorism (OAS/CICTE)
www.oas.org/en/sms/cicte/default.asp
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)

NGOs are independent, mostly privately funded and managed organizations whose purposes are to improve the human condition by applying their collective skills while gathering and distributing needed resources. Given earlier discussions in this manual about the increasing role of civilian power, it should be obvious that engagement with NGOs represents an important component in the development efforts of U.S. Foreign Policy, specifically the USAID.

Typically they are on the ground when U.S. and partner nation military forces arrive and are likely to remain after the outside military assistance has departed. Once again, each brings its own set of goals, expectations, cultures, procedures, and experiences to the effort. Some pursue very aggressive public agendas and conduct sophisticated public relations programs to promote their organization, raise funds, and shape public opinion. Those who do so introduce an important variable for those involved with public affairs and information operations.

The following NGOs are a frequent presence in countries around the world. Because of the huge numbers of NGOs registered around the world, this list is by no means exhaustive. The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (www.un.org/en/ecosoc/) identifies around 3,500 NGOs who hold “Consultive Status” with the council. Again, this is not a complete list, but is important because it’s a safe assumption that NGOs closely linked with the UN are likely to have an established presence in an operational environment.

Though incomplete, the following organizations do provide a sense of the variety of NGOs and the focus of NGO interests toiling within an AO. Some may not seem relevant to military operations, but they do share space with military forces as both pursue their objectives within the AO. If possible, the harmonization of those objectives is an essential early step in any operation. Frequently, awareness of specific NGOs and their purpose only emerges from direct contact.

Africare
www.africare.org
Established in 1970, the U.S.-based Africare organization is the oldest and largest African-American led organization in the field of development. It has provided more than $1 billion in aid through 2,500 projects. It focuses its work within 36 countries across Africa. Its four priority areas of concern include health (with particular focus on HIV/AIDS); food security and agriculture; water, sanitation and hygiene; and emergency response. Complementary activities include emergency humanitarian assistance, environmental management, microenterprise development, women’s empowerment, and civil-society development and governance.

Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
www.crs.org
The CRS was founded in 1943 by the Catholic Bishops of the United States in anticipation of the end of World War II and the relief care that would be required by its survivors. Over time the CRS effort expanded and has now reached more than 100 million people in nearly 100 countries on five continents. Its purpose is to develop and implement innovative solutions to persistent problems such as poverty, hunger, drought, disease and emergencies. Its operations and policies of inclusiveness are typical of religious-based NGOs. Areas of focus include disaster response, disease eradication, antipoverty programs, and society infrastructure building.
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE)
www.care.org

As with many NGOs, CARE was founded in 1945 to provide help to the survivors of World War II. Its efforts have expanded over the years, and the organization now has international member organizations based in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. Its worldwide reach enables it to respond quickly to the needs of the survivors of war and natural disaster. On a sustained basis, CARE focuses on developing self-help skills particularly by working through poor women. This approach is based on the organization’s firm belief that, equipped with appropriate resources, women have the power to help whole families and communities to address poverty and other persistent problems. It is concerned with improving educational opportunities, providing access to clean water and sanitation, encouraging economic development, and protecting natural resources. CARE describes itself as “facilitating for lasting change” by strengthening capacity for self-help; providing economic opportunity; delivering relief in emergencies; influencing policy decisions at all levels; and addressing discrimination in all its forms.

Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
www.doctorswithoutborders.org

Originally established in 1971 by French doctors and journalists, MSF today provides aid to people in nearly 70 countries affected by violence, neglect, and catastrophe brought about by armed conflict, epidemics, malnutrition, exclusion from healthcare, or natural disasters. MSF is vocal in its public statements and reports about situations it encounters, communicating through what it calls “bearing witness and speaking out.” It is very clear in maintaining its independence, to include through its funding. Some 90 percent of its financial support comes from private sources (U.S. funding is 100 percent private). In 2009, MSF had 3.8 million individual donors and private funders throughout the world. The organization is known for its strong position of neutrality whereby it does not take sides and seeks independent access to victims of violence as mandated under international humanitarian law. MSF received the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize for its work.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
www.icrc.org

Henry Dunant founded the Red Cross in 1863. The pioneer organization became the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movements that are committed to assisting the victims of war and internal violence. The history of the ICRC parallels the development of modern humanitarian law and the development of the rules of warfare. During World War I, national societies of the Red Cross provided ambulances to assist the wounded. At that time, the Red Cross also opened the International POW Agency, expanding its influence in the development of the rules of war. In the wake of World War II, the ICRC assisted in the drafting of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and two additional protocols in 1977. Today the ICRC is a major presence in providing healthcare, economic security, and water and habitat assistance all over the world. It remains a leader in promoting International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Humanitarian Diplomacy, and Mine Action. Based in Geneva, Switzerland, the ICRC employs some 12,000 people working in 80 countries. Specific programs targeted on victims of war and natural disaster include visiting detainees; protecting civilians; safeguarding healthcare; ensuring access to basic healthcare; and building respect for the law.

Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM)
www.oxfam.org

OXFAM represents an alliance of 17 “like-minded organizations” operating in concert with some 3,000 local partners in more than 90 countries. Their collective purpose is to improve the human condition by alleviating poverty and providing relief to victims of war and natural disasters. They work from the belief that “respect for human rights will lift people out of poverty.” They’ve identified as basic human rights the right to a livelihood; basic services; to be safe from harm; to be heard; and be treated with equality. OXFAM issues include active citizenship, agriculture, aid effectiveness, climate change, education, emergency response, gender justice, HIV and AIDS, healthcare, indigenous and minority rights, natural resources, peace and security, private sector functioning, trade, and youth outreach. Of particular note is the OXFAM commitment to serve as a voice for the disadvantaged. It is very open about
its goal to “raise public awareness” through international “campaigns” for fair trade, universal healthcare and education, agricultural reform, climate change, and arms control. It maintains offices in many of the world’s major capitals and specifically targets world leaders and organizations such as the G-7, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, United Nations, EU, and the WTO. The purpose of these lobbying programs is to encourage decisions OXFAM feels are necessary to improve the world’s quality of life. It is also involved with policy research and policy initiatives.

Refugees International (RI)
www.refugeesinternational.org

Based in Washington, D.C., RI is dedicated to providing humanitarian assistance and protection for displaced persons around the world. It began its efforts in 1979 as a citizen’s movement to protect refugees in Indochina. The organization estimates that there are more than 42.5 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world who are fleeing from the conditions of war and internal oppression. RI also reports the existence of some 12 million stateless persons. In addition to the human cost, those conditions also contribute to international instability. Working with local governments, IGOs, and other NGOs in some 24 countries, RI conducts 15-20 field missions every year in an effort to provide solutions to the plight of those displaced. RI regards nationality as a “fundamental human right and a foundation of identity, dignity, justice, peace and personal security.” RI’s basic services include providing food, water, healthcare, shelter, access to education, and protection from harm. Displacement of people is increasingly caused by weather-related disasters, environment disruption, and climate change.

Save the Children (SC/USA)
www.savethechildren.org

Working through the International Save the Children Alliance, SC/USA defines its area of influence as encompassing more than 120 countries with some 64 million children and several millions more local parents, community members, local organizations, and government agencies. It divides its focus among six continents. SC/USA responds to war and natural disasters as well as addressing the consequences of political, economic, and social upheaval. Save the Children assists in rebuilding communities by providing food, medical care and education, and by working with local infrastructure to develop long-term recovery programs. In addition to devastation wrought by natural disasters and civil disorder, Save the Children works to mitigate the scourges of poverty, hunger, illiteracy and disease.

World Vision
www.worldvision.org

World Vision is a Christian-inspired NGO supporting some 100 million people within nearly 100 countries organized by region (Europe and the Middle East, Asia and Pacific, Africa, Central, and South America). It also conducts child poverty relief programs in the United States. Its efforts focus on children and the development of strong families by addressing the broad conditions of poverty and providing assistance in response to disasters. Its earliest involvement in Afghanistan came in 1956 as it worked through the Kabul Christian Church. After the fall of the Taliban government, World Vision established a comprehensive program that began operating in 2002. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, World Vision works to provide clean water, irrigation, health clinics, and pre- and post-natal care. The organization relies on some 40,000 staff members, 97 percent of whom work in their home countries.

World Association of Nongovernmental Organizations (WANO)
www.wango.org

Based in the U.S., the WANGO is interesting as it represents an effort to organize the diverse NGO community to increase its collective effectiveness. There are other such organizations pursuing similar agendas. It began with 16 international NGOs and now counts members from more than 140 countries. Its first stated purpose is to “unite NGOs worldwide in the cause of advancing world peace, as well as well-being at all levels—individual, family, tribal, national, and world.” WANGO also promotes itself as attempting to “give greater voice to smaller NGOs beyond their national borders, including NGOs from developing countries and countries with economies in transition.” WANGO supports its membership with NGO listings for networking, training seminars and conferences, and various publications
that address issues of interest to their NGO membership. WANGO is not the only such group that serves as an organizing community for NGOs. Thus an understanding of NGOs, how and where they function, and the nature of their goals is obtainable from such NGO collectives.

Additional Selected NGOs

Academy for Educational Development (AED)  
www.aed.org

American Council for Voluntary Action (Interaction)  
www.interaction.org

American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)  
www.afsc.org

American Refugee Committee (ARC)  
www.arcrelief.org/site/PageServer

Church World Service (CWS)  
www.churchworldservice.org

International Alliance Against Hunger (IAAH)  
www.alliancetoendhunger.org/
creating-global-connections/
international-alliance/

International Medical Corps (IMC)  
www.imcworldwide.org

International Rescue Committee (IRC)  
www.theirc.org

Mercy Corps  
www.mercycorps.org

Partners for the Americas (POA)  
www.partners.net/partners/Default_EN.asp

Project Hope (HOPE)  
www.projecthope.org

Salvation Army World Service Office (SA/WSO)  
www.sawso.org

Stop Hunger Now  
www.stophungernow.org/site/PageServer

U.S. Association for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (USA for UNHCR)  
www.usaforunhcr.org

International Support for Afghanistan: A Case Study

If nothing else, the commitment of the international community to the challenge of rebuilding Afghanistan in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. presents a useful example of the complexities in place to challenge the special operations warrior. Figure 18 captures a flavor of the international presence.

As the Taliban regime crumbled throughout the country, members of the international community, sponsored by the UN, gathered in Bonn, Germany to discuss the way ahead.

The product of their work is called the “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institution,” better known as the “Bonn Agreement” or “Bonn 1.” It established a timeline for the establishment of an elected government and an overview of the tasks necessary to accomplish that very specific objective.

The Afghan Presidential Election of October 2004, the inauguration of President Hamid Karzai in December 2004, the National Assembly Election of September 2005, and the seating of the National Assembly in December 2005 accomplished many of the goals of the agreement.

As part of the Bonn Agreement Process, the UN and many in the international community committed themselves to various specific tasks to assist in bringing stability to Afghanistan. The interagency door opened wide as many in the world saw an opportunity to display their capabilities to help out. In addition to the U.S. and other traditional international players, new partner countries made commitments.

The commitments included Mongolia, which undertook the mission of training Afghan artillerymen because of their experience with the Soviet-era equipment used by the Afghan National Army (ANA). The NATO-led ISAF (www.nato.int/ISAF/index.html), established by the Bonn Agreement to secure Kabul and its surroundings, swelled to some 40 countries as nonmember countries signed on to assist.
Traditionally NATO has restricted its activities to the geographic boundaries of its member countries. The alliance is guided by the provisions of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Interestingly, the only invocation of Article 5 came in response to the 2001 attacks on the United States. Over the decades, NATO has largely stayed away from direct military involvement in security missions considered to be outside of its geographical boundaries or “out of area.” Thus Afghanistan has been an entirely new experience for the collective alliance and the other military forces, although certainly not for the U.S. and other countries acting alone or in concert outside NATO.

Although exercised for generations and put to the test in limited initiatives since the end of the Cold War, NATO procedures are being used in an extended operation for the first time in Afghanistan. The challenges increased as NATO forces expanded the ISAF mandate to other parts of the country, as envisioned in the Bonn Agreement, and assumed new missions such as combat operations in the southern regions of the country.

In addition to ISAF, the original Coalition Force remained operational and continued the fight against Taliban remnants, al-Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations.

Reform of the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) and ANA became the responsibility of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A), a U.S.-led multinational organization operating from a tiny corner of a small compound in Kabul. OMC-A became the Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan (OSC-A) in July 2005 when it assumed responsibility for the reform of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), the Afghan National Police (ANP), and other law enforcement organizations.

Figure 18. International Support for Afghanistan
With the addition of new missions and more partners working on both MOD and MOI reform, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) emerged, taking over the entire compound. The expansion of USG, partner nation, and IGO involvement was having a very visible impact. The lead IGO for the entire Afghan effort is the UN and its various UN system agencies identified earlier.

Currently, Afghan security-sector reform is under the direction of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A).

In addition to the activities of the UN, NATO, IGOs, U.S., and other partner nations, many hundreds of NGOs are deployed throughout Afghanistan and have been for decades. Structures have emerged such as PRTs and VSO to respond to the security and development challenges through the mobilization of diverse skill and resource assets. All of these players actively coordinate with each other to gain the greatest effects from their activities.

Over the years, separate bilateral relationships have developed between various countries and the Afghan government. This was to be expected given the strong emphasis on hospitality within the Afghan culture. Many, if not most, of these arrangements exist outside the established organizations and protocols governing the reform of the Afghan Security Forces (ANA and ANP) and other government ministries.

Thus mentors from NTM-A, various IGOs and NGOs, and individual countries might be working alongside each other to reform the same functional area. Sometimes Afghan officials suddenly depart for training in another country without the knowledge of those with the responsibility for the reform mission.

While none of these activities is ill-intentioned, they do represent a significant disruption of the unity of effort described within the Bonn Agreement and other protocols developed over the years. It is not likely to remain an unusual case as the number of countries, IGOs, and NGOs willing to invest human and material resources into an Afghan-like situation grows.

The coordination requirements for the special operations warrior working with the USG interagency and other players will only become more complicated in such environments.
Chapter 4. Navigating the Interagency Environment

As we have seen, navigating the USG interagency process represents a demanding exercise in relationship building, cooperation, and coordination. It involves a mosaic of different capabilities, resources, organizational cultures, agendas, and ways of doing business. Experience with these complexities teaches that working the USG interagency process can be confusing and frustrating. That becomes even truer when interacting with the representatives and agendas of the HN, coalition and partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

But experience also proves that the successful achievement of national security objectives is not possible without the skillful navigation of the USG interagency process. No department, agency, or organization can do it all without assistance. The recognition of the “Three Pillars” of National Security and U.S. Foreign Policy—Defense, Diplomacy, and Development—and SOF’s unique role in possessing skills in each of those functional areas has proven to be an important step in effectively applying all the elements of national power where required.

For that special operations warrior on the ground overseas, the functioning of the USG interagency community is more than a theoretical background study. What the USG interagency process produces in Washington, D.C. has a direct practical impact on what takes place overseas. The major outputs generated by the USG interagency processes are presidential decisions, policy guidance, strategic direction, and national security objectives translated into plans that are then provided to the operators on the ground.

As noted in Chapter 1, the specifics of interagency structure, policy, and procedures will inevitably change from time to time for a variety of reasons including the preferences of different presidents, the emergence of new issues, and the nature of the security threats facing the nation.

In general, however, the principles of the USG interagency process remain the same. For instance, the structure and functioning of the NSC remains familiar, even as administrations and political parties exchange power. However, there will be differences in other areas such as participants, numbers of IPCs, procedures, and work flow. Terminology will often change as each president’s administration adds its own particular flavor to the vernacular.

Additionally, individual USG departments, agencies, and organizations are continuously seeking new ways to approach the interagency challenge, resulting in fresh bureaus and offices, working groups, and programs that must be accounted for. Thus the reality of inevitable change within the interagency process demands flexibility and a strong sense of situation awareness by all participants.

Chapters 2 and 3 discussed the added complexity that comes from extending the reach of the USG interagency process overseas and then interacting with many players from outside the USG interagency community. Even under the best conditions, the introduction of HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs demands that the special operations warrior remains focused on the CT objective while accommodating an array of differing and sometimes competing agendas.

What is encouraging is that in recent years, many traditional and potential partner nations have begun to employ their own versions of whole-of-government approaches, particularly when creating infrastructure and in responding to terrorist threats. There is an emerging consensus internationally that all the elements of national power have roles to play in CT scenarios.

With so much evolving HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO expertise present in any given AO, it is possible to face situations in which solutions seem to be in search of problems to solve. Random problem solving
may provide immediate returns, but is rarely helpful in the intermediate or long term.

At such times, an individual’s interagency skills can assist in defining shared long-term goals and orchestrating the resources to address them. The objective becomes to establish shared goals and then to chart a path that ensures unity of effort to achieve them as efficiently as possible.

In such an environment, it becomes tempting to make promises about resources and funding, especially to HN officials. It is generally not wise to do so unless there is confidence that you can keep the promises you have made.

An IGO official was once speaking to a group of senior Afghan military and police officials in Kabul about what assistance his organization can provide. A member of the audience aggressively challenged the official on what he charged was a failure of his specific IGO to make good on an earlier promise.

According to the Afghan, the IGO promised—or appeared to promise—that each family in several

villages would be provided a laptop computer. The questioner wondered why the IGO never delivered any computers, providing instead a goat and sheep to each family.

One could argue that in a country of 80 percent illiteracy and no or unreliable electrical service, a goat and a sheep would provide a very helpful contribution to improving each family’s quality of life—more so, it would seem, than a laptop computer.

Regardless, the perceived promise of laptops was not fulfilled. This outcome challenged the credibility of the specific IGO and the effectiveness of others working to improve living conditions in that district.

The critical skills—both within and outside the USG interagency process—are to learn the various cultures, identify the problems, understand the needs to be met, and encourage as many players as possible to invest in the effort to assure success. Adaptability is essential, as few situations allow for templated solutions.

Information, Influence, Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Credibility & Social Media

One of the challenges of the 21st Century operational environment has been the need to conduct continuous, full-spectrum information and influence operations in support of both direct and indirect CT activities. Traditional distinctions between public affairs (focusing on news media) and military information support operations (MISO)/psychological operations (PSYOPS) (focusing on indigenous populations) have given way to the reality that anyone with a smartphone (and there are hundreds of millions—if not billions—of such devices) is transformed into a “reporter” with the capability to communicate immediate personal observations supported by instantaneous photographs and video of events. Unfortunately, it is too often the case that efforts to address these variables in the information and influence environment are distracted by debates over terms and responsibilities. Too often confusion is present when definitions appear to be applied without clear distinctions in meaning.

As mentioned earlier, the importance of operating successfully in contemporary information and influence environments was made clear in the QDDR when Public Diplomacy was declared to be a “core diplomatic mission.” The serving Under Secretary of State, Ms. Tara Sonenshine, described her job in a speech on 28 June 2012 as “working at the intersection of communications and international policy.” This description speaks to the need to have Public Diplomacy initiatives, supported by the wider USG interagency influence establishment, align with U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.

As expressed in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, “in some cases we may convey our ideas and messages through person-to-person engagement, other times through the power of social media, and in every case through the message of our deeds.” Thus it is essential that the gap between what we say and what we are doing (the so-called “Say-Do Gap”) is kept as narrow as possible. New concepts in influence such
as Community Diplomacy, Cultural Diplomacy and Development Diplomacy offer fresh ideas on how to establish relationships with indigenous and partner populations and to provide links between information and influence campaigns and the effects brought about by the “Three Pillars” of Defense, Diplomacy and Development.

“Stories” with a precise beginning, middle and end, have yielded to detailed narratives that can reach back centuries for their resonance. Frequently, to our collective frustration, our adversaries have demonstrated an incredibly sophisticated understanding of the information and influence process.

Any discussion of the interagency process must include the global information and ideas environment in which all CT operations take place. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism acknowledges this information environment “which often involves unique challenges requiring specialized CT approaches.” After all, every player present—adversaries, affected populations, IGOs, NGOs, etc.—has its own perspective, perceptions, and narratives to explain what they are experiencing. It has become more difficult than ever to “speak with one voice”, but no less important to do so.

Even as the special operations warrior is interacting within the USG interagency process and with officials from the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs, there are “evaluators” present in the form of the local, national, and international news media. There are also those “citizen journalists” empowered by their mobile and “smart” phones.

Regardless of the measurements of success defined by the USG interagency process or agreed to by other participants, modern journalists—to include those who inhabit the realm of social media—tend to define their own standards and to judge performance through their own filters.

Thus it should not be surprising to discover that a persistent gap exists between what the USG interagency community and its international partners know to be happening and what the various domestic and international publics believe is going on. News and social media scrutiny introduces an important variable into the interagency navigation process that cannot be ignored.

The achievement and sustainment of credibility in the CT effort are essential. Since it is clearly not possible for the special operations warrior to speak personally with each citizen of the HN, U.S., or other countries, communicating credibly through the news media, social media, and other stakeholders is a task essential to establishing the legitimacy of any initiative.

The information and communication challenge is to keep as narrow as possible that gap between what is being reported by the news media or discussed by various influential opinion leaders and what is happening within the AO. The need for accuracy and candor by both the communicator and the news media is an essential requirement. This is because support—especially from the indigenous population—is essential to the successful accomplishment of CT operations. If the narrative developed by the news and social media persists in inaccuracies or negativity, either because of the flow of events or individual bias, public support will surely wane.

It has long been understood that the explanation and communication support of foreign policy and military activities is best achieved by consistency of message or, as it is better known, speaking with one voice. To achieve this goal, the Country Team is supported by the work of the Public Affairs officer who is then backed up by the DOS Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and the wider USG strategic communication community.

All USG Public Affairs programs are part of a collective interagency effort that seeks to provide accurate information to the news and social media while providing context and meaning through carefully crafted and coordinated strategic messaging.

The National Framework for Strategic Communication, signed by President Obama and submitted to the U.S. Congress under the provisions of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, acknowledged that there is a “need to clarify what strategic communication means and how we guide and coordinate our communication efforts.” Interestingly, in December 2012, DOD announced that it was dropping the term “strategic communication”, but not the effort to develop the most credible and effective communication initiatives. However, “strategic communication” continues to be used in other
areas of the USG Interagency influence structure and internationally by NATO, the UN and others. Thus it would be wise not to become distracted from the need for effective messaging simply because of definitional discomfort.

Given the uncertainty over the precise meaning of strategic communication, the National Framework for Strategic Communication describes the process as the “synchronization of our words and deeds as well as deliberate efforts to communicate and engage with intended audiences.” This attempt at a definition is particularly useful for the special operations warrior as it reminds all players that the “say-do gap” must also be kept as narrow as possible to prevent the loss of credibility in the eyes of the HN population, government, regional audiences, partner nations, IGOs, NGOs and other stakeholders.

More precisely, the negative consequences of even the best-intentioned efforts cannot be explained away by denials of responsibility, clever marketing slogans, or other persuasive techniques. Above all, it is necessary to be aware of what is being said about the efforts of the USG, HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs within an AO. Awareness of what is being said does not imply acceptance of the content; but it does allow for the development and implementation of appropriate influence initiatives that affirm, challenge, or ignore that content depending on the circumstances.

Unity of effort for the USG influence effort originates within the White House with the Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication (DNSA/SC) and the principal deputy DNSA/SC, the Senior Director of Global Engagement (SDGE). Deliberate communication and engagement efforts are worked through the National Security Staff Directorate for Global Engagement (NSS/GE) and through the Interagency Policy Committee for Strategic Communication (IPC/SC). The DNSA/SC and SDGE chair the IPC/SC. The Interagency Policy Committee for Global Engagement (IPC/GE) also plays a critical role within the NSS on matters of strategic communication. Thus at least two IPCs within the National Security Council Structure have an impact on USG interagency strategic communication activities.

Within the wider USG interagency community (see discussions in Chapter 1), the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs serves as the central coordination hub. That individual works with functional and regional bureaus within the DOS to coordinate and create integration among policy, communication, and engagement objectives.

A variety of organizations and programs within DOS, DOD, and other USG agencies play critical roles within the interagency process to ensure the most credible and influential strategic communication effects. Some of these include the following:

a. Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (DOS)
b. The DOS Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, which provides long-term strategic planning and performance measurements www.state.gov/r/ppr/
c. Bureau of International Information Programs
d. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
e. Bureau of Public Affairs
f. Public Affairs Officers on Country Teams
g. Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications (White House)
h. Various Defense Support for Public Diplomacy initiatives
i. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
j. DOD’s Global Strategic Engagement Team
k. NCTC’s Radicalization and Extremist Messaging Group
l. Office of Strategic Communications and Outreach
m. Office of Partnerships (CSO)
n. SelectUSA Initiative (DOC)
p. Bureau of Consular Affairs (DOS)
q. Broadcasting Board of Governors, who are responsible for USG nonmilitary, international broadcasting to include, among others, the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio and TV Marti, and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks Radio Sawa and Alhurra Television

These organizations and programs, along with other efforts are coordinated, as appropriate, with the USAID, IC, NCTC, and other interagency members.
The distribution of common strategic messages and public affairs guidance assists all USG departments, agencies, and organizations to breed consistency into their unilateral and collective information programs. The ultimate goal is to sustain a single-voiced relationship with the news and social media and with other relevant national and international audiences.

It is a difficult challenge, one made even more so by the introduction of scores — perhaps hundreds — of HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO voices and agendas that are competing for exposure. It is important to remember that each serves a variety of stakeholders who provide both active and passive support. The interest of each stakeholder must be accounted for within the many disparate media relations programs that are in play.

The information and influence environment is made even more complex by the presence of sophisticated terrorist propaganda initiatives that skew the truth while frequently attracting sympathetic news and social media coverage. As a result, extremists have become quite skillful in shaping narratives in ways to animate grievances and attract new recruits. Thus the difficult challenge of synchronizing all the information agendas within the USG interagency process is just a first step toward establishing and sustaining a credible agenda internationally where both friendly voices and enemy propaganda compete for finite air time and column inches.

Experience teaches that pursuing complete strategic message control in such an environment is usually a waste of time. Some participants such as the HN, partner nations, and some IGOs may be willing to coordinate some messages to improve their effectiveness. However, those other players must also serve constituencies that are not relevant to the USG agenda and who must be addressed separately.

IGOs and NGOs frequently present special challenges as many operate sophisticated Web sites and frequently issue their own reports on their own progress and that of others within the AO. Those in the USG who are used to the comfort of speaking with one voice are often shaken by what those assessments assert and the degree of instant credibility they are often afforded by the national and international news media, especially if they appear to contradict official USG positions.

When such reports are not supportive of CT operations within the AO or are inconsistent with ongoing USG strategic messaging, they are frequently cited by the news media as evidence of policy failure by the USG and its various partners.

During the summer of 2004, a dispute between Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières-MSF) and the Coalition operating within Afghanistan caused the NGO to withdraw its representatives from the country. The squabble focused on what the NGO felt was an unacceptable threat to its personnel because of the appearance similarity between vehicles they used and those driven by the Coalition. MSF believed that the vehicles used by their representatives had become indistinguishable from the military’s and thus placed them in increased danger.

A similar episode took place in the summer of 2008 when aid workers from Refugees International were murdered by Taliban forces near Kabul, causing the NGO to leave the country.

In both cases, the announcement of NGO withdrawals led to flurries of reports in which the news media, many reporting from far outside the country, amplified the circumstances and drew conclusions about the poor state of security in the country that may or may not have been accurate.

Considering these and other cases, those USG personnel involved with Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy, and Information Operations should be attentive to the chorus of potentially conflicting voices present in the AO and prepare contingencies for addressing their impact on public perceptions.

But information and influence initiatives should also actively engage the environment, pursuing what the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs calls the “Strategic Imperatives for 21st Century Public Diplomacy”:

1. **Shape the Narrative**
2. **Expand and Strengthen People-to-People Relationships**
3. **Combat Violent Extremism**
4. **Ensure Better-Informed Policy Making**
5. **Deploy Resources In Line with Current Priorities**
The USG Interagency Community Way Ahead

Considerable effort has gone into formalizing the structure, work flow, and cohesion of the USG interagency process. Even so, that process frequently remains uncertain in its purpose and direction while remaining confusing in its complexity.

By its very nature, the USG interagency process remains a coordinative system that largely depends on the relationship-building skills of individuals for its success. What is required for that success is for leadership to take the initiative within the midst of uncertainty and imprecise direction. Experience teaches that such steps do not always happen.

Institutional and personal credibility are essential to functioning successfully within the interagency process. Those who are the most responsive, provide the best databases, listen closely, craft the most perceptive assessments, and present the most promising options are most likely to have the greatest positive impact.

Major strategic and operational challenges remain to cut through the stovepipes that flow vertically through the traditional management practices of individual USG departments, agencies, and organizations. The goal is to ensure inclusion of the relevant skill sets, experiences, and resources needed to address the most pressing security challenges. Ideally, the steps taken during the functioning of the USG interagency process will fit the appropriate expertise to the specific problem.

Predictably, the special operations warrior within the AO will face situations that do not fit traditional military problem-solving models. Even those most skilled and experienced within the SOF community will face expertise limitations from time to time.

For instance, special operations warriors are not necessarily well positioned to offer advice to local mayors on how to interact effectively with village councils and community opinion leaders to build a consensus for action in a given situation. Others within the USG and throughout the private sector, however, have those experiences and can contribute if properly engaged and deployed to where they are needed. In their absence, however, such responsibilities frequently fall to the special operations warrior who is immediately available.

Thus the broad question remains how best to gather the necessary human and material resources and set them on the path to achieve the nation’s national security objectives. The USG interagency process has progressed to some extent in precisely defining those objectives. Recent discussions about Civilian Power and the interaction of the “Three Pillars” of Defense, Diplomacy and Development are encouraging.

Shortcomings remain, however, in determining how the interagency process should improve the efficiency of information exchanges; technology interface; analysis; assessment; development of policy options and operational courses of action; anticipation of consequences; presentation of recommendations; the translation of strategic guidance, policies, and Presidential decisions into workable operational plans; and the management and adaptation of those plans once introduced into the operational environment.

Put another way, how does the USG most efficiently and effectively employ all of the elements of national power (DIME-FIL: diplomatic, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence, and law enforcement) to address specifically the threats posed by terrorism overseas?

In the absence of standardized USG interagency work flow and coordination procedures, gaining agreement in identifying shared end states remains a challenge. This situation is particularly true overseas where HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO influences beyond the USG interagency community inevitably complicate the factors of where we are going (goals), how we are getting there (ways), and how we are going to resource the effort (means).

For instance, those from the international community assisting with the institutional reform of HN parliaments or national assemblies inevitably bring with them their own knowledge and expectations of how the systems function within their own home countries. An American mentor relying on U.S. congressional history as a backdrop will offer different advice than someone from a parliamentary tradition or individuals from several different parliamentary traditions.
Faced with what appears to be conflicting guidance, HN officials sincerely trying to develop the most effective representative democracy for their own country may find themselves receiving different and perhaps conflicting advice on how legislative bodies “should” work.

The presence of representatives from several different military forces — each with its own doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures — introduces similar confusion when all are advising the same HN military using their own familiar points of reference. The problem is compounded when those from different services from within the U.S. military and those of other countries train the HN more narrowly on “how we do it” in our service or, more narrowly, on our base.

Whether domestically or internationally, the USG interagency process seeks to achieve efficiencies by leveraging diverse human and material resources toward a shared end state. Part of the effort involves minimizing task duplication and structural redundancy. Complete elimination of either is not possible, resulting in frustration who try to do so.

While horizontal coordination is necessary within the USG interagency process, it is essential within the AO.

In the absence of the familiar unity of command, the special operations warrior must learn to work within an interagency process guided by lead agencies pursuing a unity of effort or, in some cases, the even-softer unity of purpose.

As always, individual and organizational credibility is gained through producing results. Operating within the USG interagency process requires a difficult balancing act between loyalty to one’s own home agency and allegiance to the objectives of U.S. policy. Understandably, that loyalty to home agency is a powerful motivator, one correctly viewed as essential to self-preservation.

Those seeking to improve the functioning of the USG interagency process must wrestle with that reality and others. The USG interagency process is in a condition very similar to the one that led to the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433). Goldwater-Nichols reorganized the DOD and redirected the efforts of the U.S. defense community.

Though shortcomings remain, the DOD is a vastly more efficient defender of U.S. national security than it was 27 years ago. The process has taken time, as will any broader effort to bring similar reform to the entire USG interagency structure.

Though complex in its provisions, Goldwater-Nichols answered the basic question, “Who’s in charge?” Such clarity would quickly boost the effectiveness of the USG interagency process. Establishing responsibility within any context enables the reform of relationship-building, coordination, and work flow shortfalls.

It also leads to a harmonization of organizational or “tribal” cultures, but not their replacement. If done well, establishing clear responsibility and follow-on reform initiatives will improve interagency flexibility and responsiveness by creating consistency. It has worked in the IATF structures and can, with effort, in more complex organizations.

Just as many countries display maps that portray themselves as the center of their region or of the entire world, many participants regard the USG interagency process with themselves as the central point of focus. Thus the question for them becomes, How does the interagency process support my department, agency, or organization?

It is the wrong question. Rather we should ask how the interagency process can better support the achievement of U.S. national security objectives.

The seemingly simple act of identifying who’s in charge is an important first step in interagency reform. Until then, the special operations warrior — possessing defense, diplomatic, and development skills — must continue to navigate through a situationally and personality dependent environment, with all its attendant uncertainties and frustrations, to accomplish the CT mission.
Appendix A. List of Organizations & Programs

The following USG departments, agencies and organizations, IGOs, and NGOs provide the human and material resources to wage the fight against terrorists, their networks, and their ideologies. They also work to eliminate the conditions that breed terrorism and seek to replace them with reforms and initiatives that bring about stability and good governance. There is also an increasing number of entries involved with Transnational Criminal Organizations and other sources of violence and extremism. Some of the components listed here are not discussed in the text or have only a limited mention, but can be reached through the links to allow for individual research as required.

The CT environment is ever changing with new structures and programs regularly joining the fight. This list is not exhaustive, but it does identify the major players. As noted several times, this caveat is particularly apt for NGOs because there are many thousands that operate around the world. A comprehensive list would be more confusing than helpful; it would also never be completely accurate.

ABCA Armies (IGO)
www.abca-armies.org
Action Against Hunger (USA) (NGO)
www.actionagainsthunger.org
Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (DOS)
www.state.gov/r/adcompd
Afghan Local Police (ALP) Program
Afghan New Beginnings Program (UN) (IGO)
www.undp.org.af/WhoWeAre/UNDPinAfghanistan/Projects/psl/prj_anbp.htm
Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) (DOD)
African Union (Regional IGO)
www.au.int/en/
Africare (NGO)
www.africare.org
Agricultural Trade Office (ATO) (FAS/USDA)
American Council for Voluntary Action (Interaction) (NGO)
www.interaction.org
American Friends Service Committee (NGO)
www.afsc.org
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) (FAS/USDA)
American Refugee Committee (NGO)
www.arcrelief.org/site/PageServer
Antiterrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) (DOJ)
www.justice.gov/usao/moe/attf.html
Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) (DOS)
www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (Regional IGO)
www.apec.org
Area Mine Action Centres (AMACs) (UN)
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
www.apec.org
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation Counterterrorism Task Force (CTTF)
Assistant Attorney General for National Security (DOJ)
www.usdoj.gov/nsd/
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Security Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD (HD&ASA))
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict) (ASD (SO/LIC))
http://policy.defense.gov/OUSDPOffices/ASDforSpecialOperationsLowIntensityConflict.aspx
Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Counterterrorism Policy
www.dhs.gov/person/david-heyman
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<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Regional IGO)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.aseansec.org">www.aseansec.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) (Regional IGO)</td>
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<td>Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)</td>
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<td>Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) (ICE/DHS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ice.gov/best/">www.ice.gov/best/</a></td>
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<td>Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bb.gov">www.bb.gov</a></td>
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<td>Bureau for Food Security (BFS) (USAID)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bgsa.gov">www.bgsa.gov</a></td>
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<td>Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives (BATFE) (DOJ)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.atf.gov">www.atf.gov</a></td>
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<td>Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) (DOS)</td>
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<td>Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) (DOS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/j/cso/">www.state.gov/j/cso/</a></td>
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<td>Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) (DOS)</td>
<td><a href="http://travel.state.gov/">http://travel.state.gov/</a></td>
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<td>Bureau of Counterterrorism (S/CT) (DOS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/j/ct/">www.state.gov/j/ct/</a></td>
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<td>Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/j/drl">www.state.gov/j/drl</a></td>
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<td>Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) (DOS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/m/ds/">www.state.gov/m/ds/</a></td>
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<td>Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB) (DOS)</td>
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<td>Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) (DOS)</td>
<td><a href="http://eca.state.gov/">http://eca.state.gov/</a></td>
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<td>Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (DHS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ice.gov/index.htm">www.ice.gov/index.htm</a></td>
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<td>Bureau of Industry and Security (DOC)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bis.doc.gov">www.bis.doc.gov</a></td>
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<td>Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/s/inr">www.state.gov/s/inr</a></td>
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<td>Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) (DOS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/r/iip">www.state.gov/r/iip</a></td>
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<td>Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)</td>
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<td>Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)</td>
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<td>Bureau of Justice Assistance (DOJ)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA">www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA</a></td>
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<td>Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/t/pm">www.state.gov/t/pm</a></td>
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<td>Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) (DOS)</td>
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<td>Bureau of Public Affairs (DOS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/r/pa/index.htm">www.state.gov/r/pa/index.htm</a></td>
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<td>Business Executives for National Security (BENS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bens.org/home.html">www.bens.org/home.html</a></td>
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<td>Business Transformation Office (BTO) (DNI)</td>
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<td>Catholic Relief Services (CRS) (NGO)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.crs.org">www.crs.org</a></td>
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<td>Center for Awareness &amp; Location of Explosives-Related Threats (ALERT) (DHS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.dhs.gov/st-centers-excellence">www.dhs.gov/st-centers-excellence</a></td>
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<td>Center for Maritime, Island, and Remotes and Extreme Environments (MIREES) (DHS)</td>
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<td>Center for Security Evaluation (CSE) (ODNI)</td>
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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (DHHS)
   www.cdc.gov/
Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) (DHS)
   www.dhs.gov/st-centers-excellence
Center of Excellence in Command, Control and Interoperability (C2I) (DHS)
   www.dhs.gov/st-centers-excellence
Central American Citizen Safety Partnership (CACSP) (DOS)
   www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/181294.htm
Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) (DOS)
   www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/181294.htm
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
   https://www.cia.gov
CIA Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC)
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) (DOS)
   www.jcs.mil
Chief of Mission (COM) (DOS)
Church World Service (CWS) (NGO)
   www.churchworldservice.org/site/PageServer
Civilian Response Corps (CRC) (USAID)
   www.civilianresponsecorps.gov/
Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) (DOS)
   www.state.gov/documents/organization/123604.pdf
Civil-Military Cooperation Center
Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC)
Civil-Military Information Center (CIMIC)
Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) (DOD)
Civil-Military Support Element (CMSE) (DOD)
Civilian Response Corps (CRC) (DOS)
   www.civilianresponsecorps.gov/
Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI)
Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP) (DOC)
   http://cldp.doc.gov/
Coalition Support Funds (CSF) (DOD)
   www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-735R
Collaborative Information Environment (CIE)
Combatant Commanders Initiative Funds (CCIF) (DOD)
Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) (DOD)
   www.ctc.usma.edu/
Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) (DOD)
   www.ndu.edu/chds/docUploaded/CTFP%20article.pdf
Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) (DOD)
   www.cttso.gov/
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) (DOD)
   http://comptroller.defense.gov/fmr/12/12_27.pdf
Comprehensive National Security Initiative (CNSI) (NSC)
   www.whitehouse.gov/cybersecurity/comprehensive-national-cybersecurity-initiative
Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) (USAID)
   www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/
Congressional Research Service (CRS)
   www.loc.gov/crsinfo/
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) (NGO)
   www.care.org
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) (DOD)
   www.dtra.mil/oe/ctr/programs/index.cfm
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)-related Training (DOD)
Counterintelligence Division (CD) (FBI)
Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) (DOD)
Counter Narco Terrorist (CNT) Training (DOD) Counterterrorism Financial Unit
   www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16662.htm
Counterterrorism Communications Support Office (CCSO)
Counterterrorism Division (CTD) (FBI)
Counterterrorism Finance Unit (CTF) (DOS)
   www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm
Counterterrorism Fly Team (FBI/DOJ)
Counterterrorism Section (CTS) (DOJ)
   www.usdoj.gov/nsd/counterterrorism.htm
Counterterrorism Training Coordination Working Group
Counterterrorism Support Group (CSG) (NSC/PCC)
Counterterrorism Training and Resources for Law
Enforcement
www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/mission/index.html
Counterterrorism Training Working Group (DOJ)
Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions (TFS) (DOS)
www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/index.htm
Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group
(CRSG) (DOS)
Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) (DOJ)
www.it.ojp.gov/cicc
Cultural Support Teams (CST) (DOD)
www.soc.mil/swcs/cst/index.htm
Cyber Crimes Center (C3) (ICE/DHS)
www.ice.gov/cyber-crimes/
Cyber Forensics Section (C3/ICE/DHS)
www.ice.gov/cyber-crimes/
Cyber Security Office (NSC) (White House)
Cyberspace Policy Review (NSC)
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
www.darpa.mil
Defense Attaché (DATT) (DOD/DIA)
Defense Attaché System (DAS) (DOD/DIA)
www.dia.mil/history/histories/attaches.html
Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)
www.dfas.mil
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
www.dia.mil
Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) (DOD)
Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS)
www.fas.org/irp/program/core/dodiis.htm
Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center
(DIOCC) (DOD)
Defense and Management Contacts (DMC) Programs
(DOD)
Defense Planning Committee (NATO) (Regional IGO)
www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb070102.htm
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) (DOD)
www.dscac.mil
Defense Security Services (DSS)
www.dss.mil
Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD) (DOD)
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
www.dtra.mil
Demining Test and Evaluation Program
Department of Agriculture (USDA)
www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome
Department of Commerce (DOC)
www.commerce.gov
Department of Defense (DOD)
www.defenselink.mil
Department of Energy (DOE)
www.energy.gov
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
www.hhs.gov
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
www.dhs.gov/index.shtm
Department of Justice (DOJ)
www.usdoj.gov
Department of State (DOS)
www.state.gov
Department of State Counterterrorism (S/CT)
www.state.gov/s/ct
Department of the Treasury (TREAS)
www.treasury.gov/Pages/default.aspx
Department of Transportation (DOT)
www.dot.gov
Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) (DOS)
Deputy to the Commander for Civilian-Military Activities
(DCMO) (USAFRICOM)
www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp
Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) (DOS)
www.state.gov/m/ds
Director, Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) (CIA)
Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
www.dni.gov
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) (DOS)
www.pmddtc.state.gov/
Directorate of Intelligence (DI) (FBI)
Directorate for Global Engagement (NSS/GE) (White House)
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<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)</td>
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<td>Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (NGO)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org">http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org</a></td>
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<td>Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) (DHS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.dhs.gov/transition/global_partnerships/ma/dsf.html">http://www.dhs.gov/transition/global_partnerships/ma/dsf.html</a></td>
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<td>Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (DOJ)</td>
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<td>East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/transition/global_partnerships/ma/dsf.html">http://www.state.gov/transition/global_partnerships/ma/dsf.html</a></td>
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<td>Economic Development Administration (DOE)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/transition/global_partnerships/ma/dsf.html">http://www.state.gov/transition/global_partnerships/ma/dsf.html</a></td>
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<td>Economic Support Fund (ESF)</td>
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<td>El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) (DEA/CBP)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/DEA/a1005.pdf">http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/DEA/a1005.pdf</a></td>
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<td>Energy, Sanctions and Commodities (EEB/ESC) (DOS)</td>
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<td>Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.europol.europa.eu">http://www.europol.europa.eu</a></td>
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<td>European Union (EU) (Regional IGO)</td>
<td><a href="http://europa.eu">http://europa.eu</a></td>
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<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation—Most Wanted Terrorists (FBI) (DOJ)</td>
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<td>Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fdic.gov">http://www.fdic.gov</a></td>
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<td>Federal Law Enforcement Training Center-International Programs Division (FLETC) (DHS)</td>
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<td>Federal Protective Services (FPS) (ICE/DHS)</td>
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<td>Field Advance Civilian Team (FACT) (DOS)</td>
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<td>Field Intelligence Group (FIG) (FBI)</td>
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<td>Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)</td>
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<td>Financial Investigative Units (FIU) (DOS)</td>
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<td>Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) (TREAS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#FEST">http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#FEST</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (UN) (IGO)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fao.org">http://www.fao.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (DHHS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fda.gov">http://www.fda.gov</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs Counter-Threat Training (FACT) (DOS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/88554.pdf">http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/88554.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) (DOA)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fas.usda.gov">http://www.fas.usda.gov</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Consequence Management Program (FCM) (DOS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c26799.htm">http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c26799.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) (DOS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#FEST">http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#FEST</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#FEST">http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#FEST</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#FEST">http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#FEST</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (DOD)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_07_1.pdf">http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_07_1.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF) (DOD)  
www.dsca.osd.mil/home/foreign_military_financing%20_program.htm

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) (DOD)  
www.dsca.osd.mil/home/foreign_military_sales.htm

Foreign Service Institute (FSI)  
www.state.gov/m/fsi

Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)  
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm

Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) (DOJ)  
www.fbi.gov/aboutus/ transformation/ct.htm  
www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel03/tscp091603.htm

Forensics Engagement Working Group (FEWG) (DOS)  
www.state.gov/t/isn/c26798.htm

Fusion Centers & Intelligence Sharing  
www.it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=nationalInitiatives&page=1181

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)  
www.gatt.org

Genocide and War Crimes Program (FBI)  
www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/genocide-and-war-crimes-program

Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) (DOS)  
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/172010.htm

Global Engagement Strategy Coordination Committee (GESCC) (DOD)  

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)  
www.state.gov/t/isn/c18406.htm

Global Intelligence Work Group (GIWG) (DOJ)  
www.it.ojp.gov/cicc

Global Mission Support Center (GMSC) (USSOCOM) (DOD)  

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) (DOS)  
www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi

Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)  

Global SOF Network (USSOCOM) (DOD)  

Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC) (DOS)  

Global Strategic Engagement Team (GSET) (DOS)  

Global Train and Equip Program  

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (IGO)  
www.gcc-sg.org/eng/

Harmony Program (CTC/West Point) (DOD)  
www.ctc.usma.edu/programs-resources/harmony-program

Head of Mission (HOM) (DOS)  

High-Value Interrogation Group (HIG) (FBI)  

Homeland Security Centers of Excellence (DHS)  
www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-centers-excellence

Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC) (DHS)  

Homeland Security Intelligence Priorities Framework (I&A/DHS)  

Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) (ICE/DHS)  
www.ice.gov/about/offices/homeland-security-investigations/

Homeland Security Investigations Forensic Laboratory (ICE/DHS)  
www.ice.gov/hsi-fl/

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)  
http://intelligence.house.gov/

Human Terrain Teams (HTT) (DOD)  
http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC)  

Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP)  

Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) (DOD)  

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) (DSCA/DOD)  
www.dsca.mil/hama_cd/hca/default.htm

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) (DOD)  

Humanitarian Information Center (HIC)  

Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) (DOS)  

Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC)  

Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC)  

Information Sharing Council (ISC) (ODNI)  
www.ise.gov/pages/isc.html

Information Sharing Environment (ISE) (ODNI)  
www.ise.gov

Information Sharing Environment Program Manager (PM-ISE) (ODNI)  
www.ise.gov

Information Sharing & Fusion Centers  
www.ise.gov/pages/partner-fc.html

Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) (DNI)  
www.iarpa.gov/
Appendix A. List of Organizations

Intelligence Community (IC) (USG)
www.intelligence.gov/

Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA)
www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf

Intelligence Today Office (DNI)

Interagency Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Database of Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities (INDRAC)
http://indrac.dtra.mil/

Interagency Conflict Assessment Team (ICAT) (USAID)

Interagency Executive Screen Group (ESG) (DOD)
JP 3-08 pp. D-11ff

Interagency Management System (IMS)

Interagency Operations Security Support Staff (IOSS)
www/aboutus.org/loss.gov

Interagency Policy Committees (IPC) (White House)
Interagency Policy Committee for Strategic Communication (IPC/SC) (White House)

Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA) (DOS/USAID)
http://kabul.usembassy.gov/ipa.html

Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) (UN)
http://ochaonline.un.org/Coordination/MandatedBodies/InterAgencyStandingCommittee/tabid/1388/Default.aspx

Interagency Surge Teams (DOS)

Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) (NCTC/DNI)

Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) (OAS) (IGO)
www.oas.org/eng/sms/cicte/default.asp

Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
www.irs.gov/

International Alliance Against Hunger (IAAH) (IGO)
www.alliancetoendhunger.org/
creating-global-connections/international-alliance/

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (IGO)
www.iaea.org

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (IGO)

International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (IGO)
www.icrc.org

International Communications and Information Policy (EVB/CIP) (DOS)
www.state.gov/e/eeb/cip

International Cooperation Development Fund (ICD)
International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)
www.icva.ch/

International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) (DOJ)
www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap/

International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) (IGO)
www.interpol.int

International Development Association (IDA)

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (IGO)
www.ifrc.org

International Finance Corporation (IFC)

International Finance and Development (EVB/IFD) (DOS)
www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd

International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
www.icrc.org/Eng/ihl

International Labor Organization (ILO) (UN) (IGO)

International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
www.icc-ccs.org/icc/imb

International Medical Corps (IMC) (NGO)
www.imcworldwide.org

International Military Education and Training (IMET) (DOS/DOD)
www.dsca.mil/home/international_military_education_training.htm
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (IGO)
www.imf.org/external/index.htm

International Operational Response Framework (IORF) (DOS)
www.state.gov/j/cso/resources/

International Organization Affairs
www.state.gov/p/io

International Organization for Migration
www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home.html

International Organized Crime Intelligence and Operations Center (IOC-2) (FBI/DOJ)

International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative (ISPI) (IGO)
www.civicap.info/home/international-stabilization-and-peacebuilding-initiative-isp.html

International Strategy for Cyberspace (White House)
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf

International Rescue Committee (IRC) (NGO)
www.theirc.org

International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) (UN Mandate/NATO)
www.nato.int/ISAF/index.html

International Security Events Group (ISEG) (DOS)

International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative (ISPI)
www.civicap.info/home/international-stabilization-and-peacebuilding-initiative-issp.html

INTERPOL Washington—United States Central Bureau (INTERPOL Washington—USNCB) (DOJ)
http://www.justice.gov/interpol-washington/

Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) (DOD)
www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/ty08/08-026.pdf

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (DOD)
www.jcs.mil

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)
https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF)

Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) (DOD)
www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2007/92073.htm

Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (JICC) (DOD)

Joint Intelligence Community Council (JICC) (DNI)
www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32515.pdf

Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JICAG) (DOD)

Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) (DOD)

Joint Interagency Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) (DOD)

Joint Interagency Task Force-CT (Afghanistan) (DOD)

Joint Intergency Task Force-South
www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/

Joint Intergency Information Support Command (JMSC) (DOD)

Joint Operations Center (JOC) (DOD)

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) (DOD)

Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) (DOJ/FBI)
www.usdoj.gov/jtff

Joint Terrorism Task Force Military Working Group (FBI/DOJ)

Law Enforcement Agency (LEA)

Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEX) (DOJ)
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/n-dex/n-dex

Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) (NGO)
www.doctorswithoutborders.org/donate/?msource=A0408H1001

Media Operations Center (MOC)

Merida Initiative (DOS)
www.state.gov/j/lnl/merida/

Mercy Corps (NGO)
www.mercycorps.org

Military Committee (NATO) (Regional IGO)
www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1101.htm

Military Department Intelligence Services (DOD)
www.af.milwww.army.milwww.uscg.milwww.quantico.usmc.mil/activities/?Section=MCI

Military Information Support Team (MIST) (DOD)
Appendix A. List of Organizations

Military Intelligence Program (MIP) (DOD)

Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
www.mcc.gov/

Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA) (UN)

Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) (UN)

Mission Directors (USAID)
www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/mission-directors

Mission Management Teams (DNI)

Mission Support Center (DNI)

Mobile Training Team (MTT) (DOD)

Multilateral Guarantee Agency (MIGA)

Narcotics and Transnational Crimes Support Center to Law Enforcement Activities

Narcotics Control Officer (NCO) (DOS)

National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center (NBCSC) (ICE/HSI/DHS)
www.ice.gov/bulk-cash-smuggling-center/

National Center for Border Security and Immigration (NCBSI) (DHS)
www.dhs.gov/st-centers-excellence

National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) (DHS)
www.dhs.gov/st-centers-excellence

National Center for the Study of Preparedness and Catastrophic Event Response (PACER) (DHS)
www.dhs.gov/st-centers-excellence

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (DHS)
www.dhs.gov/st-centers-excellence

National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) (DNI)
www.ncix.gov/

National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) (DNI)
www.counterwmd.gov/

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) (DNI)
www.nctc.gov

National Counterterrorism Team (DOS)
www.state.gov/j/ct/team/

National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC) (DOJ)
www.ncirc.gov

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) (DOJ)
www.it.ojp.gov/documents/ncisp/

National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) (FBI/DOJ)
www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber/ncijtf

National Defense Intelligence College (DOD)
dia.mil/millie

National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP)
www.intelligence.gov/2-business_nfip.shtml
hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/p&r/Concepts/2001/PDF/C%202000%20chap%204%20part%205%20Other%20NFIP.pdf

National Fusion Center Network (DHS)
www.dhs.gov/
national-network-fusion-centers-fact-sheet

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) (DOD)
www1.nga.mil/Pages/Default.aspx

National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) (DOD)
www1.nga.mil/Pages/Default.aspx

National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE)
http://csrc.nist.gov/nice/

National Intelligence Centers
www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21948.pdf

National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C)(DNI)
National Intelligence Council (NIC) (DNI)

National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C) (DNI)
National Intelligence Emergency Management Activity (NIEMA) (ODNI)

National Intelligence Program (NIP)
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/intelligence.html

National Intelligence Support Team (NIST)
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art8.html

National Intelligence University (NIU) (DNI)
www.ni-u.edu/

National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) (DOJ/FBI)
National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) (DOD)  
https://www.cnic.navy.mil/nsaw/About/National-MaritimeIntelligenceCenter/index.htm
National Military Joint Intelligence Center (MNJIC) (DOD)  
nsi.org/Library/Intel/8.html
National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE)  
http://nnsa.energy.gov/
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (DOC)  
www.noaa.gov
National Preparedness Directorate (NPD) (FEMA/DHS)  
www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-directorate
National Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Coordination Center (HSI/DHS)  
www.iprcenter.gov/
National Protection and Programs Directorate (DHS)  
www.dhs.gov/about-national-protection-and-programs-directorate
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) (DOD)  
www.nro.gov
National Reconnaissance Program (NRP)  
www.nro.gov
National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) (DOD)  
www.nsa.gov
National Security Branch (NSB) (FBI)  
www.fbi.gov/hq/nsb/nbsh.htm
National Security Council (NSC)  
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc
National Security Council Deputy’s Committee (NSC/DC)  
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc
National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCC)  
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc
National Security Council Principal’s Committee (NSC/PC)  
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc
National Security Council System (NSCS)  
www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc
National Security Division (NSD) (DOJ)  
www.usdoj.gov/nsd
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) (White House)  
National Security Investigations Division (NSID) (ICE/DHS)  
www.ice.gov/national-security-investigations-division/
National Security Professional Development Program (NSPD) (DOD)  
www.cpms.osd.mil/lpdd/NSPD/NSPD_index.aspx
National Security Staff (NSS) (White House)  
National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (NSISS) (White House)  
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012sharingstrategy_1.pdf
National Strategy Information Center (NSIC)  
www.strategycenter.org/
National System for Geo-Spatial Intelligence (NSG) (DOD)  
National Targeting Center (NTC) (DHS/CBP)  
cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2005/March/ntc.xml
National Transportation Security Center of Excellence (NTSCOE) (DHS)  
www.dhs.gov/st-centers-excellence
Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) (DOJ lead)  
http://nsi.ncirc.gov/
NCTC Online (NOL) (NCTC/DNI)  
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) (DOS)  
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&dbname=cp108&sid=cp108OD42V&refer=&r_n=hr222.108&item=&ssel=TOC_207044&
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Regional IGO)  
www.nato.int
Nuclear Incident Team (NIT)  
http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/emergencyoperationscounterterrorism/respondingtoemergencies/operations/nuclear
Nuclear Incident Reporting Team (NIRT) (DHS)  
orise.orau.gov/nsem/nit.htm
Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team (NRAT)  
http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/emergencyoperationscounterterrorism/respondingtoemergencies/operations/nuclear
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Nuclear Trafficking Response Group (NTRG) (DOS)  
www.state.gov/t/isn/c26798.htm
Office of Acquisition, Technology, & Facilities (AT&F) (ODNI)  
Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs (OAPA) (USAID)  
Office of Agricultural Affairs (OAA) (FAS/USDA)  
Office of Anti-Crime Programs (INL/C) (DOS)  
www.state.gov/j/inl/c/index.htm
Office of Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) (DOS)  
www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASDPA)  
www.defense.gov/pubs/almanac/asdpa.aspx
Office of the Biological Policy Staff (ISN/BPS) (DOS)  
www.state.gov/t/isn/offices/c55410.htm
Office of Capacity Building and Development (OCBD) (FAS/USDA)  
www.fas.usda.gov/OCBD.asp
Office of Civilian Response (OCR) (DOS)  
Office of Commercial and Business Affairs (EEB/CBA) (DOS)  
www.state.gov/e/eeb/cba
Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) (DOS)  
http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/
Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction (ISN/CATR) (DOS)  
www.state.gov/t/isn/offices/c55407.htm
Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (ISN/CTR) (DOS)  
www.state.gov/t/isn/offices/c55411.htm
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (UN)  
occhaonline.un.org
Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues (S/CCI) (DOS)  
www.state.gov/s/cyberissues/index.htm
Office of Counter Piracy and Maritime Security (PM/CPMS) (DOS)  
www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/piracy/index.htm
Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives (ISN/CPI) (DOS)  
www.state.gov/t/isn/offices/c55409.htm
Office of Counterterrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy (DOS)  
www.state.gov/e/eeb/c9997.htm
Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) (DHS)  
www.dhs.gov/office-cybersecurity-and-communications
Office of Democracy and Governance (USAID)  
www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/
Office of Development Partners (ODP) (USAID)  
Office of the Director General, Diplomatic Readiness Institute (DOS)  
www.state.gov/documents/organization/13742.pdf
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)  
www.odni.gov/
Office of the Director of National Intelligence Centers (DNI)  
www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization
Office of Economic Policy Analysis & Public Diplomacy (EEB/EPPD) (DOS)  
www.state.gov/e/eeb/eppd
Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation (EB/TFS/SPI) (DOS)  
www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/index.htm
Office of Export Controls Cooperation (ISN/ECC) (DOS)  
www.state.gov/t/isn/offices/c55412.htm
Office of Foreign Asset Controls (OFAC) (TREAS)  
www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-foreign-assets-control.aspx
Office of Foreign Assistance Resources (DOS)  
www.state.gov/f/
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) (USAID)  
www.globalcorps.com/ofda.html
Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Mine Action (HDM) (DSCA) (DOD)  
www.dsca.mil/programs/HA/HA.htm
Office of Foreign Service Operations (OFSO) (FAS/USDA)  
www.fas.usda.gov/ofso/overseas_post_directory/area_directors.asp
Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) (DHS)  
www.dhs.gov/about-office-intelligence-and-analysis
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Office of Threat Finance Countermeasures (EB/TFS/TFC) (DOS)
www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/tfc/index.htm
Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) (USAID)
www.globalcorps.com/oti.html
Office of Transitional Issues (OTI) (CIA)
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I))
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P))
Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (ISN/WMDT) (DOS)
www.state.gov/t/isn/c16403.htm
Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) (DOS)
www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/index.htm
Organization of American States (OAS) (Regional IGO)
www.oas.org
OAS/Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (OAS/CICTE) (Regional IGO)
www.oas.org/en/sms/cicte/default.asp
Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) (USAFRICOM)
www.africom.mil/oef-ts.asp
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (IGO)
www.oecd.org/
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (IGO)
www.opcw.org
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (IGO)
www.osce.org
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) (DOJ)
www.justice.gov/criminal/taskforces/ocdef.html
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Fusion Center (DOJ)
Overseas Advisory Council (OFAC) (DOS)
www.osac.gov/Pages/Home.aspx
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OH-DACA) (DOD/DOS)
www.dsca.mil/hama_cd/overview/default.htm
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) (USG) www.opic.gov
Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC)
www.osac.gov/ www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8650.htm
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM) (NGO)
www.oxfam.org
Pacific Island Forum (IGO)
www.forumsec.org/
Pakistan Frontier Corps
Partners of the Americas (NGO)
www.partners.net/partners/Default_EN.asp
Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PREACT)
www.state.gov/i/ct/programs/
Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES)
Political Advisor (POLAD)
Political-Military Policy and Planning Team
www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt
Populations, Refugees and Migration
www.state.gov/g/prm
President's Cyber Security Coordinator (White House)
www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/cybersecurity
President's Daily Brief Staff (PDB) (DNI)
President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) (White House)
www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/piab/
President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) (White House)
www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/iob/
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP) (DOS)
www.state.gov/t/isa/c26798.htm
Project Hope (HOPE) (NGO)
www.projecthope.org
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (DOS)
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) (DOS) (DOD)
www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/iz/c21830.htm
Public Affairs Officer (PAO)
Public Designations Unit (DOS)
www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16816.htm
Public Diplomacy Office Director (PDOD) (DOS)
Refugees International (RI) (NGO)
www.refugeesinternational.org
Regional Centers for Security Strategies (DSCA)
www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/gsa/ctfp/sections/community/dod_centers.html

Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) (DOD)

Regional SOF Coordination Centers (RSCC) (DOD)

Regional Security Teams (PM/RSAT)
www.state.gov/t/pm/rsat/c17667.htm

Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation Programs (RDT&E)

Resident Legal Advisor (RLA) (DOJ)

Rewards for Justice Program
www.rewardsforjustice.net

Salvation Army World Service Office (SA/WSO) (NGO)
www.sawso.org

Save the Children (SC/US) (NGO)
www.savethechildren.net/about

Security and Justice Sector Assistance (DOS)
www.state.gov/documents/organization/115810.pdf

Security Assistance (SA)

Security Assistance Officer (SAO)

Security Assistance Team
www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat

Security Force Assistance (SFA)

Security Force Assistance Team (DOD)

Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) (IGO)
www.spc.int/

Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
www.defenselink.mil/osd/

Secretary of State (SECSTATE)

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)
http://intelligence.senate.gov/

Senior Director for Global Engagement (SDGE) (White House)

Shiprider Agreements (USCG/DHS)

Special Operations Forces (SOF)
www.socom.mil

Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF)
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf

Special Operations Support Team (SOST) (DOD)

Special Security Center (SSC) (ODNI)

Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN) (OFAC/TREAS)

Stop Hunger Now (NGO)
www.stophungernow.org/site/PageServer

Strategic Communication (SC)

Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) (DOJ/FBI)
www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/sioc

Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) (DOD)

Technical Support Working Groups (TSWG) (DOS/DOD)
www.tswg.gov

Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) (FBI/DOJ)
www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/tedac

Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) (TREAS)

Terrorism Financing Operations Section (TFOS) (FBI/DOJ)
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_financing

Terrorism Fly Team (FBI)

Terrorism and International Victim Assistance Services Division (TIVASD) (DOJ)

Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) (NCTC/DNI)

Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)
www.state.gov/about/cl16663.htm (2001-2009)

Terrorist Screening and Interdiction Program (TSI) (DOS)
www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#TSI

Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) (FBI)
www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/tsc
Appendix A. List of Organizations

Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System (TARS) (DOD/USAF)
ftp.fas.org/irp/budget/fy98_usaf/0207217f.htm

Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) (DOD)
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf

Trade Policy and Programs (EEB/TPP) (DOS)
www.state.gov/e/eeb/tpp

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) (DOD/USAID/DOD)
www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp

Transportation Affairs (EEB/TRA) (DOS)
www.state.gov/e/eeb/tra

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) (DHS)
www.tsa.gov

Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture (TEOAF) (Treasury)
www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/The-Executive-Office-for-Asset-Forfeiture.aspx

Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF) (Treasury)

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence-USD(I) (DOD)
www.intelligence.gov/0-usdi_memo.shtml

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy-USD(P) (DOD)
www.defenselink.mil/policy

Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis (U/SIA) (DHS)
www.dhs.gov/about-office-intelligence-and-analysis

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (DOS)
www.state.gov/t/

Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights (S/D) (DOS)
www.state.gov/j/

Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and Environment (DOS)
www.state.gov/e/

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (S/R)
www.state.gov/r/index.htm

Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) (TREAS)
www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Terrorism-and-Financial-Intelligence.aspx

United Nations (UN) (IGO)
www.un.org/en

UN Afghan New Beginnings Program (ANBP)
www.un.org/afghanistan/Projects/prj_anbp.htm

UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (IGO)
http://unama.unmissions.org/default.aspx/

UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (IGO)
www.unicef.org

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (IGO)

UN Development Program (UNDP) (IGO)
www.un.org

UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC)
UN Disaster Management Team (UNDMT) (IGO)

UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (IG)

UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (IGO)
www.unesco.org/new/en/

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) (IGO)
www.ohchr.org

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (IGO)
www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home

UN Humanitarian Operations Center (UNHOC) (IGO)
www.humanitarianinfo.org/liberia/services/HOC/index.asp

UN Mine Action Coordination Center for Afghanistan (UNMACCA) (IGO)
www.mineaction.org.org.asp?o=17

UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)
ochaonline.un.org

UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) (IGO)
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko

UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) (IGO)

UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) (IGO)

UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) (UN)
www.unodc.org/unodc/human-trafficking-fund.html
USSOMCOM Joint Operations Center (USSOCOM/JOC)

Village Stability Operations (VSO) (USSOCOM)

Village Stability Platform (VSP) (USSOCOM)

Voice of America (BBG)
  www.voanews.com/english/news

Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF) (DOD)

Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) (CIA)

Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD) (FBI)
  www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/wmd

White House
  www.whitehouse.gov

White House National Cyber Security Coordinator
  www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/22/introducing-new-cybersecurity-coordinator

World Association of Nongovernmental Organizations (WANGO) (NGO)
  www.wango.org

World Bank
  www.worldbank.org

World Bank International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (IGO)

World Bank International Development Association (IDA) (IGO)
  www.worldbank.org/ida

World Food Program (WFP) (UN) (IGO)
  www.wfp.org

World Health Organization (WHO) (UN) (IGO)
  www.who.int/en

World Intelligence Review (WiRe) (DNI)

World Trade Organization (WTO) (IGO)
  www.wto.org

World Vision (NGO)
  site.worldvision.org
# Appendix B. Ranks of Foreign Service, Military, Civil Service, and NATO Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Service</th>
<th>Diplomatic Title</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Civil Service</th>
<th>NATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMSFS-CA</td>
<td>Ambassador</td>
<td>General/Admiral</td>
<td>SES-6</td>
<td>OF-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMSFS-CM</td>
<td>Ambassador; Career Minister</td>
<td>Lieutenant General/ Vice Admiral</td>
<td>SES-5</td>
<td>OF-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMSFS-M-C</td>
<td>Ambassador; Minister-Counselor</td>
<td>Major General/ Rear Admiral (Upper Half)</td>
<td>SES-3 &amp; SES-4</td>
<td>OF-8</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMSFS-C</td>
<td>Ambassador; Counselor</td>
<td>Brigadier General/ Rear Admiral (Lower Half)</td>
<td>SES-1 &amp; SES-2</td>
<td>OF-7</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMSFS-C</td>
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<td>SES-1 &amp; SES-2</td>
<td>OF-6</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMSFS-C</td>
<td>Ambassador; Counselor</td>
<td>Brigadier General/ Rear Admiral (Lower Half)</td>
<td>SES-1 &amp; SES-2</td>
<td>OF-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMSFS-C</td>
<td>Ambassador; Counselor</td>
<td>Brigadier General/ Rear Admiral (Lower Half)</td>
<td>SES-1 &amp; SES-2</td>
<td>OF-4</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMSFS-C</td>
<td>Ambassador; Counselor</td>
<td>Brigadier General/ Rear Admiral (Lower Half)</td>
<td>SES-1 &amp; SES-2</td>
<td>OF-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMSFS-C</td>
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<td>Brigadier General/ Rear Admiral (Lower Half)</td>
<td>SES-1 &amp; SES-2</td>
<td>OF-2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Brigadier General/ Rear Admiral (Lower Half)</td>
<td>SES-1 &amp; SES-2</td>
<td>OF-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMSFS-C</td>
<td>Ambassador; Counselor</td>
<td>Brigadier General/ Rear Admiral (Lower Half)</td>
<td>SES-1 &amp; SES-2</td>
<td>OF-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Foreign Services Grades**

**CMSFS-CA**: Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Personal Rank of Career Ambassador

**CMSFS-CM**: Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Career Minister

**CMSFS-M-C**: Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor

**CMSFS-C**: Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Counselor

**CMSSES**: Career Member of the Senior Executive Service

**FSO**: Foreign Service Officer
Appendix C. Interagency-Related Definitions

**Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement.** Agreements negotiated on a bilateral basis with U.S. allies or coalition partners that allow U.S. forces to exchange most common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. Authority to negotiate these agreements is usually delegated to the combatant commander by the Secretary of Defense. Authority to execute these agreements lies with the Secretary of Defense and may or may not be delegated. Governed by legal guidelines, these agreements are used for contingencies, peacekeeping operations, unforeseen emergencies, or exercises to correct logistic deficiencies that cannot be adequately corrected by national means. The support received or given is reimbursed under the conditions of the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. (JP 1-02, JP 4-07)

**Ambassador.** A diplomatic agent of the highest rank accredited to a foreign government or sovereign as the resident representative of his own government; also called the Chief of Mission. In the U.S. system, the Ambassador is the personal representative of the President and reports to him through the Secretary of State. (JSOU Special Operations Forces Reference Manual)

**Antiterrorism (AT).** Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorists acts, to include limited response and containment by local and civilian forces. (JP1-02, 3-07.2)

**Area of Operations (AO).** An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operation of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

**Asset (Intelligence).** Any resource—person, group, relationship, instrument, installation, or supply—at the disposition of an intelligence organization for use in an operational or support role. Often used with a qualifying term such as agent asset or propaganda asset. (JP 2-0)

**Assistance.** Activities that provide relief to refugees, conflict victims, and internally displaced persons. Such relief includes food, clean water, shelter, health care, basic education, job training, sanitation, and provision of physical and legal protection. Humanitarian assistance is often given in emergencies, but may need to continue in longer-term situations. (State Department)

**Asylum-Migration Nexus.** Refers to “mixed flows” of migrants—an undifferentiated combination of documented and undocumented travelers, smuggled migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and trafficking victims—moving through an area. (State Department)

**Attaché.** A person attached to the embassy in a diplomatic status who is not normally a career member of the diplomatic service. In the U.S. system, attachés generally represent agencies other than the Department of State such as the Department of Defense (DOD) and others. (JSOU Special Operations Forces Reference Manual)

**Bilateral.** Bilateral discussions or negotiations are between a state and one other. A bilateral treaty is between one state and one other. “Multilateral” is used when more than two states are involved. (www.edipomat.com/nd/glossary.htm)

**Capacity-Building Activities.** Training staff of humanitarian organizations to provide better quality service to refugees and internally displaced persons. (State Department)

**Center of Gravity (COG).** The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action or will to act. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)
Chargé d'Affaires, A.I. Formerly a chargé d'affaires was the title of a chief of mission, inferior in rank to an ambassador or a minister. Today with the a.i. (ad interim) added, it designates the senior officer taking charge for the interval when a chief of mission is absent from his or her post. (www.ediplomat.com/nd/glossary.htm)

**Chief of Mission (COM).** The principal officer (the Ambassador) in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual assigned to be temporarily in charge of such a facility. The chief of mission is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation. The chief of mission is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States Government executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a U.S. area military commander). The security of the diplomatic post is the chief of mission’s direct responsibility. (JP 1-02, JP 3-10)

**Civil Administration.** An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 1-02, JP 3-10)

**Civil Affairs (CA).** Designated active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. (JP 1-02, JP 3-57)

**Civil Affairs Operations (CAO).** Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-57)

**Civilian Power.** “The combined force of civilians working together across the U.S. government to practice diplomacy, carry out development projects, and prevent and respond to crises … It is the power of diplomats in 271 missions around the world, development professionals in more than 100 countries, and experts from other U.S. government agencies working together to advance America’s core interests in the world.” (Department of State, Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading Through Civilian Power, 2010)

**Civil-Military Operations (CMO).** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. CMO may be performed by designated CA, by other military forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces. (JP 1-02, JP 3-57)

**Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).** An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces and other USG agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and intergovernmental organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Civil Society Entities.** Nongovernmental associations of citizens, charitable or otherwise, formed for the purpose of providing benefit to the members and to society. The term includes nongovernmental organizations engaged in humanitarian work. (State Department)

**Coalition.** An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)
**Collection.** In intelligence usage, the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing elements. (JP 2-0)

**Combatant Command (COCOM).** A unified or specified command with a broad continuing command under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

**Combatant Commander.** A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

**Combating Terrorism (CbT).** Actions, including AT (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and CT (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (JP 1-02, Source: JP 3-26)

**Capacity Building.** The process of creating an environment that fosters host-nation institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthening managerial systems. (FM 3-07)

**Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF).** A task force composed of special operations units from one or more foreign countries and more than one U.S. military Department formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The CJSOTF may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. (JP 3-05)

**Comprehensive Approach.** An approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. (FM 3-07)

**Consequence Management.** Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. (JP 1-02, JP 3-28)

**Consulate General/Consulate.** A constituent post of an embassy in a foreign country located in an important city other than the national capital. Consulates General are larger than Consulates, with more responsibilities and additional staff. (JSOU Special Operations Forces Reference Manual)

**Counterinsurgency (COIN).** Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. (JP-2. Source: JP 3-24)

**Counterterrorism (CT).** Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-26)

**Country Team.** The senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.4)

**Crisis State.** A nation in which the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory. (FM 3-07)

**Defense Support to Public Diplomacy.** Those activities and measures taken by the DOD components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts from the USG. (JP-2, JP 3-13)

**Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS).** The combination of DOD personnel, procedures, equipment, computer programs, and supporting communications that support the timely and comprehensive preparation and presentation of intelligence and information to military commanders and national-level decision makers. (JP 2-0)

**Development Assistance.** Programs, projects, and activities carried out by the United States Agency for International Development that improve the lives of the citizens of developing countries while furthering United States
foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and promoting free market economic growth. (JP 3-08, 24 June 2011; approved for inclusion in JP 1-02).

**Direct Action (DA).** Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-05)

**Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART).** A team of specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, rapidly deployed to assist US embassies and United States Agency for International Development missions with the management of US government responses to disasters. (JP 3-08, 24 June 2011; approved for inclusion in JP-02).

**Displaced Person.** An individual who has been forced or obliged to flee or leave his or her home temporarily and who expects to return eventually. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) have moved within their country, while externally displaced persons have crossed an international border. Depending upon their ability to return, and whether they are subject to persecution in their home country, externally displaced persons may be entitled to recognition as refugees under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) mandate. (State Department)

**End State.** The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

**Essential Elements of Information (EEI).** The most critical information requirements regarding the adversary and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. (JP 2-0)

**First Asylum Country.** A country that permits refugees to enter its territory for purposes of providing asylum temporarily, pending eventual repatriation or resettlement (locally or in a third country). First asylum countries usually obtain the assistance of UNHCR to provide basic assistance to the refugees. (State Department)

**Foreign Assistance.** Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters; U.S. assistance takes three forms—development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA).** Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host-nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. The FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Foreign Internal Defense (FID).** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to security. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-22)

**Fragile State.** A country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of the central government. (FM 3-07)

**Fusion.** In intelligence usage, the process of examining all sources of intelligence and information to derive a complete assessment of activity. (JP2-0)

**Governance.** The state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society, including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority. (FM 3-07)

**Host Country/Host Nation (HN).** A nation that permits, either by written agreement or official invitation, government representatives and/or agencies of another nation to operate, under specified conditions, within its borders. (JP-2, JP 2-01.2) A nation that receives the forces and/
or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP-2)

**Host Country/Host Nation Support (HNS).** Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 1-02, JP 4-0)

**Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.** Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to 1) medical, dental, veterinary, and preventive medicine care provided in rural areas of a country; 2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; 3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and 4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.4)

**Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC).** An interagency policymaking body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation. It normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the United Nations (UN), or a USG agency during a United States unilateral operation. The HOC should consist of representatives from the affected country, the United States Embassy or Consulate, the joint force, the UN, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and other major players in the operation. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Indications and Warning (I&W).** Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or allied and/or coalition military, political, or economic interests or to U.S. citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of hostile actions or intentions against the United States, its activities, overseas forces, or allied and/or coalition nations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**Information Operations (IO).** The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, military information support operations (MISO), military deception, and operations security — in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities — to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. (JP 1-02, JP 3-13)

**Information Sharing.** Providing a common platform for ideas, information (including databases), strategies, approaches, activities, and plans and programs. (UN)

**Insurgency.** The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-24)

**Intelligence Community (IC).** All departments or agencies of a government that are concerned with intelligence activity, either in an oversight, managerial, support, or participatory role. (JP 1-02, JP 2-01.2)

**Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).** An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. (JP 2-01)

**Interagency.** Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 3-08, 24 June 2011; approved for incorporation into JP 1-02).

**Interagency Coordination.** Within the context of DOD involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of DOD and engaged USG agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

**Intergovernmental Organization (IGO).** An organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states (JP 3-08, 24 June 2011; approved for incorporation into JP 1-02).
Internal Capacity Building. Facilitating capacity building and skills development of members with critical expertise to support actors in disaster management and other activities through training, joint activities, and sharing lessons-learned experiences. (UN)

Internal Defense and Development (IDAD). The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism and other threats to its security. (JP 1-02, Source JP 3-22)

Internal Security. The state of law and order prevailing within a nation. (JP 3-08, 24 June 2011; approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-08 as the source JP

Interorganizational Coordination. The interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; engaged United States Government agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. (JP 3-08, 24 June 2011; approved for inclusion in JP 1-02)

Internally Displaced Person (IDP). Any person who has left his residence by reason of real or imagined danger but has not left the territory of their own country. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.6)

Irregular Forces. Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. (JP 1-02. Source JP 3-24)

Irregular Warfare (IW). A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. (JP 1, JP 1-02)

Intergovernmental Organization (IGO). An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force. A joint task force composed of civil-military operations units from more than one Service. It provides support to the joint force commander in humanitarian or nation assistance operations, theater campaigns, or CMO concurrent with or subsequent to regional conflict. It can organize military interaction among many governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies within the theater. (JP 1-02, JP 3-05.1)

Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC). The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking SOF and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The JFSOCC is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. (JP 3-0) The inclusion of a CJSOTF into a JFSOCC changes the title to a Combined/Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (C/JFSOCC).

Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). An interdependent, operational intelligence organization at the DOD, combatant command, or joint task force (if established) level that is integrated with national intelligence centers and capable of accessing all sources of intelligence impacting military operations planning, execution, and assessment. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE). A subordinate joint force element whose focus is on intelligence support for joint operations, providing the joint force commander, joint staff, and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation. (JP 2-01)

Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). A staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. (JP 3-08, 24 June 2011; approved for inclusion into JP 1-02)
Lead Agency. The US Government agency designated to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. (JP 3-08, 24 June 2011; approved for incorporation into JP 1-02)

Letter of Assist (LOA). A contractual document issued by the UN to a government authorizing it to provide goods or services to a peacekeeping operation; the UN agrees either to purchase the goods or services or authorizes the government to supply them subject to reimbursement by the UN. A letter of assist typically details specifically what is to be provided by the contributing government and establishes a funding limit that cannot be exceeded. (JP 1-02, JP 1-06)

Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). Standard DOD form on which the USG documents its offer to transfer to a foreign government or international organization U.S. defense articles and services via foreign military sales pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act. (JP 1-02, JP 4-08)

Liaison. That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08)

Local Integration. One of the three “durable solutions” — voluntary return, local integration, third-country resettlement — sought for refugees. When voluntary return to their home country is not possible, refugees can sometimes settle with full legal rights in the country to which they have fled (also known as the country of first asylum). This is local integration. (State Department)

Measure of Effectiveness. A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 3-0)

Measure of Performance. A criterion used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0)

Military Civic Action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02)

Military Information Support Operations (MISO)—formerly Psychological Operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of MISO is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. (JP 1-02, JP 3-53)

Mobile Training Team (MTT). A team consisting of one or more U.S. military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The Secretary of Defense may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon HN requests. (JP 1-02)

Multinational. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

Multinational Force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. (JP 1, JP 1-02)

National Defense Strategy. A document approved by the Secretary of Defense for applying the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with DOD agencies and other instruments of power to achieve national security strategy objectives. (JP 3-0)

National Intelligence. The terms “national intelligence” and “intelligence related to the national security” each refers to all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including information gathered within or outside of the United States, which pertains, as determined consistent with any guidelines issued by the President, to the interests of more than one department or agency of the Government; and that involves a) threats to the United States, its people, property, or...
interests; b) the development, proliferation, or use of WMD; or c) any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland security. (JP 1-02, JP 2-01.2)

**National Intelligence Support Team (NIST).** A nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or other IC agencies as required. (JP 1-02, JP 2-0)

**National Policy.** A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. (JP 1-02)

**National Security.** A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. a favorable foreign relations position, or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

**National Security Agency (NSA)/Central Security Service Representative.** The senior theater or military command representative of the director, NSA/chief, Central Security Service in a specific country or military command headquarters who provides the director, NSA with information on command plans requiring cryptologic support. The NSA/Central Security Service representative serves as a special advisor to the combatant commander for cryptologic matters, to include signals intelligence, communications security, and computer security. (JP 1-02, JP 2-01.2)

**National Security Strategy.** A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

**Nongovernmental Organization (NGO).** A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08)

**Partner Nation (PN).** Those nations that the United States works with to disrupt the production, transportation, and sale of illicit drugs or to counter other threats to national security, as well as the money involved with any such activity. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.4)

**Peacekeeping.** Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.3)

**Persona Non Grata (PNG).** An individual who is unacceptable to or unwelcome by the host government. (www.ediplomat.com/nd/glossary.htm)

**Preventive Diplomacy.** Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

**Principal Officer.** The officer in charge of a diplomatic mission, consular office, or other Foreign Service post, such as a United States liaison office. (JP 3-08, 24 June 2011; approved for incorporation into JP 1-02)

**Protection.** Any of the activities that provide safety, meet basic needs, or secure the rights of refugees in the places to which they have fled. Examples of protection include the following:

- Providing documentation to stateless persons
- Preventing forced returns
- Preventing and combating rape and domestic abuse
- Securing education and job training for refugees
- Maintaining an international presence in places where refugees have fled. (State Department)

**Refugee.** Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. (State Department)

**Repatriation.** Voluntary return of a refugee to his or her country of origin when conditions permit. Worldwide, this is the “best case scenario” in which a refugee feels comfortable returning home to rebuild his or her life. Recent examples of repatriation have been in Kosovo and South Sudan. (State Department)

**Resettlement.** The process of relocating a refugee from the country of first asylum to another country. When it is clear that a refugee will not be able to return to his or her home and cannot be integrated into the country to which he or she has fled, resettlement is often the only solution left. However, worldwide refugee resettlement figures are very low; fewer than 1 percent of refugees will ever be considered and accepted for resettlement. The U.S. has the largest refugee resettlement program in the world. (State Department)

**Rules of Engagement (ROE).** Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-02)

**Security Assistance (SA).** Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JP 1-02)

**Security Assistance Organizations (SAO).** All DOD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.1)

**Security Cooperation.** All DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host country. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.1)

**Security Force Assistance (SFA).** The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 1-02. Source JP 3-22)

**Security Sector Reform.** The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. (FM 3-07)

**Special Operations (SO).** Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. (JP 1-02)

**Special Operations Forces (SOF).** Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-05.1)

**Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE).** A special operations liaison team provided by the joint force special operations component commander to the joint force air component commander (if designated), or appropriate Service component air command and control organization, to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with conventional air operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-05)

**Stability Operations.** An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

**Statelessness.** According to UNHCR, a stateless person is “someone who, under national laws, does not enjoy citizenship—the legal bond between a government and
an individual—with any country.” While some people are de jure or legally stateless (meaning they are not recognized as citizens under the laws of any state), many people are de facto or effectively stateless persons (meaning they are not recognized as citizens by any state even if they have a claim to citizenship under the laws of one or more states). (State Department)

**Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).** An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as Civil Affairs agreements. (JP 1-02, JP 3-16)

**Strategic Communication.** Focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0) Note: In December 2012, the DOD dropped the term “Strategic Communication” and any structures that arose because of it. However, the rest of the USG, partner nations, alliances (NATO), IGOs, NGOs and others continue to employ “Strategic Communications”. Thus it is retained for the time being in this manual.

**Strategy.** A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 2-0, JP 3-0)

**Terrorism.** The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.2)

**Terrorist.** An individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.2)

**Terrorist Group.** Any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying relationship, or are organized for the purpose of committing an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of their political, religious, or ideological goals. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.2)

**Trafficking in Persons.** Any person who is recruited, harbored, provided, or obtained through force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjecting that person to involuntary servitude, forced labor, or commercial sex qualifies as a trafficking victim. (State Department)

**Unconventional Warfare (UW).** Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. (JP 1-02)

**Unity of Effort.** The coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

**Vulnerable State.** A nation either unable or unwilling to provide adequate security and essential services to significant portions of the population. (FM 3-07)

**Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).** Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-40)

**Whole-of-Government Approach.** An approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. (FM 3-07)
## Appendix D. USG IA & Other Abbreviations/Acronyms

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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAH-USA</td>
<td>Action Against Hunger—United States of America (NGO)</td>
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<td>ACT</td>
<td>Advance Civilian Team (DOS)</td>
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<td>AFCYBER</td>
<td>24 AF/Air Force Cyber Command (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFIAA</td>
<td>Air Force Intelligence Analysis Agency (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFISRA</td>
<td>Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>U.S. Africa Command (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSC</td>
<td>American Friends Service Committee (NGO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIT</td>
<td>American Institute of Taiwan (FSA/USDA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALERT</td>
<td>Center for Excellence for Awareness and Location of Explosives-Related Threats (DHS)</td>
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<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMAC</td>
<td>Area Mine Action Centres (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANBP</td>
<td>Afghan New Beginnings Program (UN, IGO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Regional IGO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>APHS/CT</td>
<td>Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (White House)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>American Refugee Committee (NGO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARCYBER</td>
<td>United States Army Cyber Command (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (Regional IGO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD/GSA</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD (HD&amp;ASA)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD/ISA</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD/ISP</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD (SO/LIC)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Regional IGO)</td>
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<td>ASFF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (DOD)</td>
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<td>AT</td>
<td>Advisor Team (DOD)</td>
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<td>AT</td>
<td>Antiterrorism</td>
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<td>AT&amp;F</td>
<td>Office of Acquisition, Technology &amp; Facilities (ODNI)</td>
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<td>ATA</td>
<td>Antiterrorism Assistance Program (DOS)</td>
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<td>ATAC</td>
<td>Antiterrorism Advisory Council (DOJ)</td>
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<td>ATFC</td>
<td>Afghan Threat Finance Cell</td>
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<td>ATO</td>
<td>Agricultural Trade Office (FAS/USDA)</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union (Regional IGO)</td>
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<td>AVC</td>
<td>Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BATFE</td>
<td>Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (DOJ)</td>
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<td>BBD</td>
<td>Broadcasting Board of Governors (DOS)</td>
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<td>BCSC</td>
<td>Bulk Cash Smuggling Center (ICE/DHS)</td>
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<td>BENS</td>
<td>Business Executives for National Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEST</td>
<td>Border Enforcement Security Task Force (ICE/DHS)</td>
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<td>BFS</td>
<td>Bureau for Food Safety (USAID)</td>
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<td>BIFS</td>
<td>EPIC Border Intelligence Fusion Center (DHS)</td>
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<td>BIS</td>
<td>Bureau of Industry and Security (DOC)</td>
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<td>BJA</td>
<td>Bureau of Justice Assistance (DOJ)</td>
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<td>BPC</td>
<td>Building Partner Capacity</td>
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<td>BSA</td>
<td>Bank Security Act</td>
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<td>BSO</td>
<td>Battle Space Owner</td>
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<td>BTO</td>
<td>Business Transformation Office (DNI)</td>
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<td>BWC</td>
<td>Biological Weapons Convention</td>
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<td>C2I</td>
<td>Center of Excellence in Command, Control and Interoperability (DHS)</td>
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<td>C3</td>
<td>Cyber Crimes Center (HSI/ICE) (DHS)</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Bureau of Consular Affairs (DOS); Civil Affairs (DOD)</td>
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<td>CACSP</td>
<td>Central American Citizen Safety Partnership (DOS)</td>
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<td>CAF</td>
<td>Conflict Assessment Framework (USAID)</td>
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<td>CAISE</td>
<td>Civil Authority Support Element (DOD)</td>
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<td>CAO</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Operations</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Crisis Action Planning</td>
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<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (NGO)</td>
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<td>CARSI</td>
<td>Central American Regional Security Initiative (DOS)</td>
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<td>CAT</td>
<td>Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (DOS); Civil Affairs Teams (DOD)</td>
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<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence-Building Measures</td>
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<td>CBP</td>
<td>United States Customs and Border Protection (DHS)</td>
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<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (DOD)</td>
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<td>CbT</td>
<td>Combating Terrorism (DOD)</td>
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<td>CCDR</td>
<td>Combatant Commander (DOD)</td>
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<td>CCIF</td>
<td>Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund (DOD)</td>
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<td>CCIR</td>
<td>Commander's Critical Information Requirement (DOD)</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
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<td>CCISO</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Communications Support Office (DOS)</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>Counterintelligence Division (FBI)</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Civilian Deployment Center (USAID); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (DHHS)</td>
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<td>CDACS</td>
<td>Country Development Cooperation Strategy (DOS)</td>
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<td>CDRJSOTF</td>
<td>Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force (DOD)</td>
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<td>CDRTSOC</td>
<td>Commander Theater Special Operations Command (DOD)</td>
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<td>CEG</td>
<td>Cultural Engagement Group</td>
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<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program (DOD)</td>
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<td>CFIUS</td>
<td>Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (DOJ)</td>
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<td>CFSOCC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command (DOD)</td>
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<td>CI</td>
<td>Counterintelligence</td>
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<td>CICC</td>
<td>Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (DOJ)</td>
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<td>CICTE</td>
<td>Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (OAS) (IGO)</td>
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<td>CIE</td>
<td>Collaborative Information Environment</td>
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<td>CIFA</td>
<td>Counterintelligence Field Activity (DOD)</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation; Civil-Military Information Center</td>
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<td>CIP</td>
<td>Common Intelligence Picture (DOD)</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>Common Operational Picture (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>C/JFSOCC</td>
<td>Combined/Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (DOD)</td>
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<td>CJSOTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (DOD)</td>
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<td>CLDP</td>
<td>Commercial Law Development Program (DOC)</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Commander, Joint Task Force (DOD)</td>
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<td>CMCC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Coordination Center</td>
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<td>CMM</td>
<td>Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (USAID)</td>
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<td>CMPASS</td>
<td>Civilian-Military Planning and Assessment Section (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMSE</td>
<td>Civil-Military Support Element (DOD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNCI</td>
<td>Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (White House)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNT</td>
<td>Counter Narco-Terrorist Training (DOD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>Course of Action (DOD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command (Command Authority) (DOD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>Center of Gravity (DOD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COI</td>
<td>Communities of Interest</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency (DOD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>Chief of Mission (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONOP</td>
<td>Concept of Operation (DOD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Counterproliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPG</td>
<td>Contingency Planning Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Civilian Response Corps (CRC) (USAID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATE</td>
<td>Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (DHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services (NGO); Congressional Research Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRSG</td>
<td>Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (DOS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Civil Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCC</td>
<td>Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSE</td>
<td>Center for Security Evaluation (ODNI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Coalition Support Fund (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSG</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Support Group (NSC/PCC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Civilian Stabilization Initiative (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CST</td>
<td>Cultural Support Teams (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism (DOD); Counterterrorism—Finance (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combating Terrorism Center—West Point (DOD); UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTD</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Division (FBI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTED</td>
<td>UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (IGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Finance Unit <a href="http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm">www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm</a></td>
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<td>CTFP</td>
<td>Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTR</td>
<td>Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (DOD); Cooperative Threat Reduction-related Training (DOD)</td>
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<td>CTS</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Section (DOJ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTTF</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Counterterrorism Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTTSO</td>
<td>Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (DOD)</td>
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<td>CVE</td>
<td>Countering Violent Extremism <a href="http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm">www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm</a></td>
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<td>CWS</td>
<td>Church World Service (NGO)</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Direct Action (DOD)</td>
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<td>DARPA</td>
<td>Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>Disaster Assessment Team (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAS</td>
<td>Defense Attaché System (DOD/DIA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DAT. District Assessment Team
DATT. Defense Attaché (DOD/DIA)
DCHA. Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID)
DCHA/CMC. Office of Military Cooperation (USAID)
D/CIA. Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
DCM. Deputy Chief of Mission (DOS)
DCMA. Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DOD/AFRICOM)
DCMO. Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DOD/AFRICOM)
DCO. Defense Coordinating Officer
DCS. Direct Commercial Sales
DDII. Deputy Director for Intelligence Integration (ODNI)
DDR. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DEA. Drug Enforcement Administration (DOJ)
DEST. Domestic Emergency Support Team (DHS)
DFAS. Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DOD)
DHHS. Department of Health and Human Services
DHS. Department of Homeland Security
DI. Director of Intelligence (FBI)
DIA. Defense Intelligence Agency (DOD)
DIAC. Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DOD)
DIAG. Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (UN)
DIME. Defense, Information, Military, Economic [traditional elements of national power]
DIME-FIL. Finance, Intelligence, Law Enforcement [expanded elements]
DIOCC. Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DOD)
DJIOC. Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DOD)
DMAT. Disaster Medical Assistance Team
DMC. Defense and Military Contacts Program (DOD)
D/NCTC. Director of the National Counterterrorism Center
DNI. Director of National Intelligence
DNSA/SC. Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications (White House)
DOA. Department of Agriculture
DOC. Department of Commerce
DOD. Department of Defense
DODIIS. Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DOD)
DOE. Department of Energy
DOJ. Department of Justice
DOL. Department of Labor
DOS. Department of State
DOT. Department of Transportation
DPC. Defense Planning Committee (NATO)
DPKO. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
DRL. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DOS)
DS. Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DOS); Directorate of Support (CIA)
DS&T. Directorate of Science & Technology (CIA)
DSCA. Defense Support of Civil Authorities; Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DOD)
DSF. District Stability Framework (USAID)
DSPD. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DOD)
DSS. Defense Security Service (DOD); Diplomatic Security Service (DOS)
DTRA. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DOD)
EARSI. East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative
EB. Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (DOS)
EB/CBA. Commercial and Business Affairs (DOS)
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>EB/CIP</td>
<td>International Communications and Information Policy (DOS)</td>
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<td>EB/EPPD</td>
<td>Economic Policy Analysis &amp; Public Diplomacy (DOS)</td>
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<td>EB/IFD</td>
<td>International Finance and Development (DOS)</td>
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<td>EB/TFS</td>
<td>Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions (DOS)</td>
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<td>EB/TFS/SPI</td>
<td>Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EB/TFS/TFC</td>
<td>Office of Threat Finance Countermeasures (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EB/TPP</td>
<td>Trade Policy and Programs (DOS)</td>
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<td>EB/TRA</td>
<td>Transportation Affairs (DOS)</td>
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<td>ECA</td>
<td>Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (DOS)</td>
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<td>ECHA</td>
<td>Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council (UN)</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>Economic Development Administration (DOC); Excess Defense Articles</td>
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<td>EEI</td>
<td>Essential Elements of Information (DOD)</td>
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<td>EIPC</td>
<td>Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities</td>
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<td>EPIC</td>
<td>El Paso Intelligence Center (DEA/CBP)</td>
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<td>ERO</td>
<td>Enforcement and Removal Operations (DHS)</td>
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<td>ERT</td>
<td>Emergency Response Team</td>
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<td>ESC</td>
<td>Energy, Sanctions, and Commodities (DOS)</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
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<td>ESG</td>
<td>Interagency Executive Screening Group (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union (Regional IGO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUROPOL</td>
<td>European Police Office (IGO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>F3EAD</td>
<td>Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (DOD)</td>
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<td>FACT</td>
<td>Field Advance Civilian Team (DOS)</td>
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<td>FACT Training</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Counter-Threat Training (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization (UN; IGO)</td>
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<td>FAS</td>
<td>Foreign Agricultural Service (DOA)</td>
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<td>FATF</td>
<td>Financial Action Task Force (IGO)</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ)</td>
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<td>FCM</td>
<td>Foreign Consequence Management (DOS) [<a href="http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c26799.htm">www.state.gov/t/isn/c26799.htm</a>]</td>
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<td>FDA</td>
<td>Food and Drug Administration (DHHS)</td>
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<td>FDIC</td>
<td>Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS)</td>
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<td>FEST</td>
<td>Foreign Emergency Support Team (DOS)</td>
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<td>FET</td>
<td>Female Engagement Team (DOD)</td>
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<td>FEWG</td>
<td>Forensics Engagement Working Group</td>
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<td>FHA</td>
<td>Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (DOD)</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense (DOD)</td>
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<td>FIG</td>
<td>Field Intelligence Groups (DOJ/FBI)</td>
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<td>FinCEN</td>
<td>Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (Treasury)</td>
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<td>FIRST</td>
<td>Federal Incident Response Support Team</td>
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<td>FISA</td>
<td>Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act</td>
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<td>FISC</td>
<td>Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court</td>
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<td>FIU</td>
<td>Financial Investigative Units (DOS)</td>
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<td>FLETC</td>
<td>Federal Law Enforcement Training Center-International Programs Division (DHS)</td>
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<td>FLTCYBERCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Navy Fleet Cyber Command (DOD)</td>
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<td>FMF</td>
<td>Foreign Military Financing Program (DOD)</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales (DOD, DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FON</td>
<td>Freedom of Navigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPS</td>
<td>Federal Protective Services (ICE/DHS)</td>
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<td>FSF</td>
<td>Foreign Security Forces (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSI</td>
<td>Foreign Service Institute (DOS)</td>
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<td>FTO</td>
<td>Foreign Terrorist Organizations (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTTTTF</td>
<td>Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (DOJ)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GATT. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC. Geographic Combatant Commander (DOD); Gulf Cooperation Council (IGO)
GCTF. Global Counterterrorism Forum (DOS)
GCTN. Global Combating Terrorism Network (DOD)
GESCC. Global Engagement Strategy Coordination Committee (DOD)
GICNT. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (IGO)
GIWG. Global Intelligence Work Group (DOJ)
GMSC. Global Mission Support Center (USSOCOM) (DOD)
GPF. General Purpose Forces (DOD)
GPOI. Global Peace Operations Initiative (DOS)
GSCF. Global Security Contingency Fund
GSD. Gulf Security Dialogue (DOS)
GSEC. Global Strategic Engagement Center (DOS)
GSET. Global Strategic Engagement Team (DOD)
HACC. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (DOD)
HA/DR. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (DOD)
HAP. Humanitarian Assistance Program (DOD)
HAST. Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (DOD)
HCA. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
HDM. Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action (DOD/DSCA)
HIC. Humanitarian Information Center
HIG. High-Value Interrogation Group (FBI)
HIU. Humanitarian Information Unit (DOS)
HN. Host Nation/Host Country
HNS. Host Nation/Host Nation Support
HOC. Humanitarian Operations Center
HOCC. Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center
HOM. Head of Mission
HOPE. Health Opportunities for People Everywhere (Project Hope, NGO)
HPSCI. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
HSCC. Homeland Security Coordinating Committee (DOS)
HSI. Homeland Security Investigations (ICE/DHS)
HSIC. Homeland Security Intelligence Council (DHS)
HTT. Human Terrain Team (DOD)
HUMINT. Human Intelligence
IA. Interagency (USG)
I&A. Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS)
IAAH. International Alliance Against Hunger (IGO)
IACG. Interagency Coordination Group (DOD)
IAEA. International Atomic Energy Agency (IGO)
IAG. Interagency Action Group (USCENTCOM/DOD)
IARPA. Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (ODNI)
IASC. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (UN)
IATF. Interagency Task Force (DOD)
I&W. Indications and Warning (DOD)
IBRD. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IGO)
IC. Intelligence Community (USG)
ICAT. Interagency Conflict Assessment Team
ICD. Interagency Coordination Directorate (USNORTHCOM/DOD)
ICE. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS)
ICITAP. International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (DOJ)
ICRC. International Committee of the Red Cross (IGO)
ICS. Incident Command System (FEMA)
ICSID. International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (IGO)
ICVA. International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDA. International Development Association (IGO)
IDAD. Internal Defense and Development (DOD)
IDP. Internally Displaced Person
IE. Intelligence Enterprise (DHS)
IFC. International Finance Corporation (IGO)
IFRC. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IGO)
IGO. Intergovernmental Organization
IHL. International Humanitarian Law
IIP. Bureau of International Information Programs (DOS)
IMAT. Incident Management Assistance Team
IMB. International Maritime Bureau
IMC. International Medical Corps (NGO)
IMET. International Military Education and Training (DOS, DOD)
IMF. International Monetary Fund (IGO)
IMS. Interagency Management System
IN. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE)
INCLE. International Narcotic Control and Law Enforcement Program
INDRAC. Interagency Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Database of Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities
INL. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (DOS)
INL/C. Office of Anti-Crime Programs (DOS)
INR. Bureau of Intelligence and Research (DOS)
INS/COM. U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (DOD)
INTERPOL. International Criminal Police Organization (IGO)
INTERPOL Washington-USNCB. INTERPOL Washington—United States National Central Bureau (DOJ)
IO. Bureau of International Organization Affairs (DOS); Information Operations (DOD)
IOB. President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (White House)
IOC-2. International Organized Crime Intelligence and Operations Center (FBI/DOJ)
IOM. International Organization for Migration (IGO)
IORF. International Operational Response Framework (DOS)
IOSS. Interagency Operations Security Support Staff
IPA. Interagency Provincial Affairs (DOS) (USAID)
IPC. Interagency Policy Committee (White House)
IPI. Indigenous Populations and Institutions
IPR. National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center (HSI/ICE/DHS)
IRC. International Rescue Committee (NGO)
IRS. Internal Revenue Service
IRTPA. Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004
ISAF. International Security and Assistance Force (UN Mandate/NATO)
ISC. Information Sharing Council (ODNI)
ISE. Information Sharing Environment (ODNI)
ISN. Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (DOS)
ISN/BPS. Office of the Biological Policy Staff (DOS)
ISN/CATR. Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction (DOS)
ISN/CPI. Office of Counter-proliferation Initiatives (DOS)
ISN/CTR. Office of Cooperative Threat Reductions (DOS)
ISN/ECC. Office of Export Controls Cooperation (DOS)
ISN/MBC. Office of Missile, Biological, and Chemical Non-Proliferation (DOS)
ISN/MNSA. Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs (DOS)
ISN/NA. Nuclear Affairs (DOS)
ISN/NDF. Office of Non-proliferation and Disarmament Fund (DOS)
ISN/NESS. Office of Nuclear Energy, Safety, and Security (DOS)
ISN/NNCP. Non-Nuclear and Counter-Proliferation (DOS)
ISN/NP. Non-Proliferation Programs (DOS)
ISN/RA. Office of Regional Affairs (DOS)
ISN/SCO. Office of Strategic Communications and Outreach (DOS)
ISN/WMDT. Office of Mass Destruction Terrorism (DOS)
ISO. Office of International Security Operations (DOS)
ISPI. International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative (IGO)
ISR. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (DOD)
ISSF. Iraq Security Sector Fund (DOD)
ITA. Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis (DOS/DS)
ITACG. Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (NCTC/ODNI)
IW. Irregular Warfare (DOD)
JCC. Joint Collaboration Center (DOD/USSOCOM)
JCET. Joint Combined Exchange Training (DOD)
JCISFA. Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (DOD)
JCMOTF. Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
JCS. Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFCC-ISR. Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence (DOD/USSTRATCOM)
JFSOC. Joint Force Special Operations Component (DOD)
JFSOCC. Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (DOD)
JIACG. Joint Interagency Coordination Group (DOD)
JIATF. Joint Interagency Task Force
JICC. Joint Intelligence Community Council (DNI); Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (DOD)
JIOC. Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DOD)
JIPOE. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (DOD)
JISE. Joint Intelligence Support Element (DOD)
JITF-CT. Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (DOD)
JLOC. Joint Logistics Operations Center (DOD)
JMISC. Joint Military Information Support Command (DOD)
JOA. Joint Operations Area (DOD)
JOC. Joint Operations Center (DOD)
JSCP. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (DOD)
JTF. Joint Task Force (DOD)
JTTF. Joint Terrorism Task Force (DOJ/FBI)
KIQ. Key Intelligence Questions
LEA. Law Enforcement Agency; Law Enforcement Activities
LFA. Lead Federal Agency
LNO. Liaison Officer
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>LOA.</td>
<td>Letter of Assist (UN); Letter of Offer and Acceptance (DOD)</td>
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<td>MA.</td>
<td>Management and Administration (DHS)</td>
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<td>MBN.</td>
<td>Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc. (BBG)</td>
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<td>MACCA.</td>
<td>Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAPA.</td>
<td>Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (UN)</td>
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<td>MARFORCYBER</td>
<td>United States Marine Forces Cyber Command (DOD)</td>
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<td>MC.</td>
<td>Military Committee (NATO)</td>
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<td>MCC.</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Corporation</td>
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<td>MCIA.</td>
<td>Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (DOD)</td>
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<td>MIGA.</td>
<td>Multilateral Guarantee Agency (IGO)</td>
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<td>MILDEP.</td>
<td>Military Department (DOD)</td>
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<td>MILGP.</td>
<td>Military Group</td>
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<td>MIP.</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Program (DOD)</td>
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<td>MIREES.</td>
<td>Center for Maritime, Island, and Remote and Extreme Environment Security (DHS)</td>
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<td>MISO.</td>
<td>Military Information Support Operations (formerly PSYOP) (DOD)</td>
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<td>MIST.</td>
<td>Military Information Support Team (DOD)</td>
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<td>MOA.</td>
<td>Memorandum of Agreement</td>
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<td>MOC.</td>
<td>Media Operations Center</td>
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<td>MOE.</td>
<td>Measures of Effectiveness (DOD)</td>
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<td>MOP.</td>
<td>Measures of Performance (DOD)</td>
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<td>MOU.</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MPAT.</td>
<td>Multi-National Planning Augmentation Team</td>
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<td>MRE.</td>
<td>Mine Risk Education (UN)</td>
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<td>MRR.</td>
<td>Mission Resource Requirements (USAID)</td>
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<td>MSC.</td>
<td>United States Mission’s (UN) Military Staff Committee</td>
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<td>MSF.</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (NGO)</td>
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<td>MSG.</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Security Guard detachment</td>
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<td>MTT.</td>
<td>Mobile Training Team (DOD)</td>
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<td>NADR.</td>
<td>Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (DOS)</td>
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<td>NATO.</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Regional IGO)</td>
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<td>NAVOCEANO.</td>
<td>U.S. Navy Oceanographic Office (DOD)</td>
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<td>NBCSC.</td>
<td>National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center (HSI/ICE/DHS)</td>
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<td>NCBSI.</td>
<td>National Center for Border Security and Immigration (DHS)</td>
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<td>NCFPD.</td>
<td>National Center for Food Protection and Defense (DHS)</td>
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<td>NCIIJTF.</td>
<td>National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (FBI/DOJ)</td>
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<td>NCIRC.</td>
<td>National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCTC)</td>
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<td>NCISP.</td>
<td>National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (DOJ)</td>
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<td>National Counterintelligence Executive (DNI)</td>
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<td>NCO.</td>
<td>Narcotics Control Officer (DOS)</td>
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<td>NCPC.</td>
<td>National Counter-Proliferation Center (ODNI)</td>
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<td>National Capital Region</td>
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<td>NCS.</td>
<td>National Clandestine Service (CIA)</td>
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<td>National Counterterrorism Center (ODNI)</td>
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<td>N-DEEx.</td>
<td>Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (DOJ)</td>
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</table>
**PDOD.** Public Diplomacy Office Director (DOS)

**PE.** Office of Partner Engagement (ODNI)

**PIAB.** President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (White House)

**PIR.** Priority Intelligence Requirement (DOD)

**PISCES.** Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System

**PKO.** Peacekeeping Operations

**PKSOI.** U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (DOD)

**PM.** Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DOS)

**PM/CPMS.** Counter Piracy and Maritime Security (DOS)

**PM/DDTC.** Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DOS)

**PM/ISO.** Office of International Security Operations (DOS)

**PM/PPA.** Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis (DOS)

**PM/RSAT.** Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfer (DOS)

**PM/WRA.** Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (DOS)

**PM-ISE.** Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (ODNI)

**PN.** Partner Nation (DOD)

**PNG.** Persona Non Grata

**PNISP.** Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (DOS) Peace Operations

**POA.** Program of Analysis; Partners for the Americas (NGO)

**POLAD.** Political Advisor

**POLMIL.** Political-Military

**PPD.** Presidential Policy Directive (White House)

**PREACT.** The Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm

**PRM.** Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (DOS)

**PRT.** Provincial Reconstruction Team (DOS) (DOD)

**P&S.** Office of Policy and Strategy (ODNI)

**PSA.** List. Politically Sensitive Areas List

**PSD.** Presidential Study Directive (White House)

**PSI.** Proliferation Security Initiative (DOS)

**QDDR.** Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (DOS) www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/

**QDR.** Quadrennial Defense Review (DOD) www.defense.gov/qdr/


**RDT&E.** Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DOD)

**RFA.** Request for Assistance; Radio Free Asia (BBG)

**RFE/RL.** Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (BBG)

**RFI.** Request for Information

**RI.** Refugees International (NGO)

**RLA.** Resident Legal Advisor (DOJ/FBI)

**R/PPR.** Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (DOS)

**RSAT.** Regional Security Teams

**RSI.** Regional Strategic Initiative (DOS) www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm

**RSCC.** Regional SOF Coordination Centers (DOD)

**RSO.** Regional Security Officer

**SA.** Security Assistance

**SAO.** Security Assistance Officer

**SAR/NSI.** Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative

**SA/WSO.** Salvation Army World Service Office (NGO)
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<tr>
<td>USAID/OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>USASAC</td>
<td>United States Army Security Assistance Command (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard (DHS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCR</td>
<td>United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCYBERCOM</td>
<td>United States Cyber Command (DOD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD/I</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (DOD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD/P</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DOD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEU</td>
<td>United States Mission to the European Union (FAS/USDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command (DOD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command (DOD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM JICC</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (DOD)</td>
</tr>
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<td>USSS</td>
<td>United States Secret Service (DHS)</td>
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<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>United States Strategic Command (DOD)</td>
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<td>USTR</td>
<td>United States Trade Representative (FAS/USDA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USUN</td>
<td>U.S. Mission to the United Nations (DOS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>Unconventional Warfare (DOD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>(mine) Victim Assistance (UN)</td>
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<td>VTF</td>
<td>Voluntary Trust Fund (UN)</td>
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<td>VOA</td>
<td>Voice of America (BBG)</td>
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<td>VSCC</td>
<td>Village Stability Coordination Center (USAID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSO</td>
<td>Village Stability Operations (USSOCOM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSP</td>
<td>Village Support Platform (USSOCOM)</td>
</tr>
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<td>WANGO</td>
<td>World Association of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO)</td>
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<td>World Food Program (UN, IGO)</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
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<td>WIF</td>
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<td>WINPAC</td>
<td>Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (CIA)</td>
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<td>WiRe</td>
<td>World Intelligence Review (DNI)</td>
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<td>WMD-CM</td>
<td>Consequence Management</td>
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<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (FBI)</td>
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<td>Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (DOS)</td>
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<td>WOG</td>
<td>Whole-of-Government</td>
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<td>WRI</td>
<td>World Relief Institute</td>
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</table>

WTO. World Trade Organization (IGO)
Appendix E. Bibliography

The following references provide both sourcing material and content for additional understanding about the USG IA process.


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